93d Congress
2d Session

COMMITTEE PRINT

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

RELATING TO

SOUTHEAST ASIA AND VIETNAM

(7th REVISED EDITION)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE



DECEMBER 1974

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

93d Congress
2d Session

COMMITTEE PRINT

BACKGROUND INFORMATION
RELATING TO
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND VIETNAM
(7th REVISED EDITION)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE



DECEMBER 1974

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
92-991 WASHINGTON : 1975

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, *Chairman*

JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine
GEORGE S. McGOVERN, South Dakota
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota

GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois
ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, Michigan

PAT M. HOLT, *Chief of Staff*
ARTHUR M. KUHL, *Chief Clerk*

PREFACE

The first of these compilations of background information relating to Southeast Asia was published by the Committee on Foreign Relations on January 14, 1965. This is the seventh and final revised edition.

The material in this volume was assembled by the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations with the assistance of the Foreign Affairs Division of the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress and the Department of State. It contains material deemed useful in discussion of the situation in Southeast Asia. The Committee is most grateful to the staff of the Congressional Research Service for the painstaking service which they have performed in keeping these volumes current.

Publication of this final revision has been delayed several times in the hope that the conflict in Indochina would at last be terminated and that a final volume could be issued which would document that fact. Today, almost two years after the conclusion of cease-fire agreements in Vietnam and Laos, the fighting continues in both Vietnam and Cambodia.

The chronology contained in this volume begins with the signing of the Baie d' Along Agreement establishing the Bao Dai government in Vietnam on June 5, 1948. It concludes with President Nixon's statement of August 15, 1973 asserting that the Congress' action in terminating the bombing of Cambodia had "eroded the structure of peace in Indochina." Also among the final documents is Secretary of State Kissinger's memorandum of March 25, 1974 expressing the "hope" that the Khmer Communists will perceive that "peace is a far more hopeful prospect for Cambodia than incessant conflict."

While most observers would certainly agree that peace would be a more "hopeful" prospect it seems, in fact, to be a rather remote one.

J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.

CONTENTS

	Page
Preface	III
A. Summary chronology of events in Southeast Asia, June 1948 to August 1973	1
B. Official documents and statements on United States-Vietnam relations:	
U.S. recognition of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia: Statement by the Department of State, February 7, 1950	181
Economic aid program: Note from the American Charge d'Affaires at Saigon to the chiefs of state of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, May 24, 1950	182
The defense of Indochina: Communique regarding discussions between representatives of the United States, France, Vietnam, and Cambodia, June 18, 1952	183
Additional U.S. aid for France and Indochina: Joint Franco-American communique, September 30, 1953	184
The threat of direct Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina: Address by the Secretary of State, June 11, 1954 (excerpt)	185
Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, July 20, 1954	187
Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, July 20, 1954	201
Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos, July 20, 1954	209
Final declaration of July 21, 1954, of the Geneva Conference	217
The cease-fire agreements in Indochina: Statement by the President, July 21, 1954	219
Statement by the Under Secretary of State at the concluding plenary session of the Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954	220
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and protocol thereto, September 8, 1954	221
Direct aid to the associated states: Communique regarding Franco-American conversations, September 29, 1954	226
Aid to the State of Vietnam: Message from the President of the United States to the President of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam, October 23, 1954	227
Mission of the special U.S. representative in Vietnam: Statement issued by the White House, November 3, 1954	227
Recognition of the new chief of state of Vietnam: Statement by the Department of State, October 26, 1955	228
U.S. policy with respect to Vietnam: Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Washington, June 1, 1956	229
Vietnamese-United States relations: Joint statement issued at Washington by the President of the United States and the President of Vietnam, May 11, 1957	232
The importance to the United States of the security and progress of Vietnam: Address by the President (Eisenhower), Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, Pa., April 4, 1959 (excerpt)	234
Joint communique issued at Saigon by the Vice President of the United States and the President of Vietnam, May 13, 1961	235
Exchanges of messages between President Kennedy and President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of Vietnam, December 14 and December 7, 1961	237
Joint communique issued by the United States and Vietnam on the expansion of economic development programs, January 4, 1962	240

B. Official documents and statements on United States-Vietnam relations—Continued

	Page
Declaration on the neutrality of Laos, July 23, 1962	242
President Kennedy's TV interviews, September 2 and 9, 1963 (excerpts)	250
U.S. policy on Vietnam: White House statement, October 2, 1963	252
Message from President Johnson to Gen. Duong Van Minh, Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Republic of Vietnam, December 31, 1963	253
United States to increase economic and military aid to Vietnam: Statement by the White House, March 17, 1964	254
President's message to Congress, August 5, 1964	256
Security Council hears U.S. charge of North Vietnamese attacks: Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. representative in the Security Council, August 5, 1964	258
Address by President Johnson, August 12, 1964 (excerpt)	263
President Johnson reaffirms the basic policy of the United States in Vietnam, December 1, 1964	264
Communique issued by the United States and Vietnam regarding measures to be taken to improve the situation in Vietnam, December 11, 1964	265
Joint United States and South Vietnamese retaliatory attacks against North Vietnam: White House statement, February 7, 1965	266
Legal basis for U.S. actions against North Vietnam: Department of State memorandum, March 8, 1965	266
Pattern for peace in Southeast Asia: Address by President Johnson, Johns Hopkins University, April 7, 1965	270
U.S. reply to 17-nation appeal on Vietnam, April 8, 1965	275
Letter from Assistant Secretary of State MacArthur to Senator Fulbright, August 2, 1965, transmitting a paper entitled "The U.S. Commitment To Assist South Vietnam"	278
The Question of a Formal Declaration of War in Vietnam: State Department position paper, November 19, 1965	281
Letter from Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. representative to the United Nations to Secretary General U Thant, January 5, 1966	283
U.S. official position on Vietnam: State Department press release, January 3 and 7, 1966	285
Letter from Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. representative to the United Nations, to the President of the Security Council, requesting an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the situation in Vietnam, January 31, 1966	287
Letter from Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. representative, to Ambassador Roger Seydoux, President of the Security Council of the United Nations, January 31, 1966	289
Declaration of Honolulu, February 8, 1966	289
Joint communique by President Johnson and Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu, Chairman, National Leadership Committee, Republic of South Vietnam, following talks in Honolulu, Hawaii, at the Honolulu Conference, February 7, 8, 1966	292
The U.S. commitment in Vietnam: Fundamental issues: Statements by Secretary Rusk and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 1966	294
Text of the declaration on peace and progress in Asia and the Pacific issued at the Manila conference, October 24, 1966	314
Text of the joint communique issued at the Manila Summit Conference, Manila, The Philippines, October 24, 1966	316
Exchange of letters between Presidents Johnson and Ho Chi Minh	321
The bombing of North Vietnam: The President's Letter to Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington, March 1, 1967	323
Joint communique on Guam conference, March 21, 1967	324
Text of the joint statement issued by President Johnson and South Vietnamese President Thieu, December 20, 1967	326
Address by President Johnson, March 31, 1968	328
Remarks of the President on Vietnam, October 31, 1968	336
Statement by the U.S. Government, November 25, 1968	340
Report by President Nixon on peace in Vietnam, May 14, 1969	341

B. Official documents and statements on United States-Vietnam relations—Continued

Page

Midway Island meeting, June 8, 1969: Remarks of President Nixon and President Thieu announcing decision to replace 25,000 U.S. troops with Vietnamese forces 348
Statement by President Nixon on President Thieu's speech of July 11, 1969 354
Excerpts from unofficial account of President Nixon's meeting with reporters on Guam, July 25, 1969 356
Address by President Nixon on the war in Vietnam, November 3, 1969 367
Address by President Nixon on developments in the pursuit of peace, December 15, 1969 378
U.S. foreign policy for the 1970's: A new strategy for peace. President Nixon's report to the Congress, February 18, 1970 (excerpts) 381
Statement by President Nixon on the situation in Laos, March 6, 1970 401
Statement by President Nixon of an update report on Vietnam, April 20, 1970 407
Address by President Nixon on the Cambodian strike, April 30, 1970 411
President Nixon's news conference, May 8, 1970 417
Address by President Nixon on the Cambodian sanctuary operation, June 3, 1970 423
The President's report on Cambodia, June 30, 1970 427
A conversation with the President on foreign policy, July 1, 1970 443
The new initiative for peace in Southeast Asia, the President's address to the nation, October 7, 1970 445
The President's news conference of December 10, 1970 446
A conversation with the President, January 4, 1971 447
The President's news conference of February 17, 1971 448
United States foreign policy for the 1970's: Building for peace. President Nixon's report to Congress, February 25, 1971 (excerpts) 450
The President's news conference of March 4, 1971 454
Report on the situation in Southeast Asia, the President's address on April 7, 1971 455
Internment of prisoners of war in a neutral country, statement by the President 456
President's remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1971 456
The President's news conference of November 12, 1971 457
Statement by the President on signing the Military Procurement Authorization Act with the Mansfield Amendment 458
A plan for peace, the President's address to the Nation on January 25, 1972 459
U.S. foreign policy for the 1970's: the emerging structure of peace. A report to Congress by President Nixon, February 9, 1972 (excerpts) 461
Report on Vietnam, the President's address to the Nation on April 26, 1972 469
Remarks of the President at the Connally Ranch, April 30, 1972 471
The situation in Southeast Asia, the President's address to the Nation on May 8, 1972 472
News conference of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, May 9, 1972 474
Impressions of Ho Chi Minh in 1946: Statements by Frank M. White, Former Major, Office of Strategic Services; and Abbot Low Moffat, Former Chief, Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee May 9, 10, and 11, 1972 (excerpts) 477
The President's news conference of June 29, 1972 480
The President's news conference of July 27, 1972 482
The President's news conference of August 29, 1972 482
The President's news conference of October 5, 1972 483
Summary of Nine Point U.S.-DRV draft agreement (as broadcast by Radio Hanoi, October 26, 1972) 484

B. Official documents and statements on United States-Vietnam relations—Continued

Page

News conference of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, October 26, 1972 487
News conference of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, December 16, 1972 495
Address by President Nixon on Vietnam peace agreement, January 23, 1973 502
News conference of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, January 24, 1973 503
The Vietnam Agreement and Protocols, signed January 27, 1973 516
United States-North Vietnam Communique, February 14, 1973 543
Declaration of the International Conference on Vietnam, signed March 2, 1973 544
Texts of notes by North Vietnam and United States, sent to Peace Conference participants, from the New York Times, Apr. 25, 1973 546
United States-North Vietnam Joint Communique, June 13, 1973 553
Transcript of Dr. Kissinger's News Conference on the results of the talks in Paris, June 13, 1973 557
Secretary Kissinger Responds to Senator Fulbright on Relation Between War Powers Resolution and Legislation Prohibiting Hostilities By U.S. Forces in Indochina 561
Secretary Kissinger responds to Senator Kennedy on Indochina Policy Issues, Mar. 25, 1974 562

C. Congressional documents concerning United States-Vietnam relations:
Southeast Asia resolution, approved August 10, 1964 569
Comparison of resolutions relating to the maintenance of peace and security in various areas 570
Public Law 90–5, 90th Congress, S. 665, March 16, 1967 572
Resolution seeking U.S. initiative to assure United Nations Security Council consideration of Vietnam conflict, November 30, 1967 573
S. Res. 85, 91st Congress, national commitments resolution, June 25, 1969 573
Cooper-Church Amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act, FY 1970, December 15, 1969 574
Fulbright Amendment (in italics), Section 502, Armed Forces Appropriation Authorization, 1971—Public Law 91–441, October 7, 1970 (excerpt) 574
Cooper-Church amendment to the special foreign assistance act of 1971, as amended, H.R. 19911, Public Law 91–652 574
Mansfield amendment to draft extension act, H.R. 6531, Public Law 92–129 575
Symington Amendment, Section 505, Armed Forces Appropriation Authorization, 1972—H.R. 8687, Public Law 92–156, November 17, 1971 (excerpt) 576
Mansfield amendment to military procurement authorization bill, H.R. 8687, Public Law 92–156, November 17, 1971 576
Fulbright-Aiken Amendment—Public Law 93–52, Section 108, July 1, 1973 577
Department of State Appropriation Authorization Act of 1973—Public Law 93–126, Section 13, October 18, 1973 577
Military Procurement Authorization Act of 1973—Public Law 93–155, Section 806, November 16, 1973 577
McGovern Amendment to Foreign Assistance Act of 1973—Public Law 93–189, Section 30, December 17, 1973 577

D. Documents and statements by Vietnamese, and Cambodian authorities:
Premier Pham Van Dong on position of North Vietnam, April 8, 1965 579
Extract of speech by South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tran Van Do, June 22, 1965 580
Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam, effective April 1, 1967 581
Text of political program adopted by NFLSV, August 1967 597
Statement by the NFLSV Central Committee, November 3, 1968 611
Statement by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, November 26, 1968 614

D. Documents and statements by Vietnamese, and Cambodian authorities—Continued

Page

Message of President Nguyen Van Thieu to the joint session of the National Assembly of South Vietnam, April 7, 1969 615
Text of proposal submitted at Paris conference by Tran Buu Kiem, chief delegate of the NFLSV, May 8, 1969 628
Basic resolution of Congress of National Delegates of South Vietnam, establishing the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam held from June 6 to 8, 1969 631
Text of President Thieu's speech on restoration of peace in Vietnam, July 11, 1969 (excerpt) 635
Text of 8 point proposal submitted at Paris conference by Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh of the NFLSV/Provisional Revolutionary Government, September 17, 1970 638
Text of 7 point peace plan submitted at Paris by Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh of the NFLSV/PRG, July 1, 1971 640
New York Times letter to Premier Pham Van Dong and Hanoi's response, January 1972 642
North Vietnamese broadcast of January 31, 1972 containing U.S. 8 point peace proposal of October 11, 1971 and the nine points of the DRV of June 26, 1971 643
Provisional Revolutionary Government two point clarification of February 2, 1972 645
Letter from Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh to U.S. Congress, April 20, 1972 646
Mme. Binh receives Bella Abzug, Patsy Mink on 21 April 647
Provisional Revolutionary Government statement on ending the war, September 11, 1972 647
Speech to Parliament by Premier Lon Nol, January 28, 1973 649
Statement by Prince Sihanouk, January 29, 1973 651
Statement by Sihanouk government in exile, January 29, 1973 652
North Vietnamese statement on Cambodia, January 30, 1973 653
North Vietnamese statement on Cambodia, February 1, 1973 654
Royal Decree Lists Members of Coalition Government of Laos, April 5, 1974 655
Lon Nol Proposes Unconditional Peace Talks, July 9, 1974 656
Text of Sihanouk Statement Rejecting Talks Offer 657

A. SUMMARY CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, JUNE 1948–AUGUST 1973

Prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, and the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations

1948

June 5.—Bao Dai, French High Commissioner Emile Bollert, and Gen. Nguyen Van Xuan sign the Baie d'Along Agreement to establish State of Vietnam with Bao Dai as chief of state within the French Union.

1949

March 8.—The Elysee Agreement, in the form of an exchange of letters between Bao Dai and President Auriol of France, outlines the general principles affecting French-Vietnam relations.

June 14.—An exchange of letters between Bao Dai and French High Commissioner Leon Pignon puts into effect the Elysee Agreement. United States sends message of welcome to Bao Dai.

July 1.—Bao Dai decrees formally establishes State of Vietnam and provides a basis for its organization on a constitutional framework.

1950

February 7.—Great Britain and the United States extend de jure recognition to Vietnam.

December 23.—The United States signs Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with France, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos for indirect U.S. military aid to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

1951

September 7.—The United States signs agreement with Vietnam for direct economic assistance.

September 8.—Delegates from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos participate in the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty at San Francisco.

1952

July.—The U.S. Legation in Saigon is raised to Embassy status. U.S. Ambassador presents credentials to Bao Dai. Vietnamese Embassy is established in Washington, D.C.

1954

May 8–July 21.—The Geneva Conference on Indochina is held. The delegates are from Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. (joint chairmen),

1954—Continued

France, the United States, Communist China, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, and the Vietminh regime. Agreements are signed on July 20 and 21 and the main provisions concerning Vietnam are that (1) Vietnam is to be partitioned along the 17th parallel into North and South Vietnam, (2) regulations are imposed on foreign military bases and personnel and on increased armaments, (3) countrywide elections, leading to the reunification of North and South Vietnam, are to be held by July 20, 1956, and (4) an International Control Commission (ICC) is to be established to supervise the implementation of the agreements. The United States and Vietnam are not signatories to the agreements. The United States issues a unilateral declaration stating that it (1) "will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb" the Geneva agreements, (2) "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security," and (3) "shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections, supervised by the U.N. to insure that they are conducted fairly."

June 26.—Ngo Dinh Diem, appointed Premier by Emperor Bao Dai, arrives in Saigon from Paris. He completed his first cabinet on July 7 and this served as the anniversary date of his rise to power.

August.—Flow of almost 1 million refugees from North to South Vietnam begins.

September 8.—The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol thereto are signed in Manila.

October 11.—The Communist Vietminh regime formally takes over control of Hanoi and North Vietnam.

October 24.—President Eisenhower sends a letter to Premier Diem of South Vietnam stating that American assistance will be given hereafter not through the French authorities, but directly to the Government of South Vietnam. The letter also states that the U.S. Government "expects this aid will be met by * * * undertaking needed reforms."

December 29.—Conference of France and the Associated States (Cambodia, etc.) terminates the economic and customs union between the Associated States.

1955

January 1.—The United States begins direct aid to Vietnam.

January 20.—The United States takes over training of South Vietnamese army from the French.

February 1.—The U.S. Senate ratifies the Southeast Asia Defense Treaty and Protocol by a vote of 82 to 1.

February 5.—Premier Diem decrees the first of a series of laws initiating important and extensive land reform program.

February 12.—The U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) takes over the training of the South Vietnamese Army, following the relinquishing of command authority by the French.

February 19.—Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO)—with its protocol covering Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—comes into force.

March 2.—Cambodia's King Sihanouk abdicates in favor of his father Prince Norodom Suramarit after criticism by the International Control Commission of his proposed electoral reforms.

March 7.—United States and South Vietnam sign agreement which supplements existing economic cooperation agreement of September 1951.

March 29.—Armed revolt is precipitated in Saigon by the Binh Xuyen political-bandit group, spreading ultimately into large-scale dissidence in the southern provinces with the participation of elements of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious sects.

April 17.—South Vietnamese Government appeals to the U.N. against the North Vietnamese Communists, who, in violation of the Geneva agreements, prevent northerners from migrating to South Vietnam.

April 23.—Chou En-lai and the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister gives assurances of "noninterference" to ex-King Sihanouk of Cambodia.

May 10.—Premier Diem forms a new Cabinet composed largely of his own followers.

May 16.—The United States signs agreement with Cambodia for direct military aid to replace the aid formerly given through the French Government.

July.—The Communists initiate first overt propaganda move in South Vietnam by distributing literature signed by North Vietnam's "National United Front."

July 1.—France formally relinquishes command authority over the Vietnamese Navy.

July 7.—French formally transfer Nha Prang Airbase to Vietnamese control.

July 20.—Talks were scheduled to begin (according to Geneva agreement) for the preparation of all-Vietnam elections to be held on July 20, 1956, to reunite the country. The Government of South Vietnam rejects the North Vietnamese Government's invitation to discuss the elections, on the grounds that in North Vietnam the people would not be able to express their will freely and that falsified votes in North Vietnam could overrule the votes in South Vietnam.

August 16.—The last French High Commissioner in Vietnam departs.

September 25.—Cambodia leaves the French Union. Cambodia declared an "independent and sovereign state" by the Cambodian National Assembly.

October.—Binh Xuyen is defeated as an organized armed insurgent force.

October 23.—A national referendum deposes Bao Dai, former Emperor and since March 7, 1949, head of State of Vietnam. Ninety-eight percent of the votes express preference for Premier Diem.

October 26.—A Republic is proclaimed by Ngo Dinh Diem who becomes the first President of South Vietnam.

October 31.—President Diem issues his first order to the Vietnamese Armed Forces as their supreme commander.

December 12.—The U.S. consulate in Hanoi is closed.

1956

January.—South Vietnamese Army units occupy Tay Ninh, principal Cao Dai political center, leading to breakup of the organized Cao

1956—Continued

Dai armed insurgency. Agreement with Cao Dai leaders on February 28 legalizes Cao Dai religious practices and forbids its political activities as a religious sect.

February 12.—Tran Van Soai, leader of an important Hoa Hao faction, surrenders. Ba Cut, another principal Hoa Hao leader, is captured on April 13, leading to breakup of organized Hoa Hao armed insurgency.

February 18.—Prince Sihanouk on a visit to Peking declares that Cambodia renounces SEATO protection.

March 4.—General elections for South Vietnam's first National Constituent Assembly, which is to have 123 members, result in the victory of the National Revolutionary Movement and other political parties supporting President Diem.

March 31.—Souvanna Phouma becomes Prime Minister of Laos.

April 6.—Vietnam Government announces it will continue to cooperate with the ICC and reiterates its position of supporting Vietnam-wide elections at such time as conditions in Communist North Vietnam permit genuinely free voting.

April 28.—MAAG officially assumes responsibility for training Vietnamese army. French Military High Command in Vietnam is dissolved.

May 9.—Communist China signs a 2-year economic and technical aid agreement with Cambodia.

May 17.—The Soviet Union announces the establishment of diplomatic relations with Cambodia.

July 4.—The Constituent Assembly in Vietnam approves unanimously a draft constitution providing for a strong executive with safeguards for individual citizens. The President, whose term of office is to be 5 years, has veto power over all legislation of the unicameral parliament and may rule by decree when the National Assembly (elected for 4 years) is not in session.

July 6.—U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon visits Vietnam, hands to President Diem of South Vietnam a letter in which President Eisenhower declares he is looking forward to many years of partnership between the two countries. As guest speaker before the Constituent Assembly, Nixon declares that "the militant march of communism has been halted."

July 30.—Vietnamese liaison mission to the ICC is established preparatory to the transfer of functions from the French liaison mission.

August 5.—An accord is reached between Premier Prince Souvanna Phouma and Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphanouvong for establishment of a coalition government.

September 19.—French Air Force officially transfers the Touraine Airbase to Vietnamese control.

October 26.—South Vietnam's first constitution is promulgated.

1957

January 3.—The International Control Commission reports that between December 1955 and August 1956 neither North Vietnam nor South Vietnam have been fulfilling their obligations under the 1954 armistice agreement.

May 1.—The French responsibility for training Vietnamese Navy and Air Force terminates.

May 5–12.—President Diem visits the United States. He addresses on May 9 a joint session of Congress. In a joint communique (issued May 11), President Eisenhower and President Diem declare that both countries will work toward a "peaceful unification" of Vietnam. The United States will continue helping South Vietnam to stand firm against communism.

June.—The French naval and air force training mission is withdrawn from South Vietnam.

July 29.—The United States establishes a consulate in Hue.

October 22.—U.S. MAAG and USIS installations in Saigon are bombed; U.S. personnel are injured.

November 19.—Two Pathet Lao leaders receive Cabinet portfolios to form government of national union.

1958

January 4.—Large Communist guerrilla band attacks plantation north of Saigon, reflecting steady increase in Communist armed activity in South Vietnam since mid-1957.

May 17.—North Vietnamese liaison mission to the ICC is withdrawn from Saigon.

June 25.—A Cambodian royal proclamation is issued alleging that South Vietnamese troops have "invaded" and occupied several Cambodian border villages; it accuses South Vietnam of 19 cases of violation of Cambodian territory since January 1957. The allegation is repudiated by the Foreign Minister of South Vietnam.

July 18.—Cambodia recognizes Communist China.

September 10.—France and South Vietnam sign agreement under which France provides aid for the Vietnam Government's agrarian reform program—1,490 million francs.

November 19.—Cambodia signs trade and payments agreement with North Vietnam.

1959

May.—At the request of the Government of Vietnam, CINCPAC directs U.S. advisors be provided to infantry regiment, artillery, armored and separate Marine battalion level.

May 13.—Japan signs a World War II reparations and loan agreement with South Vietnam.

June.—Pathet Lao resumes attack in northern provinces of Laos.

July 8.—Communist guerrillas attack Vietnamese military base at Bien Hoa, killing and wounding several U.S. MAAG personnel.

July 10.—In Belgian Communist publication Red Flag, Ho Chi Minh, head of the North Vietnamese Communist regime, states "we are building socialism in Vietnam, but we are building it in only one part of the country, while in the other part we still have to direct and bring to a close the middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist revolution."

July 31.—Lao Government announces renewed Pathet Lao attacks on Government forces.

1959—Continued

August 30.—Second national elections give the National Revolutionary Movement and other pro-Government political parties overwhelming majority in the National Assembly in South Vietnam.

October 30.—A spokesman of the Vietnamese Army discloses that a campaign against Communist guerrillas in the country's southernmost region, the Camau Peninsula, resulted in heavy guerrilla losses.

November 14.—French Minister of Finance and Vietnamese Vice President initial (in Saigon) agreements for the settlement of financial claims between the two countries and for a French loan of 7 billion (old) francs (about $14 million) and a credit of 11 billion (old) francs (about $22 million) for the purchase by South Vietnam of capital equipment.

December 31.—General Nosavan takes over control of Lao Government.

1960

February 5.—GVN requests the United States to double MAAG strength to 685.

April 17.—North Vietnam protests to the chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference (Britain and the U.S.S.R.) against a "formidable" increase of personnel in the American Military Assistance and Advisory Group in South Vietnam; and accuses the United States of turning South Vietnam into "a U.S. military base for the preparation of a new war."

April 30.—An opposition group of 18, calling themselves the Committee for Progress and Liberty, sends letter to President Diem demanding drastic economic, administrative, and military reforms.

May 5.—The United States announces that at the request of the Government of South Vietnam, the U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group will be increased by the end of the year from 327 to 685 members.

May 30.—The U.S. Special Forces team arrives in RVN to conduct training.

June-October.—Communist guerrilla activities in South Vietnam increase.

June 13.—Prince Sihanouk becomes Chief of State of Cambodia.

July 2.—Prince Sihanouk declares that if the United States does not "radically revise" its military aid policy, he will ask the Soviet bloc for aircraft and arms.

August 9.—Kong Le takes over Vientiane in coup.

August 15.—Prince Souvanna Phouma becomes Premier of Laos again.

September 29.—Sihanouk urges the East and West power blocs to turn Cambodia and Laos into a guaranteed neutralized buffer zone as means of bringing peace to southeast Asia.

October 26.—President Eisenhower assures President Ngo Dinh Diem, in a letter of good wishes on South Vietnam's fifth anniversary, that "for so long as our strength can be useful, the United States will continue to assist Vietnam in the difficult yet hopeful struggle ahead."

November 10.—South Vietnam sends a letter to the ICC charging that Communist attacks in the Kontum-Pleiku area in October

(1) involved regular army forces from Communist North Vietnam through Laos, (2) constituted open aggression which was well prepared, commanded by high-ranking officers, and conducted by regular forces trained in North Vietnam, and (3) employed weapons made in North Vietnam and other Communist countries.

November 11.—A military coup attempt is made against President Diem's regime. Paratroop battalions led by Col. Nguyen Van Thi and Lt. Col. Vuong Van Dong beseige the presidential palace. An order of the day issued by Colonel Thi declares that struggle against the Communists will be intensified, that President Diem is guilty of autocratic rule and nepotism and has "shown himself incapable of saving the country from communism and protecting national unity."

November 12.—Loyalist troops enter the capital and subdue the rebels. According to press reports from Saigon, an estimated 200 soldiers and civilians were killed during the fighting.

November 13.—The U.S. State Department expresses satisfaction at the failure of the coup against President Diem and also hopes that "his powers will be established on a wider basis with rapid implementation of radical reforms and energetic action against corruption-suspected elements."

November 16.—Ngo Dinh Nhu, President Diem's brother and political adviser, announces that President Diem plans to appoint a new Government and introduce a far-reaching reform program based on reports of the Ford Foundation and of a French study group.

December 16.—Phoumi Nosavan retakes Vientiane.

1961

January 4.—Prince Boun Oum is installed as Premier of Laos.

January 29.—Radio Hanoi praises establishment of the "National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV)," allegedly founded in December 1960. On January 30, Radio Hanoi, quoting the press organ of the Lao Dong Party in North Vietnam, states that the "sacred historical task" of the NFLSV is "to overthrow the U.S.-Diem clique" and "to liberate the south."

February 6.—President Diem announces (at the first press conference held by him in 5 years) his administrative reform program.

February 7.—President Diem announces he will be a candidate for re-election in the presidential elections to be held on April 9.

March 6.—Pathet-Lao forces begin advance toward Luang Prabang and Vientiane.

March 10.—The Communist-led newly formed National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam announces that a guerrilla offensive against the Government will be started to prevent the holding of the April 9 elections. The "National Front" also declares that it will fight with every means the "dictatorial regime set up by the Americans," that it stands for the "peaceful reunification of the country."

March 27.—Cambodian and South Vietnamese representatives reach agreement in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on settling the Cambodian refugee problem which has recently strained relations between the two countries. Large numbers of Cambodians settled in Vietnam

1961—Continued

crossed into Cambodia during the past weeks complaining that both Communist guerrillas and Government forces have committed atrocities against them.

April 3.—United States-Vietnamese Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations is signed in Saigon. National Assembly ratifies treaty on June 14.

April 4.—President Diem appeals to the ICC to make an "immediate and energetic investigation" of growing Communist terrorism and subversion throughout South Vietnam."

April 9.—President Diem and Vice President Tho are elected by an overwhelming majority in Vietnam's presidential elections.

April 22.—Prince Souvanna Phouma, in Moscow, signs joint communique calling for neutralizing of Laos.

May 2.—North Vietnam calls for a cease-fire in Laos.

May 5.—President Kennedy declares at a press conference that consideration is being given to the use of U.S. forces, if necessary, to help South Vietnam resist Communist pressures. He declares that this will be one of the subjects discussed during the forthcoming visit of Vice President Johnson in South Vietnam.

May 11–13.—Vice President Johnson visits South Vietnam. Joint communique on May 13, declares that additional U.S. military and economic aid will be given to help South Vietnam in its fight against Communist guerrilla forces.

May 12.—International Control Commission reports a de facto cease-fire has been brought about in Laos.

May 16.—Fourteen-nation conference on Laos convenes in Geneva.

June 4.—President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, in Vienna, reaffirm their support of a neutral and independent Laotian Government and of international agreements to assure Lao neutrality.

June 12.—Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong (in Peking on a visit) accuse the United States of aggression and intervention in South Vietnam.

June 21.—Three Lao princes meet at Zurich and agree to form a coalition government.

August 2.—President Kennedy declares that the United States will do all it can to save South Vietnam from communism.

September 1–4.—Series of attacks are carried out by 1,000 Communist guerrillas in Kontum Province. Army Command communique states that during the month of August there were 41 engagements between Government forces and Communist rebels in South Vietnam.

September 18.—Communist forces estimated at 1,500 men attack and seize the capital of Phuoc Thanh Province, only 60 miles from Saigon.

September 25.—President Kennedy, addressing the U.N. General Assembly in New York, declares that a threat to peace is "the smouldering coals of war in southeast Asia."

October 1.—Military experts of SEATO meet in Bangkok, Thailand, to consider the increasing Communist menace to South Vietnam. Adm. Harry D. Felt, U.S. Navy commander in chief in the Pacific, declares that there is no immediate prospect of using U.S. troops to stop the Communist advance in southeast Asia, but he indicates that among the plans evolved for "every eventuality" some do call for the use of American troops.

October 2.—President Diem declares at the opening of the National Assembly's budgetary session: "It is no longer a guerrilla war waged by an enemy who attacks us with regular units fully and heavily equipped and who seeks a strategic decision in southeast Asia in conformity with the orders of the Communist International." The President also says that the U.S. committee headed by Dr. Eugene Staley recommended an increase in aid both for military measures and for economic and social development.

October 8.—The three Laotian princes—neutralist Souvanna Phouma, pro-Western Boun Oum, and pro-Communist Souphanouvong—agree on Souvanna Phouma as head of a coalition government. Agreement subsequently breaks down in dispute over distribution of Cabinet posts.

October 11.—President Kennedy announces that he is sending Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, his military adviser, to South Vietnam to investigate there the military situation and to report on it to him personally.

October 18.—A state of emergency is proclaimed in South Vietnam by President Diem.

October 26.—Prince Sihanouk declares that he has "lost all confidence in the Americans," and that Cambodia "is ready to do without American aid if it implies * * * obligation * * *."

November 16.—Following closely the recommendations in General Taylor's report, President Kennedy (with the approval of the National Security Council) decides to bolster South Vietnam's military strength, but not to commit U.S. combat forces.

December 8.—A U.S. State Department "white paper" indicates that South Vietnam is threatened by "clear and present danger" of Communist conquest.

December 14.—U.S. President Kennedy pledges increased aid to South Vietnam.

1962

February.—United States withholds cash grant aid from Lao Government "pending further progress toward formation of a government of national union."

January 4.—A joint United States-South Vietnamese communique announces "broad economic and social program [to raise living standards], * * * Measures to strengthen South Vietnam's defense in the military field are being taken simultaneously."

February 7.—Two U.S. Army air support companies totaling 300 men arrive in Saigon, increasing the total of U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam to 4,000.

February 8.—The United States reorganizes its South Vietnam military command, establishes new "U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam" under four-star Gen. Paul D. Harkins.

February 24.—In a Peking Radio broadcast, Communist China declares her security seriously threatened by an "undeclared war" being waged by the United States in South Vietnam. The broadcast demands the withdrawal of U.S. personnel and equipment.

February 27.—Two fighter planes, piloted by members of the South Vietnam Air Force, bomb and strafe Presidential palace in Saigon for 25 minutes. President Diem and his staff are not injured.

1962—Continued

March 17.—Tass Soviet news agency publishes Soviet Ministry note to the signatories of the 1954 Geneva agreements. The note charges the United States with creating "a serious danger to peace" by its "interference" in South Vietnam, in contravention of the Geneva agreements, and demands immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops.

March 22.—"Operation Sunrise," a comprehensive plan to eliminate the Vietcong guerrillas in South Vietnam, begins with a mopping up operation of rebels in Binh Duong Province.

April 20.—South Vietnam's National Assembly pledges full support to President Diem's plan to establish thousands of "strategic hamlets" in the Communist-infested Mekong Delta during 1962.

May 6–27.—Communist forces in Laos gain control of large territories; about 2,000 Lao Royal Army troops with their commander flee into Thailand crossing the Mekong River.

May 15.—President Kennedy announces that at the request of the Thai Government and "because of recent attacks in Laos by Communist forces and the subsequent movement of Communist military units toward the border of Thailand," he has ordered U.S. military forces to Thailand.

May 22.—President Diem promulgates a "protection of morality" law, which prohibits all dancing and beauty contests, and makes prostitution and "unnatural methods" of birth control illegal.

June 2.—Canadian and Indian members of the ICC find North Vietnam guilty of subversion and covert aggression against South Vietnam. The Polish delegation to the Commission rejects the charge.

June 12.—Three Lao factions sign an agreement for the establishment of a neutralist regime under Souvanna Phouma with Cabinet posts to be divided between the three factions.

June 26.—South Vietnam's National Assembly votes to extend its term of office by 1 year, to August 1963. The explanation given is that it is impossible to hold elections now, because it would tie down troops needed against the Communist guerrillas.

July 6.—U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara declares that, while a final victory over the Communists in South Vietnam is years away, he is encouraged by the increased effectiveness of U.S. aid to the South Vietnamese forces.

July 23.—The declaration and protocol on the neutrality of Laos is signed by 14-nation conference at Geneva.

July 30.—The United States completes the withdrawal of the 5,000 Marines sent to Thailand.

August 20.—Prince Sihanouk asks President Kennedy for an international conference to guarantee Cambodia's neutrality—threatens to ask for Chinese Communist protection in the absence of guarantees.

September 12.—General Taylor, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, visits the central highlands of South Vietnam were mountain peasants (montagnards) are being trained by the U.S. special forces for war against the Vietcong guerrillas.

October 26.—The National Assembly extends by 1 year President Diem's emergency powers to rule by decree.

November 8.—South Vietnam withdraws its Ambassador to Laos as a result of Laos' establishment of diplomatic relations with North Vietnam.

December 6.—South Vietnam protests to the ICC against the introduction of Chinese-made weapons and ammunition. A large cache was discovered by a patrol in the central highlands.

December 29.—Saigon announces that 4,077 strategic hamlets have been completed (of a total of 11,182 to be built) and that 39 percent of South Vietnam's population is now living in these communities.

1963

January 9–11.—Adm. Harry D. Felt, commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific confers with Gen. Paul D. Harkins and declares, before his departure, that the Vietcong guerrillas face "inevitable" defeat, and he says: "I am confident the Vietnamese are going to win the war."

March-June.—Pathet Lao launch attack on Kong Le's forces.

March 6.—U.S. military sources report that the Vietnamese Navy has taken over patrol of South Vietnam's coast from the U.S. 7th Fleet.

April 8–10.—SEATO Ministerial Council meeting in Paris (to discuss the Communist threat to southeast Asia) issues communique on April 10 expressing "concern over the continuing and widening threats to the security" of the treaty area; takes note of the "considerable progress" made in South Vietnam in the fight against Communist subversion and rebellion; emphasizes that effective measures to "prevent and counter subversion continues to be a major task facing the member countries"; and notes the improvements in the "plans for defensive action, in the light of changing and anticipated situations."

April 10.—SEATO Ministerial Council meeting in Paris calls on the parties to the 14-nation Geneva Conference "to assure the maintenance of peace, neutrality, and national unity" in Laos.

April 14.—U.S. Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman (in a television interview) says that President Kennedy has decided that the United States must not become involved in the continuing conflict in Laos. He says that there are no plans to commit U.S. troops, and military supplies will only be sent if requested by the Lao Government.

April 17.—President Diem proclaims an "open arms" campaign to induce Vietcong guerrillas to give up their weapons and return to the side of South Vietnam.

April 22.—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk calls the situation in South Vietnam "difficult and dangerous," and says that the United States "cannot promise or expect a quick victory" and that its role is "limited and supporting."

May 8.—Riot erupts in the city of Hue, former imperial capital, involving Buddhist celebration of the anniversary of Buddha's birth and the flying of flags on the special day—12 persons are killed, including some children. Buddhist leaders charge that Government troops fired into the crowd, while Government officials say that Communists were responsible for the explosion.

1963—Continued

June 3.—Buddhist demonstrations break out in Hue. Martial law is swiftly imposed.

June 7.—President Diem (in a broadcast) appeals for calm and makes a partial concession to Buddhist demands that the Government accept responsibility for the incidents in Hue.

June 11.—A Buddhist monk (Thich Quang Duc) commits suicide by burning himself to death with gasoline in front of the Cambodian legation.

June 15.—Tentative agreement is reached between Buddhist leaders and representatives of President Diem to end alleged religious discrimination.

June 16.—Government troops use tanks, tear gas, clubs, firearms, and barbed wire to suppress riots in Saigon which follow an agreement between Buddhist leaders and the Government.

June 27.—President Kennedy announces (in Ireland while on a European tour) the appointment of Henry Cabot Lodge as the next American Ambassador to South Vietnam, effective September 1963, to succeed Frederick Nolting.

July 11.—U.S. Ambassador Nolting returns to South Vietnam after consultations in Washington and issues a statement assuring continued U.S. support to President Diem and warning that "unity of purpose and purpose in action" must not be weakened by "internal dissension."

July 17.—Armed policemen use clubs against 1,000 Buddhists protesting religious discrimination in front of a pagoda in Saigon. On the same day, President Kennedy says that the religious crisis in South Vietnam is interfering with the war effort against the Vietcong guerrillas and expresses hope that President Diem and Buddhist leaders will "reach an agreement on the civil disturbances and also in respect for the rights of others."

August 21.—Martial law is proclaimed throughout South Vietnam by President Diem after hundreds of armed police and government troops raided the main Buddhist XA Loi pagoda in Saigon.

August 22.—Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau (a Buddhist) submits his resignation to President Diem. South Vietnam's Ambassador to the United States Tran Van Chuong (father of Mme. Ngo Dinh Nhu) resigns. Both resign in disapproval of Government policies toward Buddhists. Department of State issues statement deploring action against Buddhist pagodas.

August 26.—U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge presents his credentials to President Diem.

August 27.—Cambodia breaks off diplomatic relations with South Vietnam.

August 29.—French President de Gaulle issues a policy statement on South Vietnam. He declares that France is able "to appreciate the role this people would be capable of playing in the current situation of Asia for its own progress and for the benefit of international understanding once it was able to exercise its activity in independence from foreign influence, in internal peace and unity, and in concord with its neighbors. Today, more than ever, this is what France wishes for all of Vietnam."

August 30.—French Ambassador to the United States Herve Alphand declares, after meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, that General de Gaulle's statement is part of a long-range French political solution which would reunify North and South Vietnam in "independence and neutrality" and that his declaration is not meant as a slap at the United States.

September 2.—Times of Vietnam charges that U.S. Central Intelligence Agency agents had planned a coup d'etat for August 28 to overthrow President Diem. President Kennedy declares (in a television interview with CBS Correspondent Walter Cronkite) that the United States is prepared to continue to assist South Vietnam "but I don't think that the war can be won unless the people support the effort and, in my opinion in the last 2 months, the Government has gotten out of touch with the people."

September 5.—President Diem declares (in a press interview) that "the Government considers this [Buddhist] affair closed." He denies reports that his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu has taken control of the Government. Ngo Dinh Nhu says (in a press interview): "I have never controlled the Government."

September 8.—David Bell, Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, warns (in a television interview) that the U.S. Congress may cut back aid to South Vietnam unless the Diem government changes its policies. Cambodia receives from Soviet Union three MIG–17 jet fighters and other military equipment.

September 9.—President Kennedy (in a televised interview) says that he doesn't think "it would be helpful at this time" to reduce U.S. aid to South Vietnam, because that might bring about a collapse similar to that of the Chiang Kai-shek government in China after World War II.

September 14.—Presidential decree announces end of martial law in Vietnam on September 16.

September 21.—President Kennedy orders Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to go to South Vietnam to review the military efforts against the Vietcong. McNamara and Taylor are in South Vietnam from September 24 to October 1.

September 27.—Elections are held for the 123-member National Assembly. All candidates were approved in advance by the Government; many were unopposed, including President Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and his wife, Mme Nhu.

October 2.—Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, report to President Kennedy and the National Security Council on their mission to South Vietnam. The statement says that the United States will continue its "policy of working with the people and Government of South Vietnam to deny this country to communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Vietcong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central object of our policy in South Vietnam."

October 7.—Mme. Ngo Dinh Nhu, sister-in-law of President Diem, arrives in New York to begin a 3-week unofficial visit to the United States.

1963—Continued

October 8.—U.N. General Assembly agrees to send a factfinding mission to South Vietnam to investigate charges of Government oppression of Buddhists. The Diem government on October 4 had invited the U.N. to send such a mission.

October 24.—U.N. factfinding mission on the Buddhist situation in South Vietnam arrives in Saigon, and on the next day confers with President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu.

October 27.—A Buddhist monk burns himself to death in Saigon—the seventh such suicide since June 11.

November 1.—A military coup (organized by the key generals of the armed forces) ends the Diem regime. Rebels lay siege to the presidential palace in Saigon which is captured by the following morning. President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu escape from the palace, but a few hours later are taken by the rebels, and while being transported in an armored carrier to rebel headquarters they are assassinated. A proclamation broadcast by the leaders of the coup (a council of generals, headed by Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh) declares that they have "no political ambitions" and that the fight against the Communists must be carried on to a successful conclusion.

November 2.—Military leaders in South Vietnam set up a provisional Government headed by former Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho (a Buddhist) as Premier. The Constitution is suspended and the National Assembly dissolved. Buddhists, students, and other political prisoners arrested by the former regime are released.

November 4.—Premier Nguyen Ngoc Tho of South Vietnam announces formation of a mixed military-civilian Cabinet which has been approved by the military leaders. United States recognizes the new provisional Government of South Vietnam. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk rejects, during a press conference, French President de Gaulle's proposals for a neutral, independent Vietnam, stating that the result would be a Communist Vietnam.

November 9.—The United States announces resumption of its commodity-import aid to South Vietnam, suspended in August.

November 14.—President Kennedy, in his news conference, states his confidence in General Harkins and denies reports that Harkins "lost his usefulness in Vietnam because of his identification with the Diem regime."

November 15.—A U.S. military spokesman in Saigon reports that 1,000 U.S. servicemen will be withdrawn from South Vietnam, beginning December 3.

November 19.—Prince Sihanouk declares an end to all U.S. military and economic aid to Cambodia, charging that the CIA is trying to oust him from power.

November 20.—U.S. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk confer in Honolulu, Hawaii, with U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge and commander of U.S. military operations in the area, Gen. Paul D. Harkins.

November 22.—President John F. Kennedy is assassinated in Dallas, Tex. His successor, Lyndon B. Johnson affirms on November 24 the U.S. intention to continue its military and economic support of South Vietnam's struggle against the Vietcong.

December 12.—Prince Sihanouk announces the recall of the Cambodian Ambassador to the United States and the entire staff.

December 14.—A U.S. military spokesman in Saigon reports on stepped up guerrilla attacks on hamlets, outposts, and patrols in November, estimating Government casualties at 2,800 and Vietcong losses at 2,900.

December 19–20.—U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara and Director of CIA McCone are in Saigon to evaluate the new Government's war efforts against the Vietcong.

1964

January 2.—Secretary Rusk announces in a news conference that "A Vietnamese Army group seized in the delta area of Vietnam some 300,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, weapons like mortars, recoilless ammunition, made in China" and that almost certainly Hanoi was primarily responsible for their infiltration into South Vietnam.

January 6.—South Vietnam's Government decrees a three-man military command over the Vietnamese forces and Government (consisting of Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh (chief of state), Maj. Gen. Tran Van Don and Maj. Gen. Le Van Kim).

January 11.—Prince Sihanouk says he is willing to accept U.S. aid if it is offered "without conditions."

January 27.—U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara in a speech before the House Armed Services Committee states that the situation in South Vietnam "continues grave," but that "the survival of an independent Government in South Vietnam is so important to the security of southeast Asia and to the free world that I can conceive of no alternative other than to take all necessary measures with our capability to prevent a Communist victory." France establishes diplomatic relations with Communist China.

January 30.—Military coup, organized by Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, ousts Government of Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh from power in South Vietnam.

February 4–6.—The Vietcong launches an offensive in Tay Ninh province and the Mekong Delta; in the ensuing fighting hundreds of Government troops are reported dead.

February 7.—When asked at a press conference about certain neutralization proposals regarding South Vietnam, Secretary Rusk reiterates U.S. policy that, "If the agreements which have already been reached and which have been signed by those in the north would be fulfilled, there could be peace in southeast Asia."

February 8.—Maj. Gen. Khanh, leader of the military junta, announces formation of a new Vietnamese Government with himself as Premier, Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh as nominal Chief of State, and a mixed civilian-military Cabinet in charge of administration.

February 19.—Sihanouk proposes that a four-nation agreement be signed by the United States, Thailand, South Vietnam, and Cambodia to "recognize" Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity.

1964—Continued

March 7.—General Khanh announces a 1-year reform program to rebuild South Vietnam's political and administrative structure and raise standard of living.

March 8–12.—Secretary McNamara and General Taylor visit Saigon.

March 22.—Vietnam Military Council gives unanimous vote of confidence to Premier Khanh.

April 13–15.—SEATO Ministerial Council communique declares the defeat of the Vietcong is "essential" to the security of southeast Asia and that SEATO will fulfill its treaty obligations.

April 19.—A military coup (by rightwing generals) ousts the government of Souvanna Phouma in Laos. United States, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, and France protest the coup as a violation of the Geneva accords.

April 23.—Legitimate government of Souvanna Phouma restored in Laos.

May 1.—Souvanna Phouma announces merger of rightwing and neutralist forces in Laos.

May 12.—Secretary Rusk asks NATO members to give greater support to South Vietnam.

May 12–13.—Secretary McNamara and General Taylor make fifth on-the-spot review of South Vietnam situation.

May 13.—Cambodia calls for urgent meeting of U.N. Security Council to consider the "repeated acts of aggression" by United States and South Vietnamese forces.

May 17.—Pathet Lao forces begin overrunning neutralist forces in the Plain of Jars.

May 20.—France proposes reconvening of 14 nation conference on Laos in Geneva. This proposal is rejected by the United States and United Kingdom and endorsed by the Soviet Union, Poland, Cambodia, India, and Communist China.

May 21.—The United States initiates reconnaissance flight over Laos.

May 22.—Secretary Rusk, listing the choices in Vietnam, says: "A third choice would be to expand the war. This can be the result if the Communists persist in their course of aggression."

May 25.—The U.N. Security Council considers establishment of a commission of experts "to help define and mark the border line between South Vietnam and Cambodia."

May 27.—The United States announces that several T–28 fighter-bombers have been sent to Laos.

June 6–7.—Two U.S. reconnaissance planes are shot down by Pathet Lao ground fire from the Plain of Jars.

June 10.—The House passes foreign assistance authorization for fiscal 1965 by a vote of 230 to 175. The Senate passes the bill (H.R. 11380) by a vote of 45 to 16. A subsequent conference report is adopted by both Houses on October 2. The authorization includes about $200 million for operations in Vietnam.

June 12.—President de Gaulle calls for an end to all foreign intervention in South Vietnam.

June 20.—General Westmoreland assumes command of USMACV, replacing General Harkins. General Westmoreland had assumed duties as Deputy Commander on January 27.

June 23.—President Johnson announces appointment of General Taylor to be U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam and Alexis Johnson as Deputy Ambassador.

August 2.—U.S.S. *Maddox* is attacked in international waters off the coast of North Vietnam by North Vietnamese torpedo boats.

August 4.—Destroyer *C. Turner Joy* and destroyer *Maddox* are attacked by North Vietnamese PT boats.*

August 4.—President Johnson orders U.S. "air action" against "gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam."

August 5.—President Johnson sends message to Congress on the Tonkin Gulf incident; joint resolution is introduced "to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia."

August 5.—The United States sends reinforcements to Tonkin Gulf area.

August 6.—Cambodia charges "Americans in uniform joined South Vietnamese in firing into Cambodia."

August 7.—U.S. Congress approves Southeast Asia resolution (Senate vote, 88–2; House vote, 416–0). The resolution approves and supports the determination of the President to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression. It also declares that the maintenance of peace and security in Southeast Asia are vital to U.S. national interests and that the United States is prepared to take all necessary steps to assist any member or protocol state of SEATO requesting assistance in national defense. On the same day General Khanh declares a state of emergency in Vietnam.

August 11.—President Johnson signs Southeast Asia resolution into law (Public Law 88–408).

August 16.—General Khanh is elected Vietnamese President by Military Revolutionary Council, ousts Duong Van Minh as chief of state and installs new constitution.

August 25.—General Khanh promises liberalization of regime after repeated protests by Vietnamese.

August 27.—The new Vietnam Constitution is withdrawn; Revolutionary Council disbands; General Khanh, Duong Van Minh, and Tran Thien Khiem are named provisional leaders.

August 29.—Nguyen Xuan Oanh is named acting premier of Vietnam to head caretaker government for 2 months. He states General Khanh has suffered mental and physical breakdown.

September 3.—General Khanh resumes premiership; Taylor sees him "rested and recovered"; dissolves triumvirate and restores Duong Van Minh to position of chief of State. Cambodia charges South Vietnam launched "major attack" near Koh Rokar, penetrating into Cambodia territory.

September 13.—Bloodless coup by Brig. Gen. Lam Van Phat is carried out against General Khanh in Saigon.

---

*Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1968 by Secretary of Defense McNamara and other U.S. officials involved in the Tonkin Gulf Incident raised questions and debate concerning whether or not the attack of August 4 actually had taken place and whether or not the U.S. ships had provoked the attacks by violating DRV territorial waters and by being in the Tonkin Gulf the same time that South Vietnamese forces were conducting raids against North Vietnamese coastal installations. See: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Gulf of Tonkin, the 1964 Incidents. Hearings, 90th Congress, 2d session, February 20, 1968. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968.

1964—Continued

September 13.—Forces loyal to General Khanh regain control of Vietnam Government.
September 15.—Cambodia indefinitely postpones presentation of credentials by U.S. Ambassador-designate Kidder.
September 16.—Laotian talks in Paris end because of deadlock.
September 18.—The U.S. Defense Department reports U.S. destroyers in Tonkin Gulf fire on and presumably hit four or five hostile targets.
September 19.—The Vietnam Government makes sweeping changes in military command following abortive coup of September 13.
September 26.—The Vietnam High National Council is formally inaugurated and is charged with preparing a new constitution.
October 2.—Prince Sihanouk, at Communist China's 15th anniversary celebration, says China will grant Cambodia military and economic assistance.
October 20.—The Revolutionary Council presents a new Vietnam constitution.
October 21.—The United States charges Cambodian troops crossed South Vietnam border and seized a U.S. officer.
October 24.—A USAF C–123 loaded with ammunition is shot down by Cambodia.
October 25.—The United States charges Cambodians fired on U.S. helicopter in South Vietnam searching for missing U.S. officer.
October 26.—The Vietnam Revolutionary Council elects Phan Khac Suu chief of state.
October 27.—Cambodia claims it shot down U.S. C–123. The United States admits the plane was over Cambodian territory due to "map-reading error."
November 1.—Tran Van Huong is named Premier of Vietnam.
November 2.—Russia delivers new arms shipment to Cambodia to replace American equipment.
December 4.—South Vietnam military leaders announce support of Premier Tran Van Huong's government.
December 8–17.—Ambassador Bonsal meets with Cambodian Delegate Son Sann in New Delhi in an attempt to clear away misunderstandings.
December 20.—South Vietnam's military conduct a purge; dissolve civilian High National Council (provisional legislature). The United States opposes power takeover of military and dissolution of civilian parliament.
December 21.—General Khanh supports power of military versus U.S. appeals; declares Vietnam forces would not fight "to carry out the policy of any foreign country."
December 24.—Terrorist bombing in Saigon kills 2 Americans and wounds 52 Americans and 13 Vietnamese.

1965

January 1.—U.S. military strength in Vietnam is approximately 23,000.
January 8.—South Korea sends 2,000 military advisers to South Vietnam.
January 13.—Defense Department confirms that two U.S. planes were shot down over Laos.

January 27.—Premier Huong ousted. General Khanh asked to solve the political crisis.

January 28.—General Khanh nominates Nguyen Xuan Oanh as acting Premier.

February 6.—Russian Premier Kosygin arrives in Hanoi.

February 7.—President Shastri of India proposes a meeting between Russian and American leaders to solve problems of southeast Asia.

February 7.—Communist guerrillas stage attack on U.S. outpost near Pleiku. U.S. planes strike targets in North Vietnam. U.S. dependents are evacuated from South Vietnam.

February 8.—South Vietnamese Air Force planes accompany U.S. air mission into North Vietnam. President Johnson indicates that further developments depend on Communist response. Indian Foreign Ministry requests a new Geneva conference.

February 8.—Premier Kosygin announces Soviet willingness to aid North Vietnam if she is invaded.

February 9.—U.S. Marine Corps Hawk air defense missile battalion deploys at Danang.

February 10.—The Vietcong blow up a U.S. military billet at coastal city of Quinhon, killing 23 soldiers.

February 11.—Secretary General U Thant calls for international negotiations on Vietnam inside or outside of the U.N.

February 15.—Chinese Communists threaten to enter the war if American troops enter North Vietnam.

February 16.—South Vietnamese Armed Forces Council announces that Phan Huy Quat has been named new premier.

February 18.—South Vietnamese Army and Marine units stage bloodless coup in Saigon and oust General Khanh.

February 19.—Khanh regains temporary control of the Government.

February 20.—Armed forces council demands resignation of General Khanh.

February 21.—Khanh bows to council demands for resignation.

February 24.—Premier Phan Huy Quat announces South Vietnam's determination to end the war with honor.

February 25.—North Vietnamese officials state negotiations would be considered if American troops were withdrawn.

February 27.—State Department issues "white paper" detailing charges of aggression on the part of North Vietnam.

February 27.—Prince Sihanouk calls for a new Geneva conference on Indochina.

February 28.—United States and South Vietnamese officials declare that President Johnson has decided to open continuous limited air strikes against North Vietnam in order to bring about a negotiated settlement.

March 1.—President Quat rules out peace until the North Vietnamese stop their infiltration into South Vietnam.

March 8.—Secretary General U Thant proposes that the United States, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, France, Communist China, and North and South Vietnam participate in a preliminary conference.

March 8.—The first U.S .Marine Infantry (3rd Battalion, 9th Marines) lands in South Vietnam.

March 9.—The United States rejects U Thant's offer until North Vietnam stops its aggression against South Vietnam.

1965—Continued

March 19.—The first U.S. Army battalion (716th MP Bn) arrives in South Vietnam.

March 22.—The United States discloses that it has provided the South Vietnamese Army with certain types of nonlethal gases.

March 23.—Russian Communist Party Secretary Brezhnev hints of Russian participation in the war.

March 25.—In a public statement President Johnson held out to North Vietnam the prospect of economic aid if peace is secured.

March 28.—U.S. Seventh Fleet undertakes South Vietnam coastal surveillance.

Mach 29.—A bomb explodes outside U.S. Embassy in Saigon, causing heavy damage and casualties.

April 1.—Seventeen nonalined nations meeting in Belgrade appeal for immediate negotiations.

April 1.—The U.S. Army 1st Logistical Command activated in South Vietnam.

April 2.—The United States announces intention of sending several thousand more troops to South Vietnam.

April 7.—President Johnson, in a speech at Johns Hopkins University stresses U.S. willingness to negotiate, and suggest a $1 billion aid program for southeast Asia.

April 8.—The U.S.S.R. proposes international conference to guarantee Cambodian neutrality.

April 8.— Peking charges that U.S. peace offer is a trick.

April 11.—North Vietnam officials denounce President Johnson's offer to negotiate.

April 14.—The United States urges Hanoi to consider the plea of 17 nonalined nations for peace talks.

May 3.—Cambodia breaks diplomatic relations with the United States.

May 3.—The U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade begins arriving in South Vietnam.

May 4.—President Johnson requests $700 million supplemental appropriation for Department of Defense for Vietnam effort.

May 5.—The House of Representatives approves President's request for additional $700 million in defense funds by vote of 408 to 7.

May 5.—SEATO condemns Communist aggression in Vietnam war.

May 6.—The Senate passes $700 million supplemental appropriation bill by vote of 88 to 3.

May 7.—The III Marine Amphibious Force activated in South Vietnam.

May 12.—The Chinese Chief of Staff calls for preparation for atomic war. President Johnson declares that Peking prevents Hanoi from agreeing to talks.

May 13.—The United States halts bombing missions over North Vietnam.

May 19.—The United States resumes air attacks on North Vietnamese targets.

May 25.—Soviets announce construction of antiaircraft missile sites is underway around the capital of North Vietnam.

June 1.—President Johnson asks Congress to authorize $89 million for expanded program of economic and social development in southeast Asia.

June 7.—U.S. military authorities disclose that the number of American military personnel in South Vietnam has passed 50,000 mark.

(Army 21,500; Marine Corps, 16,500; Air Force, 9,500; and Navy, 3,500).

June 7.—The Senate adopts by a vote of 42 to 26 an amendment adding $89 million in economic assistance to Southeast Asia to the foreign aid bill in accordance with the President's request of June 1. The bill (H.R. 7750) goes to conference committee. The House agrees to the conference report including the amendment by a vote of 244 to 150 on August 19. The Senate agrees to the report by a vote of 67 to 27 on August 24. The bill becomes P.L. 89–171 (Foreign Assistance Act of 1965).

June 8.—A State Department spokesman says that the U.S. military command in South Vietnam has been authorized to send American troops into combat alongside Vietnamese forces if such "combat support" is requested by South Vietnam.

June 9.—The White House issues statement that "There has been no change in the mission of U.S. ground combat units in Vietnam in recent days or weeks."

June 12.—Premier Quat decides to hand back the reins of government to the military following Chief of State Suu's refusal to approve proposed cabinet changes.

June 16.—Secretary McNamara announces new troop movements to Vietnam which will bring total there to over 70,000.

June 17.—A four-nation British Commonwealth peace mission to find an end to the Vietnam war is formed at the opening session of a Commonwealth conference in London. The mission will consist of representatives from Britain, Ghana, Nigeria, and Trinidad-Tobago.

June 24.—The new South Vietnamese Government under Brig. Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky announces a series of measures including a formal state of war, extension of Saigon's curfew, and price controls.

June 24.—The Saigon government severs diplomatic relations with France but retains consular ties.

June 24.—The Soviet news agency Tass reports that Soviet Premier Kosygin has informed the Ambassadors of Britain, Ghana, and Nigeria that he would refuse to meet with the Commonwealth peace mission.

June 25.—Communist China formally rejects any visit by the Commonwealth peace mission to Peking. Two days later a similar response is received from the National Liberation Front of the Vietcong.

June 25.—President Johnson in an address at ceremonies in San Francisco commemorating the 20th anniversary of the signing of the U.N. Charter declares that "bilateral diplomacy" for a peaceful settlement has "yielded no results." He adds, "I now call upon this gathering of the nations of the world to use all their influence, individually and collectively, to bring to the table those who seem determined to make war. We will support your efforts as we will support effective action by any agent or agency of these United Nations."

June 25.—Prime Ministers of the British Commonwealth issue a "Statement of Guidance" outlining the objectives of the Commonwealth's Vietnam peace mission. Expressing "grave doubts" as to an early solution of the conflict "by military means" the mission states its objectives as: (1) "A suspension of all U.S. air attacks

on North Vietnam." (2) A North Vietnamese halt in "the movement of any military forces or assistance or material to South Vietnam." (3) "A total cease-fire on all sides to enable a conference to seek a peaceful solution."

June 27.—The 173rd Airborne Brigade undertakes first major U.S. combat offensive of war.

July 1.—North Vietnam formally rejects a request by the British Commonwealth peace mission on Vietnam for talks in Hanoi.

July 4.—In a Voice of America broadcast Secretary of State Dean Rusk says that on several occasions, the United States, acting through an unnamed intermediary, had asked Hanoi "what would be stopped if we stopped the [aerial] bombing * * * we've never had a reply."

July 8.—The White House announces that Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor has resigned as U.S. Amabassador to South Vietnam and will be replaced by Henry Cabot Lodge.

July 10.—President Johnson declares in a press conference that in Vietnam, "we committed our power and our honor and that has been reaffirmed by three Presidents."

July 12–18.—The United States begins a large-scale buildup of its forces in South Vietnam.

July 14–21.—Ambassador Lodge and Defense Secretary McNamara arrive in Saigon and confer with General Taylor, General Westmoreland, and South Vietnamese Premier Ky.

July 15.—A "voluntary censorship" of news is requested of journalists by the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

July 15.—U.S. Ambassador W. Averell Harriman begins informal talks in Moscow with Soviet Premier Alexey Kosygin.

July 20.—Secretary McNamara leaves Vietnam after receiving requests for additional U.S. troops. He states that "in many respects there has been a deterioration" in the Vietnam war since his last visit 14 months ago.

July 28.—In a press conference, President Johnson states: "We must not let this [the unconventional nature of the fighting] mask the central fact that this is really war."

July 28.—U.S. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg delivers a note to Secretary General U Thant from President Johnson asking the U.N. to employ its "resources, energy, and immense prestige" in finding ways "to halt aggression and bring peace in Vietnam."

July 29.—The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division lands in South Vietnam.

August 11.—The Soviet Union indicates, in an editorial, in the Communist Party paper, Pravda, that it would have no part of any American efforts to involve the U.N. in Vietnam.

August 13.—The United States formally affirms its adherence to the 1949 Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war and war victims.

August 18.—The Senate approves $1.7 billion for operations in Vietnam included in the Defense Appropriation bill for fiscal 1966 (H.R. 9221). The House had passed the bill in June before Secretary McNamara had returned from Vietnam and made the special request for $1.7 billion. The bill is referred to conference committee

and the resulting report is approved by the House on September 17 and by the Senate on September 21. It becames P.L. 89-213.

August 24.—The House Republican Committee on Planning and Research issues a "white paper" criticizing the administration's actions in Vietnam. It accuses the Johnson administration of "an uncertain policy," "lack of candor," and "misleading statements."

September 12.—The first elements of U.S. Army 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) land in South Vietnam.

October 4.—Pope Paul VI flies to New York to address the United Nations where he makes a plea for an end to the war in Vietnam.

October 14.—The Defense Department orders a military draft call of 45,224 men for December, the biggest quota since the Korean war.

October 15-16.—The student-run National Coordinating Committee To End the War in Vietnam sponsors a series of nationwide demonstrations. A number of sympathy demonstrations were also staged in foreign cities.

November 2.—Norman B. Morrison, 32, a Quaker of Baltimore, Md., commits suicide by fire in front of the Pentagon "to express his concern over the great loss of life and human suffering caused by the war in Vietnam."

November 9.—Roger Allen LaPorte, 22, of the pacifist Catholic Worker movement, burns himself in front of U.N. headquarters in New York as a protest against war. LaPorte dies of his injuries on November 10.

November 11.—Defense Secretary McNamara announces that the administration "believes it will be necessary to add further to the strength of U.S. combat forces in Vietnam."

November 16.—Correspondent Eric Sevareid reports in a Look magazine article that the United States rejected a Hanoi proposal in 1964 that United States and North Vietnamese representatives meet in Rangoon, Burma, to discuss a possible means of ending the Vietnam war. State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey states that "on the basis of the total evidence available to us, we did not believe at any time that North Vietnam was prepared for serious talks."

November 17.—In a letter to U.S. Physicist Linus Pauling, North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh charges that U.S. proposals for peace negotiations were "deceitful talk."

November 26.—The North Vietnamese official newspaper, Nhan Dan denies that Hanoi has issued any proposals for peace negotiations with the United States.

November 27.—Marchers variously estimated as numbering from 15,000 to 35,000 converge on the White House in a march on Washington for peace in Vietnam initiated by the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy.

November 27.—The Vietcong release two U.S. soldiers who had been captured November 24, 1963. A National Liberation Front broadcast claims that the prisoners are free in appreciation for the anti-war demonstrations in the United States.

November 28-29.—Defense Secretary McNamara meets with U.S. military leaders in Saigon. It is reported that the U.S. military authorities request that U.S. forces in Saigon be increased to 350,000 to 400,000 men.

1965—Continued

November 29.—Defense Secretary McNamara states in a press conference that the Vietcong's "expressed determination to carry on the conflict * * * can lead to only one conclusion—that it will be a long war."

December 1.—In a meeting with British Foreign Minister Stewart, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko declares that peace talks on the Vietnamese war would be conditioned on the halting of U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam.

December 9.—Ho Chi Minh, in an interview with British Journalist Felix Greene, calls President Johnson's offer of unconditional talks "absolutely unacceptable."

December 16.—U.S. Air Force planes bomb and destroy a North Vietnamese thermal power plant at Uongbi in the first American air raid on a major North Vietnamese industrial target.

December 17.—U.S. Government sources confirm a report that Ho Chi Minh relayed an offer to hold talks leading to negotiations through two private Italian intermediaries.

December 18.—A North Vietnamese statement calls reports of Hanoi's peace feelers "sheer groundless fabrications."

December 19.—U.S. Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield, reports to President Johnson on an international fact finding mission he had conducted for the President.

December 25.—Upon the expiration of a 30-hour cease-fire General Westmoreland issues an order to United States and allied troops to retain their defensive posture and not to fire unless attacked.

December 26.—United States and South Vietnamese offensive operations are resumed in the face of a resumption of heavy Vietcong attacks; however, the suspension of air raids on North Vietnam is continued.

December 28.—The Vietcong propose a 4-day cease-fire for January 20–23, 1966, to mark the Vietnamese lunar New Year.

December 29.—The United States dispatches high-ranking emissaries to various capitals of the world to sound out the possibilities of achieving a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam war.

December 29.—The 3rd Brigade of the U.S. Army 25th Division begins arriving in South Vietnam.

1966

January 1.—Pope Paul VI makes public messages he had sent on December 31 to Moscow, Peking, Hanoi, and Saigon urging their leaders to seek an end to the Vietnam war.

January 2–3.—U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Arthur Goldberg, and Vice President Humphrey return from foreign tours representing part of a concerted U.S. campaign to achieve a cease-fire and peace in Vietnam. Their efforts are denounced by the North Vietnamese newspaper, Nhan Dan, as a "noisy propaganda campaign."

January 3.—Cambodia informs the U.N. that it will use force to repel any invasion of its territory by United States and South Vietnamese troops.

January 7–12.—A five-man Soviet mission, led by C. P. Central Committee Secretary Aleksandr Shelepin, visits Hanoi and arranges for increased Soviet military aid to North Vietnam.

January 8.—Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield, and four other Senators file a report with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee based on their trip to South Vietnam and other countries. The report expresses the view that "a rapid solution to the conflict in Vietnam is not in immediate prospect." The report states that despite the U.S. expanded military effort, the Vietcong offensive had only been "blunted," not "driven back."

January 9.—Yale Prof. Staughton Lynd returns to New York after an unauthorized 10-day visit to North Vietnam where he held a 90-minute interview with North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong.

January 15.—Secretary Rusk and Ambassador at large Averell Harriman meet with South Vietnam Premier Ky in Saigon, reportedly to allay South Vietnamese fears that U.S. peace efforts would be detrimental to the Saigon regime.

January 15.—South Vietnam Premier Ky pledges a popular referendum in October on a new constitution for South Vietnam to pave the way for "real democratic elections in 1967" for a civilian government to replace the current military regime. One of the government's principal tasks in 1966, he declares, will be a rural construction program.

January 16.—A communique issued at the end of the United States-South Vietnamese talks states: "The basic positions of the two Governments were consistent in all fundamental respects." The communique also restated Saigon's demands that "all aggression" in South Vietnam must stop before Ky's regime would attend a peace conference.

January 16.—Communist China denies what it states are Soviet-supported rumors that Peking is impeding the transshipment of Soviet military equipment through China to North Vietnam.

January 17.—Gen. Wallace M. Greene, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps commandant, declares after returning from a 13-day tour of southeast Asia, "You can kill every Vietcong and North Vietnamese and still lose the war unless" the Vietnamese villages are rehabilitated and reorganized.

January 19.—The President sends Congress a request for an additional $12.76 billion in supplemental funds primarily for Vietnam expenses. New authorization will be needed for $4.8 billion of this amount.

January 20.—Defense Secretary McNamara reports that the United States lost 351 planes and helicopters in Vietnam in 1965.

January 20.—U.N. Secretary General U Thant infers in a news conference that any future South Vietnamese Government should include the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Vietcong.

January 20–23.—The Vietnamese lunar New Year is marked by a temporary cease-fire. The truce was largely observed although many instances of minor clashes are reported. The truce expires at 6 p.m. on January 23.

January 21.—Secretary of State Rusk says in a Washington news conference: "I regret that I cannot report * * * any positive and encouraging response [from North Vietnam] to the hopes of the overwhelming majority of mankind," for negotiations to end the Vietnamese war.

1966—Continued

January 24.—North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh states in a message to world Communist leaders that the United States must accept Hanoi's four-point peace formula as the basis for ending the war and that if the "United States really wants peace it must recognize" the NLF "as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam."

January 24.—President Johnson submits his budget for fiscal year 1967 to Congress. The budget proposes a $4.2 billion increase in defense expenses to a total of $57.05 billion. The President also requests $9.1 billion of new obligational authority for Vietnam expenses. Vietnam expenditures for fiscal 1967 are estimated at $10.5 billion.

January 24.—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee hears 3 hours of testimony from Secretary Rusk in a closed hearing. It is reported that Rusk opposes Senator Fulbright's suggestion that the Vietcong be invited to peace talks before the bombings are resumed.

January 31.—President Johnson announces the resumption of U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam. At the same time he instructs U.S. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg formally to request the U.N. Security Council to intervene in the crisis to seek an international conference to end the war and establish a permanent peace in southeast Asia.

January 31.—Secretary Rusk at a news conference following President Johnson's speech summarizes "the unprecedented effort of the past 40 days, an effort aimed at peace, and the tragically negative responses from Hanoi."

February 1.—The U.N. Secretary Council meets to consider a U.S. draft resolution calling for Council action to arrange an international conference to bring peace to South Vietnam and southeast Asia.

February 2.—The North Vietnamese foreign ministry formally rejects any U.N. action on the Vietnamese war.

February 2.—The U.N. Security Council agrees by a 9-to-2 vote (U.S.S.R. and Bulgaria opposed; France, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda abstaining) to consider the Vietnam war.

February 4.—Defense Secretary Robert McNamara refuses on the grounds of security to testify publicly before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His position is publicly endorsed by President Johnson.

February 6.—President Johnson and other U.S. officials arrive in Honolulu for discussions with Premier Ky and other Saigon representatives concerning the Vietnamese war. In his remarks at airport ceremonies President Johnson declares that those who "counsel retreat" from the war "belong to a group that has always been blind to experience and deaf to hope."

February 7.—Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, states that he doesn't agree with an attitude of "quiet and acquiescence" on the part of Congress toward administration policies in Vietnam.

February 8.—President Johnson states his determination, at the conclusion of the 3-day Honolulu conference, to fight the battle against aggression as well as the battle for social construction in Vietnam.

February 8.—Vice President Humphrey leaves Honolulu for Saigon with Premier Ky and other Vietnamese leaders, reportedly to spur action on economic and social problems in South Vietnam.

February 10.—Speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former U.S. Ambassador George Kennan urges the United States to seek an orderly end to the Vietnam conflict without enlarging it in order to concentrate on "potentially more important" world problems.

February 11.—President Johnson in a news conference disavows any desire to escalate the war. However, he adds that "additional troops" will be sent as militarily required.

February 11.—Le Duc Tho, a leading North Vietnamese Communist, castigates a minority in the Hanoi government opposed to a long drawn out war in an article appearing in the official party publication Hoc Tap. Tho also accuses this faction of favoring negotiations with the United States.

February 14.—Vice President Humphrey announces that the United States will increase military aid to Thailand to meet the threat posed by Communist guerrillas in that country.

February 18.—Secretary Rusk, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, places emphasis on the SEATO Pact as the legal basis for the U.S. commitment in Vietnam.

February 19.—Senator Robert Kennedy states that the National Liberation Front should be included in any postwar Saigon Government. Senator Kennedy later (February 22) clarified his position, stating that the NLF should not be "automatically excluded" from power in an interim Government preceding elections.

February 20.—South Korea announces it will send an additional division and a regiment to South Vietnam.

February 21.—Vice President Humphrey criticizes Senator Kennedy's suggested inclusion of the NLF in a Vietnam coalition government, asserting that popular front governments are either paralyzed from within or taken over by the Communists.

February 24.—The House passes $415 million supplemental foreign assistance appropriation bill (H.R. 12169). On March 10 the Senate passes the bill with modifications and the bill goes to conference. Both Houses agree to the conference report on March 15 and it becomes P.L. 89-871. The bill includes $290 million for economic assistance to Southeast Asia.

March 1.—The House passes a $4.8 billion military supplemental authorization bill for Vietnam War purposes (H.R. 12889) by a vote of 393 to 4. The Senate passes a bill with different wording and a conference committee is convened. Both Houses approve the committee report on March 10. 78 Democratic House members declare their support should not be considered an endorsement of a larger war.

March 1.—President Johnson renews his offer of aid to North Vietnam and exhorts Hanoi to negotiate.

March 2.—Secretary McNamara reveals that the U.S. forces in South Vietnam had reached a total of 215,000 men, with 20,000 additional men on their way.

1966—Continued

March 5.—Gen. Maxwell Taylor proposes the mining of Haiphong harbor.

March 6.—Communist China accuses the Soviet Union of pressing North Vietnam to negotiate.

March 8.—Australia announces its intention of tripling its Vietnam force from 1,500 to 4,500 by June 1966.

March 9.—U.S. planes carry out the heaviest bombardment of the war, and U.N. Secretary General U Thant issues an appeal for a cessation of the bombing, a reduction of military activities, and participation of the National Liberation Front in any peace settlement.

March 10.—The South Vietnamese Government removes Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi as District Commander in Hue on the grounds that he was acting independently of the Government.

March 11.—Vice President Humphrey bars any settlement of the Vietnam war that would give the Vietcong a role in a coalition government not earned in free elections.

March 10–16.—Protests in Hue and Danang ensue over the dismissal of General Thi and, though increasingly anti-American, urge U.S. support against the Government. Buddhist demonstrations begin in Saigon, protesting General Thi's removal and demanding a return to civilian rule.

March 15.—The House approves a supplemental appropriation bill for fiscal 1966 (H.R. 13546) by a vote of 389 to 3. The Senate approves the bill on March 22 by a vote of 87 to 2 and it becomes P.L. 89–374. The bill appropriates $13.1 billion of which $12.8 billion is for U.S. operations in the Southeast Asia.

March 18.—South Vietnam's Government votes to make no concessions to Buddhist demonstrators.

March 23.—General strikes occur in Danang and Hue.

March 25.—Premier Ky announces that a committee will be appointed to draft a constitution to be followed by elections.

March 31.—10,000 Buddhists demonstrate in Saigon.

April 2–5.—Anti-government demonstrations intensify in Saigon and spread to other leading towns in South Vietnam. Premier Ky threatens the use of troops and flies to Danang to quell the rebellion.

April 6.—Secretary General Thant states that all parties in the Vietnam conflict must accept the concept of a unified, independent and nonaligned country, guaranteed by all the major powers.

April 11.—Defense Department officials acknowledge that Buddhist demonstrations have hampered operations against the Vietcong.

April 12.—B–52's from the U.S. Strategic Air Command base on Guam bomb North Vietnam for the first time. The press reports a Pentagon decision to use B–52's regularly in bombing the north.

April 12–14.—The National Political Congress (boycotted by Buddhist and Catholic organizations) meets in Saigon and adopts a program designed to meet Buddhist demands. Demonstrations end.

April 16.—South Vietnam's military National Leadership Committee sets elections for a Constituent Assembly in August.

April 18.—Senator Mike Mansfield proposes a "direct confrontation across a peace table" between the United States, Communist China,

North Vietnam, and "essential elements" from South Vietnam, to be held in either Japan or Burma—a proposal rejected by Peking April 21. Hanoi on April 22, calls Senator Mansfield's proposal a "new peace trick."

April 24.—Communist MIG–17's appear in strength for the first time in the air war in North Vietnam.

April 25.—Senator Richard Russell proposes a poll in major South Vietnamese cities to decide whether the Vietnamese people want U.S. assistance. He asserts that if the answer is "No," the U.S. should pull out.

April 26.—The State Department reiterates previous warnings that planes of Communist China or other nations attacking allied aircraft over North Vietnam will be pursued into the territory of their home "sanctuary" if necessary.

April 26.—North Vietnam's official news agency reports speeches by Ho Chi Minh and Premier Pham Van Dong before the National Assembly reaffirming Hanoi's four points as the conditions for peace in Vietnam.

April 30.—U.S. officials in Saigon set the rate of North Vietnamese infiltration of the south at 5,500 men per month.

May 1.—An American battalion drives Communist units across the ill-defined frontier into Cambodia.

May 2.—Secretary McNamara predicts an increase in U.S. troop strength in order to offset rising North Vietnamese infiltration.

May 3.—U.S. forces fire on Vietcong units in Cambodia.

May 7.—Premier Ky declares that he has no intention of resigning following the election of a constituent assembly.

May 13.—Communist China charges that five U.S. planes had "flagrantly" intruded over Yunnan Province May 12.

May 15–23.—Vietnamese Government troops regain control of Danang from pro-Buddhist army units.

May 18.—The United States protests to Cambodia concerning the Vietcong's use of its territory.

May 20–23.—Saigon police and army units break up massive Buddhist demonstrations.

May 22.—Harold Brown, Secretary of the Air Force, states that President Johnson has decided against expanding the list of bombing targets in North Vietnam to include industrial and port installations, and fuel storage facilities.

May 24.—Secretary General Thant calls on the parties participating in the Vietnam war to start scaling down military operations and to agree to discussions among all powers concerned, including the Vietcong and Communist China.

May 31.—Buddhist leaders and South Vietnamese Government officials begin talks in Saigon in an attempt to resolve the 2½-month-old political crisis.

May 31.—Anthony Eden proposes the establishment of a neutral belt composed of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as a means of ending the war.

June 3.—South Vietnam requests United Nations observers at the Constituent Assembly elections now scheduled for September.

June 6.—South Vietnam's ruling military National Leadership Committee of 10 generals is expanded to include 10 civilians.

1966—Continued

June 8.—Buddhist leader Tri Quang begins a fast in protest against American support of Premier Ky.

June 16.—South Vietnam's Government moves troops into Hue to deal with Buddhist disorders.

June 18.—President Johnson, at a news conference, declares that the United States would persist in using "the ground, naval, and air strength required to achieve our objective" and warns that: "I must observe that this does not mean that we shall not increase our forces or our operations."

June 20.—Premier Ky signs a decree setting September 11 as the date for the election of a constituent assembly to be known as the National Constituent Assembly, which will draft a new constitution.

June 23.—South Vietnamese troops seize the principal Buddhist stronghold in Saigon, the United Buddhist Church's Secular Affairs Institute.

June 26.—Secretary Rusk, in Canberra, Australia, states that he sees no prospects for an early peace in Vietnam.

June 29.—American planes conduct the first of continuing attacks on oil installations in the areas of Hanoi and Haiphong.

June 30.—Speaking in Omaha and Des Moines, President Johnson warns that attacks on military targets in North Vietnam "will continue to impose a growing burden and a high price on those who wage war against the freedom of their neighbors," and calls for unconditional peace talks, saying "there need only be a room and table and people willing to talk respectfully."

July 2.—State Department officials estimate that 40,000 Chinese workers are in North Vietnam repairing bombed facilities.

July 5.—Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt, speaking before the National Press Club, endorses U.S. policy in Asia, including the bombing of North Vietnam.

July 6.—Several captured American pilots are paraded through the streets of Hanoi. Communist mobs demand their punishment.

July 7.—The Warsaw Pact nations issue a declaration stating that they are ready to send "volunteers" to Vietnam, if Hanoi asks for them.

July 7.—Prime Minister Gandhi of India calls for an immediate end to the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and a peace conference to end the war.

July 8.—South Vietnam's Chief of State, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu, states that the allies should invade North Vietnam if necessary in order to end the war.

July 9.—Communist China rules out reconvening the Geneva Conference on Vietnam unless the United States withdraws its troops from that country.

July 10.—The Defense Department announces that U.S. forces in Vietnam will expand to 375,000 by the end of 1966 and to 425,000 by the spring of 1967.

July 11.—The United States is reported to be carrying out over 100 air strikes a day over Communist infiltration routes in Laos.

July 12.—Premier Sato of Japan calls on North Vietnam to enter into peace talks with the United States.

July 14.—Secretary Rusk warns Hanoi against trying captured U.S. pilots as war criminals.

July 15.—Eighteen U.S. Senators who had expressed opposition to administration policy in Vietnam sign a statement calling on North Vietnam to refrain from any act of vengeance against captured American airmen.

July 16.—Secretary General Thant urges North Vietnam to exercise restraint in its treatment of American prisoners and calls on both sides to observe the 1949 Geneva Convention on prisoners of war.

July 16.—Prime Minister Gandhi, in Moscow, reaffirms her belief that a cessation of the U.S. air raids over North Vietnam is a precondition for negotiations to end the war.

July 19.—North Vietnamese Ambassadors in Peking and Prague report that captured American pilots will go on trial in Hanoi.

July 20.—At a news conference, President Johnson warns Hanoi that the American people would regard war-crime trials of American prisoners as "very revolting and repulsive" and that they would "react accordingly." Pope Paul calls on North Vietnam to accord American prisoners "the safety and the treatment provided for by international norms."

July 23.—In response to a cable from the President of CBS, Ho Chi Minh declares there is "no trial in view" for American prisoners. Speaking in Indianapolis, President Johnson says: "We are not going to run out on South Vietnam. . . . However long it takes, we will persist until the Communists end the fighting or negotiate an honorable peace."

July 24.—North Vietnam's official publication Nhan Dan reiterates Hanoi's four point plan as the "sole basis" for settling the Vietnam problem.

July 25.—In an interview published in U.S. News & World Report Premier Ky urges an allied invasion of North Vietnam even at the risk of a military confrontation with Communist China, as the sole alternative to a long war. The Department of State tells reporters that the United States is "not seeking any wider war. . . . We do not threaten any regime."

July 30.—B–52 bombers initiate the first of series of attacks on growing North Vietnamese troop concentrations in and around the demilitarized zone.

July 31.—Premier Ky states that he will not be a candidate for President in 1967.

August 3.—Thailand proposes an all-Asian peace conference on Vietnam. Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia suggests that the United States should negotiate directly with the Vietcong.

August 3.—A House Appropriations Subcommittee makes public testimony of May 11 by Secretary Rusk in which he said that the United States observes a no-bombing buffer zone along North Vietnam's border with Red China.

August 7.—Former Vice President Nixon, in Saigon, suggests that 500,000 American troops are needed in Vietnam to shorten the war.

August 9.—Premier Ky expresses a willingness to negotiate an end of the war with North Vietnam, provided "they would be willing to compromise" by agreeing to accept the 17th parallel as the border and "to withdraw their agents and soldiers from South Vietnam."

1966—Continued

August 10.—Thailand's Premier officially opens the U.S. airbase at U-Tapao, capable of handling B–52 bombers.

August 13–14.—At the end of 2 days of conferences with General Westmoreland in Texas, President Johnson warns that, while a Communist military take-over in South Vietnam is impossible, there will be no quick victory.

August 18.—North Vietnam denounces the proposed all-Asia peace conference as "shop-worn merchandise" from President Johnson's "clique."

August 24.—President Johnson endorses proposal for an all-Asian conference to settle the Vietnam war, but cautions that "we do not want to make it appear that we are trying to direct it or force it."

August 28.—The U.S.S.R. announces that it is training North Vietnamese fighter pilots at an unidentified Soviet airbase.

August 30.—The Chinese Communist Party newspaper, Peoples Daily, calls for anti-American uprisings throughout the world, claims that U.S. forces are "bogged down" in Vietnam.

September 1.—President Charles de Gaulle calls on the United States to pledge to withdraw from South Vietnam in a fixed period as a step toward restoring peace, declaring that such a pledge of U.S. military withdrawal would be a prelude to genuine international negotiations on peace in Vietnam.

September 5.—President Johnson says that a U.S. troop withdrawal from South Vietnam is dependent upon a pull-out of Communist forces.

September 11.—South Vietnam voters (80.8 percent of those eligible) elect a 117-member constituent assembly to draft a new constitution and pave the way for restoration of civilian government in 1967.

September 22.—Ambassador Goldberg states that the United States will halt the bombing of North Vietnam when it receives assurances, privately or otherwise, that Hanoi will respond by a reduction of its war effort. The United States will then be prepared to participate in a mutual withdrawal of military forces under international supervision.

September 24.—Both Communist China and North Vietnam reject the U.S. peace proposals put forward by Ambassador Goldberg.

September 27.—President Johnson accepts the invitation of President Marcos of the Philippines to attend a heads of government conference in Manila to discuss the Vietnam conflict.

October 3.—The Soviet Union announces a new aid agreement with North Vietnam providing for both military and economic assistance. Washington officials cite evidence that Russian advisers might at times be operating Hanoi's air defenses.

October 4.—U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Foy D. Kohler, warns that an American blockade of North Vietnam would raise the risk of a military confrontation with the U.S.S.R.

October 4.—French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville is reported to have told President Johnson that North Vietnam no longer believes it can achieve a military victory, but that it is in no mood for negotiations.

October 6.—North Vietnam rejects Secretary General Thant's appeal for a mutual deescalation of the ground war but endorses his call for a cessation of the U.S. bombing of the north.

October 10.—The Soviet Union declares that an end to the U.S. air raids on North Vietnam is the key to improved Soviet-American relations.

October 13.—President Johnson rules out ending the bombing of North Vietnam without an indication that Hanoi will, in turn, deescalate its military activities in South Vietnam.

October 24.—The Manila Conference opens. Premier Ky tells the Conference that South Vietnam will press a program of political-economic reform.

October 25.—The United States and five other nations assisting South Vietnam militarily offer to withdraw their troops from South Vietnam 6 months after Hanoi disengages itself from the war.

October 26.—President Johnson pays a surprise visit to Camranh Bay, South Vietnam, and pledges full support to U.S. forces.

October 27.—Hanoi and Peking reject the Manila Conference's mutual troop withdrawal offer.

November 5.—Secretary McNamara states that the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam will continue to grow in 1967 but at a lower rate than the increase in 1966.

November 10.—North Vietnam announces that the U.S.S.R., China, and other Communist countries have pledged increased aid, both military and economic.

November 12.—Hanson Baldwin, New York Times military writer, asserts that Pentagon military experts have estimated that 600,000 to 750,000 U.S. troops are needed in South Vietnam to achieve the objectives of defeating the Communists and pacifying the country.

November 18.—Secretary Rusk states that the United States might agree to a short holiday truce in December but does not intend to begin another prolonged bombing pause. He repeats the U.S. position that Hanoi must indicate that it will take reciprocal action in response to a halt in the bombing.

November 25.—The Vietcong offers to observe 48-hour truces at both Christmas and New Year's. On November 30, South Vietnam follows suit, adding a 4-day period for the Vietnamese New Year (February 8–12).

December 2.—Premier Ky announces that U.S. troops will be stationed in the Mekong Delta area, where operations previously were conducted solely by the South Vietnamese Army.

December 2–5.—U.S. bombers stage heavy raids on truck depots, rail yards, and fuel dumps in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi.

December 7.—The State Department confirms reports that U.S. helicopter crews are flying Thai troops to zones where antiguerrilla operations are taking place.

December 8.—Pope Paul urges the combatants in Vietnam to extend the holiday truces into an armistice and begin peace negotiations.

December 8.—Air Force Secretary Brown asserts that the U.S. bombing of infiltration routes has severely hampered the enemy's capability and has reduced his ability to launch major attacks.

1966—Continued

December 12.—The New York Times reports that the Soviet Union has sent North Vietnam 100 new MIG 17, 19, and 21 jet fighters, thus doubling the size of Hanoi's air force. The State Department and Defense Department neither confirm nor deny the report.

December 13.—The Soviet press agency Tass claims that U.S. planes attacked residential areas of Hanoi.

December 14–15.—U.S. officers admit that American aircraft have bombed military targets *in* Hanoi but deny Soviet charges.

December 16.—Communist China charges that American planes bombed its Embassy in Hanoi. Rumania follows suit December 17.

December 19.—The United States asks Secretary General Thant to take whatever steps he considers necessary to bring about cease-fire talks in Vietnam.

December 21.—North Korean pilots are reported to be flying MIG jet fighters in North Vietnam and training Hanoi's pilots.

December 25.—Harrison Salisbury of The New York Times begins a visit to North Vietnam and claims U.S. planes have bombed towns and cities including Namdinh, the country's third largest city. U.S. officials admit that American planes have "accidentally struck civilian areas while attempting to bomb military targets."

December 30.—Britain invites North and South Vietnam to begin cease-fire talks on British territory.

December 31.—Secretary General Thant, in a reply to the U.S. request that he take the initiative in bringing about a Vietnam settlement, calls on the United States to halt "unconditionally" its bombing of North Vietnam.

December 31.—President Johnson states that targets bombed in North Vietnam are military in nature and that the United States makes every effort to minimize civilian casualties.

December 31.—U.S. troop strength in South Vietnam reaches 389,000.

1967

January 1.—The National Liberation Front announces that it will observe a 7-day truce during the Lunar New Year celebration of February 1967, U.S. planes down seven Communist MIG fighters, North Vietnam's biggest daily loss of the war.

January 3.—South Vietnam accepts the British proposal of December 30. North Vietnam rejects it.

January 3.—North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong asserts that Hanoi's four points are not "conditions" for peace talks but constitute a "basis for settlement" and "valid conclusions for discussion." U Thant states that North Vietnam's willingness to negotiate depends on an unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing.

January 3.—Thailand announces its intention to send troops to Vietnam and begins to train a 2,400-man volunteer regiment, which is expected to be sent in the summer of 1967.

January 4.—Senate Majority Leader Mansfield proposes that U.S. troops seal off South Vietnam by setting up a defensive line running along the 17th Parallel. Such a line, he said should be extended into Laos to cut off the Ho Chi Minh trail and other infiltration routes.

January 5.—North Vietnam's chief diplomatic representative in Western Europe states that if the United States will "definitively and unconditionally" stop bombing his country, Hanoi will "examine and study" proposals for negotiations.

January 8.—Ambassador Lodge predicts "sensational" military gains in 1967 and that open peace negotiations would probably never take place. United States and South Vietnamese troops begin Operation Cedar Falls in the Mekong Delta, the largest single offensive of the war.

January 10.—In a released statement, U Thant rejects the view that Vietnam is vital to U.S. security and dismisses the so-called "domino theory." He also states his disagreement with "the generally held view that the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam is a stooge of Hanoi" and describes the NLF as "an independent entity" similar to the National Liberation Front of Algeria.

January 11.—Hanoi demands that Thailand prohibit the United States from using bases in its territory to bomb North Vietnam.

January 13.—Gen. Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says the United States will not bomb MIG bases in North Vietnam.

January 13.—Representatives of seven Asian nations tell U Thant that the outcome of the Vietnam war is very important to the security of Southeast Asia and adjacent territories.

January 15.—French editor Rene Dabernat of the magazine, Paris Match, states that Peking informed Washington that it would not enter the Vietnam war, if the United States would not invade Red China and/or North Vietnam and would not bomb the dikes of the Red River in North Vietnam. The State Department declines to comment on the statement.

January 17.—South Vietnam proposes talks with Hanoi on extending the Lunar New Year's truce.

January 20.—Senator John Stennis calls for an intensification of the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam to include industrial and power installations and jet airfields. He also predicts that over 500,000 American troops will be needed in South Vietnam by the end of 1967.

January 23.—In his annual posture statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee and Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Secretary McNamara lists enemy strength in South Vietnam at 275,000 men including 45,000 North Vietnamese regulars. The Secretary claims that U.S. strategy is limiting the buildup of Communist forces in the south, because they are losing as many men as they can recruit.

January 23.—Senator Fulbright's book "The Arrogance of Power" is published, detailing an eight-point peace plan for Vietnam which provides for a series of negotiations between all parties concerned including the Vietcong, the cessation of U.S. air attacks against North Vietnam and a reduction of U.S. military operations, and the eventual neutralization of South Vietnam.

January 25.—The Associated Press reports an order by the Johnson administration barring American planes from venturing within 5 miles of the center of Hanoi.

January 25.—The President presents his budget for fiscal year 1968 to Congress. For Vietnam, it estimates expenditures at $21.9 billion. Total defense spending for fiscal 1968 is estimated at $73.1 billion. Defense Department expenditures for Vietnam in fiscal 1967 are estimated at $19.4 billion.

January 26.—U.S. officials acknowledge previous reports of secret negotiations with the National Liberation Front but claim that these dealt only with American prisoners held by the Vietcong.

January 28.—North Vietnam's Foreign Minister asserts that "it is only after the unconditional ending of the bombing and other acts of war being carried out by the United States against North Vietnam that there can be talks between the two countries." He also reiterates that Hanoi's four points provide the basis of a settlement.

January 31.—Former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, urges a prudent deescalation of the bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward peace talks, although he describes the prospects for negotiations as gloomy.

January 31.—The State Department declares that it sees no change in Hanoi's position on the opening of negotiations despite the January 28 comments of North Vietnam's Foreign Minister.

February 2.—President Johnson, at a news conference, says that he is unaware of any serious North Vietnamese effort to stop the fighting and move toward negotiations.

February 2.—The U.S.S.R. charges Communist China with hampering its aid shipments to North Vietnam.

February 8.—The Lunar New Year's truce begins.

February 8.—Premier Kosygin, in London for discussions with British officials, says that an unconditional halt in the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam is necessary to enable negotiations to take place.

February 8.—In a message to Pope Paul, President Johnson expresses the hope that the New Year's truce can be extended and open the way for negotiations.

February 9.—Secretary Rusk tells newsmen that the United States will not cease bombing North Vietnam until Hanoi shows a willingness to reduce its military effort in the south. He accuses Hanoi of trying to secure a halt in the air raids without any limitations on its own military activities.

February 11.—The State Department voices "serious concern" over reports that North Vietnam has taken advantage of the New Year's truce to increase its supplies to Communist forces in the south. Ambassador Goldberg reaffirms the U.S. willingness to enter into negotiations without preconditions.

February 11.—The Soviet newspaper Izvestia terms an end of the U.S. bombing a first step to the limiting of military operations in Vietnam and ultimately their cessation.

February 12.—The Allies resume ground action with the end of the truce, but U.S. planes do not bomb the north.

February 13.—Premier Kosygin ends his visit to Britain. Both Britain and the U.S.S.R. pledge to make every possible effort to achieve peace in Vietnam. Prime Minister Wilson and Premier Kosygin

are involved in an unsuccessful effort to achieve a phased de-escalation of the war and a beginning of peace talks.

February 14.—The United States bombs North Vietnam after a pause of nearly 6 days. President Johnson cites Hanoi's "major resupply efforts" during the break as justification for this action.

February 14.—Radio Hanoi declares that there can be no bargaining on North Vietnam's demand that the United States halt the bombing "unconditionally and for good."

February 15.—Secretary McNamara tells newsmen that the northern bombing has been effective but that the major military objectives of the war must be achieved in South Vietnam.

February 20.—A Chinese Communist Party newspaper publishes an article opposing any negotiations in return for a halt in the U.S. air attacks on North Vietnam.

February 23–24.—25,000 Allied troops begin Operation Junction City in a wide area near the South Vietnam-Cambodia border.

February 24.—Secretary McNamara states at a news conference that the United States might bomb new targets in North Vietnam.

February 25.—A newly released Gallup Poll indicates that 67 percent of the American people favor continuing the bombing of North Vietnam.

February 27.—U.S. planes begin to drop mines in North Vietnam's rivers.

March 1.—North Vietnam's Premier Pham Van Dong states that he does not think there is any possibility of negotiations between the opposing sides in Vietnam.

March 1.—The Senate, by a vote of 75 to 19, passes a resolution tied to a $4.5 billion military spending bill (for fiscal 1967) pledging support to President Johnson and others who are trying to prevent the expansion of the Vietnam war. President Johnson signs the bill on March 16 with the resolution attached.

March 2.—Senator Robert Kennedy proposes a three-step peace plan for Vietnam providing for a suspension of the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and an offer to negotiate within a week, negotiations linked with a mutual agreement not to increase the scale of infiltration and reinforcement, and a settlement allowing all major political elements in South Vietnam to participate in elections. The administration immediately replies, reaffirming U.S. policy that Hanoi must reduce its military activities in response to a suspension of the bombing.

March 3.—A North Vietnamese diplomat in Rangoon states that Secretary General Thant held discussions on Vietnam with envoys from Hanoi.

March 6.—Premier Kosygin declares that the recent U.S. escalation of the war will result in a corresponding increase in Communist aid to Hanoi.

March 8.—Former presidential adviser Arthur M. Schlesinger charges that the Johnson administration does not want to enter into negotiations on Vietnam.

March 10.—U.S. warplanes bomb the North Vietnamese Thainguyen iron and steel works for the first time.

March 15.—President Johnson announces in Nashville that Ellsworth Bunker will replace Henry Cabot Lodge as U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam.

1967—Continued

March 16–20.—The House and Senate pass a $12.2 billion supplemental (fiscal 1967) defense money bill for Vietnam. Senate vote, 77–3; House vote, 385–11.

March 20.—President Johnson arrives on Guam for meetings with United States and South Vietnamese officials. Premier Ky, in his opening speech, opposes a coalition government in South Vietnam which would include the Vietcong.

March 21.—North Vietnam's Foreign Ministry discloses that President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh exchanged letters in February. Ho rejected the President's call for peace talks unless the United States halted the bombing and all other acts of war against North Vietnam.

March 22.—U.S. officials announce plans to base B–52 bombers in Thailand for use in Vietnam.

March 23.—Senator Edward Brooke, upon his return from Southeast Asia, shifts his position on Vietnam to one of general support for administration policy. He expresses the opinion that North Vietnam at present is not interested in meaningful negotiations.

March 26.—Senator Stuart Symington suggests that the United States should bomb more meaningful targets in North Vietnam and indicates such targets should include Hanoi's MIG airfields.

March 27.—South Vietnam's Government approves the new constitution voted by the Constituent Assembly on March 18. The constitution was promulgated on April 1.

March 27.—A Senate Armed Services subcommittee issues a report charging that restrictions on U.S. pilots bombing North Vietnam have resulted in increased American casualties in the air war. The report proposes a relaxation of these limitations.

March 28.—Secretary General Thant discloses that, on March 14, he proposed to both sides a "standstill" truce in Vietnam as a first step toward peace negotiations. The United States and South Vietnam approved the plan but Hanoi rejected it.

March 28.—Communist China's Premier Chou En-lai, in an interview published in several U.S. newspapers in May, warns that China will enter the war if a U.S. invasion of North Vietnam occurs which threatens China's "security". Chou states that "Americans won't be allowed to approach our borders." He reportedly states that China would intervene if Hanoi was threatened with a "sellout peace" arranged by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. He repeats past statements by Chinese leaders that war between the U.S. and China is inevitable, but does not indicate that he believes such a war is imminent. Chou states that the Chinese had warned North Vietnamese leaders in January not to propose negotiations with the United States in exchange for a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam.

March 31–April 1.—Senator Joseph Clark proposes that the United States put U Thant's standstill cease-fire into effect unilaterally. Thant endorses Clark's idea.

April 1.—The Government decrees that elections for the President and the Senate will be held September 1, 1967, while the lower house of the Parliament will be chosen October 1, 1967.

April 3.—The State Department expresses concern that North Vietnam is brainwashing captured American pilots to obtain propaganda statements attacking U.S. policy.

April 8.—Saigon announces it will observe a 1-day truce on Buddha's birthday, May 23. The United States says it will observe the truce, including a halt to all bombing, but states that if the Communists use the period to resupply their troops then air attacks might be resumed.

April 11.—U.S. officials state that the Soviet Union and Communist China have apparently worked out an agreement to speed the flow of Soviet aid to North Vietnam.

April 18.—A SEATO ministerial meeting opens in Washington. Adm. Ulysses S. G. Sharp, commander of U.S. Pacific Forces, tells a Pentagon news conference that at least three North Vietnamese divisions threaten "a large-scale attack" along South Vietnam's northern border.

April 18.—Saigon, in response to a Canadian proposal, suggests that one means of bringing about peace might be a withdrawal by both sides from the demilitarized zone. Hanoi had already rejected the Canadian proposal.

April 19.—The United States proposes that both sides pull back military forces 10 miles from the demilitarized border zone as a first step toward peace talks. The North Vietnamese on April 21 rejected the proposal, calling it a "trick." The NLF on April 23 denounced the U.S. proposal.

April 20.—The SEATO ministers end their conference by issuing a communique stressing "that reciprocity is an essential element of any acceptable proposal for reduction in the fighting" in Vietnam.

April 20.—U.S. planes bomb two powerplants inside Haiphong for the first time. The United States and allies participating in the Vietnam war hold a strategy conference in Washington.

April 24.—U.S. planes attack two North Vietnamese MIG bases, marking the first strike against such installations.

April 24.—Communist China claims to have shot down 2 U.S. jets over Kwangsi Province bordering North Vietnam.

April 26.—Secretary McNamara states that North Vietnamese MIG activity has increased sufficiently within the last 3 weeks to justify bombing raids on the MIG bases.

April 27.—The Vietcong announces in a radio broadcast that it will observe a 48-hour truce for Buddha's birthday on May 23.

April 27.—Senator John McClellan charges that the use of some U.S. aid funds in Vietnam has been improper and "of highly questionable legality." He also describes the program as showing "gross laxity and inefficiency."

April 28.—In a speech before Congress, Gen. William Westmoreland predicts that U.S. forces will "prevail in Vietnam over the Communist aggressor." He also asserts that "in evaluating the enemy strategy, it is evident to me that he believes our Achilles heel is our resolve."

April 29.—State Department officials warn of the possibility of a full-scale North Vietnam invasion across the demilitarized zone and assert that a major attack of this type could change the nature of war from a guerrilla to a conventional one.

April 30.—Communist China rejects a recent appeal by Soviet Communist Party leader Brezhnev for unity in aiding North Vietnam and the Vietcong.

1967—Continued

April 30.—South Vietnam rules out any extension of the truce on Buddha's birthday without direct negotiations between Saigon and North Vietnam.

May 1.—In a speech before the annual meeting of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Secretary Rusk lists 28 peace proposals "made by ourselves and others" which North Vietnam had turned down.

May 1.—The Senate Republican Policy Committee releases a staff study critical of many aspects of U.S. Vietnam policy. The report questioned whether Republicans should continue to support "an open-ended—unilateral commitment to an Asian land war." Some Republican Senators, including Senate Minority Leader Dirksen, insisted this did not mean that Republicans might withdraw their support of administration policy in Vietnam. Senator Dirksen said that while "preserving the right of full and fair inquiry and criticism—we reaffirm our position standing four-square behind (the Commander-in-Chief) and our field, air and sea commanders in Southeast Asia."

May 2.—The New York Times reports information received from "informed sources" in Saigon that General Westmoreland had asked President Johnson to increase American strength in Vietnam to at least 600,000 men.

May 3.—At a news conference, President Johnson states that he has no "imminent" plans to substantially increase U.S. fighting strength in Vietnam.

May 4.—General Abrams arrives in Saigon to take up his duties as Deputy COMUSMACV.

May 4.—Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary Rusk declares that the United States "is not contemplating any nuclear ultimatum to North Vietnam" and insists that the United States remains ready and eager to meet with North Vietnamese leaders. He rules out, however, any unconditional halt to the American bombing of North Vietnam.

May 4.—Senator Cooper warns of the danger of a confrontation with Communist China if the Vietnam war continues to escalate. He calls on the administration to confine bombing to infiltration routes entering South Vietnam.

May 5.—U.S. Marines capture the third and final peak of Hill 881 after days of bitter fighting.

May 8.—Administration officials state that the United States did not bomb the immediate Hanoi area from mid-December to late April in an unsuccessful effort to open negotiations with North Vietnam. Washington reportedly informed Hanoi that if it took reciprocal steps, the United States would make other moves to deescalate the fighting.

May 10.—U.N. Secretary General Thant calls on the United States to "take a calculated risk" and halt the bombing of North Vietnam. He asserts his belief that such a step would result in peace talks within "a few weeks' time."

May 11.—Secretary General Thant expresses his fear that "the initial phase of world war III" is being fought in Vietnam. He states that if the present trend in the fighting continues, a United States-Chinese Communist confrontation is inevitable.

May 11.—South Vietnam's Premier Ky tells his Cabinet that he will run for president in the election scheduled for September 3. Later, Lt. Gen. Nguyen van Thieu, the country's chief of state, said it was "entirely possible" that he would oppose Ky in the contest.

May 13.—Premier Ky indicates he might respond "militarily" if a civilian whose policies he disagreed with is elected president. Ky also declares that press censorship will continue during the election campaign. On his reasons for continuing censorship, Ky on June 18 stated: "There are parts of a constitution that can be respected right away and there are others that take time."

May 14.—South Vietnam's Chief of State Thieu states his belief that 50,000 American or allied troops will be needed 10 to 20 years after the end of the Vietnam war to guard against future aggression. He also states that he expects heavy fighting to continue for 2 to 3 years followed by 3 or 4 years of cleanup operations.

May 14.—General Lewis W. Walt, U.S. Marine Commander in Vietnam, states that more allied troops are needed there, particularly in order to insure the success of the pacification effort.

May 15.—South Vietnam's National Assembly rules that military men can run for the presidency in the September 3 elections without resigning from the armed forces.

May 15.—Senator Mansfield, in a Senate speech, repeats previous calls for a U.N. Security Council meeting, to be attended by all belligerents, to debate and attempt to achieve a peaceful solution of the Vietnam war.

May 17.—Sixteen U.S. Senators, who in the past have criticized the extent of American involvement in Vietnam, issue a statement urging North Vietnam to negotiate and warning that, despite disagreements with some aspects of U.S. policy, they remain "steadfastly opposed" to an unilateral withdrawal of American forces.

May 18–19.—U.S. and South Vietnamese forces for the first time in the war, move into the demilitarized zone separating North and South Vietnam while U.S. planes bomb a powerplant 1 mile north of the center of Hanoi.

May 19.—South Vietnam's chief of state Thieu declares his candidacy for President in the September 3 elections. On June 14 he made a "formal" announcement of his candidacy.

May 21.—In a television interview, General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, states that U.S. commanders in Vietnam have strict orders to stay out of North Vietnam even if engaged in "hot pursuit" of the enemy. He said that: "We have no intention of invading North Vietnam."

May 22.—In issuing his Memorial Day proclamation, President Johnson calls on North Vietnam to help negotiate a way "out of this bloody impasse."

May 23.—State Department officials reportedly state that if Communist China intervenes with massive forces in Vietnam, the United States would have to take action with everything it had. They add that they consider a Chinese intervention very unlikely at the present time.

May 24.—Former Premier Tran Van Huong announces his candidacy for President of South Vietnam.

1967—Continued

May 30.—Secretary of Defense McNamara authorizes the Navy to spend $800,000 for "exploratory" demothballing of the battleship *New Jersey* to see how much it will cost to prepare it for service off Vietnam. Press reports earlier in May had claimed a decision had been made by the Defense Department to recommission a battleship for Vietnam service.

May 31.—The National Liberation Front issues a statement that it will "respect the territorial integrity of Cambodia in its present borders" and "recognize and undertake to respect the present border between South Vietnam and Cambodia."

June 11.—U.S. jets attack the North Vietnamese airfield at Kep, (Reconnaissance photos show 10 MIG's destroyed or damaged.)

June 12.—South Vietnam releases 39 sick and wounded North Vietnamese prisoners at the border separating North and South Vietnam. According to press reports, the U.S. Government prompted the move because of its concern over the treatment of American captives in North Vietnam and in the hope that Hanoi might respond by releasing sick and wounded prisoners.

June 12.—U.S. military spokesmen state that U.S. planes have destroyed 115 North Vietnamese aircraft, roughly equal to the strength of the North Vietnamese combat air force in 1965. However, American intelligence sources reportedly have stated that Soviet deliveries of MIG fighters have kept the Hanoi air force at a strength of 100 planes or more.

June 13.—Prince Norodom Sihanouk announces that Cambodia will establish diplomatic relations with North Vietnam and that both Hanoi and the Vietcong have recognized Cambodia's frontiers.

June 15.—The Constituent Assembly, acting as the provisional national legislature, promulgates the electoral law for both senatorial and presidential elections in South Vietnam. The law had been passed by the assembly on May 16. Both elections are scheduled to take place on September 3. All senatorial candidates will run on a nationwide basis.

June 15.—Premier Ky states that 600,000 U.S. troops are needed in Vietnam. Ky also said he had changed his mind about his earlier statement that he would not oppose Chief of Staff Thieu in the presidential election.

June 20.—The United States formally expressed regret for damages caused to the Soviet ship *Turkestan* on June 2 off the North Vietnamese port of Campha. The Department of Defense on June 18 had conceded that fire from U.S. planes aimed at antiaircraft guns protecting Campha may have struck the *Turkestan*. The U.S. note added that every effort would be made to "insure that such incidents do not occur." The United States had earlier denied Soviet charges that American planes had damaged the Soviet ship.

June 23–25.—President Johnson and Soviet Premier Kosygin hold conferences at Glassboro, N.J., with no apparent success in reaching agreement on steps toward a solution of the Vietnam war. At a news conference on June 25 following the talks, Kosygin describes the United States as the aggressor in Vietnam and calls for the unconditional cessation of the American bombing of North Vietnam and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam.

June 26.—Communist Chinese fighters attack and down a U.S. F4C Phantom jet south of Hainan Island. The Defense Department states that the plane had drifted off course on a flight from the Philippines to Danang, South Vietnam.

June 27.—Former General Duong Van Minh announces from exile in Bangkok that he is a candidate for President in the September elections.

June 29.—Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker tells newsmen that: "The policy of the United States is to support fair, free, and honest elections" in South Vietnam.

June 30.—Immediately following a Soviet charge that U.S. planes had damaged the Russian merchant ship, *Mikhail Frunze*, in Haiphong Harbor, the Defense Department acknowledges that American bombs directed at an antiaircraft site in the port area may have struck the vessel.

June 30.—After three days of meetings of the ruling Armed Forces Council, Premier Ky withdraws from the presidential race to seek the vice-presidency on a ticket headed by Chief of State Thieu.

July 7.—Secretary McNamara arrives in Saigon to begin his ninth on-the-spot review of the Vietnam war.

July 9.—Following briefings from field commanders and an inspection of U.S. positions, Secretary McNamara comments that more progress has been made in the last 9 months than in the previous 6 years. In a "Meet the Press' interview, Presidential Assistant Walt W. Rostow states that North Vietnam's strategy has "shifted from a posture of trying to win the war to keeping the war going."

July 11.—At a Saigon press conference before his return to Washington, Secretary McNamara states that the United States will continue to "provide the troops which our commanders consider necessary" but that "what is necessary depends on the extent to which we are using the resources we have available to us."

July 12.—At a news conference, South Vietnam's Chief of State Thieu rules out a general mobilization of South Vietnam because of the problems of training and equipping additional troops. He states that his country needs more American troops in order to exploit more successfully recent military gains.

July 12.—Secretary McNamara tells reporters at the White House that more American troops will be needed in Vietnam beyond the present approved ceiling of 480,000, although the exact amount has yet to be fixed. He states that substantial progress has been made on nearly all fronts, although progress in the pacification effort has been "very slow."

July 13.—Following a meeting with his chief military advisers including General Westmoreland, President Johnson tells newsmen that: "We have reached a meeting of the minds. The troops that General Westmoreland needs and requests—as we feel it necessary—will be supplied."

July 15.—The Vietcong stage a massive mortar attack on the U.S. air base at Danang, killing 13 Americans and wounding 150. The shelling destroys 11 planes and damages 10 more.

July 16.—The United States, in a diplomatic note made public admits that U.S. planes may have bombed the Soviet ship, *Mik-*

1967—Continued

hail Frunze in Haiphong Harbor on June 29 but warns that foreign ships entering areas of hostilities run the risk of sustaining damage.

July 17.—The White House issues an appeal to North Vietnam and the Vietcong to agree to an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war and to permit International Red Cross inspection of the condition of prisoners.

July 19.—Speaking at a press conference, Secretary Rusk forecasts "a long tough job ahead" in Vietnam, even though the Communists "are hurting very badly." On the bombing of North Vietnam, he states that "we are not prepared to stop half the war while the other half goes on unrestricted, unimpeded, and with maximum violence."

July 18–19.—South Vietnam's Constituent Assembly approves 11 slates of candidates to be entered in the September presidential elections, including the Thieu-Ky ticket. It rejects seven slates including those headed by exiled Gen. Duong Van Minh and "peace candidate," Au Truong Thanh.

July 22.—Presidential Advisers Gen. Maxwell Taylor and Clark Clifford leave for a tour of the Far East and discussions with leaders of the "Manila nations" amid reports that they intend to ask these countries to increase the size of their military forces in Vietnam.

July 22.—Premier Ky announces that South Vietnam will increase the size of its armed forces and will overhaul the entire military establishment "at every level." He repeats his view that 600,000 American troops are needed in Vietnam. He states that South Vietnam will allow political exiles to return home after the presidential elections.

July 24.—A military spokesman in Saigon discloses that allied units are making regular sweeps through the demilitarized zone but that they are observing the provisions of the Geneva Agreements which prohibit the permanent stationing of troops in the zone.

July 27.—Premier Ky announces after talks with General Taylor and Clark Clifford that South Vietnam will increase the size of its armed forces by 65,000 men to approximately 685,000. He also states that he will overthrow any opposition ticket that wins the September presidential election by "trickery."

July 30.—Speaking in Greensboro, N.C., U.N. Secretary General Thant says that the Vietnam war cannot end until the United States recognizes that it is "a war of national independence" rather than a war of Communist aggression.

August 1.—State Department press officer Robert McCloskey discloses that the United States had proposed on May 27 a strengthening of the International Control Commission along the Cambodia-South Vietnam border and a reestablishment of United States Cambodian "contacts." He adds that Cambodia had rejected the proposals on June 8.

August 3.—President Johnson announces that he has authorized the raising of the maximum limit of U.S. personnel in South Vietnam to 525,000. South Korean officials tell the Associated Press that the Seoul government has "agreed in principle" to send about 17,000 reservists to man supply lines in South Vietnam.

August 5.—President advisers Clifford and Taylor return from a 2-week trip to the capitals of the "Manila countries." Clifford states that there was "unanimous agreement among all the allies that the bombing (of North Vietnam) should be carried on at its present level or possible at an increased level." Taylor adds that a consensus existed among the allies for a maximum effort in the war.

August 7.—Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia issues a statement accusing pro-Peking leftists in his country of subversive activity aimed at turning Cambodia into a dependency of Communist China.

August 8.—South Vietnam's Chief of State Thieu states that, if he wins the September presidential election, he would ask Hanoi to negotiate with his government.

August 9.—Following a closed hearing of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, Senator Stennis, the chairman, states that Adm. Ulysses S. Sharp commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, had testified that the United States should continue the bombing of North Vietnam and that more valuable military targets could be hit.

August 11.—South Vietnam's Defense Minister Gen. Cao Van Vien states that the bombing of North Vietnam will not itself stop the infiltration into the South and that the war will last another 20 to 30 years unless the infiltration is halted. The UPI account of his statement quotes the general as saying that the allies are bombing infiltration routes in Cambodia. A Pentagon spokesman denies this.

August 11.—A dozen Senators from both parties charge that the South Vietnamese election is being turned into a "farce" by the ruling military junta. Senate leaders reject a request from South Vietnam to send a delegation to observe the election in September. Senator Mansfield says he could "see no reason why Congress should involve itself in this matter by sending a delegation to observe the process". Senator Dirksen, the Republican leader, says he is opposed to any observer role for Congress. Assistant Secretary of State Bundy declares that the United States had assurances from Generals Thieu and Ky that the elections would be free.

August 11.—U.S. planes bomb and destroy the center span of North Vietnam's most important railway bridge linking Hanoi with Haiphong and Communist China.

August 12.—An Air Force spokesman in Saigon discloses that the United States has been bombing Communist targets in Laos since May 1964 at the request of the Royal Laotian Government.

August 12.—U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Harold K. Johnson says at a White House news conference that the planned dispatch of 45,000 additional U.S. troops to Vietnam should be enough "to carry through a solution."

August 12.—Premier Ky denies charges that his government has rigged the coming elections and invites U.S. Congressmen to observe them.

August 13.—Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp discloses that the Chinese communists are operating some of North Vietnam's antiaircraft guns used in defense against U.S. air attacks. Presidential envoys Taylor and Clifford state that, on their recent Asian trip, they had conveyed

President Johnson's personal warning to the Saigon government that rigged elections would alienate the American people.

August 15.—Senator John Stennis releases the previously secret testimony of Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee in which Sharp stressed the importance of continuous air attacks on North Vietnam and pointed out that the northeast sector of North Vietnam contained "many fixed and transitory targets that have not been struck."

August 17.—President Johnson states during a White House ceremony that South Vietnam's election campaign may not be "without blemish" but that it represents a serious effort to conduct "an open election in a nation under fire." He also says that Generals Thieu and Ky "have given their pledge that they will support the outcome of fair elections whoever wins."

August 17.—Gen. Earle Wheeler testifies before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee that North Vietnam has shown a "marked ability" to recuperate from the U.S. bombing and that the United States has to bomb targets repeatedly to make sure that the level of destruction is maintained.

August 18.—U.S. officials announce that Communist strength in South Vietnam had been declining by about 2,000 men per month since January 1967 and that the U.S. command would probably lower the estimate of Communist strength from the current level of 297,000.

August 18.—President Johnson declares at a news conference that the bombing of North Vietnam close to the Chinese border does not threaten China and that Peking is aware of that. He denies that the war is a stalemate.

August 19.—South Vietnam's Chief of State Thieu pledges to serve a civilian President if a civilian should be elected on September 3.

August 21.—The Defense Department announces that two Navy A–6A Intruder aircraft had strayed over Communist China during a raid on North Vietnam close to Hanoi and had been destroyed by Communist fighters.

August 22.—Testifying before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. John P. McConnell asserts that 800,000 additional soldiers would have been needed in Vietnam if there had been no bombing of North Vietnam. He credits the bombing with preventing the Communists from cutting South Vietnam in half in 1965 but declares that "there are valuable targets remaining unstruck."

August 22.—Communist China accuses the United States of a "bold war provocation" in ordering the bombing of North Vietnamese targets close to its border. Peking's People's Daily refers to what it calls the "erroneous appraisal" made by the United States of Chinese intentions during the Korean war.

August 22.—In a letter to Vice President Humphrey and Speaker of the House McCormack, Premier Ky denies charges that his government has sabotaged the campaigning of South Vietnam's civilian presidential candidates and asserts that he and General Thieu will accept the results of the September 3 election.

August 23.—President Johnson names a 20-man commission to observe the elections in South Vietnam, South Vietnam's Foreign Minister announces that observers are coming from at least six other nations besides the United States: Belgium, New Zealand, Greece, Japan, Laos, and the Philippines.

August 25.—Secretary McNamara tells the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee that he opposes a widening of the range of bombing targets in North Vietnam. He expresses the belief that no level of bombing short of direct strikes on population centers will weaken Hanoi's will to carry on the war, which he says must be determined in the south rather than the north.

August 27.—Appearing on NBC's "Meet the Press," Assistant Secretary of State Bundy predicts that none of South Vietnam's presidential candidates will receive a majority of the votes cast. Bundy suggests that the winners could bring in leading members of other tickets into a government that would then "speak for a very, very high percentage of people." He also says that Washington would "take very seriously" any request by the new, postelection Saigon Government for a bombing pause.

August 27.—Chief of State Thien said he would meet with individual members of the NLF to discuss problems but would not recognize them as equals or as an official negotiating group.

August 29.—Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. Harold K. Johnson tells the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee that the United States should bomb Haiphong harbor. Eleven Senators, including Senate Majority Leader Mansfield, urged the administration to place the Vietnam issue before the U.N. Security Council.

August 31.—The Senate Preparedness Subcommittee issues a 20-page report following its hearings on the bombing of North Vietnam. It asserts that Secretary McNamara has "shackled" the campaign and calls for the "closure, neutralization, or isolation" of Haiphong.

September 1.—The Vietcong radio broadcasts a new national liberation front political program, which states that the front's objective is to overthrow the Saigon Government to establish a "national union democratic government" composed of "the most representative persons" among various social, religious, ethnic, and political groups. The program promises a number of democratic freedoms and a neutral foreign policy but one in which the NLF will take an active part in the struggle of the world's people against U.S. imperialism. It asserts that reunification with North Vietnam would take place through negotiations.

September 1.—President Johnson denies the existence of a "deep division" within the administration over the bombing of North Vietnam.

September 3.—South Vietnam's presidential elections take place. Approximately 4.8 million voters participate—81 percent of the registered voters. General Thieu wins the presidency, receiving about 35 percent of the vote.

September 6.—President Johnson's 22-man panel of election observers report that South Vietnam's elections were generally fair.

September 7.—Secretary McNamara announces that the United States will build an anti-infiltration barrier along the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam.

1967—Continued

September 11.—U.S. planes bomb the North Vietnamese port of Campha for the first time on September 11 and attack four previously untouched targets in Haiphong on the 12th.

September 14–16.—A long article by North Vietnamese Defense Minister General Vo Nguyen Giap on Communist strategy in Vietnam is published in Nhan Dan. Though Giap still cites the standard line of fighting a protracted war to weaken and defeat the United States, he warned that "our fight will be more violent in the days ahead," that the NLF would "step up their armed and political struggle, make the great people's war develop to a new degree and completely defeat the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys." Giap claimed that the United States had been forced to shift its troops to meet Communist initiatives, thereby disrupting pacification and "search and destroy" operations in large areas and enabling the Communist political infrastructure to further strengthen its position. Giap indicated that this tactic would be continued.

September 17.—Harry S. Ashmore, executive vice president of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara, Calif., accuses President Johnson of nullifying a secret and conciliatory letter to Hanoi drafted by him and State Department officials in January 1967. He claims that the letter proposed that both sides show some reciprocal restraint as a prelude to peace talks to indicate that neither side intended to use the occasion of the talks for military advantage, while President Johnson's letter of February 2 to Ho Chi Minh proposed a specific halt to North Vietnamese infiltration in return for a cessation of the U.S. bombing of the north.

September 18.—The State Department issues a reply to the Ashmore accusation of September 17, asserting that no inconsistency existed between the Johnson and Ashmore letters to Ho Chi Minh. Assistant Secretary of State Bundy states that Ashmore was involved in only a peripheral part of U.S. peace efforts.

September 21.—Speaking to the U.N. General Assembly, Ambassador Goldberg cites North Vietnam's failure to give a definite pledge that it will enter meaningful negotiations if the United States halts the northern bombing.

September 21.—About 1,200 Thai troops land in Vietnam as the first of 2,500 troops expected to participate in the Vietnam war.

September 22.—The Defense Department states that North Vietnamese troops operate fairly frequently between Cambodia and South Vietnam.

September 23.—The Soviet Union and North Vietnam sign an aid agreement, which provides for increased deliveries of military equipment (both air defense weapons and small arms), vehicles, petroleum, and other materials designed to bolster Hanoi's economy. Premier Kosygin pledges to support North Vietnam "till total victory" but declares that "perspectives for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese question have been opened recently."

September 26.—Premier Souvanna Phouma of Laos says in an interview that he would oppose any U.S. project to extend the anti-infiltration barrier into Laotian territory.

September 26.—An editorial appearing in the official North Vietnamese newspaper, Nhan Dan, rejects the idea of North Vietnam rendering definite assurances that it will negotiate in return for a U.S. bombing halt.

September 27.—Canada proposes to the U.N. General Assembly a four-point Vietnam peace plan: (1) the end of the bombing of North Vietnam linked to the restoration of the "intended status" of the demilitarized zone separating North and South Vietnam; (2) a freeze on military operations and capabilities throughout Vietnam at the existing levels; (3) a cease-fire; and (4) a withdrawal of all outside forces, whose presence is not provided for in the 1954 Geneva accords, and the dismantling of all military bases.

September 29.—President Johnson declares in a speech at San Antonio that the United States will stop the bombing of North Vietnam "when this will lead promptly to productive discussions. We would assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation."

October 2.—South Vietnam's Constituent Assembly approves the election of Nguyen Van Thieu as President by a vote of 58 to 43.

October 3.—The North Vietnamese official newspaper, Nhan Dan, rejects President Johnson's San Antonio proposals as "nothing new."

October 4.—U.S. military authorities in Saigon claim that massive U.S. firepower had broken the North Vietnamese siege of Conthien.

October 4.—The Senate Preparedness Subcommittee makes public the testimony of Air Force Chief of Staff John P. McConnell, who stated that in 1965 the Johnson administration turned down a Joint Chiefs of Staff proposal that the United States employ a "very severe application of airpower" and destroy 94 key North Vietnamese targets in 16 days. He also said that Secretary McNamara had authorized the bombing of 45 previously prohibited targets since the committee began hearings early in August 1967.

October 12.—Speaking at a news conference, Secretary Rusk terms the Vietnam war a testing ground for Asia's ability to withstand the threat of "a billion Chinese * * * armed with nuclear weapons."

October 17.—Australia announces that it will increase the size of its Vietnam force from 6,300 to 8,000. New Zealand announces that it will send an additional 170 infantrymen to join the 370 already there.

October 19.—The official North Vietnamese newspaper, Nhan Dan, states that Hanoi had rejected U.S. offers of a conditional bombing pause because "the root of the war in Vietnam is U.S. aggression, the world's people, including the Americans, have urged that the root be pulled out, that the United States stop its aggression against Vietnam, recognize the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, withdraw U.S. troops from South Vietnam, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs."

October 25.—U.S. planes bomb North Vietnam's largest air base, Phucyen, for the first time.

October 25.—Fifty-five Senators from both parties introduce a "sense of the Senate" resolution, asking President Johnson to consider bringing the U.S. resolution of January 31, 1966, to the U.N. Security Council for action.

1967—Continued

October 29.—Thailand's Interior Minister tells newsmen that his country will send 12,000 additional troops to Vietnam as soon as the United States provides arms and equipment.

October 31.—General Thieu is inaugurated as President of the Republic of Vietnam. He names Nguyen Van Loc as Premier.

November 1.—Speaking at the Chu Lai air base in Vietnam, Vice President Humphrey states his belief that South Vietnam and its allies are "winning the struggle" and cites "very significant progress" in political developments in the country.

November 2.—Ambassador Goldberg tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States would not object if the U.N. Security Council decided that the National Liberation Front should be invited to Vietnam peace talks. He also states that Washington would recognize the competence of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in determining the participants and scope of a new Geneva Conference on Southeast Asia and that U.S. efforts at the U.N. had been directed at bringing about such a conference.

November 10.—Soviet Premier Kosygin tells members of the National Liberation Front that the U.S.S.R. will provide the front with all necessary support in its struggle against "American aggression."

November 10.—Vice President Humphrey states on NBC television that: "We are on the offensive; territory is being gained. We are making steady progress. . . ."

November 11.—Speaking aboard the aircraft carrier *Enterprise*, President Johnson suggests that Vietnam peace talks take place aboard a neutral ship in neutral waters.

November 11.—U.S. officials in Saigon disclosed that 67 percent of South Vietnam's population live in areas controlled by the Government. The Communists control 17 percent, while the remaining 16 percent live in contested areas.

November 11.—President Thieu says that allied forces will observe cease-fires at Christmas, New Year's, and Tet, the lunar new year.

November 13.—Ambassador Bunker tells newsmen in Washington that he sees "steady progress: on Vietnam's military and political fronts" and that "there is every prospect too that the progress will accelerate."

November 14.—North Vietnam rejects President Johnson's offer to conduct negotiations at sea.

November 14.—Thailand's Cabinet gives final approval to the dispatch of a full division—10,000 to 12,000 men—to Vietnam. The State Department acknowledges on November 20 that the United States will provide Thailand with surface-to-air missiles.

November 15.—General Westmoreland arrives in Washington for talks on Vietnam and tells newsmen that: "I have never been more encouraged in my 4 years in Vietnam." When asked about the possibility of a new bombing pause, he says: "I'm not happy about the prospect, but we can live with it for short periods." Following testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Ambassador Bunker states that a long pause would be "very unfortunate" unless there are indications it would lead to something.

November 15.—President Johnson and Japanese Premier Sato issue a joint communique at the conclusion of Sato's visit to Washington, which calls for reciprocity in response to an American halt of the bombing of North Vietnam.

November 16.—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approves two "sense of the Senate resolutions": (1) that the commitment of U.S. forces to future foreign wars be in accordance with constitutional processes, "which, in addition to appropriate executive action require affirmative action by Congress specifically intended to give rise to such commitment," and (2) asking that the President consider placing the Vietnam question before the United Nations.

November 16.—U.S. planes bomb Haiphong's shipyard No. 2 for the first time in the war.

November 17.—President Johnson tells a news conference that the United States has no plans to increase its Vietnam troop strength beyond the authorized limit of 525,000.

November 17.—U.S. planes bomb the Bacmai airfield near the center of Hanoi for the first time.

November 19.—General Westmoreland states that Communist strength in Vietnam could be sufficiently sapped by 1969 to permit the withdrawal of some U.S. troops. He cautions that initial withdrawals would depend on South Vietnam's ability to shoulder a greater burden of the fighting.

November 19.—The Vietcong announces that it will observe 3-day cease-fires for both Christmas and New Years and a 7-day truce over the Tet new year in February 1968.

November 20.—Associated Press staff writers George McArthur and Herbert Foas report that a group of foreign correspondents had discovered a large Vietcong camp on the Cambodian side of the border with South Vietnam.

November 20–24.—Heavy fighting between Allied and North Vietnamese troops rages around Dakto in the Central Highlands.

November 21.—General Westmoreland says in a speech at the National Press Club that the Vietnam war has reached a point "when the end begins to come into view." He states that South Vietnamese forces would undertake "a major share of frontline defense" of the demilitarized zone area in 1968 and that the United States would intensify its operations in the Mekong Delta.

November 24.—The U.S. command in Saigon issues a revised estimate of Communist strength in South Vietnam. The estimate is 223,000 to 248,000 men plus an additional 75,000 to 85,000 political cadres.

November 25.—Hungarian journalist Istvan I. Szabo states in Vientiane, Laos, that Ho Chi Minh is seriously ill and is delegating more authority to Premier Pham Van Dong.

November 29.—General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, states in an interview that "there is no intention or plan to change the character of the Vietnam war."

November 29.—North Vietnam's army newspaper predicts that American and Communist forces will be embroiled in savage fighting during the next few months.

November 30.—The Senate passes by a vote of 82 to 0 a "sense of the Senate resolution," calling on the President to "consider taking

1967—Continued

the initiative" in bringing the Vietnam question before the U.S. Security council.

December 2.—President Thieu says that South Vietnamese troops should cross into Cambodia when pursuing Vietcong forces.

December 5.—The State Department issues a statement that the United States would not oppose a U.N. invitation to the National Liberation Front to appear before the Security Council. The South Vietnamese Government declares its opposition to a Front appearance at the U.N.

December 7.—Speaking on a CBS radio panel discussion, Vice President Humphrey states that the South Vietnamese Government has contacts with individual members of the National Liberation Front and that "it is possible that there may be a split within the NLF—I don't know." He also says that, at some future date, non-Communist members of the Front might be brought into a national government.

December 7.—Ambassador Goldberg confirms reports that the National Liberation Front had inquired as to whether it would be permitted to send two envoys to the U.S. The United States had replied that it would grant visas in connection with U.N. business, meaning an invitation from the Security Council or General Assembly. Goldberg further asserts that the Front's response indicated that it did not seek official status for its representatives at the U.N., although they would work principally there. The State Department on December 8 spelled this out in more detail: "So far as the situation in the United Nations is concerned, Ambassador Goldberg has made clear * * * that we would not oppose representatives of the NLF presenting their view to the United Nations when they are officially invited for official business. The question of the NLF's coming to the United Nations under an official invitation is of course totally different from any question of their entering the United States for propaganda purposes. We do oppose their coming merely to mount a propaganda campaign."

December 9.—U.N. Secretary General Thant tells newsmen that the National Liberation Front had sought to send representatives to the U.N. "on the same basis as the Algerian NLF 10 years ago" and that it was his impression that the NLF "did not want to come to the Security Council."

December 12.—The official Cambodian radio states that the Vietcong "have used Cambodia as a haven" but denies that Cambodia allows the Communists to move supplies through its territory into South Vietnam.

December 19.—In a television interview with correspondents of the three major television networks, President Johnson states that talks between the Saigon government and members of the National Liberation "could bring good results." As principles for a final settlement of the conflict, he emphasizes an end to North Vietnamese infiltration of Laos, the principle of one-man, one-vote constitutional government throughout South Vietnam including Vietcong-held areas, and peaceful negotiations aimed at eventual unity between North and South Vietnam.

December 20.—The Washington Post reports that the U.S. Government is considering the use of South Vietnamese troops to pursue

the Vietcong into Cambodia and that, according to South Vietnamese officers and American advisers, Cambodian troops had fired across the border into South Vietnam in support of Vietcong operations.

December 20.—President Thieu tells newsmen that his Government would never recognize the National Liberation Front as a legal body but that he would be willing to talk to individual NLF members who came "over to our side."

December 21.—President Johnson and Thieu issue a joint statement in Canberra, Australia, in which Thieu expressed the willingness to "discuss relevant matters with any individuals now associated with the so-called National Liberation Front while making it clear that his Government could not regard the front as an independent organization in any sense." They also affirmed the principles of a settlement that President Johnson had enumerated on television two days earlier.

December 23.—President Johnson and Pope Paul meet in Rome, and the President expresses support for the Pope's call for "mutual restraint" in the Vietnam war.

December 24.—The 24-hour allied Christmas truce goes into effect in Vietnam.

December 26.—South Vietnam's Foreign Minister Tran Van Do states in Paris that South Vietnam's forces will employ the doctrine of hot pursuit if Communist troops used Cambodia as a sanctuary from which to cross the border into South Vietnam.

December 27.—Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk says "that he might seek volunteers" from Communist China and other Communist countries if U.S. troops entered Cambodia.

December 29.—Prince Sihanouk says that Cambodia will not intervene militarily to stop U.S. troops from entering certain sections of its territory in pursuit of Communist forces if he were convinced that Communist units had crossed the Cambodian frontier into outlying regions difficult to control. He warns against South Vietnamese forces crossing the border.

December 29.—Communist China promises "all-out support" to Cambodia if the United States extends the Vietnam war into that country.

December 30–31.—The allies announce a 12-hour extension of the 24-hour New Years truce in response to a plea by Pope Paul.

1968

January 1.—Radio Hanoi broadcasts a December 24 statement by North Vietnam's Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh that Hanoi "will hold talks with the United States on relevant questions" after the United States has "unconditionally" halted the northern bombing and all other acts of war against North Vietnam.

January 2.—The allied New Years truce ends and the United States resumes the bombing of North Vietnam.

January 4.—Secretary Rusk tells a press conference that the United States will explore fully North Vietnam's statement that it will negotiate if the United States stopped the northern bombing.

1968—Continued

January 4.—The White House announces that Ambassador Chester Bowles will represent the United States in talks with Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk.

January 6.—President Thieu states that Saigon and Hanoi should be the principal parties to any peace negotiations.

January 10.—Prince Sihanouk tells a news conference that his Government and the United States had agreed to ways of preventing the Vietnam war from spilling over into Cambodia and that Ambassador Chester Bowles had given assurances that the United States would do everything possible to avoid violating the Cambodian border.

January 11.—Assistant Secretary of State Bundy states that it was now up to the International Control Commission to keep the Vietnam war from spreading into Cambodia and that if Poland continued to block effective steps, it was up to "a majority of the Commission" to act. He describes India's attitude as critical.

January 12.—Following 5 days of talks in Cambodia, Ambassador Bowles and Prince Sihanouk issue a joint communique stating that Bowles had "renewed American assurances of respect for Cambodian sovereignty, neutrality, and territorial integrity" and had expressed the hope that "effective functioning of the International Control Commission" would avert violations of Cambodia's territory and neutrality by forces operating in Vietnam.

January 13.—Cambodia makes public a note to the International Control Commission, asking it to ascertain, verify, and report Vietnam war incidents that occur in Cambodia and investigate and report "all foreign infiltration" into the country.

January 15.—Speaking to a group of Vietnamese newspaper editors, President Thieu declares that South Vietnam "should have the central role in any development relating to the events in Vietnam" and that "peace efforts should be made by the Saigon Government." Secretary Rusk states in Washington that there could be no decisions on negotiations "without full consultation with" the Saigon Government and that the future of South Vietnam could not be decided without the "full participation" of the South Vietnamese Government.

January 17.—President Johnson says in his state of the Union message that North Vietnam "must not take advantage of our restraint as they have in the past" if the United States halted the northern bombing. He asserts that Washington is "exploring the meaning" of Hanoi's statement that it will negotiate if the United States stops the bombing and that should negotiations begin, the United States would consult with its allies and the other side to determine "if a complete cessation of hostilities * * * could be made the first order of business."

January 19.—Cambodia charges that United States and South Vietnamese forces intruded 200 yards into its territory on January 18, killing three Cambodians.

January 22.—The State Department acknowledges that a combined United States-South Vietnamese patrol had entered Cambodian territory on January 18 in the heat of battle with a Vietcong unit that had fled into that country.

January 25.—Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Clark Clifford, the President's nominee for Secretary of Defense, states that he would "assume" that North Vietnam would "Continue to transport the normal amount of goods, munitions, men to South Vietnam" if the United States halted the northern bombing. He emphasizes the President's condition that Hanoi must "not take advantage of" a bombing halt to carry out a military buildup. In Saigon, President Thieu states that the bombing could be stopped only if North Vietnam halted "all its aggressive activities."

January 29.—The Allies cancel their 36-hour Tet truce in South Vietnam's five northernmost provinces and state that the United States will continue bombing North Vietnam south of Vinh, a city about 125 miles north of the demilitarized zone. U.S. sources cite the Communist buildup around Khesanh as the reason for the cancellation.

January 30–31.—The Communists launch simultaneous attacks on major South Vietnamese cities, including Saigon (January 31), where they temporarily invade the grounds of the U.S. Embassy. President Thieu announces a total cancellation of the 36-hour Allied Tet truce.

January 31.—President Thieu declares martial law throughout South Vietnam as the Communists continue their attacks on Allied bases and major cities. U.S. officials in Saigon state that the Communists had attacked more than half of South Vietnam's 44 provincial capitals plus 25 airfields.

February 1.—Secretary McNamara presents his final posture statement to the Congress. He warns that the combat strength of North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam "may increase sharply in the next few months" and states that North Vietnam's manpower reserves are adequate to meet current demands and that Hanoi can support a higher level of military mobilization. He declares that ultimate success in South Vietnam depends on the ability of the Saigon government to reestablish its authority over its territory so that peaceful reconstruction can be undertaken. He states that the bombing of North Vietnam had left few strategically important targets unstruck but expresses the opinion that the air attacks could not pinch off the flow of military supplies into the south.

February 2.—President Johnson tells newsmen that the Communists had failed to achieve their stated goal of sparking a general uprising in South Vietnam's cities. He also states that he has no evidence to indicate a connection between the *Pueblo* incident and the Communist Tet offensive but that practically every expert whom he had consulted thought a connection did exist.

February 4.—Secretary Rusk expresses the view on NBC's "Meet the Press" that the recent Communist attacks on South Vietnamese cities showed "that they are not seriously interested at the present time in talking about a peaceful settlement. * * *" He also says that, while the United States had been exploring the meaning of North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Trinh's statement of December 29, 1967, it had exercised some restraint in the bombing of the North, particularly in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong.

1968—Continued

February 6.—Dang Quang Minh, chief National Liberation Front representative in Moscow, states that the NLF aim in its latest attacks was to overthrow the Saigon government.

February 8.—Radio Hanoi quotes North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Trinh as saying that negotiations "will begin as soon as the United States has proved that it has really stopped unconditionally the bombings and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam." He rejects the San Antonio formula as a basis for talks.

February 13.—President Thieu states that more U.S. troops are needed in South Vietnam if the war was to be ended soon.

February 13.—The Pentagon announces that the United States will airlift 10,500 additional troops to Vietnam in compliance with General Westmoreland's request. Assistant Secretary of Defense Goulding tells newsmen that no decision has been made to increase the authorized maximum level of U.S. troop strength beyond the current limit of 525,000.

February 14.—Secretary Rusk announces that all U.S. attempts to launch peace talks "have resulted in rejection" by North Vietnam of the San Antonio formula and that Hanoi had given no indication that it would refrain from taking military advantage of a U.S. bombing halt.

February 16.—President Johnson at an unscheduled news conference states that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had made no recommendations for the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam and that Hanoi is not any more ready to negotiate than it was 3 years previously.

February 16.—North Vietnam releases three captured American pilots in celebration of the Tet new year.

February 20.—Secretary McNamara testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident. He denies any element of provocation on the part of the United States and insists that Washington had conclusive proof of North Vietnamese attacks on two U.S. destroyers before ordering air strikes against North Vietnam. Senators Fulbright and Morse dispute McNamara's testimony, charging that the Defense Department had withheld certain information, that U.S. naval activity in the Gulf of Tonkin might have provoked North Vietnam's actions in the incident and that the incident did not justify the subsequent American bombing.

February 24.—South Vietnamese forces recapture the palace grounds of the citadel at Hue after 25 days of fierce fighting.

February 24.—U.N. Secretary General Thant issues a report on his February 8–21 peace mission to various world capitals. He states that if the United States ended the bombing and other acts of war against North Vietnam, "I am more than ever convinced that meaningful talks will take place much earlier than is generally supposed, even perhaps within a matter of a few days." He also says that it could be "reasonably assumed" that the question of Hanoi's not taking advantage of a bombing halt "will be dealt with in good faith" at the ensuing talks.

February 24.—The United States issues a statement in reply to Secretary General Thant's report, which declares that Washington

"would welcome confirmation from Hanoi that talks would start promptly in circumstances where we could reasonably assume that North Vietnam would not take military advantage of the cessation."

February 25.—General Westmoreland states that additional U.S. troops "will probably be required" in Vietnam.

February 27.—U.S. sources in Saigon state that American advisers are on the ground in Laos coordinating U.S. air strikes against North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao forces attacking Laotian Army positions.

February 28.—The French Government declares that it has "specific information" that a cessation of the American bombing of North Vietnam would be a "necessary and sufficient" condition for the opening of negotiations on the war.

February 29.—Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk threatens to resign as chief of state and transfer power to anti-Communist General Lon Nol unless Communist China and "other foreign powers" call off the growing Communist guerrilla warfare in the country. He predicted that Lon Nol would call for American aid.

March 10.—The *New York Times* and *Washington Post* report that the Johnson administration is considering raising U.S. troop strength in Vietnam by as much as 206,000. White House Press Secretary Christian states on March 9 that the President has received no specific requests from American commanders concerning the sending of additional U.S. forces.

March 11–12.—Secretary Rusk testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He admits that the Communists Tet offensive has set back the Allied effort but declares that abandoning Vietnam would be "catastrophic—not just for Southeast Asia but for the United States." Rusk tells the committee that if more troops are needed, the administration "will, as we have done in the past, consult with appropriate Members of Congress."

March 22.—President Johnson announces that he will nominate Gen. William Westmoreland to replace retiring Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Harold K. Johnson, in July 1968.

March 31.—President Johnson announces that he has ordered U.S. aircraft and naval vessels "to make no attacks on North Vietnam except in the area north of the demilitarized zone where the continuing enemy buildup directly threatens allied forward positions and where the movements of their troops and supplies are clearly related to that threat." He states that the area covered by the bombing pause includes 90 percent of North Vietnam's population. He asserts that a complete bombing halt could come "if our restraint is matched by restraint in Hanoi." He calls on North Vietnam to respond positively to the bombing halt by agreeing to peace talks and states: "We assume that during those talks Hanoi would not take advantage of our restraint."

April 2.—President Thieu says that his government had agreed to the partial U.S. bombing halt and warns "that if North Vietnam does not respond with a corresponding good will gesture, it will be hard for us to accept any more good will gestures in the future." He adds that South Vietnam should be strong enough by the end of 1968 to allow a gradual withdrawal of American troops.

1968—Continued

April 2.—Administration officials state that under the terms of the President's partial bombing halt, air attacks are still authorized from the 17th to the 20th parallel.

April 3.—The U.S. command in Saigon announces that 20,000 Allied troops are advancing on the U.S. marine base at Khesanh to lift the 75-day siege of that fortress. The operation, which began in secret on April 1, reaches Khesanh on April 6.

April 3.—North Vietnam offers to send representatives to meet with U.S. representatives "with a view to determining with the American side the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam so that talks may start."

April 3.—President Johnson sends a reply to Hanoi, suggesting Geneva as a meeting site. He publicly announces that: "The United States is ready to send its representatives to any forum, at any time, to discuss the means of bringing this war to an end. Accordingly we will establish contact with the representatives of North Vietnam."

April 5.—North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, in an interview with CBS Correspondent Charles Collingwood, suggests Phnom Penh, Cambodia, as a site for United States-Democratic Republic of Vietnam talks. He states that: "In the course of this contact, the American side will specify the date when the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will become effective. Then the two sides will reach agreement on the date, place, and level of the formal talks between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States."

April 7.—General Westmoreland states in Washington that: "The spirit of the offensive is now prevalent throughout Vietnam with advantage being taken of the enemy's weakened military position. * * * Militarily we have never been in a better relative position." According to U.S. officials, Westmoreland emphasized to President Johnson the need for new and better equipment for South Vietnamese troops.

April 8.—President Johnson announces that he had received an official reply from Hanoi to his proposal for direct diplomatic contact and that: "We shall be trying to work out promptly the time and the place for the talks."

April 9.—President Johnson states that the United States and North Vietnam are discussing "a number of alternative locations (for a meeting site) which could be convenient to both sides." It was later reported that the United States had proposed New Delhi, Rangoon, Vientiane, or Djakarta as alternative locations.

April 10.—President Johnson announces the appointment of Gen. Creighton Abrams to replace General Westmoreland as U.S. commander in Vietnam.

April 11.—Hanoi proposes Warsaw as the site for the initial United States-Democratic Republic of Vietnam contact. The White House indicates that the United States favors a neutral site with adequate communication facilities.

April 17.—A United Nations source says that Secretary General U Thant is acting as a third party between Washington and Hanoi

and has suggested Paris and "other possible sites likely to be acceptable to both sides."

April 18.—The United States proposes 10 more sites for diplomatic contacts with North Vietnam: Ceylon, Japan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Malaysia, Italy, Belgium, Finland, and Austria. North Vietnam rejects the sites on April 19.

April 19.—The Senate approves by a vote of 54 to 3 a military procurement authorization bill for fiscal 1969 (S. 3293). The House passes the bill with changes on July 11 by a vote of 363 to 15. A conference committee report is argued to by the House on September 10 and by the Senate on September 11. It becomes P.L. 90–500. The law stipulates funds can be used to support the Vietnamese and free world forces in Vietnam.

April 27.—Hanoi dispatches assert that on April 20–21 the Alliance of National Democratic and Peace Forces met near Saigon and issued a manifesto, stating that the Alliance "is prepared to enter into discussions with the U.S. Government" but that the NLF "cannot be absent from the settlement of any problem in South Vietnam." (The Alliance, according to Hanoi and the NLF, came into being during the Tet offensive and was concentrated mostly in the cities.) The State Department states on April 28 that the United States was not prepared to enter into talks with the Alliance, because "it seems obvious to us that this is an artificial organization, a creature of the NLF and Hanoi."

April 30.—Secretary Clifford states that the United States had stepped up the level of bombing missions south of the 20th parallel because "for some weeks there has been a very considerable increase in the flow of men and material from North Vietnam into South Vietnam." He notes, however, that the increase in the infiltration level took place before the partial bombing halt of March 31 and that he was "not conscious of any increase in the level of traffic following our cutback to the 20th parallel."

May 3.—President Johnson announces that the United States has accepted a North Vietnamese offer to meet in Paris for preliminary peace talks on May 10 or soon afterwards. A radio Hanoi broadcast an hour before the President's announcement declares that Hanoi would send veteran diplomat Xuan Thuy "to enter into formal talks with the U.S. Government's representatives, to determine with the U.S. side the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and then to hold talks on other problems of concern to the two sides."

May 7.—The State Department releases the names of the members of the U.S. delegation to Paris: Averell Harriman, Cyrus Vance, Lt. Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Philip C. Habib, William Jorden of the White House Staff, and David I. Davidson (special assistant to Harriman).

May 8.—President Johnson states in a speech welcoming Thai Premier Thanom Kittikachorn that the United States still bases its Vietnam policy on the offer made at Manila in 1966 to withdraw American troops "as the military and subversive forces of North Vietnam are withdrawn, infiltration ceases, and the level of violence subsides."

1968—Continued

May 9.—President Thieu states: "We will never cede an inch of land to the northern communists, we will never set up a coalition government with the NFLSV, and we will never recognize the NFLSV as a political entity equal to us, with which we must negotiate on an equal footing."

May 10–11.—United States and North Vietnamese delegates meet in Paris for the first time and agree to begin substantive negotiations on May 13.

May 13.—The first formal negotiating session is held in Paris.

May 18.—President Thieu appoints Tran Van Huong as Premier of South Vietnam in place of Nguyen Van Loc, who resigned. Thieu directs Huong to form a new cabinet.

May 21.—Nguyen Thanh Le, a spokesman for the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris, tells newsmen that a U.S. halt to the bombing and other acts of war against North Vietnam will be followed by "questions relating to a political settlement of problems" within the framework of the 1954 Geneva Accords.

May 27.—At the fifth negotiating session in Paris, North Vietnam's Xuan Thuy asserts that "any Vietnamese has the right to fight" the United States "on any portion of his dear country's territory." U.S. press officer Jorden describes this as coming close to admitting the presence of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam.

June 10.—At a press conference on the eve of his departure from Vietnam, General Westmoreland asserts that a military victory "in a classic sense" is not possible "because of our national policy of not expanding the war." He also declares, however, that North Vietnam's losses were "being raised to the point where it could be intolerable to the enemy."

June 11.—The House passes a supplemental appropriation bill for fiscal 1968 (H.R. 17734) by a vote of 324 to 33. On June 26, the Senate passes the bill with an amendment and sends it to conference. Both bodies agree to the conference report on July 2 and it becomes P.L. 90–392. The act includes $3,750,950,000 in new defense appropriations for operations in Southeast Asia and releases $2,345,000,000 that had been appropriated in 1967 but subsequently frozen by a Congressional spending restriction.

June 18.—U.N. Secretary General Thant predicts that the Paris negotiations will remain deadlocked for a long time, because the opposing sides still seek a military victory.

June 19.—President Thieu signs South Vietnam's first general mobilization law. He states that the South Vietnamese Government "intends to take over more responsibility" for the war and that it will draft 200,000 men by the end of 1968 under the law. He declares: "We do not intend to ask the United States and our allies for more troops, but we still need equipment and other types of help, of course." The new law allows the government to draft males between the ages of 18 and 43 into the regular armed forces and men in the 16–17 and 44–50-year-old brackets into part-time defense units.

June 27.—The U.S. Command in Saigon announces that U.S. troops are withdrawing from the base at Khesanh, which had survived a 77-day siege beginning in January 1968.

June 28.—South Vietnamese Premier Trian Van Huong warns that the government will bring to trial and imprison those who advocate neutralist or pro-Communist causes.

June 3.—North Vietnam announces that it will release three captured American pilots for humanitarian reasons.

July 4.—President Thieu and Vice President Ky appear together at a ceremony formally inaugurating the People's Alliance for Social Revolution, a union of political groups supporting the two men. The alliance is intended to become the government party in a two-party South Vietnam.

July 20.—President Johnson and Thieu issue a joint communique following talks at Honolulu. Johnson promises "the continued support and assistance of the United States to the people and Government of Vietnam as long as such aid is needed and desired." The two leaders called on Hanoi to respond to the partial bombing halt of March 31 and concluded that North Vietnam has shown "no response" as yet. The United States pledges that it "will not support the imposition of a "coalition government" or any other form of government on the people of South Vietnam." Instead, President Johnson "endorsed" Saigon's policy of offering "full participation in political activities to all individuals and members of groups who agree to renounce force and to abide by the Constitution of Vietnam." The two Presidents "affirmed that the Republic of Vietnam should be a full participant playing a leading role" in negotiating a political settlement of the conflict.

August 6.—The Republican National Convention adopts its platform for the 1968 election. The platform promises "a strategy permitting a progressive de-Americanization of the war" and one aimed at inducing "the South Vietnamese to assume increased responsibility * * *." It also pledges "a program for peace in Vietnam—neither peace at any price nor a camouflaged surrender of legitimate United States or allied interests—but a positive program that will offer a fair and equitable settlement to all, based on the principle of self-determination, our national interests and the cause of longrange world peace." The platform also states that a Republican administration "will sincerely and vigorously pursue peace negotiations as long as they offer any reasonable prospect for a just peace."

August 26.—The Democratic National Convention adopts its party platform for the 1968 election. The Vietnam plank advocates a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam "when this action would not endanger the lives of our troops in the field. This action should take into account the response from Hanoi." It also calls for the negotiating of "an immediate end or limitation of hostilities and the withdrawal from South Vietnam of all foreign forces—both United States and allied forces, and forces infiltrated from North Vietnam." For a political solution, the platform calls for the encouragement of all parties in South Vietnam to agree to a postwar government "determined by fair and safeguarded election, open to all major political factions and parties prepared to accept peaceful processes." Finally, the plank pledges accelerated efforts to train and equip South Vietnamese forces and the withdrawal of U.S. forces when the Saigon troops are able to bear greater responsibilities.

1968—Continued

August 27.—South Vietnam's President Thieu states that the recent Communist attacks in South Vietnam were aimed at U.S. public opinion and particularly at the Democratic National Convention. On the subject of negotiations, he says: "We will never talk to the Front. We are willing to talk to Hanoi." With respect to Vietcong participation in future elections, he declares: I would never accept any Communist to run in an election in Vietnam. When we say one man, one vote, we mean the vote would only be given to Vietnamese citizens who deserve it."

September 12.—The House approves a defense appropriation bill for fiscal 1969 (H.R. 18707) by a vote of 333 to 7. On October 3, the Senate approves an amended version and the bill is sent to conference. On October 11, both bodies approve the conference report and it became P.L. 90–580. $25.5 billion is included to support the war in Southeast Asia.

September 14.—President Thieu announces that he will ask former chief of state Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh (Big Minh) to return from exile and become a presidential adviser. Minh, who led the coup that deposed President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, was exiled in 1964 following the overthrow of his regime.

September 23.—U.N. Secretary General U Thant suggests that if a resolution calling on the United States to halt the bombing of North Vietnam should be placed before the U.N. General Assembly, it would be approved by a majority of the 124 U.N. members. The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, George Ball, later met with Thant and protested the remarks, stating that such a public discussion did not assist in furthering progress in the Paris talks.

September 24.—Congressman Melvin Laird states that current plans of the Johnson administration call for reducing American troops in Vietnam by about 90,000 men by June 30, 1969. White House Press Secretary George Christian says that "I have no idea what he's talking about," and Assistant Secretary of Defense Phil Goulding states that he knows of "no plans" to lower the troop ceiling of 549,000 men and of "no preliminary planning toward this end."

October 19.—GOP presidential candidate, Richard Nixon, proposes that the non-Communist nations of Asia be guided into a mutual security pact of their own to deal with future Communist threats.

October 25.—Secretary of Defense Clifford states that President Johnson has ordered no slackening of the U.S. military effort in Vietnam. He asserts that North Vietnam has withdrawn 30,000 to 40,000 troops from South Vietnam but that 80,000 still remained.

October 31.—President Johnson announces that the United States will cease "all air, naval, and artillery bombardment of North Vietnam" as of 8 a.m. (Washington time), November 1.

October 31.—Following President Johnson's announcement of a total bombing cessation, President Thieu issues a statement which reads: "* * * the American government has unilaterally decided to stop the bombing on the whole territory of North Vietnam * * *."

October 31.—Following President Johnson's announcement of a total bombing cessation, U.S. officials indicate that the United States will continue to bomb Communist supply lines in Laos and will continue to send reconnaissance planes over North Vietnam.

November 1.—The North Vietnamese delegation at Paris issues a communique stating that Ambassadors Harriman and Vance had informed Xuan Thuy that President Johnson had issued the order "to stop all air, naval, and artillery bombardment and all other acts involving the use of force on the entire territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam * * *." The communique further states that "a meeting including the representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, the United States, and the Republic of Vietnam will be held in Paris, not earlier than November 6, 1968." Secretary of State Rusk at a news conference says the next step is up to North Vietnam: "We have made our move, now you make yours." Rusk asserts that the United States stopped the bombing of North Vietnam "upon specific expectations that the Government of South Vietnam will participate in the discussion of an honorable peace and that the action will bring about a de-escalation of the fighting." When asked if Washington had acted "on more than an assumption," Rusk replies: "We are acting on more than an assumption."

November 2.—President Thieu tells the South Vietnam National Assembly that his government would not attend the Paris negotiating session scheduled for November 6, because its conditions were not fulfilled.

November 4.—President Thieu states over South Vietnamese television that: "In order to win victories at the negotiating table, we should have victories on the battlefield. We will only be able to force the enemy to accept our conditions if we can destroy as many enemies as possible."

November 6.—State Department Press Officer Robert McCloskey says that "It is not true that the United States knew in advance that the Government of Vietnam would not be represented at the November 6 meeting scheduled for Paris before the President made his statement last Thursday evening," He states, however, that he was "not disputing" reports that the South Vietnamese had informed the United States that it opposed the terms upon which President Johnson ordered the bombing halt.

November 8.—President Thieu proposes that the new phase of the Paris talks consist of two delegations: an Allied delegation headed by South Vietnam and including the United States, and a Communist delegation headed by North Vietnam including members of the NLF. North Vietnam's Xuan Thuy rejects the idea, saying that Hanoi could not accept the idea of a single Communist delegation.

November 11.—President Johnson and President-elect Nixon meet at the White House; Nixon later told newsmen that during the remainder of Johnson's term of office, the President and Secretary of State "could speak" on Vietnam "not just for this administration but for the Nation, and that meant for the next administration as well."

November 12.—Secretary Clifford tells a news conference that he believes that the President will have to eventually decide whether to proceed with the Paris negotiations with or without South Vietnamese participation. He states that the United States and

1968—Continued

Hanoi could negotiate military issues such as a mutual troop withdrawal from South Vietnam but that a political settlement was up to Saigon and Hanoi.

November 26.—The State Department issues a statement "designed to answer the questions which have been raised by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam about new meetings in Paris." It asserts that "our side" at the negotiations "will be constituted as separate delegations of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States" and that "the United States has not agreed and will not agree that the meeting is, or can correctly be described as a four-sided or four-party conference." The statement reiterates that the presence of the NLF at the conference does not imply recognition of the front as a separate entity and that "we will regard and treat all the persons on the other side of the table * * * as members of a single side, that of Hanoi, and for practical purposes as a single delegation." The statement declares that South Vietnam would "take the lead and be the main spokesman on all matters which are of principal concern to South Vietnam." It repeats the U.S. previous pledge not to impose a coalition government on South Vietnam.

November 27.—South Vietnam's Foreign Minister Tran Chanh Thanh announces that South Vietnam will take part in the Paris peace talks, since the United States, in the State Department statement of November 26, had satisfied "in their essential aspects" Saigon's earlier objections to participating.

November 29.—The Saigon Government warns "political parties, religious groups and individuals" not to deviate publicly from the government's stand on the Paris peace talks. The Interior Ministry states that it will take punitive action against any group that advocated, even by implication, direct negotiations with the NLF in Paris.

December 2–3.—The South Vietnamese Government announces that it will observe a 24-hour truce at Christmas. The U.S. Command states that U.S Forces will observe the ceasefire.

December 11.—The U.S. mission in Saigon reports the most optimistic statistics on pacification yet, claiming that 73.3 percent of the South Vietnamese population are living in relatively secure areas. This represented a 3.5 percent increase during November. The Mission states that 13.3 percent are living in contested areas while the remaining 13.4 percent are under Vietcong control.

December 16.—Speaking to a world anti-Communist league meeting in Saigon, President Thieu lists three points upon which the Saigon Government stood with respect to a peace settlement: (1) The Communists must "stop all activities under any form" against the South Vietnamese Government; (2) the Communists "must deal directly" with the Saigon Government on any war settlement; (3) South Vietnam "never will accept any Communist organizations" in its territory.

December 18.—South Vietnam's Premier Tran Van Huong says in an interview that: "I am now certain that if the North Vietnamese withdrew and the Americans pulled back to their bases, our forces could defeat the Vietcong without help" from U.S. Forces.

December 22.—Vice President Ky appears on CBS's "Face the Nation" and advocates negotiations between his government and the NLF, but only in Saigon and not in Paris. He describes the front as a "reality" rather than an "entity" and asserts that "between the front and our government it's an internal affair. So, as my President and government has always said, we are ready to hear, to meet with them, to talk with them, to discuss with them their problems. * * *" Ky endorses negotiations between Washington and Hanoi over a mutual troop withdrawal but says South Vietnam should be present at such talks. He then describes troop withdrawal negotiation as a "first phase" of the talks with the "second phase" dealing with a political settlement in South Vietnam.

December 23.—The NLF's Tran Buu Kiem states that direct talks between the NLF and the "present Saigon administration" were impossible and that the problem in South Vietnam would have to be solved by the United States and the NLF. He states that "we do not exclude anyone" from a "peace cabinet" in Saigon to replace the Thieu government.

1969

January 4.—President-elect Nixon announces that he has asked Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to remain at his post in Saigon.

January 5.—President-elect Nixon names Henry Cabot Lodge to be chief U.S. negotiator at the Paris talks after January 20. He also names New York attorney Lawrence E. Walsh as Lodge's assistant.

January 11.—A newly released U.S. pacification report states that 76.3 percent of the people of South Vietnam live in "relatively secure" areas. The Vietcong control 12.3 percent, according to the report, while 11.4 percent live in contested areas.

January 15.—South Vietnam's Premier Tran Van Huong suggests that American troops could begin "a gradual phased withdrawal at the rate of 10,000 to 20,000 a month." Huong asserts that his government is willing to enter into direct negotiations with the National Liberation Front as "an opposition group, as a political group anywhere at any time within Vietnam, in Laos or anywhere." He lists two conditions for negotiations. He says that the NLF will have to reaffirm that it is not the political creature of the Hanoi regime but notes that the Front had already described itself as an independent organization. He also declares that the NLF could not claim to be a legal government. Huong states that South Vietnam would like the presence of a "token force" of U.S. troops in the future to guarantee against a new invasion by regular North Vietnamese troops.

January 16.—The United States and North Vietnam announce agreement on the shape of the conference table and other procedural matters with the assent of the South Vietnamese Government and the National Liberation Front. The table will be round with two rectangular tables on either side of the main table, 18 inches away. There will be no flags or nameplates on the conference table. Ambassador Harriman says of the agreement that he thought that the Communists "desire negotiations." North Vietnamese spokesman

1969—Continued

Nguyen Thanh Le states that the agreement shows that the conference "will have four participants with equal status."

January 17.—South Vietnamese Foreign Ministry officials state that a restoration of the DMZ heads the list of priorities for the United States and South Vietnam at the Paris negotiations. The officials say that the two allies would like to have the question of the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the South as the second item on the agenda with the exchange of prisoners of war as the third priority.

January 25.—At the first substantive session of the Paris negotiations, Ambassador Lodge proposes "as a practical first step on the road to peace" the restoration of the DMZ. He cites the shortcomings of existing methods" of "international supervision" of the Geneva Accords and suggests that "the nations of the area should be involved in the system of monitoring of the agreement at which we may arrive." Lodge declares that "all external forces should be withdrawn from South Vietnam and that all military and subversive forces of North Vietnam must be withdrawn into North Vietnam." He states that the United States was prepared to work toward this objective and "the prompt release of prisoners held by both sides." He adds that "we seek peace not only in Vietnam but in the entire area of Southeast Asia" and cites Laos and Cambodia in this respect.

South Vietnam's Pham Dang Lam declares that South Vietnam "is ready to hold talks with the Hanoi authorities on the subject of relations between the South and the North for economic, cultural and family matters." He asserts that "the national community is prepared to welcome" back the NLF if they renounce the use of force, and Communist ideology and if they "opt for political struggle" according to the South Vietnamese constitution.

North Vietnam's Xuan Thuy and the NLF's Tran Buu Kiem both state that their delegations seek a "political solution" to the Vietnam question. Thuy reiterates Hanoi's four point program and Kiem states the NLF's five point program, both calling for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam and the settlement of South Vietnam's internal affairs "in accordance with the political program of the NLF without foreign interference." Thuy calls for the formation of a "peace-restoring cabinet" in Saigon.

January 27.—Vice President Ky states that while he thought it is "too soon" for private talks in Paris with "the other side * * * I don't see why we can't have contact with the other side if they are willing." Ky says that such private talks "could be anywhere, in Paris or elsewhere."

February 5.—President Nixon states at a news conference that the subject of U.S. troop withdrawals from South Vietnam was "high on the agenda of priorities, and that just as soon as either the training program for South Vietnamese forces and their capabilities, the progress of the Paris peace talks, or other developments make it feasible to do so, troops will be brought back." He asserts that "at this time the separation of" political and military problems at the Paris talks "is in our interest and in the interest of bringing progress in those talks."

February 14.—The Vietcong high command orders its forces to "launch new simultaneous attacks" and "increase military pressure on all fronts" during the new year.

February 23–24.—Communist forces launch a series of mortar and rocket attacks on some 115 targets in South Vietnam, including Saigon, Danang, Hue, and the U.S. base at Bien Hoa.

February 23.—South Vietnamese police arrest militant Buddhist leader Thich Thien Minh and some 50 to 60 youths at Minh's Buddhist youth center. The Saigon Government states that the raid turned up alleged draft dodgers, defectors, deserters, weapons, and Communist documents.

February 24.—Vice President Ky states that the South Vietnamese Air Force should bomb North Vietnamese cities if the Communists continue to shell cities and towns in South Vietnam.

February 25.—State Department spokesman Carl Bartch states that there was "no change in the terms of the understanding reached with the North Vietnamese prior to the talks and prior to the bombing halt" and that the Nixon administration expected that the understanding will be "lived up to."

March 4.—President Nixon tells a new conference that the administration was reviewing the Communist offensive to determine whether the violation of the understandings with Hanoi leading to the U.S. bombing halt of October 31, 1968, was "so significant that it requires action on our part." Declaring that the offensive had failed to achieve its objectives, the President asserts that the United States "will not tolerate" a continuation of the attacks in violation of the understanding and which "result in heavier casualties to our men." He asserts that the United States "has a number of options that we could exercise to respond."

March 6.—Secretary of Defense Laird arrives in Saigon and accuses the enemy of violating the bombing halt understanding in conducting "indiscriminate assaults" against civilians in Vietnam. He refuses to discuss the possibility of American troop withdrawals because "we're in the midst of an escalation" by the Vietcong and North Vietnamese.

March 10.—Secretary of Defense Laird says in Saigon that he does not foresee any increase in American troop strength in Vietnam, but that "an appropriate response in either a military or diplomatic way" will be made if Communist shelling of Vietnamese cities continues.

March 12.—The South Vietnamese cabinet is reshuffled, eliminating supporters of Vice President Ky. The Defense Department estimates that 100,000 North Vietnamese troops are in South Vietnam, 85,000 of them in North Vietnamese line units.

March 13.—At the 8th session of the Paris peace talks, the Communist side warns against military retaliation to the shelling of the cities; allied delegates protest such attacks. Communist spokesmen reject the idea of secret talks and call on the United States to deal directly with the NLF.

March 14.—President Nixon states at a news conference that because of the current enemy offensive there is no prospect for a reduction of American forces in the foreseeable future." But he says that "if the enemy de-escalates his attacks, ours will go down."

1969—Continued

March 15.—A South Vienamese military court sentences Thich Thien Minh, a leader of a militant Buddhist faction, to ten years at hard labor for "harboring rebels and concealing weapons and illegal documents."

March 19.—Secretary Laird tells the Senate Armed Services Committee that American military commanders in Vietnam assume that "no reduction in U.S. personnel would be possible in the absence of total withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops," but says that "we must greatly increase our effort to improve [South Vietnamese] capabilities and to work toward a situation in which U.S. forces can in fact be withdrawn."

March 23.—For the fourth Sunday in a row, villages throughout South Vietnam hold elections to select their own leaders. The March elections involve approximately three million people in 24 percent of South Vietnam's villages. The elections held are the first in these villages since 1956.

March 25.—President Thieu declares "We are ready to have private talks with the National Liberation Front if they like." Thieu rejects a coalition government including the NLF but says that the Front could participate in elections if it reconstituted itself as a non-Communist party.

March 26.—President Nixon states that progress in the Paris negotiations will come through private talks and that the Administration will not publicly disclose the content of these talks.

March 27.—At the 10th session of the Paris conference, the NLF's Tran Buu Kiem denounces President Thieu's offer to hold private discussions with the Front. Ambassador Lodge and Pham Dang Lam declare that the price of a peace settlement includes the withdrawal of all North Vietnamese "regular and subversive forces" from Laos and Cambodia as well as from South Vietnam.

March 27.—Vice President Ky states in Saigon that "South Vietnam could quite possibly unilaterally take the decision to bomb the North" if the Communists continue to shell Saigon.

March 30.—Secretary of Defense Laird, says in an interview "I would certainly accept a coalition government if it were elected in a free and independent election in South Vietnam." He says "if Paris fails, we will announce an alternative course of action."

April 3.—American military sources in Saigon say that U.S. Special Forces teams have made forays into Cambodia during the past year to scout Communist troop movements in that country, with the tacit approval of the Cambodian Government.

April 6.—In an interview, North Vietnam Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap predicts total victory through another Dienbienphu rather than through the Paris negotiations. He states that: "While the delegates talk, we fight. We want peace but not peace at any price, not a compromise peace."

April 7.—President Thieu tells the South Vietnamese National Assembly of six principles for a peace settlement: (1) An end to North Vietnam's efforts to conquer South Vietnam. (2) Once North Vietnam has withdrawn its forces from South Vietnam, President Thieu would ask the allies to remove their forces. (3) An end to North

Vietnam's use of Laos and Cambodia as sanctuaries and the withdrawal of Hanoi's forces from those countries. (4) A policy of national reconciliation, welcoming as full citizens persons who renounce violence and respect the laws. (5) Reunification of North and South Vietnam "by the free choice of the entire population of Vietnam through democratic processes." (6) An "effective system" of international control and reliable international guarantees against the resumption of fighting.

April 7.—In a 347-page report on the Vietnam War prepared by General Westmoreland, and by Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, former commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, Westmoreland states that the enemy "lost the cream of his Army" during Tet and that "South Vietnamese troops in general had fought well."

April 7.—Sharp says that the purpose of the air war against North Vietnam, "was to cause the Government of North Vietnam to cease its support and direction of the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos." Sharp concludes that the bombing was "clearly successful in fulfilling its purposes."

April 8.—NLF spokesman Tran Haoi Nam labels as "insolent and absurd" and "reactionary" President Thieu's six point program for negotiations and a peace settlement with the Front.

April 10.—In an interview, NLF delegate Tran Buu Kiem says that the NLF would back the formation of any peace government proposed by the various political groups in Saigon and that "the NLF is holding out no condition that it participate in such a government."

April 12.—The United States announces that it had dispatched a note to Cambodia stating that "the United States of America recognizes and respects the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, and territorial integrity of the kingdom of Cambodia within its present frontiers."

April 16.—Prince Norodom Sihanouk said that Cambodia will resume diplomatic relations with the United States because of U.S. recognition of Cambodian frontiers.

April 17.—President Thieu states that South Vietnam needs U.S. military equipment and economic assistance, "But in terms of flesh and blood, we are ready to replace our allies on the battlefield."

April 18.—President Nixon says at a news conference that the political stability and military capabilities of South Vietnam have "increased significantly" during his administration, and that this makes a negotiated peace more likely. He indicates no immediate plans for a reduction of U.S. forces in Vietnam.

April 21.—Secretary Rogers states that "high priority is being given to preparing South Vietnamese forces to assume a growing share of the combat burden" and "to developing the political unity of the country," in the event that the other side "does not yet want to negotiate a peaceful settlement."

April 30.—At the 15th session of the expanded Paris peace talks, the NLF's Tran Buu Kiem hints that the Front might be ready to hold private talks with South Vietnam. He adds, that the Front's position had not changed and that the conference must accept the Front's political program as "the base" for a "correct political solution."

1969—Continued

April 30.—As of the end of March 1969, the Vietcong controlled 2,608 hamlets, the Government controlled 7,212, and 1,572 were contested, according to U.S. figures.

April 30.—A captured COSVN document describes the major purpose of the latest Communist offensive as the killing of many American troops and states that the purpose of a summer offensive for 1969 "is to force the Americans to adopt a policy in our direction." It says that the most significant success of the recent offensive was that "it boosted the anti-war movement in the United States."

May 3.—Secretary of Defense Laird states that the American objective in Vietnam "always has been and continues to be free elections without outside interference." He states that the withdrawal of U.S. troops could begin under any one of three conditions: agreement in Paris for mutual withdrawals, a reduction in the level of violence by the Communists, or improvement of the South Vietnamese armed forces.

May 3.—President Thieu states that: "The reduction of U.S. troops depends on the growth of Vietnamese forces." He also states that South Vietnam will not engage in private talks with North Vietnam and the Vietcong if "the other side" set conditions for such talks.

May 6.—In Hue more than 800 bodies of South Vietnamese have been found in makeshift graves. It is believed about 2,000 persons were murdered by the Vietcong in their month long occupation of Hue in the 1968 Tet offensive.

May 7.—Cambodia protests to the United Nations Security Council that the United States had attacked Cambodian troops while deliberately describing them as enemy forces.

May 8.—At the 16th session of the Paris peace talks, NLF Delegate Tran Buu Kiem offers a ten-point peace proposal for "an overall solution to the South Vietnam problem." The proposal includes the following provisions: (1) The United States should unconditionally withdraw its troops, leaving remaining military questions to be decided by the "Vietnamese parties among themselves." (2) A "provisional coalition government" would be established to include "all persons no matter what their political beliefs." (3) The provisional government would arrange for elections and the form of the future "coalition government of South Vietnam," without foreign interference. (4) The future foreign policy of South Vietnam will be one of "peace and neutrality." (4) Reunification of Vietnam "will be achieved step by step" through discussions. (5) U.S. withdrawals would be conducted under international inspections.

May 8.—Ambassadors Lodge and Nguyen Xuan Phong reject the demands for unilateral American withdrawals and for "the overthrow of the legal and constitutional government of Vietnam."

May 9.—The Cambodian Government and the NLF agree to raise their diplomatic relationship to the embassy level.

May 12–13.—The Communists launch more than 200 attacks against military and civilian targets throughout South Vietnam. In Saigon, ten terrorist incidents are reported.

May 13.—The NLF's Tran Buu Kiem accuses the United States of intensifying the war and calls on the United States to negotiate

directly with the NLF, demanding a provisional "peace" cabinet in Saigon to prepare the way for elections in South Vietnam.

May 14.—President Nixon delivers a nationally televised speech on the Vietnam War and predicts possible unilateral U.S. troop withdrawals. The President outlines an eight-point formula for peace, based on the freedom of the South Vietnamese to determine their own political future and requirements for withdrawal from South Vietnam "of all non-South Vietnamese forces." The proposals also call for observation of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements on South Vietnam and Cambodia and Laos. Nixon emphasizes that the United States is flexible and insists "on no rigid diplomatic formula" provided "there were adequate assurances that it would be observed." He says that the United States does not seek to retain bases in Vietnam, nor to accomplish "a purely military solution." He praises President Thieu's proposals for peace, saying that his plan is made with the approval of the South Vietnamese government.

May 14.—Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew says that the United States should withdraw from Vietnam gradually so that "confidence in American commitments in the region can be maintained."

May 15.—President Thieu applauds President Nixon's eight-point peace formula, but initial Communist reaction is negative and the NLF says in a broadcast that "we will further accelerate the armed and political struggles. . . ."

May 16.—At the 17th session of the Paris conference, Xuan Thuy describes the U.S. eight point proposal as a collection of "apparently alluring words" that is really designed "to elude the key question" of unconditional U.S. troop withdrawal. Tran Buu Kiem said the U.S. plan was evidence that the "Nixon Administration does not seek peace."

May 17.—President Thieu asks for a summit meeting with President Nixon "to set up a common policy."

May 17.—In an interview, North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong says: "The day the United States decides to withdraw its forces, all other problems will be solved and the Paris deadlock will be broken. It is this decision we demand and it is the key to all other issues."

May 18.—South Vietnamese Premier Tran Van Huong says in an interview that "the Americans are too anxious to get peace" and that "the North Vietnamese, the Red Chinese consider this a sign of weakness, a sign of flagging will, so they exploit it. . . . In the meantime our government is trying to win over the people of South Vietnam. . . ." Huong stated that militarily the Communists were no longer winning the war but that: "they are on the downward slope here."

May 19.—Secretary Rogers says in Saigon that "we don't foresee any coalition government," for South Vietnam.

May 19.—Secretary of Defense Laird criticizes North Vietnam for its treatment of American prisoners of war and calls on Hanoi to: (1) release the names of prisoners held; (2) immediately release sick and wounded prisoners; (3) permit impartial inspection of

1969—Continued

prisoner of war facilities by an organization such as the International Committee of the Red Cross; (4) afford proper treatment of all prisoners; (5) permit regular flow of mail. The United States lists 1,303 American servicemen as missing in action or prisoners. Of these, 336 are known prisoners.

May 20.—Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma states that: "We are ready to stop the bombing if the North Vietnamese withdraw." He rules out the need for major changes in the 1962 Geneva Accords on Laos but urges strengthening of the International Control Commission (ICC).

May 21.—The House passes the second supplemental appropriation bill (H.R. 11400) for 1969 (349 to 40). The Senate passes a changed bill on June 19 and it goes to conference. Both Houses approve the conference report on July 9. It includes an additional $1.2 billion for military activities in Southeast Asia.

May 22.—The United States and South Vietnam present to a conference of the seven Vietnam allies in Bangkok a detailed program for mutual withdrawal of American and North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam. The conference issues a communique stating that the "objective" of the war was "to bring about a peace in which the people of South Vietnam are able to express their unconditional right of self-determination free from external interference and terrorism."

May 23.—Secretary Laird states that there has been a step-up in enemy military operations since the peace proposal presented May 8 by the NLF. Laird says "We are moving forward with increased priority on our collective efforts to Vietnamize the war, should the Paris talks fail."

May 24.—Xuan Thuy says that: "Between the ten points of the National Liberation Front and the eight points of President Nixon, there are points of agreement that could be the object of discussion," despite "fundamental differences" between the proposals, particularly on the issue of mutual troop withdrawal.

May 25.—President Thieu announces the formation of the pro-government National Social Democratic Front, an alliance of six political parties formed as a broad political union to oppose the Communists.

May 25.—Secretary Laird states: "It's always been our goal to keep the maximum pressure on the enemy consistent with the lowest possible casualties" and that these instructions to U.S. field commanders in Vietnam stand.

May 26.—In an interview, NLF delegate Tran Buu Kiem predicts that at a certain point a cease-fire would be agreed upon in Paris; but in order for this to come about, the United States would have to halt military operations. Kiem specifically barred President Thieu, Vice President Ky, and Premier Huong from a future coalition government of South Vietnam.

May 27.—President Thieu arrives in Seoul and is encouraged by South Korean President Chung Hee Park to wage "a tenacious struggle to win final victory. . . ." Park pledges continued South Korean support for Vietnam.

May 28.—In an interview, President Thieu claims that "there is no single area, not even a small locality, village or hamlet, through-

out South Vietnam, which the Vietcong can honestly claim to be under their control."

May 28.—Officials report that North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam has been 8,000 to 10,000 a month, except for March when the figure was doubled.

May 30.—Presidents Thieu of Vietnam and Park of Korea issue a communique opposing unilateral withdrawal of Allied forces from Vietnam and declaring that the imposition of the "spurious coalition advocated by the Communist side" in South Vietnam would be totally unacceptable.

May 31.—The U.S. Command says that 84.2 percent of the South Vietnamese lived in "relatively secure" areas during May, a rise of 0.9 percent since April.

June 5.—Secretary Rogers states at a news conference that the United States is "not wedded to any government in Saigon" but that "any government that represents the will of the people of South Vietnam is acceptable to the United States." He says that the details of elections were subjects for negotiation, and calls on the Communists to release the names of American prisoners of war and to permit visits by neutral observers.

June 5.—American planes bomb North Vietnamese anti-aircraft batteries in North Vietnam which shot down an unarmed U.S. reconnaissance plane. This was the first reported bombing in North Vietnam since November.

June 5.—A group of 23 prominent South Vietnamese issue a peace plan calling for an immediate cease-fire, an interim "reconciliation" government, and withdrawal of all non-South Vietnamese forces from the country. The group, calling itself the Committee for the Establishment of Progressive Nationalist Forces, is chaired by prominent lawyer and former minister Tran Ngoc Lieng and is composed of well-known businessmen, labor unionists, and Roman Catholics.

June 8.—President Nixon meets with President Thieu at Midway Island and announces that the United States would withdraw 25,000 combat troops from Vietnam in July and August. The President asserts that "further replacements" of American troops will depend on three criteria: progress in the training of South Vietnamese forces, progress in the Paris peace talks, and the level of enemy activity.

In their joint communique, Nixon and Thieu "agreed that application of the principle of self-determination required that the people be able to choose without interference or terror. They rejected Communist attempts to pre-determine the outcome of future elections before they are held." They favor adequate guarantees and supervision of any agreement, and urge a timetable for future mutual withdrawals of American and enemy forces.

June 9.—The NLF delegation in Paris declares that the American decision to withdraw 25,000 troops from Vietnam represents "only a grain of sand thrown in an ocean and in no way affects the continuation and intensification of the war."

June 10.—The NLF's Liberation radio announces the formation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South

1969—Continued

Vietnam, by the NLF, the Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces, and other "patriotic organizations." NLF sources in Paris said that Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, number two member of the NLF delegation in Paris, had been named foreign minister of the PRG and would become head of the delegation.

June 10.—Secretary Laird states that the Defense Department will spend about $36 million in the remainder of fiscal 1969 and about $120 million in fiscal year 1970 to improve the fighting effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, and to procure equipment.

June 10.—Secretary Rogers says that the planned withdrawal of 25,000 U.S. troops "provides an opportunity for the North Vietnamese, if they are interested in de-escalating this war, to respond by withdrawing their forces to North Vietnam," but terms it "discouraging" from the enemy's standpoint, because it shows that South Vietnamese forces are becoming stronger.

June 10.—An eight-member private American study team in South Vietnam from May 29 to June 5 says the Saigon government uses torture and brutality to suppress opposition and that present conditions would prevent South Vietnam from developing a strong, democratically elected government.

June 11.—The Liberation Radio broadcasts the "program of action" of the PRG. The program declares that the PRG is "prepared" to consult with "political forces representing the various social strata and political tendencies" in South Vietnam that stand for peace, independence and neutrality "with a view to setting up a provisional coalition government." The program calls for "normal relations" between North and South Vietnam, and other references to foreign policy are similar to those in the NLF program. The PRG program pledges to maintain a "good neighbor policy" toward Laos and Cambodia.

June 11.—President Thieu terms the Provisional Revolutionary Government a "new propaganda maneuver" conceived by Hanoi and vows not to recognize the PRG.

June 11.—Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk announces that diplomatic relations between his country and the United States would be established at the level of charges d'affaires. Sihanouk charges at a press conference that "our Vietnamese socialist friends [the Vietcong] are communizing our people and overtly Vietnamizing our territory . . ." and asserts that Cambodia will "fight with our own means to maintain our territorial integrity."

June 15.—Communist China recognizes the Provisional Revolutionary Government and urges it to fight until "complete victory." The Peking statement says that the United States "will never carry out unconditionally the withdrawal of all" its forces from South Vietnam "nor will they ever agree to the establishment of a revolutionary coalition government. . . ."

June 18.—In an article in the July issue of *Foreign Affairs*, former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford proposes the withdrawal of all American ground combat forces from Vietnam by the end of 1970. He also suggests that American military commanders be instructed to discontinue the policy of applying maximum military pressure on the enemy and instead to seek to reduce the level of combat. With-

drawal of logistic and air support would be determined on the basis of political and military developments. Clifford says his policy would place pressure on President Thieu to make his government more "representative of other nationalist elements in South Vietnamese society."

June 19.—President Nixon says at a news conference that "there is no substantial evidence, publicly, to report" with regard to substantive negotiations at Paris but that "we hope within the next two or three months to see some progress in substantive discussions." He says, "I would hope that we could beat Mr. Clifford's timetable for troop withdrawals." He proposes that the enemy "withdraw one-tenth of its forces, as we have withdrawn one-tenth of our combat forces," to reduce the level of fighting. President Nixon describes the NLF Provisional Revolutionary Government as "simply a new name" for the National Liberation Front. The President endorses the concept of cease-fire as long as it was guaranteed and supervised by "an international force or some outside force."

June 20.—The Information Ministry announces in Saigon that publishers of daily newspapers must submit three copies of each issue to the government two hours before they go on sale. A Ministry spokesman says that if an issue contained articles "harmful to the national policy or helpful to the Communist cause" the publisher could be prosecuted.

June 20.—Pentagon sources indicate that U.S. ground combat elements in South Vietnam constituted about 263,000 men, or about sixty percent of the total army and Marine strength of slightly under 440,000. In using the term "combat forces", President Nixon includes both combat troops such as infantry and direct combat support troops such as artillery.

June 21.—Prince Sihanouk says that the Vietcong have signed a paper admitting that its troops had violated Cambodia's territory, especially in Svayrieng Province.

June 21.—Averell Harriman, former chief U.S. negotiator at Paris, urges the United States take a "more defensive military position in Vietnam", shifting its forces to the cities as American troops are withdrawn, to cut the casualties. Harriman states "There's a reasonable prospect the other side would respond and de-escalate."

June 23.—Le Duc Tho, Hanoi's supervisor of the North Vietnamese delegation at Paris, says in an interview that the Communists would reject a political settlement in South Vietnam based on elections supervised either by a mixed commission of Communists and non-Communists or by an international supervisory body because "such supervision would constitute interference in the internal affairs of the South Vietnamese people. . . ." Le Duc Tho denies that "many secret meetings" have taken place and says that "no progress at all has been made in the meetings."

June 25.—The Senate passes a national commitments resolution by a vote of 70 to 16. The resolution (S. Res. 85) expresses the sense of the Senate that the Armed Forces of the United States cannot be used on foreign territory without the joint authority of the President and the Congress.

June 25.—The United States Navy turns over to the South Vietnamese Navy sixty-four river patrol gunboats valued at $18.2 million

1969—Continued

in what is described as the largest single transfer of military equipment to the South Vietnamese armed forces thus far.

June 27.—The United States allocates $1 million to support a radical new South Vietnamese land reform program which will give land to more than 800,000 rice farmers. The Thieu government is pushing for legislative approval of the program.

June 28.—Preliminary figures show about 10,000 Communists a month entering South Vietnam from North Vietnam during the first five months of 1969 as against just under 17,000 a month in 1968.

June 28.—U.S. military sources in Saigon state that heavy fighting had taken place between North Vietnamese troops and Cambodian army units trying to drive the North Vietnamese from sanctuaries in Cambodia.

July 2.—Secretary Rogers says at a news conference that "if the rate of combat falls off to a very small level, then obviously our plans will change," but he rules out a cease-fire without some sort of an overall agreement. On the political question, Rogers says that President Thieu supported the idea of a mixed commission to supervise elections and would include this in new political proposals.

July 10.—The State Department acknowledges that the United States signed a secret "military contingency plan" with Thailand in 1965 but interprets the agreement as falling within the framework of previous commitments to Thailand. President Nixon said on July 25 in Guam that there was no secret defense agreement with Thailand.

July 11.—President Thieu challenges the Communists to compete in internationally-supervised elections under the administration of a mixed elections commission, to allow South Vietnam's people to choose their future government. Thieu promises that all groups could participate and suggests six principles to govern the elections.

July 11.—President Nixon hails Thieu's offer as an eminently fair proposal and appeals to Hanoi to "let the political issues be resolved by the political process."

July 11.—The Provisional Revolutionary Government dismisses President Thieu's new peace proposal as a "swindle and a farce."

July 12.—South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tran Chanh Thanh announces that the National Liberation Front could participate in the elections proposed by Thieu as the NLF, not "as Communists."

July 15.—Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "I think we've certainly turned the corner" in the Vietnamese War. He said, "There is a change that has come about by assigning more combat responsibility to Vietnamese forces." He states that there is a "new emphasis on reducing casualties" but that the order of "maximum pressure" still stands.

July 19.—President Thieu says that it is not possible for South Vietnamese forces to replace all American combat troops by the end of 1970 but that "if the U.S. government helps us with enough

equipment and enough funds, we can replace a very important amount of combat troops by 1970."

July 25.—Speaking at an informal news conference on Guam, President Nixon says that a long-range post-war Asian policy for the United States should involve a continued American role there. He says that such a role would be based on keeping treaty commitments but avoiding the encouragement of dependence by Asian nations. He urges collective security to deal with future security threats in Asia, with the United States avoiding creeping military involvement while supplying economic assistance.

July 25.—In Paris, Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Prime Minister of Laos, charges that 60,000 North Vietnamese troops are waging war in his country. Souvanna says he had authorized the American bombing raids along the Ho Chi Minh Trail as a measure of legitimate self-defense.

July 26.—President Thieu reassures his government that South Vietnam could prevail over its enemies even without American troops. He also promises to maintain three objectives: "no territorial concessions, no coalition government, and no letting the country fall into Communist hands."

July 28.—In Thailand, President Nixon says that the "United States will stand proudly with Thailand against those who might threaten it from abroad or from within."

July 29.—American commanders in Vietnam are reported to have modified their battlefield strategy of "maximum pressure" to a strategy of limited response to enemy tactics, "protective reaction" designed to hold U.S. casualties down.

July 30.—President Nixon confers with Vietnamese President Thieu in Saigon and visits American troops in Vietnam, calling on the other side "to sit down with us and talk seriously about ways to stop (the) killing. . . ."

July 31.—President Nixon says in India that he went to Saigon to demonstrate solidarity with the government of Nguyen Van Thieu. He says South Vietnamese governmental institutions are strong and calls President Thieu probably one of the four or five best politicians in the world.

August 4.—President Nixon briefs Congressional leaders on his trip to the Pacific, telling them that the United States intends to keep but not expand its commitments in Asia. He stresses the need for Asian countries to bear an increasing responsibility for their own defense.

August 4.—Three United States servicemen held captive by North Vietnam were released in Hanoi in the custody of an American pacifist group headed by Rennard C. Davis.

August 6.—The Army announced that eight Green Berets, including six officers and two non-commissioned officers, had been charged with the murder of a suspected Vietnamese double agent.

August 12.—The Communists attack more than 100 cities, towns and bases across South Vietnam with rockets, mortars and infantry charges, breaking an eight-week lull in the war.

August 12.—The Senate approves an amendment by Senator Fulbright and modified by Senator John Stennis limiting to $2.5 billion procurement authorization for support of Vietnamese and free world forces in Vietnam and local forces in Thailand and Laos. The bill

(S. 2546) passes the Senate on August 12 and a modified version passes the House on October 3. The House and Senate approve the conference report on November 5 and 6 respectively and the bill becomes P.L. 91–121. This is the first piece of legislation placing a limit on the Southeast Asia portion of procurement.

August 15.—According to official American figures, 87.6 percent of South Vietnam's population was considered to be under "relatively secure" government control as of the end of July.

August 19.—Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman says that the Thai government had pledged to President Nixon that it would never ask for U.S. combat troops to fight insurgents.

August 20.—Secretary of State William Rogers says that the Nixon policy of disengagement from the war by turning more and more of the fighting over to the South Vietnamese would not be affected by the level of enemy attack unless there was a new and massive assault. Concerning the contingency plan with Thailand, Rogers says that the Administration would "consult" with Congress before using it.

August 21.—President Thieu announces that Premier Tran Van Huong has agreed to step aside so that a more broadly based government could be formed. Huong had succeeded Nguyen Van Loc fifteen months earlier. On August 23 General Tran Thien Khiem is named Premier and Minister of the Interior. A four-star army general and close friend of President Thieu, Khiem had been Deputy Premier, Interior Minister and head of the Pacification Program.

August 21.—Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird says that the 1965 military contingency plan with Thailand "does not have the approval of this Administration," but that "we have all sorts of contingency military plans."

August 22.—The State Department announces that the U.S. and Thailand had agreed to begin talks on reducing the American forces in Thailand.

August 23.—A White House spokesman announces that President Nixon will defer a decision on the withdrawal of more troops from Vietnam due to the increase in enemy-initiated fighting there.

August 24.—In an interview former U.S. Ambassador W. Averell Harriman says that the stalemate in Paris could only be broken when the United States is "ready to accept the status quo, militarily and politically." He says "the way to freeze this is to take parallel action, announce that you're taking parallel action; we can afford to announce it." He expresses disappointment in President Thieu's government, saying that the U.S. should apply increased pressure on Thieu to broaden the base and that the election commission proposed by Thieu does not go far enough.

August 24.—Retail prices in South Vietnam, especially those of rice and sugar, take their sharpest rise in sixteen months, as AID reported a cost-of-living increase of twenty-three percent in three and one-half months.

August 24.—For a brief period, A Company of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade refuses to obey orders to resume operations in enemy territory in the Song Chang Valley, where they were attempting to reach the wreckage of a helicopter shot down five days before.

August 25.—Patrick Moynihan, Executive Director of the Urban Affairs Council, reports that an end of the Vietnam War will not bring the expected fiscal dividend due to built-in cost increases in all other federal programs as well as defense replacement costs. The following day, White House sources disagree with Moynihan's assessment.

August 27.—The State Department reports that infiltration of North Vietnamese forces in the south has dropped below Hanoi's combat losses. The State Department said this is "significant" as "what we see is mutual withdrawal." The Defense Department does not agree that the drop in infiltration is "significant," stating that "the enemy is substantially replacing his losses," and "strength remains sufficient for him to conduct operations under the present strategy" of small-scale operations.

August 28.—Army Secretary Resor says that "Vietnamization" of the war is ahead of schedule but "the ARVN is still short of leaders, particularly officers and non-commissioned officers."

August 31.—According to official American figures, 89 percent of the Vietnamese people are living under "relatively secure" control of the Saigon government as of August 31—15.3 million of a population of 17.3 million. The figure is 84 percent for those in the rural areas.

September 2.—Xuan Thuy, Hanoi's chief negotiator, says in Paris: "If President Nixon withdraws troops rapidly and in considerable numbers we will examine this factor and take it into account." He dismisses as "unrealistic" suggestions that the two sides accept a truce in present battlefield positions.

September 2.—In a news conference at Bethesda Naval Hospital, two Navy men recently released from prison by the North Vietnamese tell of brutal treatment and torture of American prisoners by the North Vietnamese. Lt. Robert Frishman says, "I think it is time to get out the facts."

September 4.—Hanoi Radio announces that President Ho Chi Minh died on September 3 of a "sudden, very serious heart attack."

September 4.—In Paris, North Vietnamese delegate Xuan Thuy says that Ho Chi Minh's death will bring "no change" in Hanoi's domestic or foreign policies.

September 4.—It is announced that on September 1 allied troops fought Communist soldiers in Cambodia after a U.S. helicopter that had strayed into Cambodia was downed.

September 6.—Hanoi's Vietnam News Agency describes Ho Chi Minh's successors as "a collective ruling body," making it clear that the ruling body would continue to be the Politburo of the Lao Dong (Workers) Party.

September 12.—President Nixon meets with principal advisers on Vietnam for a full review of future U.S. strategy. Those attending included Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker, U.S. Commander General Creighton Abrams, and Pacific Commander Admiral J. S. McCain.

September 12.—Ronald Ziegler, White House News Secretary, gives an explanation of the 36-hour halt in the B–52 bombing raids on September 8 following the three-day ceasefire: "We wanted to see what the other side intended to do in terms of the level of their military activity, following the 72-hour period which was suggested

by the other side to be a cease-fire period. We did not want to resume B–52 flights for a few days following the end of this period, but . . . we were under immediate attack. . . ."

September 15.—Vietnamese Vice President Ky announces that the White House is planning to announce further U.S. troop withdrawals of 40,500 men by the end of November. Ky also says that any attempt to form a coalition with the Communists in Saigon would be overthrown within ten days by a military coup.

September 16.—President Nixon announces that 35,000 more American troops will be withdrawn from Vietnam by December 15. Reviewing the proposals he had made toward a settlement, the President urges, both sides to turn "their faces toward peace rather than toward conflict and war."

September 17.—Four American women whose husbands were missing in North Vietnam meet with Xuan Oanh of the North Vietnamese peace delegation about the fate of their husbands. They report that he said that anyone seeking information about prisoners would be welcome at the North Vietnamese delegation if he came without U.S. Government sponsorship.

September 17.—The Vietcong radio denounced President Nixon's announcement of additional troop withdrawals as a plot to prolong the war.

September 18.—In an address to the U.N. General Assembly, President Nixon says that the U.S. is prepared to withdraw all its forces from Vietnam and that the current withdrawal totalling 60,000 men is "a significant step." He urges the members of the United Nations to "use your best diplomatic efforts to persuade Hanoi to move seriously into the negotiations. . . ."

September 19.—President Thieu says "We will not agree to a cease-fire without first arranging that which will follow it." He rules out as "unacceptable" three suggested cease-fire plans that would involve cession of South Vietnamese territory.

September 19.—The Subcommittee on Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee announces that it will hold hearings on American involvement in Laos. The State Department says that the U.S. had "no military presence" in Laos aside from its nineteen man embassy military attaché staff.

September 20.—Foreign Ministers of the five allied governments fighting in South Vietnam meet in New York with Secretary of State William Rogers and South Vietnamese Minister of Foreign Affairs Tran Van Lam. The ministers agree to maintain their combined troop strength of about 70,000 men in South Vietnam.

September 21.—Senator Mike Mansfield's report to the President on his two-week trip to Southeast Asia recommends that President Nixon's "Guam Declaration" be implemented by putting an "immediate freeze" on all military and civilian personnel increases in Southeast Asia, and that some operations be cut back in the future to avoid a role of "self-appointed, great power protector" in an area in which a militant nationalism resists foreign intrusion.

September 23.—Ambassador Graham Martin, U.S. Ambassador to Thailand from 1963 to 1967, says that when he left Thailand in

1967 "there was no commitment, implied or actual, that did not exist when I arrived." Martin says that the contingency plan, signed for the U.S. by Major General Richard Stillwell, the chief of the Military Assistance Command in Thailand, could not be implemented without approval by both governments, "in accordance with our constitutional processes." Martin said there is no relationship between the contingency plan and Thai permission for the United States to use current bases there.

September 23.—Administration officials acknowledge that there did not exist a "specific document" nor a "formal diplomatic request" for U.S. troops from the Saigon government. State Department officials say, however, that the record shows "continuing consultation" about sending U.S. troops that "amounts to a request."

September 23.—The State Department reports that there are approximately 500 U.S. government employees assigned to the Embassy in Laos, plus about "330 AID contract personnel" and 1300 American dependents. The AID contract personnel, according to State Department spokesman Carl Bartch, include those working for Air America, Continental Air Service and the International Voluntary Service. He says there are no U.S. "combat troops" in Laos.

September 24.—Hanoi's official news agency announces that Ton Duc Thang, the Vice President of North Vietnam, has been chosen to succeed Ho Chi Minh as president of North Vietnam.

September 26.—President Nixon urges unity on the war at a press conference, saying that unity will speed up negotiations in Paris. He says he opposes as "defeatist" arbitrary cut-off dates for ending American presence in Vietnam, but says that he is trying to end the war by the end of 1970 or the middle of 1971. He says that he expects opposition to his policies, but "under no circumstances will I be affected by it." He says that Vietnamization is moving forward and that the United States will continue to support President Thieu.

September 28.—President Thieu says that President Nixon has not given him any plan for future U.S. troop withdrawals, but that with "substantial aid, on equipment, on funds . . . we can replace a hundred, hundred fifty thousand" in 1970. He also says that the U.S. should "help us economically and in more sophisticated weapons."

September 29.—Laotian government troops with the backing of U.S. planes from Thailand recapture the strategic outpost of Muong Soui, which fell to the Communists in June.

September 29.—Army Secretary Stanley Resor says he dismissed charges against eight Green Berets charged with murdering a suspected double agent because the Central Intelligence Agency would not let its personnel testify at the trial. The White House acknowledges on October 1 that President Nixon had "approved" the refusal by the CIA to allow its personnel to testify.

September 30.—The U.S. and Thailand announce plans to withdraw 6000 U.S. Air Force and Army men from Thailand in the next ten months. Withdrawal is possible due to changing "operational requirements related to the Vietnam conflict."

October 4.—The Gallup poll reports that 58 percent of the people polled feel that the United States made a mistake in getting into

the war. This is seven percentage points higher than the peak of dissatisfaction with the Korean War; 52 percent approve of the way President Nixon was handling the war, as compared to 45 percent expressing approval in mid-September.

October 6.—A bipartisan group of 108 Congressmen introduces a resolution praising President Nixon for his intention to withdraw 60,000 troops.

October 6.—A bipartisan group of nine Senators and Representatives gives its approval to the nationwide student protest against the Vietnam war scheduled for October 15.

October 6.—In a speech to the Vietnamese National Assembly, President Thieu says, "We have gone as far as we should go in opening the door to peace." He rejects an unconditional cease-fire but says that he was willing to discuss it if the other side was ready for "serious discussions." He says that fighting and infiltration are down because "the Communists cannot do more," due to allied pressure, and that he hopes to replace "the bulk" of American combat forces by the end of 1970.

October 7.—Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma holds separate meetings with President Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers. Sources report that the discussions included requests for assistance for Laos in the form of equipment, planes and air support against Communist attacks.

October 8.—Australian Prime Minister John Gorton says Australia will not pull its troops out of Vietnam because "to do so would be to abandon an objective, to betray our allies and, I believe, to imperil Australia's future security."

October 8.—Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma tells the National Press Club that President Nixon "will do what we have requested" to help Laos.

October 9.—In a news conference, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird says that American commanders in South Vietnam since August had been operating under new orders aimed at placing the "highest priority" on shifting the burden of the fighting to the South Vietnamese. Laird says the policy was "protective reaction" rather than "maximum pressure."

October 9.—In a planeside news conference following his return from a trip to Vietnam, General Earle Wheeler says that the Vietnamization program is on schedule and in some places ahead of schedule. However, he said that there are "sizable numbers" of enemy troops in the South and they still had the capacity to mount an offensive.

October 12.—At a White House dinner for the Associated Press Board of Directors, President Nixon predicts "I will say confidently that looking ahead just three years, the war will be over. It will be over on a basis which will promise lasting peace in the Pacific."

October 12.—Interviewed on "Meet the Press," Secretary of State William Rogers says that the war is "being deescalated" by President Nixon and that his strategy is making "tremendous progress." Asked if the enemy was also deescalating, Rogers says, "yes, the combat activity is down" and enemy infiltration is "way down

. . . by two-thirds this year." He says that it was possible that the war might "just deescalate until it sort of fades out." Asked about the possibility of a future coalition government for Vietnam, Rogers says that he would accept it if it were the result of free elections. He says that the United States would prefer to see the Thieu government be "broader-based."

October 14.—In an open letter to anti-war protesters in the United States, North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong says, "Your struggle is a noble reflection of the legitimate and urgent demand of the American people . . . the Vietnamese people and the United States progressive people against United States aggression and will certainly be crowned with total victory." Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, the leader of the Vietcong delegation in Paris, also addressed her "most friendly salutations" to the demonstrators.

October 14.—The House by a vote of 112 to 110 defeats attempts to keep it in session all night in support of the Vietnam Moratorium. Twenty-four war critics had announced they would try to talk through the night. Meanwhile, House Republicans adopt a resolution supporting President Nixon's Vietnam policy.

October 15.—In a funeral oration at the common grave of 400 persons killed in Hue in 1968 by the Vietcong, South Vietnamese President Thieu appeals to Americans "to have the courage and clear sight to remain here" and help South Vietnam. He says "I want peace, but I will not let our people fall into the hands of the Communists and be masacred. I am determined against a coalition government in South Vietnam."

October 15.—It is announced in Moscow that the Soviet Union and Hanoi have signed new agreements on Soviet aid to North Vietnam and "the granting of new long-term credits."

October 15.—Vietnam Moratorium demonstrations take place around the country, with a goal of increasing pressure on President Nixon to change his Vietnam policy and accelerate the withdrawal of troops.

October 16.—At an impromptu press conference, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird says that the United States planned to keep a "residual" force of more than six or seven thousand in South Vietnam after hostilities ended. He says that present plans called for the removal of all United States combat troops within "a year or two," but that military units engaged in training and advisory roles would remain.

October 19.—Vice President Agnew criticizes the "hard-core dissidents and professional anarchists within the so-called 'peace movement.'"

October 22.—Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird says that Vietnam spending will be cut back to an annual rate of $17 billion by June 30, 1970, which would compare with a peak of nearly $30 billion a year ago and $25 billion at current rates. Defense Department spokesman says that further troop withdrawals from Vietnam would reduce the figure still further.

October 23.—The *Washington Post* reports that Prince Souvanna Phouma told an interviewer in Paris that he had a "tacit agreement" with the United States, based on an unwritten agreement made in 1964 with the United States Ambassador to Laos. Under

1969—Continued

the agreement the United States would provide aid to defend Laotian independence, neutrality and territorial integrity.

October 26.—*New York Times* reporter Henry Kamm says that the United States maintains and controls an army of Meo hill tribesmen, the Armee Clandestine, in Laos. The size of the army is estimated at 40,000 of whom 15,000 are full-time soldiers.

October 28.—Spokesmen for the Defense Department and the State Department say that they welcome information about United States prisoners of war from whatever channel. However, the Defense Department spokesman says that North Vietnam is attempting to "abuse United States prisoners and their families for propaganda purposes" in working through anti-war groups.

October 28.—Senator J. William Fulbright says in an interview that United States participation in the war in Laos "is a major operation" costing "in the neighborhood of $150 to $160 million in fiscal 1969." He says the operation is run by the Central Intelligence Agency, operating under the National Security Council, with the knowledge of the past three Administrations. A State Department spokesman says "there is no defense agreement with Laos, written, stated, or otherwise." He says that assistance to Laos is permitted under Article 6 of the 1962 Geneva agreements.

October 30.—On President Thieu's order the South Vietnamese government releases 310 political prisoners in honor of its November 1 National Day. Among those released is Buddhist monk Thich Thien Minh, who says he had been well-treated.

November 3.—In his second major address to the nation on Vietnam, President Nixon argues that "Precipitate withdrawal would lead to a disaster of immense magnitude." He discloses that Ambassador Lodge has held eleven private meetings with North Vietnamese negotiators and he mentions other contacts that had been attempted, including an exchange of letters between himself and Ho Chi Minh.

November 3.—President Nixon releases a letter dated July 15, 1969, from himself to Ho Chi Minh in which he repeated American proposals for peace and offered to discuss the NLF's ten points. In his response dated August 25, 1969, Ho Chi Minh criticized the United States for conducting a "war of aggression against our people, violating our fundamental national rights," calling the NLF ten-point solution "a logical and reasonable basis for the settlement" of the war.

November 4.—President Nixon calls newspaper reporters and photographers into his office to see the "thousands" of telegrams of reaction to his speech on November 3. Their major theme, he says, is that "we silent Americans are behind you."

November 4.—President Thieu praises President Nixon's speech on Vietnam, calling it "one of the most important and greatest" by an American President. He says that he and President Nixon agreed completely.

November 5.—Vietnamese Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky said that "at the end of 1970, we will replace all American combat troops."

November 6.—Three American GI's released by the Vietcong arrive on foot at an American base in South Vietnam.

November 6.—Xuan Thuy, North Vietnam's chief delegate to the Paris peace talks, charges the United States with "breaking its promises" in revealing the secret talks and exchange of letters between President Nixon and Ho Chi Minh.

November 11.—Veteran's Day rallies throughout the country are used to demonstrate national support for President Nixon's war policies.

November 11.—The United States Human Rights Representative to the United Nations urges all members of the United Nations to bring pressure on the North Vietnamese to abide by the Geneva Convention in its treatment of prisoners of war and to allow Red Cross access to them.

November 11.—In a meeting with newsmen in Vientiane, Laos, a Laotian Communist official displays a list of 158 American airmen held prisoner by the Pathet Lao. He says that 51 of them were shot down over Laos last year and 41 were captured between January and June of this year. United States officials are skeptical.

November 12.—The Army reports that it is investigating a charge that First Lieutenant William Calley shot over 100 Vietnamese civilians in Quangngai province in March 1968. The lieutenant was in command of a platoon of C Company of the 11th Infantry Brigade, which, in March 1968, was ordered to take Songmy hamlet, Mylai Village in a Vietcong stronghold nicknamed "Pinkville."

November 13.—In separate surprise visits to the House and Senate, President Nixon expresses appreciation to those supporting his Vietnam policies and asks for understanding and "constructive criticism" from those who opposed them.

November 14.—Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, NLF representative in Paris, says in Paris that if General Duong Van Minh became head of a Vietnamese "peace" cabinet "we are ready to begin conversations with him." She says a peace cabinet should include all those at home and abroad who favored "peace, independence and neutrality."

November 14.—The South Vietnamese government reports that it had extended its control to 92 percent of the people of South Vietnam.

November 15.—An estimated 250,000 people mass at the Washington Monument to call for an end to the Vietnam War. The demonstration, which is generally peaceful, is the largest ever seen in Washington.

November 17.—United States bombers strike enemy guns over the Cambodian border near the United States Special Forces camp at Buprang for the second day. The United States Command said that "if fired upon from enemy positions outside South Vietnam, United States forces are authorized to return fire. This is an inherent right of self-defense against enemy attacks."

November 18.—Robert Parker, who headed an investigation unit in the Vietnamese Embassy in Saigon, tells the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Government Operations Committee that an extensive black market currency trading operation in Vietnam had siphoned millions from the Vietnamese economy and cost the United States millions more in aid funds.

November 18.—Secretary of State William Rogers says that "We've had numerous diplomatic contacts (with the enemy) . . . some of

them have occurred since the death of Ho. But . . . we see no immediate prospect for success in the negotiations."

November 19.—Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird says that there had been "some increase" in enemy infiltration "during the last two weeks." He cites "progress" in the Vietnamization program, but would not provide any timetable for the withdrawal of United States forces or the completion of the Vietnamization process. Laird says that "transitional forces" would remain following the withdrawal of American combat troops.

November 19.—Two Vietnam veterans report separately that they observed United States infantrymen execute civilians in the Mylai group of hamlets in Quangngai Province in March 1968. A third report in the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* by a former army combat photographer is similar to the stories of the other two witnesses.

In Saigon, the United States Embassy and Military Command issue a joint statement saying that "The United States government does not condone atrocities in any way, at any time, under any conditions."

November 20.—Henry Cabot Lodge and Lawrence Walsh, the United States two top negotiators at the Paris peace talks, resign effective December 8. Philip C. Habib is assigned to be acting chief of the delegation. Lodge says "It is sad that the other side has flatly refused to reciprocate in any kind of meaningful way." State Department spokesman Carl Bartch says that Lodge's departure "should in no way be interpreted as any downgrading of the talks or abandonment of hope."

November 21.—Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard concludes a six-day visit to Vietnam by praising South Vietnam's "remarkable progress" toward democracy.

November 22.—The Gallup Poll reports that President Nixon's public support rose twelve percentage points in a month to sixty-eight percent approval; there was nineteen percent disapproval.

November 24.—The Army orders that Lieutenant William L. Calley be tried by a courts martial on charges of murdering "without justification or excuse" at least 109 Vietnamese civilians in Songmy Mylai in March 1968. The Army says his case will be tried as a capital offense and that investigations of twenty-six others allegedly involved were continuing. The Army also orders investigation into allegations that attempts had been made to cover up the incident.

November 24.—United States Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and North Vietnamese Delegate Xuan Thuy issue opposite statements concerning the lack of progress in the Paris peace talks. Lodge said that it is "not true" that the United States had rejected private talks on "general problems" with the North Vietnamese. He says, "we got nowhere because they refused to consider our proposals."

November 26.—American Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge says following the 44th session of the Paris peace talks that he is willing to meet privately with the North Vietnamese delegation to discuss the future of South Vietnam, but that he "was not advocating that we negotiate the imposition of a 'provisional coalition government' on the South Vietnamese."

November 29.—President Thieu's office says that the South Vietnamese government inquiry into reports of a massacre of Vietnamese civilians by American troops was "definitely closed."

November 30.—The *New York Times* reports that informed Congressional sources said that the United States had promised to give Thailand military and economic aid totaling one billion dollars over a five-year period in return for the deployment of a Thai division to fight in South Vietnam. State Department spokesman Carl Bartch says on December 1 "no such arrangement was ever negotiated." But he confirms that the United States increased its military and economic aid to Thailand after the Thai government decided to commit troops to the Vietnam war.

December 2.—The House of Representatives passed a resolution by a vote of 333 to 55 backing the President's "efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam". Eighty two Congressmen signed a statement which declared that the resolution was not to be considered a blank check authorization for subsequent involvement in Vietnam.

December 2.—Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Refugee Subcommittee (of the Committee on the Judiciary) says that there had been more than one million casualties in Vietnam since 1965, including 300,000 deaths, primarily due to allied fire. He says that there were about 150,000-200,000 casualties per year between 1965 and 1967, 300,000 in 1968 because of the Tet Offensive, and 200,000 in 1969. The United States Mission in South Vietnam later says that its only figures date from the beginning of 1967 and show that since then 198,338 civilians had been treated at United States and South Vietnamese medical facilities.

December 4.—The Louis Harris survey reports that following the November Moratorium demonstrations, 46 percent of those polled said they sympathized with the goals of the demonstrations, while 45 percent said they disagreed with the goals.

December 4.—Henry Cabot Lodge concludes his service as Chief American delegate to the Paris peace talks by saying at the 45th plenary session of the talks that "the only concrete progress here is agreement on the shape of the table." He says the obstacle to progress was the Communist side's "absolute refusal to join us in seeking a just peace."

December 5.—Speaking at a Pentagon news conference, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard says that American withdrawals from Vietnam "are going to continue" despite a substantial increase in enemy infiltration. Informed officials say that more than 30,000 soldiers were moving from North Vietnam.

December 6.—A fact-finding committee of the South Vietnamese House of Representatives concludes that American troops needlessly killed from 450 to 500 civilians in the area of Songmy village in March 1968. Most of the deaths were due to small arms fire and artillery fire.

Commenting on the Mylai massacre incident at a news conference, President Nixon says: "What appears was certainly a massacre; under no circumstances was it justified . . . We cannot ever condone or use atrocities."

1969—Continued

December 8.—In a major Senate speech, Senator Charles Mathias introduces a bill calling for the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and other resolutions including the 1955 Quemoy and Matsu Resolution.

December 8.—In a Paris press conference, Vietcong spokesman Ly Van Sau says, "If the United States says that it will withdraw unconditionally and in six months all American troops and other foreign troops in the American camp, the parties will discuss the calendar for these withdrawals and guarantees for security during the withdrawal." The proposal is rejected by Secretary of State William Rogers as "nothing new."

December 8.—State Department officials say that Chinese army engineers are building a road from the Chinese border through Northeast Laos near the Thai border. It was estimated that 7000 Chinese engineering troops, including guards and anti-aircraft units, were in Laos.

December 11.—President Thieu issues a statement opposing neutralist government. He says, "To preserve ourselves we must side with the free world."

December 11.—The South Vietnamese government announces that South Vietnam's armed forces had increased by about 88,000 men since June, to a total of 1,090,000.

December 12.—Meeting with 26 wives and mothers of American prisoners of war, President Nixon says that "this government will do everything that it possibly can to separate out the prisoner issue and have it handled as it should be." He calls the treatment of prisoners "unconscionable."

December 13.—In an interview with the *New York Times*, Singapore's Foreign Minister Sennathamby Rajaratnam says that "there must be extrication without defeat" from Vietnam by the United States. He says that the consequences of an American defeat would lead to a disastrous realignment of relationships in Asia, of which the Soviet Union would be the chief beneficiary. He says, however, that he did not believe in the domino theory.

December 13.—South Vietnamese officials make public a captured Vietcong document that they said outlined plans to revert to more traditional forms of guerrilla and political warfare. The document, Resolution No. 9, of the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN), urges attacks to inflict casualties on American forces.

December 14.—In a television interview Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird says that there had been little progress in the Paris peace talks and although there had been "some increases" in enemy infiltration, Vietnamization is the "corner-stone" of American policy in Vietnam. Asked what would happen if Vietnamization failed, Laird says, "I can assure you that this will not happen."

December 15.—In a brief radio and television address to the American people, President Nixon gives a progress report on the war in Vietnam and announces the planned withdrawal of 50,000 additional American troops by April 15, 1970. The President cites progress in the Vietnamization program as the reason for the additional withdrawals. The President is not optimistic regarding his other two criteria, progress in the Paris talks and the level of enemy activity, however and says that "Enemy infiltration has in-

creased substantially." He warns the North Vietnamese against continued increases in infiltration. He says that "There has been no progress whatever on the negotiating front since November 3," and names Philip Habib, acting negotiator, as head of the American delegation, given him the personal rank of ambassador.

December 15.—Senator Church introduces an amendment to the Defense Appropriation Act for fiscal 1970 (H.R. 15090) which prohibits the use of funds appropriated by the act to finance introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand. The amendment is offered as a substitute for the Cooper-Mansfield amendment. The Church amendment is approved by a vote of 73 to 17 and the Cooper-Mansfield amendment with wording of Senator Church passes the Senate (85 to 4) and is sent to conference. Both Houses accept the conference report on December 18 and the bill becomes P.L. 91–171.

December 16.—The South Vietnamese government claims control of 92.5 percent of the South Vietnamese people at the end of November. This is one half of one percent higher than the October figure.

December 17.—A House-Senate conference committee incorporates into the Defense Appropriation Act an amendment passed by the Senate and supported by the President which prohibits the use of funds appropriated by the act to finance introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand. The Senate and House agree to the conference report and the President signs the bill on December 24. Meanwhile, the Administration opposes another bill calling for the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on the grounds that it might be needed to back the "international obligations" of the United States and that repeal would have "consequences for Southeast Asia which go beyond the war in Vietnam."

December 18.—The Associated Press reports that desertions from the South Vietnamese armed forces rose from 9 per thousand in September to 10 per thousand in October. Monthly desertions were approximately 10,000.

December 20.—The Korean Foreign Minister tells the National Assembly that Korea will keep its 50,000-man force in Vietnam as long as is necessary. Meanwhile, it is reported from Manila that the withdrawal of the 1,300 Filipinos from Vietnam has been completed.

December 21.—Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman says that he will formally request the Cabinet to order the withdrawal of some of the 12,000 Thai troops in South Vietnam.

December 22.—A dozen opposition members of the South Vietnamese National Assembly hold a news conference in which they accuse President Thieu of attempting to establish a military dictatorship and asked that he stand trial for high treason. At the same time, twenty Senators criticize the President, accusing him of being responsible for an anti-Communist demonstration in which protesters broke into the lower house. A majority of the lower house signs a resolution saying that President Thieu's support of the demonstration divided the government and harmed the country's fighting spirit.

December 23.—In a news conference, Secretary of State William Rogers says that enemy infiltration into South Vietnam had dropped

1969—Continued

since the beginning of December and was down by 60 percent compared with last year. He also says that the climate of world opinion toward the United States had "been greatly improved because of our change of policy in Vietnam."

December 26.—Vice President Agnew leaves Washington for a 23-day goodwill trip to 10 Asian countries. Agnew says that he will explain the Nixon "Asia doctrine" in the nations he visits, and said that within this policy, nations would be expected to handle insurgency within their own borders, but "in the event we determine any action against them threatens the general security of the Asian hemisphere, we will support them with material and other forms of assistance."

December 26.—It was reported in Saigon that the number of Vietcong defectors has dropped sharply in recent weeks to about half the average of the last several months.

December 28.—Lieutenant General William Peers and a five-man team arrive in Saigon to continue the Army's investigation of a possible cover-up of the alleged Mylai massacre.

December 30.—At the year's last meeting of the Paris peace talks, American delegate Philip Habib presents a list of 1,406 Americans missing in action in Southeast Asia and asked for negotiations on the prisoner of war issue. The Communist side says that the problem must wait for overall solution of the war.

December 31.—A State Department report lists 19,157 civilians killed by Vietcong terrorist action from 1965 to December 30, 1969. This does not include figures for February 1968, but the Government of South Vietnam claims that 7,400 civilians were killed in the Tet offensive of February 1968. A total of 32,174 civilians have been abducted by the Vietcong, and nearly 36,000 have been wounded since 1967 by the Vietcong. Figures from Saigon indicated that 202,778 civilians were admitted (since January 1967) to South Vietnamese and United States military hospitals as of November 30, due to war-related causes.

December 31.—United States troop strength in Vietnam stands at 474,400. United States troops killed in combat in 1969 total 9,414. This compares to a figure of 14,592 in 1968 and 9,378 in 1967.

1970

January 2.—Vice President Spiro Agnew winds up a 24-hour visit to South Vietnam and says he found morale "higher than it ever was."

January 4.—Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield says that it is time for a close examination of "powers and authorities which the Congress, and especially the Senate, have given to Presidents over the years, but which have never been looked at again and remain in force," especially the President's extraordinary war powers of the Formosa resolution, the Mideast resolution and the Tonkin Gulf resolution.

January 4.—Thai Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn says that Vice President Agnew had assured him that "there will be no change in American policy and no lessening of U.S. commitments to Thailand and Southeast Asia."

January 5.—The South Vietnamese Senate votes 25–4 to approve a resolution describing the alleged Mylai massacre as "regrettable" but "an isolated act by an American unit and not the policy of the United States armed forces."

January 6.—American officials in South Vietnam estimate that infiltration from North Vietnam into South Vietnam totaled between 100,000 and 110,000 in 1969. At the end of 1969, there were 230,000 to 240,000 enemy soldiers or functionaries either in South Vietnam or ready to enter. 130,000 were considered Vietcong, and the rest North Vietnamese. Forty percent, or less than 90,000, were believed to be combat troops, while the rest were considered support troops and cadre.

January 9.—In a news conference, South Vietnamese President Thieu says, "I believe peace will come in two to three years when the Communists are completely defeated. He speaks of American troop withdrawals in terms of years and says that future American troop withdrawals would depend on the "crucial question" of whether the United States had provided adequate supplies and equipment for South Vietnamese forces.

January 11.—Official sources in Saigon report that the use of surface-to-air missiles by the enemy in Laos had been spotted for the first time, and that American B–52 raids over the Ho Chi Minh trail were continuing.

January 15.—Secretary of State Rogers tells a conference of editors and broadcasters that the Vietnamization program "will be carried out until all combat forces, and ultimately other forces have been withdrawn" or until Hanoi decides to seek peace through negotiations. He says that "President Nixon's program to end American participation in combat in Vietnam is irreversible."

January 18.—Nguyen Minh Vy, a member of the North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris peace talks, tells a news conference in Stockholm that North Vietnam will allow American prisoners of war to send a postcard to their families once a month and to receive a package from home every other month.

In New York, peace advocates open an office called the Committee of Liaison with Families of Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam in order to arrange and facilitate the flow of mail between prisoners and their families.

January 21.—The *New York Times* reports that security in seven of the 16 Mekong Delta provinces of South Vietnam diminished during the last two months as a result of increasing enemy infiltration. In terms of Vietnamese casualties, it is reported, more than half of the war is being fought in the Delta, and more South Vietnamese regional and popular force militiamen had been killed in the Delta since the beginning of December than in all the other areas of South Vietnam. At the same time, more of the enemy were killed in the Delta during that period than in any other corps area.

January 22.—In his State of the Union message, President Nixon says, "The prospects for peace are far greater today than they were a year ago," and asks for Congressional support.

January 22.—The transcript of a Senate executive session on December 15, released on January 22, indicates that the United States is

1970—Continued

spending about $190 million in military and economic aid to Laos in 1970.

January 24.—South Vietnam protests to the International Control Commission that 4,619 civilians were killed and 14,412 injured by Communist terrorist acts in 1969. In addition, Saigon says that 1,879 persons were kidnapped in 1969.

January 26.—President Thieu tells the Vietnamese Newspapers and Editors Association that "a Communist Party cannot be accepted in the Republic of Vietnam because of our location * * * and the historically painful experiences we have suffered * * * The Republic of Vietnam cannot be a neutralist nation." Thieu suggests a new election law "stipulating that after the first ballot—if there is no ticket with a majority of the votes—we should have a second ballot between the two tickets with the most votes."

January 28.—The Gallup Poll reports that 65 percent of 1,460 adults interviewed between January 16 and 19 said that they approve of the way President Nixon was handling the situation in Vietnam. The rating shows his highest level of approval to date. Twenty-four percent disapprove, and 11 percent have no opinion.

January 28.—Secretary of the Air Force Robert Seamans, Jr., after a 10-day trip to Vietnam, says that the South Vietnamese will be able to take over half of the air war in Vietnam "in the next year and three-quarters." He says that South Vietnamese currently fly 25 percent of the air sorties.

January 30.—The United States Command reports that American planes were lost in an attack on a missile base 90 miles inside North Vietnam made on January 28 in retaliation for firing on an unarmed American reconnaissance plane.

The U.S. Command emphasizes that the incident does not reflect any policy change and that reconnaissance flights, which had been conducted since the bombing halt of November 1968, would continue.

January 30.—In a news conference, President Nixon says that "The policy of Vietnamization is irreversible." He adds, however, that the pace of the program could vary.

February 10.—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee publishes a report by two of its investigators that indicates the Vietnamization program will take at least two to four years. The report says that the underlying assumptions of Administration policy "seem to rest on far more ambiguous, confusing and contradictory evidence than pronouncements from Washington and Saigon indicate" and that even if Vietnamization succeeds, substantial American involvement will still be required in Vietnam.

Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma says that he is prepared to "close his eyes" to Communist activity on the Ho Chi Minh trail and call for a halt in air attacks there if the Communists withdraw their 50,000 troops from the rest of Laos.

February 2.—President Nixon's proposed 1971 budget calls for increased economic aid to South Vietnam. Economic aid for South Vietnam will increase by nearly $100 million to total $474 million.

February 2.—North Vietnam reveals a new official population estimate of 20 million, an increase of 3 million over the 1960 figures.

February 4.—American military sources report that U.S. planes have struck targets within North Vietnam 41 times since the bombing

halt began. Only 12 such strikes were reported officially because the others were not considered "significant."

February 5.—A State Department spokesman announces that the Soviet Union has agreed to relay packages from families to prisoners of war in North Vietnam.

February 6.—The South Vietnamese government orders that the unpaid irregular People's Self-Defense Force be upgraded to enable it to take over more offensive operations.

February 6.—Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia condemns American "imperialism" in Asia, but acknowledges that the American presence in Asia assures Cambodia's independence and territorial integrity by diverting the pressures of Asian Communism from Cambodia.

February 9.—The Democratic Policy Council calls for a "firm and unequivocal commitment" to withdraw all American military forces from Vietnam on a specific timetable and suggests that withdrawal should be completed within 18 months, saying, "Such a withdrawal can be accelerated by efforts to create the conditions necessary for a peaceful political settlement."

February 13.—Speaking with reporters prior to his departure from Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird says that despite the stalemate in Paris and continued enemy threat in Vietnam, American withdrawals can continue because of "positive progress" in the Vietnamization program. However, he says, "The road to successful completion of the Vietnamization program is not going to be free of some hard knocks and disappointments," and that the enemy threat remains "significant."

February 17.—William Colby, head of the pacification program in Vietnam, tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Phoenix Program is not an assassination or "counter-terror" program. He says that the annual cost of pacification in 1970 would be $1.5 billion, of which $873 million would be paid by the United States.

February 18.—President Nixon submits to Congress his first annual foreign Affairs message, entitled "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace." Emphasizing that the President's policy for Asia is based on the so-called Nixon Doctrine, the report says that "Our cooperation with Asian nations will be enhanced as they cooperate with one another and develop regional institutions" in terms of defense as well as political and economic concerns. The report stresses that the American goal in Vietnam was a "just settlement" and concludes that the other side was to blame for the lack of progress in negotiations.

February 18.—John P. Vann, head of the pacification program in the Mekong Delta, says that he has become "increasingly convinced" that pacification is succeeding. He says that the biggest difference is in the "changed attitude" of the population of South Vietnam and their increased confidence in the Saigon government.

February 19.—Laotian Premier Prince Souvanna Phouma tells a press conference that the current North Vietnamese offensive in his country is "the most important" yet and is aimed at recovering the territory lost in 1964 and 1965. He says that he does not want

1970—Continued

the involvement of U.S. ground forces, but hopes that the United States would send more arms, particularly M16's.

February 21.—The Laotian government's last major stronghold in the Plain of Jars, the airfield, falls to the North Vietnamese.

February 25.—Deputy Tran Ngoc Chau is found guilty by a military court of having damaged South Vietnamese security through contacts with a Communist agent, his brother, and is sentenced to 20 years in prison.

February 25.—In New York on a visit to the United States, Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman suggests that Asian nations develop regional security arrangements against the day when the United States withdraws its troops from Asia.

February 25.—Adm. John S. McCain, U.S. Commander in the Pacific, says in Saigon that "the present deteriorating situation in Laos is of serious concern to us." An estimated 16,000 North Vietnamese troops were involved in the recent offensive, out of a total 50,000 thought to be in Laos.

February 25.—Secretary of State Rogers confers in Washington with Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, assuring him that the United States intends to fulfill its pledges to Thailand.

February 26.—Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird says "The President has made it very clear that should any decision be made, or a recommendation on his part be made, as far as the use of American military ground combat forces in Laos, he would come to the Congress of the United States for such approval." Laird says that American policy toward Laos had not changed, and that no American ground troops were being used in Laos.

March 1.—Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma sends a letter to Britain and the Soviet Union, co-chairmen of the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, protesting North Vietnamese military activity in Laos, and asking them to consult on violations of Laotian neutrality.

March 3.—Secretary of State William Rogers tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States "has no present plans" to commit ground combat troops to Laos even "if it is overrun" by Communist forces. Elliot Richardson says that the Administration did not rely on the Tonkin Gulf Resolution as its authority for American involvement in Vietnam. He argues that the Administration needs no Congressional authority to engage in air operations over Laos because it was continuing a policy begun by the Johnson administration.

March 3.—Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird denies that the United States is conducting a build-up in Laos, saying that "there has not been any significant change in the numbers of Americans that are in Laos, either . . . civilians or . . . military."

March 5.—Tran Ngoc Chau, is sentenced to ten years at hard labor in his second trial before a military court in Saigon for "liaison with a person whose activities are harmful to national security."

March 6.—In a statement to the nation on U.S. policy and activity in Laos, President Nixon says that there are no American ground combat troops in Laos nor are there any plans to introduce American ground combat forces. He says that there are 1,040 Americans

in Laos, 616 employed by the United States government and 424 under contract to the government. The total number engaged in military advisory functions is 320, and 323 are logistics personnel. "No American stationed in Laos has ever been killed in ground combat operations," the President says. He says that U.S. personnel in Laos did not increase during the past year, when the North Vietnamese had sent over 13,000 additional combat troops into the country, raising their total in Laos to over 67,000 men.

The President says that "Our goal in Laos has been and continues to be to reduce American involvement . . . to bring peace in accordance with the 1962 accords. . . ." He says that U.S. assistance had been provided at the request of the Royal Laotian Government as had air support mission for Laotian forces and that American planes also were flying reconnaissance flights in North Laos and bombing the Ho Chi Minh, trail to protect Americans in South Vietnam.

March 6.—The President says that he had written Britain and the Soviet Union "asking their help in restoring the 1962 Geneva agreements."

March 7.—In a broadcast from Hanoi, the political arm of the Pathet Lao issues a five-point proposal calling for all countries to respect the sovereignty, independence, neutrality and territorial integrity of Laos as provided in the 1962 Laotian agreements. The plan calls for the complete withdrawal of the United States from Laos, the formation of a coalition government and the eventual election of a neutralist government. The program calls for the strict neutrality of Laos as well as respect for the sovereignty of neighboring Vietnam and Cambodia.

March 8.—The White House announces that six civilians and one army captain were killed in Laos since the beginning of 1969. The announcement said that the army officer "was not engaged in combat operations." A total of 27 Americans stationed in Laos were killed in the last six years, 26 of them civilians.

On March 9 it is announced that future American casualties and aircraft losses in Laos will be listed separately, rather than being included in Vietnam casualties.

March 10.—The Defense Department discloses that American military men serving in Laos have been entitled to "hostile fire pay" since January 1, 1966.

March 11.—An estimated 20,000 Cambodians in Phnom Penh demonstrate against the presence of North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops in Cambodia and sack the embassies of both governments.

March 12.—In Laos, Prince Souvanna Phouma encourages the Pathet Lao leaders to join in discussions to adhere to the terms of the Geneva agreements.

March 13.—The Nixon administration announces that it will not oppose attempts to repeal the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. The Administration says it is neutral on a bill to repeal the resolution and other cold war foreign policy resolutions.

March 13.—The Cambodian government demands that North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops withdraw from Cambodia by March 15. The Cambodian demand came in the midst of riots in Phnom Penh

against the North Vietnamese and Vietcong and during a trip abroad by Chief of State Norodom Sihanouk.

March 14.—A statement by the Democratic National Committee in response to President Nixon's foreign policy message to Congress charges that the Vietnamization policy "at best can only perpetuate the fighting with continued U.S. involvement." The statement is also critical of American involvement in Laos.

March 14.—Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield says that he had received "good enough assurance to suit me" that the United States did not intend to repeat the use of B–52 bombers in Northern Laos.

March 14.—The Gallup Poll reports that 46 percent of 1,538 adults surveyed from February 27 to March 2 favor withdrawal from Vietnam by the end of 18 months; 21 percent favor immediate withdrawal. Thirty-eight percent favor withdrawal over as long a period as is necessary for the South Vietnamese to assume the burden of the war, and seven percent favor sending more troops to Vietnam.

March 16.—The White House refuses to comment on a letter from Soviet Premier Kosygin asking that the United States "stop fully and unconditionally the bombing of Laotian territory" as a precondition "for the interested Laotian sides to meet." The letter, released in Moscow, calls President Nixon's proposal to reconvene the Geneva Conference "unrealistic."

March 17.—In a television interview, Secretary of State William Rogers says that "if a situation should arise that would require consideration of combat forces in Laos, I told the Senate of the United States that we would consult with them to the fullest extent possible." He says that he could not "foreclose" the President in making any decisions about future action, however.

March 17.—The army accuses 14 officers, including two generals, of involvement in suppression of information concerning the alleged 1968 massacre of civilians in Mylai, Vietnam, bringing the total accused in connection with the incident to 24. The charges grew out of an investigation by General William Peers.

March 17.—Cambodian troops launch an attack against North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces on the South Vietnamese border and are aided in their efforts by South Vietnamese artillery.

March 18.—Phnom Penh radio announces that Prince Norodom Sihanouk has been overthrown as Chief of State of Cambodia while absent on a trip abroad. Power is seized by Lt. General Lon Nol and Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak. Cheng Heng, President of the National Assembly, is designated as interim Chief of State, pending elections. Sihanouk is deposed following a unanimous no-confidence vote by the National Assembly.

South Vietnamese President Thieu says that he hopes to establish diplomatic relations with a "more amenable Cambodia" and that he hopes the two countries could work together in attempting to control Communist activity along their border.

March 19.—The leaders of Cambodia's coup say that Cambodia's foreign policy will remain one of "independence, sovereignty, peace, strict neutrality and territorial integrity."

The U.S. State Department announces that U.S. recognition of Cambodia will continue and that "our position is that the question

of recognition does not arise." The new Cambodian government closes the port of Sihanoukville to North Vietnamese supply ships to stem the supply of food and ammunition to Communist troops.

March 19.—Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird says that even if a Communist government took over in Laos, he would "certainly recommend" that the United States continue bombing the Ho Chi Minh trail "because it's tied so closely with the safety and security of American armed forces" in Vietnam. He says that the Administration is not sure of the objective of Communist forces in Laos, but that his major concern is with infiltration through Laos into South Vietnam. Laird said B-52 strikes in the war had declined to 1,200 a month, from 1,800 a year ago.

March 20.—The Associated Press reports that two battalions of Thai soldiers were flown to the Laotian base at Long Thieng to help defend it against an expected North Vietnamese attack.

March 22.—Pathet Lao leader Souphanouvong sends a letter to Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma which contains a "proposition" for ending the war. The Premier's office said that the proposal would be given careful study before a response was made. The message demands an immediate halt to all U.S. bombing as a precondition for talks and demanded that the Prince reply as soon as possible.

March 22.—The new government of Cambodia issues a statement which charges that Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops are occupying the country and calls on the International Control Commission "to help put a stop in peaceful fashion to the occupation," and to consult with the other signatories of the Geneva Accords.

March 23.—At a news conference, Secretary of State Rogers says that President Nixon had sent a letter to the Soviet Union asking it to "exercise its responsibilities . . . and seek consultations among the signatories for the purpose of carrying out the agreement that was reached in 1962, which is to provide for the neutrality of Laos." He says that the United States "had nothing to do, directly or indirectly" with the overthrow of Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk.

March 23.—In a statement issued from Peking, Prince Norodom Sihanouk says that he will form a "national union government" and a "national liberation army." The North Vietnamese, Vietcong and Pathet Lao declare their support for Sihanouk against the new government of Cambodia.

March 26.—South Vietnamese President Thieu signs into law the "Land to the Tiller" land reform bill passed by the National Assembly. The bill passed the Senate on March 9 and the House on September 9.

March 26.—In some provinces of Cambodia, rioting breaks out against the new regime.

March 27.—South Vietnamese forces launch their first major attack against Vietcong strongholds in Cambodia, as a battalion crossed about two miles into Cambodia. U.S. helicopters provide support (though no Americans participated in the fighting across the border). The attack is reportedly launched with the agreement of Cambodian authorities.

March 27.—North Vietnamese and Vietcong diplomats leave Phnom Penh.

1970—Continued

March 28.—It is reported that for the second day in a row, South Vietnamese troops cross the Cambodian border in an effort to trap a Vietcong force. The operation is conducted with the cooperation of the Cambodian army.

March 28.—South Vietnamese and Cambodian military officers hold an informal meeting on the border of their two countries, accompanied by an American colonel. The American says his orders are "to encourage meetings between Vietnamese and Cambodians."

March 28.—Commenting in an interview on the Pathet Lao formula for peace in Laos, Prince Souvanna Phouma says that the insistence that U.S. bombing be halted is an obstacle to negotiations.

March 29.—It is reported that Vietcong advances in Laos and Cambodia and the risks of setbacks in pacification in Vietnam led General Creighton Abrams and other high-ranking U.S. military officers to call for a slow-down in U.S. withdrawals from Vietnam and that General William Westmoreland favors a six-month delay in withdrawals.

March 30.—State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey says that the question of American arms aid for Cambodia "has not been raised in Washington nor Phnom Penh."

April 1.—Several thousand Vietnamese Communist troops fight Cambodian troops near the Vietnamese border, the Cambodian government reports. In Phnom Penh, a government spokesman refuses to comment on the possibility of joint action with American troops but says that the government will not ask for American ground intervention. The spokesman says that the government desires a return to Cambodian neutrality and would settle for nothing less than the total expulsion of North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops from Cambodian territory.

April 1.—A statement issued by the French cabinet expresses concern for the widened Indochina war and urges possible reconvening of the 1954 Geneva Conference.

April 2.—Secretary of State William Rogers tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in closed session that the Nixon administration is striving to maintain the neutrality of Cambodia and to avoid becoming entangled in an all-Indochina war.

April 2.—The Cambodian government denies that the United States has the right to pursue enemy forces into Cambodia, saying "Cambodia will not in fact accept the right of pursuit carried out on its territory."

April 2.—Cambodian Premier Gen. Lon Nol says at a news conference: "In my opinion the intervention by friendly countries is possible—for example, Indonesia and others * * * in case of * * * aggression by foreign troops."

April 4.—An estimated 50,000 people march in Washington to support the war.

April 5.—Two South Vietnamese battalions move against Vietcong sanctuaries in Cambodia near Tayninh. There is no American support for the operation, which penetrates more than 10 miles into Cambodia.

April 6.—South Vietnamese President Thieu tells the joint opening session of the National Assembly that "Stable peace in Indochina

can be achieved only if the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia is not violated by external forces and is supervised and guaranteed by an efficient international system."

April 7.—The Cambodian delegate to the United Nations asks the Security Council "to consider the possibility of exerting all their influence" to halt North Vietnamese and Vietcong aggression.

April 8.—South Vietnamese Premier Khiem tells the Senate that President Thieu intended to ask for legislation to enable him to govern by decree in case of a sudden change in the military or economic situation in South Vietnam.

April 8.—Cambodian government forces are driven back by the Vietcong and North Vietnamese in heavy fighting nine miles from the South Vietnamese border. Official sources in Cambodia say that "Local authorities have an agreement between each other to help" in establishing cooperation between Cambodian and Vietnamese forces against the enemy.

April 9.—A Defense Department spokesman in Washington says that American military advisers in South Vietnam have been given permission to cross the Cambodian border to "exchange pleasantries and protocol greetings."

April 9.—The Laotian government formally answers the Pathet Lao's terms for peace with a series of counter-proposals. The government refuses to accept demands for a halt in American bombing in Laos, but says that it is willing to negotiate on the Pathet Lao point.

April 10.—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee votes unanimously for the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.

April 11.—Gen. Lon Nol, addressing a Cambodian pro-government rally, says that the government will "look forward * * * to the establishment of a republican government in Cambodia."

April 11.—Senators Frank Church and John Sherman Cooper announce that they are planning to sponsor an amendment to the military appropriations bill to forbid the use of funds to finance the use of American ground forces in Cambodia, Thailand or Laos.

April 12.—American troops push within about 500 yards of the South Vietnamese-Cambodian border near Tayninh, but American commanders says that the prohibitions against American operations across the border have not been changed.

April 13.—The Cambodian campaign against Vietnamese, which continued for about ten days, reportedly reaches new levels of intensity. In Saigon, a "people's delegation" authorized by the government plans a trip to Phnom Penh to investigate reports of mistreatment of Vietnamese by Cambodians.

April 14.—Cambodian Premier Lon Nol, in a broadcast from Phnom Penh, issues an appeal for aid from any country. The announcement asks for arms only and no other form of assistance. The General accuses enemy forces of mounting "an escalation of systematic acts of aggression."

April 15.—The Defense Department announces that it is suspending the use of the herbicide 2,4,5,-T ("agent orange") as a defoliant in Vietnam.

April 15.—The bodies of an estimated 1,000 Vietnamese who appeared to be civilians are counted floating in the Mekong River in Southeastern Cambodia. They appear to be the victims of a mass killing.

1970—Continued

April 16.—Yakov Malik, the Soviet Union's chief delegate to the United Nations, says at a news conference in New York, that "only a new Geneva Conference could bring a new solution and relax tension on the Indochina peninsula." However, in an interview on April 17, Malik calls the proposal for a new Geneva conference "unrealistic."

April 16.—North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces in Cambodia increased since March 8 to an estimated 54,500. While most of the Communist forces are located in the Northeast, they have made gains in the Southeast Parrot's Beak.

April 16.—State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey says that the United States has received a specific request from Cambodia for arms and military supplies but not for American troops.

April 17.—Cambodia's delegate to the United Nations says that unless the International Control Commission in Cambodia could be reactivated, Cambodia would ask the Security Council to send observers.

April 18.—Secretary of State William Rogers says that "We think that the international communists should play a more active role, particularly in the light of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, to bring about negotiations," and that tensions in Laos and Cambodia had increased "in the last few weeks * * * (because) the neutrality of each has been threatened by North Vietnam in direct violation of its solemn pledges" in signing the 1962 and 1954 Geneva Agreements. He says that the objective of the Nixon administration is to avoid "widening" of the war or lengthening the American involvement.

April 19.—Senator Stuart Symington's, Subcommittee on Commitments makes public the hearings on Laos held in October. The testimony represents official acknowledgement that Americans stationed in Laos had been at least indirectly involved in the conflict there and that 100 American civilian and military personnel had been killed in Laos since 1962. The testimony reveals that since 1966 Americans served as air spotters in Laotian planes bombing enemy targets, and that the American ambassador to Laos approved or disapproved targets.

April 20.—In a report to the nation on Vietnam, President Nixon announces the withdrawal of 150,000 American troops from Vietnam, to be completed in the spring of 1971, depending on "the current military and diplomatic situation." The President says that his decision is "based entirely on the progress of Vietnamization."

April 20.—The President says that "we finally have in sight the just peace we are seeking," and "pacification is succeeding." Appealing to the country for its support, the President says that "we shall not be defeated in Vietnam."

April 20.—Responding to a French proposal for a new conference on Indochina, Provisional Revolutionary Government Foreign Minister Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh says that the proposal "could not contribute to solveing the problems" of Indochina.

April 21.—In the third major offensive in a week, South Vietnamese troops again cross the Cambodian border in force to strike at enemy sanctuaries.

April 21.—Cambodian sources disclose that Premier Lon Nol sent an appeal to President Nixon asking for military equipment and arms as well as active assistance from American-trained and equipped Cambodian mercenaries serving in South Vietnam. The sources describe the military situation in Cambodia as critical.

April 21.—President Thieu says that South Vietnam would need more aid from the United States in order to assume full responsibility for its own defense.

April 22.—The Nixon administration discloses that Saigon and the United States had agreed to supply Cambodia with about 6,000 automatic rifles of Soviet and Chinese manufacture.

April 22.—In a letter to the United Nations Security Council, the Cambodian government makes "an urgent appeal to all countries which love peace and justice" to help Cambodia fight North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces.

April 22.—The Australian government announces that it had decided to withdraw one of the three Australian battalions serving in Vietnam.

April 23.—Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik says that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had agreed to sponsor an Asian conference in May to try to maintain Cambodia's neutrality.

April 23.—Cambodia agrees to admit a South Vietnamese Red Cross delegation to begin the repatriation of Vietnamese living in Cambodia. The 5-man delegation arrives in Phnom Penh on April 26.

April 25.—Secretary of State William Rogers, in a speech to the American Society of International Law, says that, "More than 40,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops have invaded and now occupy Cambodia * * *. A more explicit and unprovoked violation of the fundamental provisions of the charter of the United Nations and of additional specific international obligations . . . could hardly be imagined."

April 26.—Official press statements from North Vietnam and Red China reject proposals by Indonesia for an Asian conference to restore the neutrality of Cambodia.

April 27.—Hanoi radio reports that leaders of Communist forces in North Vietnam, Laos and South Vietnam joined Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia in a "summit conference" of the Indochinese people on April 24 and 25. Later reports indicate that Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai attended part of the conference.

April 27.—Testifying in closed session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State William Rogers says that the President had the authority to extend limited aid without Congressional approval.

Rogers emphasizes that the Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia were the locations "from where the war is being conducted." He says that "the South Vietnamese have made several (cross-border) attacks and they have been fairly successful."

April 27.—Pham Huy Ty, a South Vietnamese Foreign Ministry official, calls upon the Cambodian Foreign Minister and asked Cambodia to avoid "a hate campaign against the Vietnamese people." Cambodia agrees to take steps to "stop all acts that are contrary

1970—Continued

to the principles of justice and humanity." Mr. Ty suggests the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

April 29.—An announcement from the U.S. Command in Saigon which is also issued by the Pentagon says: "In response to the request of the government of the Republic of Vietnam, advisers, air, logistics, medical and artillery support, as required, is being provided by COMUSMACV to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces operating in counter-attacks against North Vietnamese army and Vietcong forces deployed in the Parrot's Beak area of Cambodia just across the border from the Republic of Vietnam.

"Supplementary support to help save the lives of free world forces and to help accomplish ARVN objectives was requested by the RVN from U.S. sources.

"Authority to provide the requested supplementary support was given in Washington. . . ."

April 29.—The Defense Department announces that the purpose of the assault into Cambodia is "to save American and other free world lives and to strengthen the Vietnamization program."

April 30.—In an address to the nation concerning the situation in Indochina, President Nixon announces that American troops are attacking North Vietnamese and Vietcong sanctuaries in Cambodia. He said that the United States was sending small arms assistance to the Cambodian government in response to their request for aid. He says that the action had been taken "to protect our men who are in Vietnam and to guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal and Vietnamization program."

The President says that attacks on enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia would be made "in cooperation with the armed forces of South Vietnam," with the immediate objective of locating the headquarter's of the enemy's Central Office for South Vietnam in the Fish Hook area.

The President stresses that it is not an invasion of Cambodia but an extension of the Vietnam war, and that the United States was still committed to a negotiated solution of the war.

April 30.—In Laos, Communist troops capture Attopeu, their farthest advance thus far into government territory.

April 30.—White House officials say that they expect the operation against Communist COSVN headquarters in Cambodia will be completed in six to eight weeks. While officials will not say how many Americans were involved in the operation, they say that there were probably several thousand ground troops. Officials say the President took the action under his authority as Commander-in-Chief, and that the action will not affect the promised withdrawal of 150,000 men from Vietnam over the next year.

May 1.—Premier Lon Nol states that Cambodia has not been consulted in advance about the American and South Vietnamese military operations. He declares that the operation is a violation of Cambodia's territorial integrity. The Premier says that he would have preferred that countries give arms so that they could have handled the operation themselves. Premier Lon Nol states that Communist penetration into the country poses a threat to Phnom Penh.

May 1.—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee requests a conference with President Nixon to discuss American military involve-

ment in Cambodia. The committee approves a bill that would repeal the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution.

May 1.—The recently disbanded Vietnam Moratorium Committee calls for "immediate massive protests" against the Cambodian operation. Demonstrations are held at many universities protesting the Cambodian decision.

May 1.—In Paris the North Vietnamese and Vietcong react angrily to "the open and impudent American aggression" in Cambodia. They appeal for American public opinion and foreign governments to stop the action of the "warlike and perfidious" Nixon administration.

May 2.—Administration sources state that the United States had conducted heavy bombing against supply dumps and other targets north of the demilitarized zone in North Vietnam. The raids are the first major bombing of North Vietnam since November 1968 when the U.S. announced the end of the bombing of North Vietnam. Officials contend that it reflects no change in policy. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird warns that he will urge a resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam if Hanoi should react to the attack on Cambodian sanctuaries by moving troops across the demilitarized zone into South Vietnam. Laird suggests that the operations are designed to buy time until the South Vietnamese are trained to take over the responsibility for the war. He adds that the operation should not affect the President's decision to withdraw 150,000 men, but should permit a larger withdrawal.

May 2.—Premier Lon Nol tells Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. of the Philippines that the American action represents a positive response to Cambodia's appeal for help to restore her neutrality and repel North Vietnamese and Vietcong invaders. He reports that enemy forces had recently increased from 50,000 to 150,000. The Premier asks for assistance in arms and equipment but says he was not asking for troops from other countries.

May 2.—Senators Hatfield, McGovern, Hughes and Goodell announced at a news conference that they will offer an amendment to cut off funds for continued military activities in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia unless there is a declaration of war. This will be attached to the pending military procurement authorization bill.

May 2.—White House communications director Herbert Klein cites a private poll which supports the President's Cambodian decision three to one. He cites AFL–CIO head George Meany's endorsement of the action. He says that the national polling showed 65% of respondents supported the President's actions, 22% disagreed, and 13% with no opinion. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee announced that the 1,650 telegrams they received ran 8 to 1 against the President's decision.

May 2.—Demonstrations are violent at times on several university campuses in the U.S. in protest of the President's decision on Cambodia. In Saigon, students march to the National Assembly protesting the action.

May 3.—Pentagon officials confirm that the United States has carried out limited bombing of North Vietnam. The bombing was limited to anti-aircraft sites and supply areas below Donghoi,

about 45 miles above the demilitarized zone. Assistant Secretary of Defense Daniel Henkin says that the bombing reflects no change in American policy. He describes the bombing of anti-aircraft as a protective reaction "to protect the lives of our pilots." The bombing is also interpreted as a move to force the North Vietnamese to conduct "meaningful negotiations" in Paris.

May 3.—In the third day of the allied operation in Cambodia, large bunker complexes and caches of military equipment are uncovered, but COSVN headquarters is not located. There are reports of enemy advances in other parts of Cambodia, while South Vietnamese and Cambodian military commanders continue discussion of possible military cooperation between the two countries.

May 3.—Vice President Agnew states in a television interview that since Prince Sihanouk's overthrow in Cambodia, the Communists have been expanding their Cambodian sanctuaries and access to supplies until the United States felt that "the security of American forces is seriously threatened." Agnew says, however, that the United States has "no responsibility to the Cambodians" and has "absolutely not" agreed to defend the Lon Nol government. Agnew describes the North Vietnamese as "quite debilitated and decimated. There has been a great diminution in the capability and in their activity in recent years."

Agnew's statements are criticized by Democratic National Chairman Lawrence O'Brien, who accuses the Administration of "a major escalation of the war in Indochina" and the "establishment of a new front in Cambodia and a new, prolonged ground war which the Vice President himself admitted we could not win." He said "the American policy of disengagement has ended."

May 3.—CBS news reports that the results of a telephone poll it conducted showed 2 to 1 public support for President Nixon's policy of sending troops into Cambodia. The poll was based on a nation-wide random sample of 1022 interviews, with 59 percent approval and 32 percent disapproval. But only 38 percent of those surveyed believed that the United States would be able to extricate itself from the war in Southeast Asia.

May 4.—The Defense Department announces that it has stopped the large-scale air raids mounted against North Vietnam.

May 4.—The New York Times reports that more than 2,000 well-armed Cambodians (natives of South Vietnam) trained and paid by American Special Forces units arrived in Phnom Penh on the 1st and 2nd of May to reinforce the Cambodian Army. Premier Lon Nol had requested the use of the troops.

May 4.—Premier Kosygin assails President Nixon for having sent American forces into Cambodia. He warns that this action might lead to a worsening of Soviet-American relations. He charges the U.S. with repeatedly breaking the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962, declaring President Nixon's "practical steps in the field of foreign policy are fundamentally at variance with declarations" he "repeatedly made" * * * Kosygin stated "Now is the time to act and not to hold conferences." He called for the unity of "all socialist, anti-imperialist and peace loving forces in the struggle against aggression" in Cambodia.

May 4.—The Cambodian Government releases a statement "declaring that it respects the sentiments of President Richard Nixon for Cambodia's neutrality in his message of 30 April, 1970, and expresses its gratitude for them." The statement indicates Cambodia will accept unconditionally any help from friendly countries in all forms (economic, military or diplomatic).

May 4.—Communist China denounces the United States for sending troops into Cambodia and pledges support for the people of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Peking says that the "war of aggression against the Cambodian people" was a planned expansion of the war by the Nixon administration.

May 4.—The official North Vietnamese newspaper Nhan Dan says that "Nixon's April 30 address is an open avowal of the failure of the United States" and an attempt to justify the "U.S. aggression in Cambodia." The President's move is also criticized by Prince Sihanouk in a statement released from Peking.

May 4.—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee charges that the Nixon administration, by sending American troops into Cambodia "without the consent or knowledge of Congress," is usurping the war-making powers of Congress and has been "conducting a constitutionally unauthorized war in Indochina." In reply, the White House says that the decision to enter Cambodia was based on the President's constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief.

May 4.—Thirty seven college presidents urge through a letter to the President that he demonstrate unequivocally his determination to end the war.

May 5.—President Nixon meets with Congressional committees to explain U.S. involvement in Cambodia. He assures them that American troops would be withdrawn from Cambodia in three to six weeks. He also says that American troops will not penetrate more than twenty-one miles into Cambodia without Congressional approval. He reveals that some of the American forces were already being withdrawn. The President says the territory American troops were operating in "has been completely dominated by the enemy." The President says that he is not seeking a military victory in Vietnam and would accept a negotiated settlement "based on the present power balance."

May 5.—In Peking, Prince Sihanouk announces establishment of a government in exile. This government is promptly recognized by Peking and North Vietnam. Four of the cabinet members are former Khmer Rouge leaders.

May 6.—American combat troops open two new operations into Cambodia—across the border from Tayninh province and into the jungles 23 miles north of Phuocbinh. These operations increase to six the number of U.S.-South Vietnamese fronts and brings the number of allied troops to about 50,000 in Cambodia.

May 6.—The North Vietnamese and Vietcong cancel the 66th plenary session of the Vietnam peace talks in Paris.

May 6.—Communist China, North Vietnam, and North Korea break diplomatic relations with Cambodia. The government of Cambodia indicates it will establish relations with South Vietnam in the near future.

1970—Continued

May 6.—The State Department announces that the "first deliveries" of American rifles and carbines to the government of Cambodia had been made over the past few days.

May 6.—The House of Representatives rejects amendments—to the $20 billion military authorization bill—designed to restrict the President's authority to introduce U.S. ground combat troops into Cambodia, Laos, or Thailand.

May 8.—The President in a televised news conference states that the decision to intervene in Cambodia was made because the Communist action to expand sanctuaries there would present a threat to U.S. forces left in Vietnam after the withdrawal of the 150,000 soldiers scheduled to leave within a year.

May 8.—Cambodian officials indicate approval of a large-scale effort by the South Vietnamese Navy up the Mekong River to evacuate Vietnamese residents of Phnom Penh and other areas. The officials state that the South Vietnamese are free to conduct operations on both banks of the river to eliminate attacks upon the ships. President Thieu announces that gunboats will travel up the Mekong on "a relief mission to the resident Vietnamese in Cambodia." President Thieu stated that he and Premier Lon Nol have worked out agreements in principle" for South Vietnamese troops to conduct continuing operations into eastern Cambodia. Thieu indicates that South Vietnamese troops will not be bound by the restrictions President Nixon had placed on the United States forces operating in Cambodia. He also indicates that South Vietnam would take on the job of training the Cambodian Army.

May 8.—U.S. combat forces discover large amounts of munitions in an area called the City in the Fish Hook area of Cambodia. Although they do not discover COSVN headquarters, some commanders of the operation say this is one of the largest and most elaborate enemy bases they have discovered.

May 8.—More than two hundred and fifty State Department employees sign a letter sent to Secretary Rogers which expresses their "concern and apprehension over the enlargement of hostilities in Southeast Asia," and request that the Secretary "seek reconsideration of the apparent direction of United States policy in Southeast Asia."

May 9.—The U.S. command in Vietnam announces that thirty American gunboats have joined with sixty South Vietnamese gunboats in a push up the Mekong River. These forces are augmented by United States helicopter gunships and thousands of South Vietnamese ground soldiers for a portion of the 110-mile trip up the river. The United States also provides tactical air strikes and transportation for supplies, medical evacuation helicopters and spotter aircraft to direct fire onto enemy positions. The American command also announces that two new ground operations have been started involving several thousand men.

May 9.—Between 75,000 and 100,000 people gather in Washington to protest U.S. operations in Cambodia.

May 9.—The White House states that the military operation into Cambodia has already captured more enemy ammunition than the North Vietnamese and Vietcong have used in Vietnam during the first four months of the year.

May 9.—Col. Thong Phanh Knoksy, Laotian Defense ministry spokesman, says that three North Vietnamese battalions totalling approximately 1,000 troops advanced to within 18 miles of Luang Prabang, the royal capital. Col. Thong describes this thrust as a "serious threat."

May 9.—More than two hundred colleges have closed and about four hundred have organized strikes protesting United States military involvement in Cambodia and the fatal shooting of four Kent State University students. In New York City, construction workers break up an antiwar demonstration.

May 10.—The commander of the South Vietnam gunboats moving up the Mekong reveals that he will travel up the river past Phnom Penh to Kompong Cham, Cambodia's second largest city. The American gunboats do not sail beyond the limit of 21.7 miles from the South Vietnamese border set by the President.

May 10.—Under Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson on "Issues and Answers" says that the Administration decided to send troops into Cambodia after concluding that the possibility of Chinese intervention in Indochina was remote enough to constitute an "acceptable risk." He further states that the Soviet Union has maintained a "rather restrained posture" since the operation began. United States Ambassador Bunker says in Saigon that he doubts that the United States will have to make repeated raids into Cambodia to keep the North Vietnamese from rebuilding their bases. "This operation gives more time to develop the Vietnamese forces—I think the Vietnamese can handle whatever situation develops at that time," Bunker states.

May 11.—Forty-seven South Vietnamese Navy vessels arrive at Phnom Penh to begin the evacuation of Vietnamese. The boats carry relief goods to Phnom Penh. Several hundred American advisers and combat helicopter crews remain at Neak Luong, forty miles downstream from the capital. John Paul Vann, the chief American civilian official in the IV Corps tactical area of South Vietnam, says that most of the Vietnamese from Cambodia will be settled in the Delta area near the Cambodian border so that they can return to Cambodia when the situation becomes more settled.

May 11.—President Thieu tells newsmen that South Vietnamese forces "can go farther into Cambodia and there is no deadline yet for getting out." He also says that South Vietnamese troops may return to Cambodia after the current operations are over but he implies that any such action will be only with the agreement of the Cambodian government.

May 11.—Secretary Laird says that "American forces are not going to be bogged down in Cambodia," and that "the operation was to last from three to six weeks and the timetable will be met."

May 11.—Premier Souvanna Phouma says that because of the Cambodian operations he expects an intensification of the war in Laos by the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao. He appeals to the Pathet Lao for serious peace negotiations. He repeats his rejection of the five-point peace proposal submitted by the Pathet Lao in March. He attacks the recent front formed by Prince Sihanouk: "It's certain that in continuing to disregard national sovereignties,

to violate the borders of others and to harbor an aggressive and arrogant expansion, they only bring about more serious dangers."

May 11.—In a 9 to 4 vote, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approves the amendment introduced by Senators Cooper and Church to amend the Foreign Military Sales Act. The amendment would not prevent the President from carrying out the operation under way in Cambodia but would limit him from embarking upon future military actions in Cambodia without the approval of Congress. Earlier, the State Department had sent a letter to the Foreign Relations Committee urging revision of the amendment. The letter, signed by David M. Abshire, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, stated that "no such amendment should restrict the fundamental powers of the President for protection of the armed forces of the United States . . ." and that the provisions in the bill were "subject to a great variety of interpretations which might adversely affect the President's policy on Vietnamization and steady replacement of American combat forces in Vietnam."

May 12.—Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky of South Vietnam announces that allied vessels, including ships of the United States Navy, had begun a blockade along a 100-mile stretch of Cambodian coastline to prevent enemy forces from resupplying their troops by sea. This blockade began on May 9 and extends from the Cambodian port of Kompong Som (formerly Sihanoukville) to the South Vietnamese border. Ky also reveals that South Vietnam is planning to conduct extensive military operations throughout eastern and central Cambodia after American troops are withdrawn. Ky says that about 15,000 troops could be kept in Cambodia for several months without jeopardizing security in South Vietnam.

May 12.—Secretary Laird appears before the Senate Armed Services Committee. In reply to a question as to whether the Cambodian government had been consulted before the U.S. move on April 30, he says, "The Cambodian Government was informed, and it had no objections." He says that he will "not permit South Vietnamese forces to be tied down [in Cambodia] to such an extent that it in anyway slows down the withdrawal of American forces." Secretary Laird, in explaining the U.S. decision to sweep the sanctuaries, says: "I think the important thing that had an effect on the President was the information that was developed that the North Vietnamese would in the coming months be using sanctuaries at an increasing rate to increase American casualties and this would have a decided effect on public opinion in the United States. The President decided in the interest of protecting Americans."

May 12.—Allied officials in South Vietnam report that since the beginning of the incursion into Cambodia, they have captured enough materials from the North Vietnamese to support a five-month attack in South Vietnam. They believe that the COSVN headquarters may have moved deep into Cambodia.

May 12.—Foreign Minister Adam Malik of Indonesia states that his country will send troops abroad to fight Communists if the Indochina war spreads to Malaysia and Thailand and presents a danger to Indonesian security.

May 13.—Secretary Rogers makes his first detailed public remarks on the operations in Cambodia. He says: "This is not an escala-

tion. * * * It is not an attempt to win a military victory. If it were, * * * anxieties would be well founded. But the President has committed himself to limitations of time and distance, and events will answer these anxieties." Mr. Rogers says that the bombing of Cambodian enemy bases and supply routes and the patrolling of international waters could be continued after the President's deadline. He states "We don't intend to become involved militarily in support of any Cambodian government * * * I'm talking about United States troops, or air support. * * * Now, in terms of assistance, military assistance by way of supplies or otherwise, the President has announced that we are going to provide some assistance consistent with the present authority that we have. Obviously any larger program would require Congressional approval * * * we have no present plans to embark on that kind of program." He emphasizes that the United States would not become "militarily involved" to defend the Cambodian government.

May 13.—Laotian military officials state that North Vietnamese troops had attacked Laotian Forces in the Bolovens Plateau area in Laos. Three North Vietnamese companies involved apparently came from Cambodia.

May 14.—At the Paris peace conference, Philip C. Habib, the United States delegate, states to the North Vietnamese and Vietcong: "Your answer has been intransigence at the conference table, belligerence in Hanoi, massive aggression in Laos and Cambodia and stepped up attacks in South Vietnam, designed to increase American casualities. This attitude has become intolerable. . . . We will be conciliatory at the conference table. But if your response to our efforts for peaceful negotiation continues to be intransigence in negotiation and an increase in your military attacks, we shall react accordingly." This is the first meeting of the Peace conference since the operation in Cambodia began. The Communists cancelled the previous weeks meeting protesting that action.

May 15.—The White House says that it cannot accept the language of the Cooper-Church amendment. Although the amendment is in agreement with President Nixon's pledge to withdraw all American troops from Cambodia by June 30, Ronald Ziegler states that it will restrain the President from performing his constitutional responsibility of protecting U.S. troops in the field under Article II of the Constitution.

May 15.—A State Department spokesman, Carl Bartch, indicates that the United States is encouraging South Vietnam and Cambodia to produce a joint plan for the defense of the regime of Premier Lon Nol from Communist attacks. He confirms that the United States has provided 7200 M–2 carbines to the Cambodian government.

May 15.—A Laotian Defense Ministry spokesman, Col. Thong Phanh Knosky, expresses the growing concern of the military over expansion of Communist military operations in southern Laos. He says: "From a strictly military point of view a South Vietnamese intervention to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail would be a necessity." The city of Saravane (in Laos) has been the target of the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao in an effort to widen and strengthen their supply routes into South Vietnam and Cambodia.

1970—Continued

May 16.—In Jakarta, Indonesia, the Asian conference on Cambodia holds its first meeting. Twelve nations attend the conference: Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines with Cambodia as "special invitee" rather than as a participant. Foreign Minister Yem Sambaur of Cambodia pleads with the conference to act: "We need help to preserve our neutrality . . . We therefore beg friendly countries to give concrete support to resist the assault of North Vietnamese and Vietcong aggression."

May 16.—In a briefing held for reporters by the White House, Administration officials express hope that the allied military operations into Cambodia will demonstrate to the enemy the wisdom of bargaining seriously at the Paris peace talks. They say that the U.S. is prepared to undertake international arrangements to guarantee the neutrality of Cambodia. They also state that a joint defense arrangement between South Vietnam and Cambodia will be consistent with the Nixon Doctrine's goal of regional self-defense pacts. Officials say that the operations may give as many as 10 months to the South Vietnamese to equip and train their army before the enemy can rebuild to its former strength.

May 16.—The Communists attack and hold parts of Kompong Cham, Cambodia's second largest city. The provincial governor reports that he thought this push by the Communists was due to their being forced from the South Vietnamese border areas. The United States announces that it has withdrawn 5,500 troops to South Vietnam from the Cambodian operation near Se San, 40 miles west of Pleiku.

May 17.—The Asian foreign ministers' conference on Cambodia ends. In a communique the participants call for a reactivation of international peacekeeping machinery in Cambodia and for the convening of a new international conference to resolve the conflict in Indochina. They send their recommendations to the United Nations and request that that body set up an international conference. The conference appoints the foreign ministers of Japan, Malaysia and Indonesia to serve as a "task force" to begin immediate consultations with the Soviet Union and Britain on reactivation of the International Control Commission on Cambodia. The Japanese had rejected a motion to make the conference a permanent organization. The final communique asked "respect for the sovereignty, independence, neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia" and urges that all foreign troops be withdrawn from Cambodia. None of the countries offer military aid to Cambodia.

May 17.—After an air and ground assault, Cambodians regain full control of Kompong Cham. Lieut. Gen. Michael S. Davison, commander of all United States troops in Cambodia, says that at least part of the COSVN headquarters has been uncovered between May 11 and May 13 near the town of Memot, ten miles inside Cambodia. About 10,000 South Vietnamese troops supported by American advisers, aircraft and logistical elements launch a new operation across the Vinhte Canal in the Mekong Delta.

May 18.—During a hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of Defense Laird reports that

both the United States and South Vietnam have made brief attacks in Laos on specific limited missions in the past but he insists that no American troops are engaged in ground combat in Laos now. Secretary Laird emphasizes that these operations are protective actions designed to protect American troops from attack. Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam of South Vietnam says that United States and South Vietnamese soldiers have been crossing the Laotian border in "hot pursuit" of enemy forces for several years. The White House announces that "our policy is unchanged * * *. We do not have American ground troops in Laos."

May 21.—Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky declares that South Vietnamese forces are determined to remain in Cambodia after the withdrawal of American forces. He states: "I wish to make it clear that we will not let our hands be bound by anyone any more * * *. Our armed forces have the capability of mounting military operations independently in Cambodia as well as in Vietnam. We will continue to maintain our military presence in Cambodia, not only to destroy the Communists but also to provide protection for the lives and property of 600,000 resident Vietnamese in Cambodia."

May 22.—The State Department sends to Senator Fulbright a letter informing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Administration had decided to give about $7.5 million worth of arms to Cambodia, on the grounds that such assistance is important to the security of United States forces.

May 22.—The Government of South Vietnam announces that it has decided to halt the mass evacuation of Vietnamese refugees by boat down the Mekong River from Cambodia. About 70,000 Vietnamese remain in camps in Cambodia. Phan Huy Ty, the head of Saigon's permanent mission in Cambodia, says that the emergency phase of the program is over. He says that security has been restored to Phnom Penh and that the Cambodians have indicated a great comprehension of the problems of the Vietnamese minority in their country. He announces that a second phase will now begin which will allow the Vietnamese in camps to return home and resume the lives that were interrupted a few months earlier. Mr. Ty says that this second phase will be given a trial for about 10 days to find out if the Vietnamese can resume their normal living patterns. South Vietnamese sources report that between 50,000 and 80,000 Vietnamese returned to Vietnam out of the estimated 400,000 residing in Cambodia. Premier Lon Nol issues a declaration warning that those who do harm to members of the Vietnamese minority will be punished "with extreme severity." Lt. Gen. Do Cao Tri, commander of most of the South Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, says "if the Cambodians should continue to mistreat our compatriots, then our army will have an appropriate reaction." Dr. Phan Quang Dan, Minister of State and chairman of a committee to aid Vietnamese repatriates, says, "Our policy is to transfer Vietnamese from dangerous to safe areas in Cambodia. Repatriation to Vietnam will be the exception from now on." He mentions that there can possibly be an exchange of populations between Cambodia and Vietnam if this arrangement does not work. Premier Lon Nol announces that martial law will be imposed in Cambodia beginning June 1.

1970—Continued

May 22.—A military spokesman of the Saigon Government reports that the South Vietnamese have doubled their troop strength in Cambodia in the previous week to 40,000. This increase is a result of two new operations into the Cambodian provinces of Takeo and Kampot.

May 22.—Secretary Laird, appearing on the "Today" program, says: "I think it would be a mistake to make a firm timetable and establish it here for the Vietnamese forces . . . I personally feel as Secretary of Defense, if the occasion should arise when the South Vietnamese forces could go into the sanctuary areas at a time when the sanctuaries are rebuilt; when there are North Vietnamese occupying the particular territory, I would recommend that they be used if they so desire. It would be a decision that would be worked out in cooperation with the Cambodian government and the South Vietnamese." But he adds that there will be "no American advisers in Cambodia after June 30."

May 23.—President Suharto of Indonesia expresses concern that if the major powers cannot control the Indochina conflict it could lead to a third world war. Although Suharto asserts that Indonesia has "no political ties to any bloc, . . . Indonesia with her independent, active foreign policy, was obliged to help Cambodia defend her rights." He says that the expansion of the war in Indochina endangers the security of all Southeast Asia, including his country.

May 23.—South Vietnam sends 7,000 more troops into Cambodia as reinforcements for a new drive against a battalion of Communist troops holding the town of Tonle Bet, across the Mekong River from Kompong Cham.

May 25.—Foreign Minister Yem Sambaur of Cambodia, in a news conference before leaving for meetings with the government in Saigon, states that Cambodia will ask President Nixon to keep American troops fighting in Cambodia until the end of the war. He also says that he does not expect the South Vietnamese to leave Cambodia at the same time the Americans do. He says they should not withdraw until the North Vietnamese and Vietcong have been driven from Cambodia.

May 25.—The Republican National Chairman, Representative Rogers Morton, releases a poll which shows that 53 percent of the people surveyed by telephone support the decision of the President on Cambodia, 32 percent are against and 15 percent have no opinion. The question read: "President Nixon has decided to assist South Vietnam with American support in actions against North Vietnamese Communist forces in Cambodia. Do you approve or disapprove of this decision?" The Louis Harris Survey releases the findings of a poll which shows that 50 percent believe that the President was right in his action on Cambodia and 43 percent have "serious doubts" about the move. The Harris question read: "Taking everything into consideration do you think President Nixon was right in ordering the military operation into Cambodia or do you have serious doubts about his having done this?"

May 26.—The Senate votes 82–11 to amend the preamble to the Cooper-Church amendment to prohibit assistance to Cambodia. In order to

meet the objections of the White House, the sponsors revise the preamble to emphasize that the amendment is being offered "in concert with the declared objectives of the President of the United States to avoid the involvement of the United States in Cambodia after July 1."

May 27.—The foreign ministers of South Vietnam and Cambodia sign documents re-establishing diplomatic relations which provide for South Vietnamese military operations in Cambodia as long as necessary. The Foreign Ministers also sign agreements for economic cooperation and on the treatment of Vietnamese residents of Cambodia.

May 27.—In an interview President Thieu tells reporters that South Vietnamese troops will assume responsibility for all ground combat operations in South Vietnam by the middle of 1971. He says his country will need more than 100,000 Americans for an indefinite period to provide air, artillery and logistical support. He adds that South Vietnam will need American logistical and combat support for sustained operations in Cambodia.

May 28.—Thailand announces the resumption of full diplomatic relations with Cambodia and indicates it is considering a request to send troops to Cambodia. Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand declares that if Communists in Cambodia threatened Thailand's border "there isn't any doubt our military authorities will take whatever steps are necessary." He states that it is too early to discuss the possibility of Thailand sending troops into Cambodia.

May 28.—In a statement before the Hammarskjold Forum of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, John Stevenson, Legal Adviser to the Department of State outlines the legal basis of the United States and South Vietnamese operations in Cambodia. He says the "current actions in Cambodia should be viewed as part of the President's effort to withdraw United States forces from combat in Southeast Asia." The U.S. did not make a request to Cambodia for such operations in advance for to have done so "would have compromised the neutrality of the Cambodian Government." Stevenson says that "the purpose of our armed forces in Cambodia is not to help defend the Government of Cambodia, but rather to help defend South Vietnam and United States troops in South Vietnam from continuing North Vietnamese armed attack." He says that "A neutral [country] is obligated to take positive action to prevent such abuse of its neutrality either by attempting to expel the belligerent forces or to intern them." Stevenson says that the government of Prince Sihanouk had made little effort to stop a regular flow of arms and munitions through the Port of Sihanoukville (now called Kompong Som). He cited historical examples in international law where one belligerent was forced to take action in a "neutral" country because the neutral had allowed the other belligerent to violate its territory. "The United States itself has sometimes in the past found it necessary to take action on neutral territory in order to protect itself against hostile operations."

June 1.—Premier Thanom Kittikachorn announces that Thailand would send volunteers to fight in Cambodia. He says that "the volun-

teers for Cambodia would be armed and equipped from aid supplied by the United States."

June 1.—Martial law goes into effect in Phnom Penh. The Government says the martial law decree will remain in effect as long as "the nation is declared in danger."

June 2.—A Thai Cabinet decision modifies the June 1 announcement by Premier Kittikachorn. The cabinet decision stipulates that volunteers sent to Cambodia will be Thais of Cambodian descent. The State Department announces that the United States will provide arms and equipment to supply the ethnic Cambodians who would fight in Cambodia. John King, State Department press officer, says that Cambodia can use some of the $7.9 million in military aid to that country to help equip the ethnic Cambodians organized in Thailand.

June 3.—In a televised report to the nation the President calls the Cambodian operation "the most successful operation of this long and very difficult war." The President states that his decision to intervene is mainly based on the evidence of increased Communist activities in "neutral Cambodia" to "link together bases" which would "have become one continuous hostile territory from which to launch assaults upon American and allied forces."

June 3.—The Senate defeats by 54 to 36 an amendment offered by Senator Robert Dole to the foreign military sales bill which would bar legislative restrictions on the President's authority from taking effect if the President determines "that citizens or nationals of the United States are held as prisoners of war in Cambodia by the North Vietnamese or the forces of the National Liberation Front."

June 4.—President Nixon's 13-man fact-finding party of Members of Congress, of Governors and White House aides arrive in Saigon to begin a four-day check on operations in Cambodia and South Vietnam. The group returns to the United States on June 8.

June 5.—In a joint communique released at the conclusion of a five-day stay of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in France, the two governments "expressed their serious concern about the worsening of the situation in Indochina" and deplored "the foreign intervention that is widening and prolonging the conflict." They agree that their views on a negotiated settlement, on the basis of the Geneva agreements, were close.

June 6.—South Vietnamese Vice President Ky tells the Cambodian Parliament in a special session that South Vietnam possesses no territorial ambitions in Cambodia and that Saigon will send whatever military aid the Cambodian government decides it needs. Cambodia and South Vietnam also announce agreement on a settlement of the Vietnamese refugee problem.

June 7.—A staff report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concludes that Cambodia has "now been linked inextricably" to the war in Vietnam and that the terms of reference of that war have been "permanently changed." The report is based on a trip to South Vietnam and Cambodia by two Committee staff members in the first half of May. The report notes that there will be some military benefits in the short run, with substantial amounts of military equipment and supplies captured. Cambodian government forces, according to

"virtually everyone with whom we talked," cannot hold out against the enemy without sizable military and economic assistance.

June 7.—Secretary of State Rogers says that no U.S. troops will be used to protect the Lon Nol government. He says that while it would be an "unfavorable development" if Cambodia fell to the Communists, it would not be "unacceptable in the sense that we would use American forces to support the government."

June 7.—Secretary Rogers says, in answer to a question dealing with a Vietnam political settlement, "we think an election is the best way to determine the will of the people. Now, if there's some other way to determine the will of the people, we certainly would consider that. And what the President was saying was that if the Communists have 20 percent of the popular support in South Vietnam, they should have 20 percent of the representation, or 30 percent, whatever it might be. The point is we're willing to negotiate to attempt to give the other side whatever representation they are entitled to have."

June 7.—Testimony released by the subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from hearings held in the fall of 1969 involving State and Defense Department officials showed that the United States has been providing Thailand with $50 million a year to send a combat division to South Vietnam ($200 million total since their arrival in 1966). According to the testimony, the U.S. in fiscal 1968 and fiscal 1969 also increased its military assistance by a total of $30 million and agreed to supply Thailand with a battery of Hawk antiaircraft missiles.

June 7.—In Hanoi the National Assembly says North Vietnam will continue the Vietnam war with "unyielding determination" until complete victory.

June 8.—The House of Representatives votes 223 to 101 to send a 12-man factfinding mission to Southeast Asia to study "all aspects of United States military involvement in Southeast Asia."

June 9.—Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma discloses that Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops have captured the major southeast Laotian town of Saravane. (The Ho Chi Minh trail runs east of the city to Vietnam and west of the city to Cambodia through the Bolovens highlands.)

June 9.—The *New York Times* reports that the Nixon administration is drawing up plans to shift various American economic and social programs in South Vietnam and Laos from civilian (AID) to military control.

June 9.—The Army dismisses "for lack of evidence" all charges against Captain Thomas K. Willingham, accused of the alleged killing of 20 Vietnamese civilians in the Songmy-Mylai area of South Vietnam on March 16, 1968.

June 10.—The President's commission to study Indochina reports after meeting with the President that the operation into Cambodia has been a military success and suggests that this success raised the possibility that the U.S. can accelerate the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam. Senator McIntyre submits the only dissenting voice by adding his concern that the Cambodian "adventure" has broadened the war in Indochina.

1970—Continued

June 11.—The Soviet Union announces that it has signed a pact with North Vietnam to increase its military and economic aid as a result of the intensified fighting in Indochina. President Nikolai V. Podgorny tells the Soviet people that relations with the United States are "in a frozen state" because of Washington's "aggressive course."

June 11.—Communist troops seize control of Angkor Wat's renowned temple ruins.

June 11.—The Senate rejects 52–47 the revision to the Cooper-Church amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act proposed by Senator Byrd under which the President, using his authority as Commander in Chief, can send troops back into Cambodia after July 1 if he thinks such action necessary to protect the safety of American forces in Vietnam or to facilitate the withdrawal of United States forces from South Vietnam. Supporters of the Cooper-Church amendment add a provision specifying that nothing in the amendment "shall be deemed to impugn the constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief." The provision is adopted 91–0.

June 11.—Cambodian Ambassador Sonn Voeunsai presents credentials to President Nixon (Cambodia and the United States had earlier decided to raise the level of their diplomatic delegation). Ambassador Sonn says Cambodia will need United States aid and friendship to help end "the criminal aggression against its territory" and continue with national development.

June 13.—Thailand's Foreign Minister says that "for the time being," Thailand will not be sending Thai troops to Cambodia and he hopes "we will not even have to send volunteers."

June 13.—In an interview published in *Le Monde*, South Vietnam's President Thieu predicts that ARVN troops will be engaged in a long war in Cambodia, that it will take four or five years for his Government to stabilize its economic and military situation, and that American troops will have to remain in South Vietnam for "several years more."

June 13.—The Gallup Poll reports that in a poll conducted during the period May 22–25, 31 percent favor withdrawal of troops from Vietnam over as long a period as necessary to turn the war over to the South Vietnamese, 25 percent favor withdrawal of all troops by July 1971, 23 percent favor withdrawal immediately and 13 percent favor sending more troops to Vietnam and stepping up the fighting. Comparable fignres for February 1970 are 38, 25, 21 and 7; for December 1969 they are 40, 22, 19 and 11. The poll involves 1509 adults in 300 communities.

June 13.—Nguyen Thanh Le, North Vietnamese delegation spokesman at the Paris talks, denounces as "sheer hypocrisy" the proposal of U Thant for an expanded international conference on the war in Indochina. U Thant had privately proposed through diplomatic channels an international conference involving the new Cambodian Government of Premier Lon Nol, Prince Sihanouk's forces, United States, Britain, France, Soviet Union, Communist China and the three members of the International Control Commission (India, Canada, and Poland).

June 15.—The *New York Times* reports that Cambodian Premier Lon Nol has requested South Vietnamese reinforcements to help drive

the enemy out of Kompong Speu after finding Phnom Penh threatened with critical shortages of supplies. South Vietnamese forces make their deepest penetration into Cambodia when they place 4,000 men into the fight for Kompong Speu.

June 15.—Students demonstrate against the Thieu Government in Saigon. The demonstration has a decidely anti-American bias.

June 16.—Cambodian and South Vietnamese troops retake Kompong Speu as Communist forces retreat to the south and west.

June 17.—The Cambodian Parliament appeals to the United Nations "to use all possible diligence to have the invaders evacuate the temples [at Angkor] and if necessary to have the armed forces of the United Nations Organization intervene in Cambodia to protect at the right time all the Cambodian cultural monuments."

June 20.—A 12-man special House committee, headed by Representative G. V. Montgomery, departs for Southeast Asia for a two-week investigation of United States involvement there.

June 21.—The *New York Times* reports that U.S. fighter-bombers and gunships, which have been restricted to flying a maximum of 21.7 miles into Cambodia in support of ground operations, have been ranging much deeper into northeast Cambodia for nearly two months in raids on new enemy supply routes. Officials say that the purpose of the raids was to make it difficult for the North Vietnamese to establish a new supply line deeper inside Cambodia.

June 21.—North Vietnamese forces gain control of at least half of the provincial capital of Kompong Thom. The United States command issues statistics showing that 60 percent of the weapons and 80 percent of the ammunition found in enemy storage areas in Cambodia originated in Communist China.

June 21.—A seven-man military court in Danang convicts a 21-year-old marine, Private Michael A. Schwarz, of premeditated murder in the fatal shooting of 12 Vietnamese civilians in the village of Sonthong during a patrol on February 19. He is sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor.

June 22.—Senator Dole introduces an amendment to the Military Sales Act (H.R. 15628) to repeal the 1964 Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution. The repeal was previously proposed as S. Con. Res. 64 by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 15. The Senate approves the Dole amendment on June 24 by a vote of 81 to 10. Senators Cooper and Church propose an amendment in the committee report to limit U.S. involvement in Cambodia. It prohibits the expenditure of funds after July 1, 1970, for the purpose of maintaining U.S. forces in Cambodia, training Cambodian troops, or conducting air operations over Cambodia in direct support of Cambodian forces. On June 30 the Senate passes the Cooper-Church amendment (with modifications by Senators Cooper, Church, Mansfield, and Aiken) by a vote of 58 to 37 and then passes H.R. 15628 by a vote of 75 to 20. Six months later a conference committee reports a bill with the Dole amendment (Tonkin Gulf Repeal) but without the Cooper-Church amendment. On December 31, both Houses adopt the conference report. The bill becomes P.L. 91-672.

1970—Continued

June 23.—Secretary of Defense Laird in a London news conference says that after the withdrawal of American forces, "The South Vietnamese will be free to operate in Cambodia in the sanctuary areas and in this kind of combat role . . .", and he said that he would not want to draw up any limit on South Vietnamese ground forces so far as attacking any sanctuaries that now exist or may come into being in the future."

June 24.—Jonathan F. Ladd, political-military counselor at the United States Embassy in Cambodia, reports that almost all aid promised to Cambodia for the fiscal year ($7.9 million in U.S. arms) has arrived or was on the way.

June 24.—The Lower House of the National Assembly of South Vietnam passes 64 to 1, with 25 deputies boycotting, a bill which will give President Thieu extraordinary economic powers for five months to help curb the inflation and economic crises in South Vietnam. The upper house, the Senate, must also approve the bill.

June 24.—By a vote of 81 to 10 the Senate votes to repeal the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The repeal motion is offered by Senator Dole as an amendment to the foreign military sales bill. Senator Stennis protests that it "bordered on the ridiculous" to attach such a major foreign policy issue to a relatively minor bill and Senator Fulbright announces that he is voting no "to preserve the integrity of the procedures of the Senate."

June 25.—The Cambodian Government issues a "general mobilization" decree requiring every citizen between the ages of 18 and 60 to perform either military duty or some "service of national interest," and makes all property and financial resources subject to requisition for national defense purposes.

June 26.—Secretary Laird reaffirms that the Administration plans to continue bombing raids inside Cambodia after June 30. He makes it clear that the raids' "primary emphasis" will be the elimination of routes for enemy troops and supplies, but he does not rule out the use of air support for Cambodian combat ground operations.

June 26.—The *New York Times* reports that a three-man American group returning from North Vietnam says that North Vietnamese sources state that the list of 334 American prisoners compiled by the Committee of Liaison with Families of Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam in New York is a complete list of all prisoners held, and they insist that North Vietnam does not hold any men who are not on the list. The Defense Department rejects the list as incomplete and states that it "does not include the names of at least 40 men we carry as captured" (376 are listed by the Defense Department as prisoners of war). The Pentagon distributes photographs from North Vietnamese sources showing men whose names do not appear on the list.

June 26.—The Senate approves 73 to 0 an amendment proposed by Senator Javits to the Cooper-Church amendment which makes a general statement of the warmaking powers of Congress. It states that nothing in the proposed Cooper-Church amendment "shall be deemed to impugn the Constitutional powers of Congress, including the power to declare war and to make rules for the Government and regulation of the armed forces of the United States."

June 27.—The Gallup Poll reports that 56 percent of 1,509 adults interviewed between May 22–25 believe that the U.S. made a mistake in sending troops to fight in Vietnam, while 36 percent say that it was not a mistake and 8 percent have no opinion.

June 29.—Secretary of State Rogers, in San Francisco, indicates there might be some change in the U.S. negotiating stance on Vietnam: "At some point we believe it is possible that the Communists decide that it is in their best interests to negotiate an agreement which gives them representation proportionate to their numbers."

June 29.—The last United States ground combat troops withdraw from Cambodia into South Vietnam.

June 29.—Premier Lon Nol says in Phnom Penh that he thought U.S. military operations in Cambodia had brought favorable results. He says he hopes that ground troops leaving Cambodia will return if the military situation takes a drastic turn for the worse. Lon Nol says he hopes the U.S. Air Force will continue to fly combat support missions but that he has received no assurance of this from Washington.

June 30.—President Nixon reports to the nation the "successful" completion of American operations in Cambodia, says that the guidelines for future U.S. policy call for no ground personnel in Cambodia and suggests that the country's defense will be largely left to the Cambodians and their Asian allies.

June 30.—The Senate adopted by a vote of 58 to 37, after 35 days of debate, the Cooper-Church amendment aimed at limiting future Presidential action in Cambodia. The amendment prohibits U.S. military personnel (combat and advisory) in Cambodia and U.S. air activity in direct support of Cambodian forces.

June 30.—Carl E. Bartch, a State Department spokesman, says Washington can agree to the formation of a coalition regime that will include the Vietnamese Communists and will not insist on national elections in South Vietnam, an approach the U.S. previously emphasized. He says that the U.S. will be willing to hold "preliminary discussions" with North Vietnam on the formation of a coalition Government in Saigon without the participation of the present South Vietnamese Government but he adds that when the stage is reached for decisions, South Vietnam will be included.

July 1.—In a televised interview, the President announces the appointment of David K. E. Bruce as the chief negotiator at the Paris talks on Vietnam.

July 2.—The *New York Times* reports that informed sources in Saigon indicate that the first 1,300 of approximately 10,000 Cambodian troops to be instructed at Lanson infantry training center near Nhatrang have begun training.

July 3.—President Pompidou of France says that the Bruce nomination was "a point I am happy about," but "I cannot fail to repeat what I told the United States . . . that there will be no prospects for peace in Indochina until the day when the United States has taken, by itself, and voluntarily, the firm resolution to evacuate Indochina."

July 4.—Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky says in a speech to South Vietnamese newspaper publishers that United States aid to South Vietnam has failed to promote long-range economic development and is used only to patch over short-term problems.

1970—Continued

July 5.—The countries contributing troops to South Vietnam's defense hold a Ministerial Meeting in Saigon. Secretary of State William Rogers and South Vietnam's Premier Tran Thien Khiem appeal to the other countries (Thailand, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand) attending the conference to provide aid to Cambodia. The conference communique states that the ministers "suggested that the free nations examine what assistance they could give to Cambodia in response to its requests," and that they are satisfied with "the steady improvement of the military situation" in Vietnam.

July 5.—A Cambodian military tribunal, trying Prince Norodom Sihanouk in absentia on nine charges of treason and corruption, condemns the deposed Chief of State to death by firing squad, strips him of his Cambodian nationality and orders the confiscation of his property and that of his wife, Monique, and her family.

July 6.—The special House fact-finding committee that returned from a two week trip in Southeast Asia submits a report that describes the allied incursion into Cambodia as successful but emphasized that the rate of the American withdrawal from Vietnam should be maintained or accelerated. Representative Hawkins criticizes the Committee's report for what he describes as its failure to identify the South Vietnamese Government as "an unpopular military dictatorship" that tortures political prisoners.

July 7.—Thomas R. Harkin, staff member of a special House committee that toured Indochina for two weeks, says that he considered the committee's report a "whitewash" and that the panel has suppressed significant findings on the Con Son prison written by Representatives Augustus Hawkins and William Anderson.

July 7.—Economics Minister Pham Kim Ngoc in an interview reports that the South Vietnam Government plans to carry out a devaluation of the piaster "in deed if not in name." This will be a part of a two-tier foreign exchange system that the Government will be able to establish after final passage by the Senate of South Vietnam of a bill granting President Thieu the power to institute economic reforms by decree.

July 8.—Carl E. Bartch, State Department spokesman, indicates that the United States Government is very concerned about reported prison conditions at Con Son and that the Saigon Government is investigating conditions at the Con Son Correction Center.

July 9.—The House of Representatives, by a 237–153 roll-call vote, tables a motion which would instruct House conferees to agree to the Senate-passed Cooper-Church amendment to the military sales bill.

July 9.—The South Vietnamese Ministry of Information reports that the persons who are confined on Con Son "are neither political prisoners nor prisoners of war but Communist criminals," and that their confinement is temporary. The statement says that they have received disciplinary treatment because they have rebelled against the rules of the prison.

July 10.—Eighty-seven United States Senators sign a letter sent to North Vietnam's Premier Pham Van Dong, demanding that Hanoi end the "inhumane treatment" of American war prisoners.

July 10.—The *New York Times* reports that United States sources say that Thailand has assured the Cambodians of its willingness to come

to their defense if necessary. They say that Thailand has agreed to begin the training of 8,000 to 10,000 Cambodian soldiers on Thai territory soon and have already begun delivering uniforms, boots, and other equipment for 50,000 men.

July 10.—The Senate approves by a vote of 57 to 5 the repeal of the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in a concurrent resolution. The Senate voted on June 24 to repeal the Resolution in an amendment to the foreign military sales bill.

July 10.—A South Vietnamese Government spokesman announces that a 10-man team from the Interior Ministry has flown to Con Son. The Government promises to abolish the "tiger cage" punishment cells in Con Son Prison if an investigation confirms the criticism of the two United States Representatives who visited there.

July 13.—Representative John E. Moss, Chairman of a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, after hearing the testimony of Robert H. Nooter, assistant administrator of the Agency for International Development, demands a prompt and thorough Federal investigation of conditions at South Vietnam's Con Son prison and all other civil prisons in South Vietnam. He also makes the recommendation that a separate Defense Department inquiry be made into conditions of prisoner-of-war camps and military prisons.

July 14.—More than 500 prisoners flew on American military planes from the Con Son prison to Saigon and are awaiting release, a South Vietnamese Government spokesman says in Saigon.

July 14.—The Senate Armed Services Committee reports military procurement authorization bill for fiscal 1971 (H.R. 17123). It includes a committee limitation of $2.5 billion on American aid to Southeast Asia allies (conference committee changes this to $2.8 billion). Senator Fulbright offers an amendment which is approved prohibiting funding of allied military operations in support of the Cambodian or Laotian Governments. Senators McGovern and Hatfield introduce an amendment calling for a reduction of the American troop level in Vietnam to 280,000 by April 30, 1971, and a complete withdrawal by December 31, 1971. The amendment is rejected (39 to 55) on September 1. The House adopts the conference report on September 29 and the Senate on October 1. The bill becomes P.L. 91-441.

July 15.—In a memorandum from the State and Defense Departments to the members of the conference committee on the foreign military sales bill, the Administration urges Congress to drop the Cooper-Church amendment restricting military action in Cambodia and says: "The restraints imposed by this section appear to affect the President's exercise of his lawful responsibilities as Commander in Chief of the armed forces."

July 15.—Secretary Rogers in a briefing says that there are "reasonable prospects for" peace negotiations on Vietnam in the long run, but that the Communist powers will "not be inclined to negotiate" after the setbacks they suffered in Cambodia and this means that the prospect for the negotiations "in the next couple of months are not too bright."

July 15.—The Senate Armed Services Committee releases a 120-page report on the military procurement bill—authorizing weapons pro-

curement and research and development by the Pentagon—which contains a passage which would prohibit the Defense Department from using military or assistance funds to finance military operations or programs of other countries supporting the Cambodian Government. The Committee says that the Southeast Asia military assistance fund can be used to help finance operations by South Vietnam and other "free world" forces in just the border areas of Cambodia.

July 16.—Finance Minister Op Kim Ang of Cambodia says that his country will "have to depend on friendly countries to give currency or goods" to support the war against the North Vietnamese and Vietcong invaders. He says that Cambodia regards the United States as the "No. 1 hope" for economic assistance but Cambodia also seeks major aid from Japan. The Minister reveals that the Cambodian Government already asked the United States for cash grants totaling more than $127 million.

July 17.—After discussions with Premier Lon Nol, Deputy Premier Sirik Matak, and Chief of State Cheng Heng at a military base at Neak Luong, President Thieu dismisses the idea that Cambodia, Thailand, South Vietnam and Laos should forge a joint anti-Communist front in Southeast Asia.

July 17.—Dr. Marjorie Nelson testifies before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations that she has treated the victims of beating and torture inflicted in a South Vietnamese "interrogation center" that has an American adviser.

July 20.—President Nixon says in an impromptu news conference that he firmly endorses the opposition of South Vietnam's President Thieu to a coalition government, emphasizing that an open election is the best approach to a political settlement in Vietnam.

July 21.—The Government of South Vietnam announces that it has suspended the use of the "tiger cage" cells at the prison on Con Son pending improvements.

July 22.—The *New York Times* reports that Cambodian officials who participated in the discussions between Premier Lon Nol of Cambodia and Premier Thanom Kittikachorn of Thailand in Bangkok express pessimism that there will be any significant increase in Thai aid to Cambodia. A Thai official says that Thailand will send ground troops to Cambodia only if there is a threat to Thailand by the Vietnamese Communists or if there is a danger that the Communists might overthrow the Government of Gen. Lon Nol. The Thai official indicates that the chief factor in Bangkok's reluctance to commit troops to the defense of Cambodia was American unwillingness to underwrite the cost.

July 22.—Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand told reporters that Thailand had promised to give Cambodia military aid but had not promised to send troops.

July 22.—Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, leader of the Vietcong delegation to the Paris peace talks, says that some members of the Saigon Government will be acceptable in a coalition government for South Vietnam. She states that neither President Thieu nor Vice President Ky would be acceptable. Mrs. Binh says that a broad-based coalition and the withdrawal of all foreign troops are the basis of the Vietcong peace plan.

July 23.—General Lon Nol confirms at a news conference in Bangkok that the Thai Air Force was conducting bombing and strafing runs in northern Cambodia at Cambodia's request. He states that there is no desire to form an alliance or treaty between the non-Communist countries of Indochina.

July 28.—The Army completed hearings to determine whether Capt. Ernest L. Medina would face a court-martial in the Songmy case. The Army also announces that it will hold further investigations of seven officers implicated in the suppression of information about the alleged mass killings of civilians two years ago at Songmy. The Army dismisses charges against two other officers.

July 30.—President Nixon in a Los Angeles' news conference states that: "We are opposed to a coalition government [for South Vietnam], negotiated or imposed. We are for a government which is consented to by the people of South Vietnam, and if that government happens to be one that has Communists in it, and it is their choice, we do not have an objection and neither does President Thieu, as I understand it."

July 30.—President Nguyen Van Thieu in an informal dinner conversation with 11 Western correspondents, says that a "residual force" of about 50,000 American troops will be required in South Vietnam after 1973 to "guarantee the peace." He says that by the end of 1971 some American combat troops would be required, but only to protect American logistical and support troops.

August 3.—The English-language newspaper *Bangkok Post* reports that Thailand's Interior Minister, Praphas Charusathien, reveals that Premier Lon Nol of Cambodia and Premier Thanom Kittikachorn of Thailand had a "gentlemen's agreement" for Thai troops to enter Cambodia any time Thailand feels her security threatened by Communist forces in Cambodia. He says the unwritten agreement was reached when Premier Lon Nol visited Bangkok in July to discuss Thai military aid to Cambodia.

August 3.—Prince Souphanouvong, the leader of the Pathet Lao, sends new peace proposals in a letter to Premier Souvanna Phouma of Laos.

August 4.—Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, says that U.S. aircraft are flying only "interdiction" missions against enemy forces in Cambodia. Pentagon spokesmen say that American commanders in South Vietnam have wide latitude in determining what an "interdiction mission" might be. On August 3, the Cambodian deputy commander of Kompong Speu province says that the United States is conducting air strikes against enemy forces in that area.

August 6.—Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird states that United States planes are not giving close air support to Cambodian forces. Secretary Laird tells reporters that the recent bombing at Skoun is part of a general interdiction campaign aimed at protecting American forces in South Vietnam.

August 6.—David K. E. Bruce, the new chief American negotiator, attends his first session of the Vietnam peace talks, but talks remain at a stalemate.

August 6.—Premier Souvanna Phouma of Laos says in an interview that he was optimistic about the possibility of peace talks with the

Pathet Lao. The Premier restates his willingness to reach a limited truce that would exclude the region of the Ho Chi Minh Trail: "What happens along the Ho Chi Minh Trail is something between the Vietnamese and the Americans."

August 7.—President Nixon announces that he is sending former astronaut Frank Borman on a mission to seek the release of United States prisoners of war in Southeast Asia and to obtain humane treatment of those who remain in enemy hands.

August 8.—In a letter dated August 6 to Secretary of State Rogers, the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information of the Government Operations Committee accuses the United States of paying three times more than necessary to finance the war in South Vietnam and argues that Rogers urge the devaluation of the South Vietnamese currency.

August 10.—The U.S. command in South Vietnam confirms for the first time that Cambodians are flying aboard observation planes piloted by Americans to help spot targets for bombing strikes in Cambodia. A United States spokesman says that the Cambodian observers are flying with Americans "when their knowledge of the terrain is helpful to the mission."

August 12.—The *New York Times* report that President Nguyen Van Thieu says that only South Vietnam and Thailand could send troops to help Cambodia and that the time to do so is now. President Thieu renews his assurances that all Communists, including the principal leaders, will be free to run in an election conducted as part of a peace agreement but indicated that they cannot do so as a Communist party and "they must obey the results of the elections."

August 13.—A North Vietnamese spokesman announces at the 79th meeting of the Paris peace talks that Hanoi's chief negotiator, Xuan Thuy, will return to the talks soon. The Communist side reiterates that the way to get the talks moving is for the United States to "recognize reality" by agreeing to withdraw its troops quickly and unconditionally and by replacing the Saigon Government with a coalition. Mr. Bruce says that these preconditions are "wholly inconsistent with the generally accepted meaning . . . of the word negotiation."

August 13.—Thai Premier Thanom Kittikachorn says that the United States has agreed to finance Thai troops to fight in Cambodia. Robert E. McCloskey, State Department press spokesman, says on August 14 that a tentative agreement has been reached on American aid to the 5,000 troops being recruited or trained in Thailand for service in Cambodia. But he adds that "no final, overall agreements have yet been reached."

August 15.—In Danang, an 18-year-old United States marine is convicted and sentenced to five years in prison for the murder of 15 South Vietnamese women and children in a village southwest of Danang on February 19.

August 16.—A report by Hsinhua, the Chinese press agency, says a military aid agreement is signed by Peking and Prince Sihanouk's Cambodian government in exile.

August 17.—The Pathet Lao reports that peace talks between their envoy and the Laotian Government has reached a stalemate.

August 21.—The United States Senate passes unanimously an amendment to the military procurement bill which will prohibit the use of American funds to pay contingents of foreign troops fighting in support of Cambodia and Laos. It will not affect any operations in border areas adjacent to South Vietnam and will not prevent foreign countries, without United States assistance, from sending troops to aid either Laos or Cambodia.

State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey says that "under the inherent right of self-defense, allied forces may engage in protective missions [in Laos] which might at times involve American equipment and advisers."

August 24.—The State Department announces that the United States will provide Cambodia with $40 million in military aid, mainly for small arms and training.

August 25.—The South Vietnamese Government announces that it controls over 92.4 percent of the country's 18 million people. The total represents an increase of 1.3 percent in a month.

August 25.—White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler says that the United States is interested in preventing access by Communist troops to the Cambodian-Vietnamese border, and "in an independent and neutral Cambodia." However, Ziegler does not specifically endorse the Lon Nol government.

August 25.—In an interview published in *Le Monde* in Paris, Prince Norodom Sihanouk says that two-thirds of Cambodia is in the hands of his supporters. He says that Peking and Hanoi have asked that Cambodia maintain a neutral posture after the Lon Nol Government is overthrown by his supporters.

August 26.—The United States Senate votes, 62 to 22, against an amendment to the military procurement bill proposed by Senators Goodell and Nelson to stop the Army from using funds for herbicides in Vietnam.

August 27.—Premier Thanom Kittikachorn says that Thailand is negotiating the withdrawal of her 12,000 soldiers from South Vietnam because they are needed to defend Thailand's borders with Laos and Cambodia.

August 28.—State Department press officer John F. King tells reporters that Thailand has informed the United States of her "decision in principle" to pull forces out of Vietnam. He says the United States has "raised no objections" to this decision.

August 28.—President Nguyen Van Thieu hands out the first land titles to peasants in South Vietnam under the land-reform program he signed into law in March. This pilot project abolishes a system of absentee landlords and tenant farmers in 24 villages.

August 30.—The South Vietnamese go to the polls to elect 30 Senators. Each voter selects three slates of ten candidates each for the 30 seats. Over 4,300,000, some 65 percent of the electorate, go to the polls. The slates elected were an anti-government Buddhist slate headed by former Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau, an independent slate headed by a frequent critic of President Thieu and a pro-government slate headed by Senator Huynh Van Cao.

August 31.—In an interview President Nixon expresses unreserved opposition to the Hatfield-McGovern "end-the-war-amendment."

1970—Continued

He says that this amendment if adopted will remove any incentive for the other side to negotiate a settlement.

August 31.—Senator J. W. Fulbright in a televised "Reply to the President" says that the Paris peace talks are deadlocked because the Nixon Administration is unwilling to make the "key concessions" necessary to break the stalement and commit the United States to a complete troop withdrawal from Vietnam by a specific date.

September 1.—Vice President Agnew returns from his Asian tour and briefs President Nixon on the trip. Agnew tells newsmen that the United States should provide increased material aid to Asian allies after American troops are withdrawn. He says that the Asian leaders he met were "uniformly reassured by the Cambodian operation . . ." Agnew says that the Cambodian government "has at least a fighting chance for survival," but emphasizes that the United States considers Cambodia a neutral and not an ally.

September 1.—Fourteen Senators, including the Democratic and Republican leaders, send a letter to President Nixon urging an "overall cease-fire by all parties throughout Vietnam . . ." The Senators urge that the President offer new proposals in Paris for international machinery to enforce the cease-fire, free elections supervised by a mixed commission, and for safeguards for postwar freedoms in South Vietnam.

September 1.—Cambodian Foreign Minister Koun Wick says that the only solution to the war in Cambodia is total withdrawal of "aggressors." He says, "There is no question of negotiations." The Foreign Minister also announces Cambodia's intention to enlarge her army from 140,000 to 210,000 men.

September 4.—The Australian government announces that it will provide $2.24 million in economic aid in 1970–71 to Cambodia. The Australian Minister for External Affairs says that the aid will consist of such equipment as trucks and radios "and, if necessary, arms."

September 4.—The South Vietnamese police chief orders police to shoot to kill against those interfering with police in veterans' demonstrations in Saigon. The move comes after four months of increasingly violent demonstrations by Vietnamese veterans. Prime Minister Khiem accuses the protestors of "blatant violations of the laws of the land" and says that military action will be taken against them if police moves proved insufficient.

September 5.—In a change of policy, Malaysia's new Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak calls for the withdrawal of all American troops from Vietnam.

September 7.—Army Chief of Staff General William Westmoreland says during a tour of the Far East that the U.S. and South Vietnamese incursions into Cambodia in May have "particular significance" because they took pressure off South Vietnam and forced the enemy to reorient his lines of communication.

September 7.—The Cambodian army, supported by American aircraft, begins its first major offensive against the enemy. Among the forces moving north of Phnom Penh along route 6 are units trained in South Vietnam. The government offensive is reported to have been halted by the enemy on September 14.

September 8.—The U.S. mission in Thailand and the Thai Foreign Ministry announces that 9,800 American servicemen will be with-

drawn from Thailand before July 1, 1971. The withdrawals will include 7,300 airmen and 2,500 army personnel. The cutbacks will bring U.S. withdrawals from Thailand to 15,800 men since September 1969, leaving total American strength in Thailand at 32,000.

September 10.—A conference of third-world nations closed in Lusaka, Zambia, with a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Indochina.

September 12.—Emory Swank, the new U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia, arrives in Phnom Penh. Mr. Swank is the first American ambassador to Cambodia since diplomatic relations were broken in 1965.

September 13.—The Senate Foreign Relations committee releases testimony given by Administration officials in February which reveals that United States support of the 50,000 Korean troops in Vietnam since 1965 will total over one billion dollars by June 30, 1970.

September 16.—Members of the South Vietnamese Senate send an open letter to President Nixon calling for a just peace in Vietnam but urging the rejection of any coalition government. The letter is said to be inspired by Catholic, moderate and right-wing political figures and is not supported by Buddhist senators.

September 17.—At the Paris peace talks the Vietcong delegation proposes a new 8-point formula for ending the Vietnam war. The proposal calls for complete American withdrawal by June 30, 1971, and political arrangements to be made between the Vietcong regime and an interim government which will exclude President Thieu, Vice President Ky and Premier Khiem. The proposal also promises to discuss "releasing" American prisoners of war.

September 18.—The Associated Press reports that American officials have noted that the flow of letters from American POW's in North Vietnam has increased in recent months, but is still below the level allowed according to the Geneva Convention. Letters from 330 men have been received, three times the number who had written as of a year ago. The mail averages only about one letter every three months and some families have received no mail at all.

September 18.—The South Vietnamese Foreign Ministry calls the new Vietcong peace proposals "absurd" and says they contained "no initiatives at all."

September 21.—The Louis Harris poll shows that President Nixon scored a 40 percent favorable response on his handling of the Cambodian and Vietnam situations on a survey conducted between August 25 and September 1. The Cambodian rating reflects a drop of four percentage points since late June.

September 22.—Vietcong delegate to the Paris talks Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh tells reporters that the Vietcong will be "disposed immediately" to enter into talks with a new Saigon regime to settle the Vietnam war even before the total withdrawal of American forces. However, she emphasizes that a new regime cannot include President Thieu, Vice President Ky or Prime Minister Khiem. She says, however, that other members of the present government will be acceptable.

September 22.—Former astronaut Frank Borman reports to a special session of the House of Representatives on the results of his visit to 14 countries on behalf of American prisoners of war. Borman says

1970—Continued

that he has found much sympathy but is able to report no progress on efforts to gain the release of prisoners.

September 24.—American delegate to the Paris talks David Bruce tells the other side that their recent peace proposals contain unacceptable "language of preconditions and unilateral demands." He says that the United States needs "further clarification" but will continue to study the proposals.

September 25.—In an interview in Peking, exiled Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk says that the majority of the members of his government-in-exile belong to the Communist Khmer Rouge, and are not under the authority of Peking.

September 26.—A Gallup Poll conducted between September 11 and September 14 shows that 55 percent of those surveyed favor the Hatfield-McGovern plan to end the war in Vietnam, 36 percent oppose it and 9 percent have no opinion.

September 26.—A Senate Judiciary Committee subcommittee on refugees publishes a report cataloging destruction in Indochina and failure of the American efforts to cope with the human problems that have resulted. The report says that increased American bombing in Cambodia is producing a heavy toll among civilians, and that a "massive crisis in refugees and civilian war casualties" has developed in Laos as a result of the increased fighting there in recent months. The report says that there were 300,000 refugees in Laos, and 3½ million in Vietnam.

October 3.—The Vietnamese government devalues the piaster as part of a reform package aimed at halting inflation. The new rate announced is 225 piasters to the dollar instead of 118. The United States government, however, continues to purchase piasters at the old rate. (The black market exchange rate was said to be 400 to 1.)

October 5.—Members of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia call upon members of Congress to urge them to continue the campaign of public pressure against North Vietnam regarding the treatment of American prisoners. The group's chairman says that the group hopes to generate enough adverse world opinion to oblige North Vietnam to release the men.

October 5.—Cambodia's National Assembly votes unanimously to proclaim Cambodia a republic as of November 1.

October 5.—Thai Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn says that the United States had approached Thailand concerning the possible transfer of American B–52's from Okinawa to Utapao Airbase, south of Bangkok. Thanom says that Thailand has no objection to the planes being based in Thailand because they are being used for regional defense.

October 7.—In a report to the nation on Indochina, President Nixon makes a new five-point proposal to end the war in Vietnam. The President proposes a cease-fire in place "in all of Indochina" to be the "subject for immediate negotiation" and a new international conference on Indochina. He calls the Vietcong demand for the replacement of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem government "patently unreasonable" and "totally unacceptable." He says that the new proposals have been discussed with the governments of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and "all support it."

October 7.—North Vietnam announces a new agreement for military and economic aid from Communist China for 1971. The amount is not disclosed.

October 8.—American Delegate David Bruce formally presents President Nixon's five-point peace plan in Paris, but the plan is denounced by the Vietcong and North Vietnamese delegations as "a maneuver to deceive world opinion."

October 8.—State Department Spokesman Robert McCloskey says that the United States hopes that the Soviet Union will "use its considerable influence with the North Vietnamese and so-called provisional revolutionary government of the Vietcong to get an acceptance of the new (peace) proposals."

October 8.—The Senate adopts a bipartisan resolution expressing support for the President's new Vietnam peace initiative and calling it "fair and equitable." The measure is endorsed on the floor by the Senate's majority and minority leaders and is approved without dissent, reflecting the favorable response to the plan in Congress.

October 8.—In a statement issued after President Nixon's announcement of his new peace proposals, the South Vietnamese government backs the proposals and urges the other side to begin "serious discussions." The statement repeats the South Vietnamese offer of free elections and a "mixed electoral commission in which representatives of the other side can participate." The Laotian government hails the proposals as "very reasonable" and says that Laos favors the idea of an international conference on Indochina and the plan for a cease-fire.

October 10.—The Soviet Communist Party newspaper Pravda calls President Nixon's five-point Indochina peace plan "a great fraud" that will "legalize and perpetuate the intervention of the United States in Indochina."

October 10.—The North Vietnamese paper Nhan Dan rejects President Nixon's proposals, commenting that President Nixon has not presented "a precise schedule for total withdrawal" nor for "the replacement of the Saigon team."

October 10.—A General Accounting Office report critical of the administration of American aid to Laos is made public. The report says that as much as 25 percent of the aid for refugees in Laos is lost or diverted due to failure of the Agency for International Development to check on whether or not the shipments arrive. The House Government Operations Committee also issues a report criticizing the AID program in Vietnam for a "hastily conceived and poorly administered" program to construct barges in South Vietnam, which has resulted in substantial loss.

October 14.—Cambodian officials explain that their government's support of President Nixon's latest peace plan for Indochina is based on his affirmation of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 as a basis for settlement. They say that a stand-still cease-fire could have only limited application in ending the war in Cambodia because the war is the result of invasion by North Vietnamese forces. They say that they are not seeking a military settlement of the war in Cambodia, but rather a political settlement that will include the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

1970—Continued

October 15.—The Communist side at the 88th session of the Vietnam peace talks in Paris declares a point-by-point "firm, total, and categorical" rejection of the latest Nixon peace proposal.

October 19.—The *New York Times* states that a report (of May 1970) by the Central Intelligence Agency concludes that the Communists in 1969 decided to shift their long-range strategy from intense military activity to political erosion. The Communists stepped up their infiltration of agents into various branches of the South Vietnamese government, and the CIA study estimates that more than 30,000 agents have penetrated the South Vietnamese armed forces, police and the South Vietnamese intelligence organization charged with eradicating the Vietcong and North Vietnamese in South Vietnam. The Communist strategy includes penetration of non-Communist political parties and religious groups to take advantage of the weaknesses of the South Vietnamese government. White House officials acknowledged the existence of the report but say that reports of its contents are exaggerated.

October 21.—Commenting on reports that the United States and South Vietnam might announce a unilateral cease-fire, White House Secretary Ronald Ziegler said. "We do not plan to announce any further initiatives."

October 25.—The Associated Press reports that American Special Forces soldiers based in Vietnam have been leading missions into Laos at least since March, and that the Americans are suffering casualties of 1 or 2 killed each month and 3 to 10 wounded. The AP reports that its information came from "unofficial sources," and the U.S. Command in Vietnam says that, "There are no U.S. ground combat troops in Laos."

October 30.—The South Vietnamese Supreme Court annuls the conviction of Tran Ngoc Chau, a National Assembly deputy sentenced to 10 years in prison in March for having Communists contacts. The Court had previously declared his conviction unconstitutional.

October 31.—Small demonstrations are staged across the country against the Vietnam war. Their purpose is reportedly to influence the November 3 elections.

October 31.—In his State of the Nation address before the National Assembly, South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu said that "peace in victory" would not come at the Paris peace talks because the Communists viewed negotiations as a way to "achieve victory gradually."

November 2.—Asked if the Vietcong might be willing to deal with General Duong Van Minh ("Big Minh"), Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, head of the Vietcong delegation to the Paris talks says, "We are ready to make contact with any person except Thieu, Ky, and Khiem, provided that the person is for peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy, with a view to discussing . . . the formation of a coalition government . . ."

November 2.—At a news conference in Peking, deposed Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk says that his forces would not try to capture Phnom Penh because "We want to liberate the other parts of Cambodia first."

November 3.—In a 13-page statement presented to the United Nations, North Vietnam accuses the United States of a general policy of

civilian massacres in South Vietnam and of "extending the war to all of Indochina."

November 3.—Cambodian Chief of State Cheng Heng says in a news conference that President Nixon had promised more military and economic aid for Cambodia, but he says that the amount is still being discussed. He says that Cambodia will try to bring peace through military means and negotiations, but that it will not accept a coalition government as the price of peace. He says that there has been no direct or indirect contacts between Phnom Penh and Hanoi.

November 5.—Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans, in a news conference in Saigon, says that the North Vietnamese have built up supplies in their southern provinces, and "Our plan is to make it as difficult as possible for them to get supplies down these trails. We have confidence in what we can do."

November 13.—The United States Command in Saigon announces that an American reconnaissance plane flying over North Vietnam has been downed by enemy ground fire. In an address at the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird says, "We remain ready to take appropriate action in response to attacks on our unarmed aircraft." Secretary Laird also recalls that there has been a recent rocket attack on Saigon (November 2), and he says that such action and firing at reconnaissance planes are contrary to the understanding under which the American bombing of North Vietnam was halted in 1968.

November 15.—South Vietnam's Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky arrives in New York to begin an unofficial two-and-a-half-week visit to the United States. Ky is scheduled to visit military schools where Vietnamese soldiers are undergoing training as well as to make a visit to Washington.

November 16.—In an address at West Point, South Vietnamese Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky says that the attacks on enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia have marked the "turning point of the war." Ky expresses his concern that American troops not withdraw from Vietnam too quickly.

November 18.—In a special message to Congress, President Nixon asked for $1.035 billion in supplemental foreign aid for fiscal year 1971, of which $255 million would be earmarked for Cambodia. The new figure, which includes the $48.9 million in military assistance to Cambodia previously announced, totals $70 million in economic assistance and $185 million in military assistance. President Nixon says that the funds are necessary to the success of the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization. The President also requests $65 million in supplemental aid for Vietnam to maintain Vietnamese economic stability in the light of recent economic reforms and the "increasing burden of defense" borne by the Vietnamese. (The $255 million figure for Cambodia does not include $30 million in P.L. 480 funds.)

November 18.—Thai Premier Thanom Kittikachorn says that all Thai troops in South Vietnam will be withdrawn by the end of 1972, and that at least half will be withdrawn by June 1971.

November 20.—Staff Sergeant David Mitchell is acquitted by a court martial of charges of assault with intent to commit murder of 30 Vietnamese civilians in 1968. Sergeant Mitchell is the first soldier to be tried in connection with the Mylai massacre.

1970—Continued

November 21.—Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird confirms a North Vietnamese radio report that the United States began bombing North Vietnamese anti-aircraft sites on November 20. The raids continued for about 24 hours. The Secretary of Defense says that the strikes have been conducted in retaliation for the downing of an American reconnaissance plane on November 12.

November 21.—Some members of the Senate are critical of the American bombing raids in North Vietnam. Majority Leader Mike Mansfield says that "it means a resurgence of activity, a renewed involvement and possibly a delay in settlement."

November 21.—The *New York Times* reports that the rate of desertion from the South Vietnamese army has increased dramatically in 1970 and estimates that 10,000–12,000 men deserted every month. It is reported that most desertions are due to family problems.

November 23.—In a news conference at the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird discloses details of an American mission to rescue POW's in North Vietnam, "the only operation that took place north of the 19th parallel this past weekend." He says that approval for the mission was given on Friday, November 20, partly as the result of information that Americans were dying in POW camps. Laird says that at 2 p.m., EST on November 20, "a small rescue team successfully landed by helicopter at a reported prisoner of war compound at Son Tay, approximately 20 nautical miles west of Hanoi . . . Regrettably, the camp was empty.

November 27.—The Defense Department announces that American aircraft have attacked military targets near Hanoi in connection with the raid on the Son Tay POW camp.

November 30.—The United States Command in Saigon says that a United States plane has attacked an anti-aircraft position in North Vietnam which threatened U.S. planes by zeroing in with radar in preparation for firing. Secretary Laird says U.S. pilots have the right "to use this electronic missile to go in on the site that has them locked in on radar."

December 1.—The Social Committee of the United Nations General Assembly approves a resolution calling for humane treatment of all prisoners of war and inspection of POW camps. The resolution is sponsored by the United States and eleven other countries. The resolution is opposed by the Soviet Union and other Communist nations. The resolution is passed in the General Assembly on December 9.

December 3.—The *New York Times* states that in a report to President Nixon submitted October 13, Sir Robert Thompson has indicated that United States efforts have failed to destroy the Vietcong infrastructure in South Vietnam.

December 3.—At the Paris peace talks, Ambassador Bruce proposes that prisoner of war facilities in North and South Vietnam be opened to inspection by an impartial international organization. The North Vietnamese delegate responds that the prisoner issue can only be settled by the United States' agreeing to leave Vietnam by June 30, 1971.

December 5.—An editorial in the North Vietnamese newspaper *Quan Doi Nhan Dan* says that Secretary Laird's warning against firing

on American reconnaissance planes is "a pretext permitting the United States to attack the North at any time." The paper says that North Vietnam is determined to "continue to shoot down American reconnaissance planes, set up antiaircraft installations anywhere, and mass troops in any sector."

December 5.—Senator Edward M. Kennedy releases a General Accounting Office report which is critical of refugee programs in South Vietnam. The report maintains that reports that the number of refugees has declined are "misleading" because of inaccurate reporting and Saigon's "reluctance to report new refugees." The report says that in addition to the 268,000 officially-counted refugees, there are 572,000 widows, orphans, and disabled persons "in need of assistance." The report also estimates that there have been more than a million civilian casualties in South Vietnam since 1965, including at least 300,000 dead.

December 7.—Responding to a suggestion by Senator Henry Jackson that the Christmas cease-fire in Vietnam extend through Tet, a State Department spokesman says, "We are considering extending the Christmas standdown, but for anything like this to have meaning, it would have to be strictly observed by both sides."

December 8.—Secretaries Rogers and Laird testify before a subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee in support of the Administration's supplemental foreign aid request. Secretary Rogers says that the aid for Cambodia contained in the bill is the first installment of a continuing military and economic aid program for that country, but he says "the idea that this is a repetition of Vietnam is fallacious." Secretary Laird says that it will be necessary to have a military aid mission in Cambodia "which we hope to hold to a minimum."

December 8.—South Vietnam's Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky arrives in Saigon following a 17-day visit to the United States. He says that President Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers have assured him that the upcoming Vietnamese presidential elections "would be purely a matter for the South Vietnamese people."

December 10.—In a news conference, President Nixon explains the American policy on bombing North Vietnam.

December 11.—In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird says that the "understanding" concerning the halt in American bombing of North Vietnam includes American expectations that the other side will "sit down for serious negotiations in Paris." He says that if North Vietnam insists that there has been no "understanding," if the understanding is to be "thrown out, then the bombing of the North will eventually follow."

December 11.—Former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford says in a television interview that President Nixon, in his news conference, "enunciated . . . a complete departure from any understanding" that existed between the United States and North Vietnam.

December 12.—President Nixon's press conference warning to Hanoi concerning retaliatory bombing attacks is criticized in the North Vietnamese press as "the height of cynicism and insolence." It is denied that any understanding concerning reconnaissance flights

exist, and the President's description of an understanding is said to be "sheer invention."

December 14.—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reports (S. Rept. 91–1437) supplemental foreign assistance authorization bill (H.R. 19911) with an amendment restricting involvement in Cambodia. The bill passes the Senate on December 16 by a vote of 72 to 22 and goes to conference. The House and Senate both approve the conference report on December 22, retaining the Cooper-Church amendment and the bill becomes P.L. 91–652. The amendment prohibits the use of authorized funds for the introduction of ground troops into Cambodia, or for the provision of U.S. advisers to Cambodian forces, and proclaims that any assistance given by the United States does not constitute a commitment by the United States to the defense of Cambodia.

December 14.—In an interview with the Associated Press, guerrilla war expert Sir Robert Thompson says that United States Vietnamization and pacification policies are "unassailable by the enemy." He says, "I am optimistic about the future . . . developments are now taking an encouraging trend."

December 16.—Senator J. W. Fulbright inserts in the *Congressional Record* a report written by two Foreign Relations Committee staff members, based on a visit to Cambodia and South Vietnam in late November and early December. The report says that the Cambodian forces would probably have been destroyed by Communist troops except for U.S. and South Vietnamese assistance. The report says that it is taken as a foregone conclusion by Cambodian officials and by the U.S. Embassy that American help will continue. The report concludes that in order to survive, Lon Nol's government will require a long-term American aid commitment. Both U.S. and Vietnamese aircraft are providing close air support to Cambodian forces, and South Vietnamese forces are carrying the brunt of the fighting throughout eastern Cambodia. The report notes that the Lon Nol government appears to have "considerable support" among civil servants, members of the Senate and Assembly, the youth, and intellectuals.

December 17.—The *Washington Post* reports that Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and General Creighton Abrams have recommended that the United States cease the use of chemical herbicides in Vietnam, using up the remaining stock only in jungles and uninhabited areas. The remaining supplies of the chemicals "White" and "Blue," if used in such a way, will last until May, the report says.

December 19.—South Vietnam announces that it has asked the International Control Commission to seek the release of prisoners of war held by the Communists.

December 20.—Speaking on "Issues and Answers," U.S.I.A. Director Frank Shakespeare says that the military incursions into Cambodia in May and June produced "a traumatic reaction in the world at large" and a blow to American prestige abroad.

December 22.—A list of 339 prisoners of war held by North Vietnam is delivered to aides of Senators Edward Kennedy and J. W. Fulbright in Paris. The list also contains the names of 20 prisoners who are said to have died in captivity and nine who have been released.

December 22.—In a speech broadcast from Hanoi, North Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap warns that American reconnaissance planes flying over North Vietnam will be shot down.

December 23.—In a news conference, Secretary of State William Rogers comments on American bombing policy in Vietnam by reaffirming that the President felt "responsible to protect American lives" and that "if the North Vietnamese take action which he thinks is going to jeopardize those lives and the safety of those men, he will take action that he thinks is appropriate." Asked about Secretary of Defense Laird's apparent indication that progress in the Paris talks is an additional consideration to the continuance of the bombing halt, Rogers says "that's not the premise on which we are operating."

December 26.—In an interview, Admiral Thomas Moorer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says that if the enemy chooses to stage a new offensive, the Ho Chi Minh trail supply lines will be "vulnerable to interdiction" and can be cut in a ground thrust by the South Vietnamese army.

December 28.—The Senate completes action on the 1971 supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 19928), including $155 million in military and economic aid for Cambodia. The allocation for restoring funds temporarily "borrowed" from other military and economic aid programs (for example, Taiwan) for use in Cambodia is reduced from $100 million to $75 million. The bill also includes $50 million for the commercial import program in South Vietnam, but $15 million for the land reform program is cut. The House had passed the bill on December 22.

December 28.—The Cambodian government publishes a decree imposing censorship on newspapers and periodicals in Cambodia. Those publications not complying with the new censorship law will be closed down, the decree says.

December 29.—Both Houses of Congress pass the second conference version of the defense appropriations bill (H.R. 19590), which includes an appropriation of $2.5 billion to support "Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces and local forces in Laos and Thailand; and for related costs . . . ," provided that none of the funds are spent for combat allowances higher than those paid to American soldiers, and provided that none of the funds be used to "support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the governments of Cambodia or Laos." A proviso specified, however, that "nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit support of actions required to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war." The provision is described by Sen. John Sherman Cooper as a "loophole."

A subsequent section of the bill provides that "In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds appropriated by this act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand."

1970—Continued

December 30.—The U.S. Navy turns over 125 river patrol and combat boats to the South Vietnamese in a ceremony marking the withdrawal of the last navy combat forces. About 17,000 navy men are expected to remain in Vietnam as advisers, however. The South Vietnamese navy numbers about 40,000 men.

December 31.—Both Houses of Congress adopt the final conference report on the Foreign Military Sales Act (H.R. 15628). As passed, the bill contains a provision repealing the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (President Nixon signed the bill on January 12).

December 31.—The House of Representatives clears the Foreign Aid Appropriations Bill (H.R. 17867) for the President by agreeing to a Senate amendment to the second conference report prohibiting the expenditure of the bill's military sales funds prior to authorization. The bill does not contain restrictions which appeared in 1969 and 1970 appropriations bills on military aid to Communist countries and on aid to countries trading with North Vietnam.

1971

January 4.—President Richard M. Nixon tells television newscasters from the major networks that "if the enemy at a time we are withdrawing, starts to build up its infiltration, starts moving troops and supplies through the Mugia Pass and other passes, then I as Commander in Chief will have to order bombing strikes on those key areas." He describes this as a "new" understanding in line with the Vietnamization program.

January 6.—Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird says in Paris that American "combat responsibility" in South Vietnam will end in the course of 1971, although U.S. forces will continue to fulfill logistics, air support, artillery, and security roles.

January 15.—A Pentagon spokesman says that the Defense Department "will not rule out" using U.S. planes to transport South Vietnamese troops into Cambodia. He says that such action will not constitute ground combat.

January 17.—Press reports indicate that U.S. helicopter gunships are involved in the fighting in Cambodia for control of Highway 4. When asked about the reports, Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says: "If helicopter gunships are required they will be used."

January 20.—Secretary of Defense Laird at a news conference says the United States has conducted and will continue to conduct air operations against enemy forces in Cambodia, and that the United States is giving air and logistic support to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in Cambodia.

January 25.—A Pentagon spokesman says that U.S. Special Forces are training Cambodian cadres at bases in Thailand and South Vietnam. He states that he is "not aware of any plans" for a similar training program to be carried on inside Cambodia. UPI, citing U.S. military sources, reported from Saigon that the Green Berets are training 2,100 Cambodians in guerrilla tactics at bases in Thailand, South Vietnam, and Laos for use against Communist supply lines in northeast Cambodia.

January 26.—A Pentagon spokesman announces that the United States will replace part of the losses suffered by the Cambodian Air Force during the Communist attack on Phnom Penh's airport on January 22. The replacements, he says, will come out of already appropriated U.S. military aid to Cambodia.

January 29.—Secretary of State William P. Rogers refers at a news conference to North Vietnam's attempts to develop a new base-supply area in northeastern Cambodia and southern Laos, saying that: "We don't have to wait until the base areas have been reestablished. We want to take the action which is necessary to prevent that from happening."

February 8.—President Nguyen Van Thieu orders South Vietnamese forces into Laos in an operation described by him as "limited in time and space, with the clear and unique objective of disrupting the supply and infiltration network" of the North Vietnamese. U.S. officials in Saigon say the United States was providing the South Vietnamese with full combat air support.

February 8.—State Department press officer Robert J. McCloskey states that South Vietnam's incursion into Laos poses no threat to either the Soviet Union or Communist China. On the U.S. role in the operation, he asserts: "No U.S. ground forces or advisers will be committed to Laos."

February 8.—Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma issues a statement that "the primary responsibility" for foreign intervention in Laos rests with North Vietnam but that it "cannot constitute a justification for entry of other troops [South Vietnamese] into Laos." He calls for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Laos.

February 10.—South Vietnam's Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky says that South Vietnamese forces will probably remain in Laos until the end of the dry season in May. He predicts that they would reenter Laos during the dry season in 1972 and says that it might be necessary for South Vietnamese forces to attack bases in the southern part of North Vietnam. When asked about Ky's statement on North Vietnam, Secretary Rogers asserts that: "That certainly is not under consideration."

February 12.—Communist China says that it "will not remain indifferent" to the Laos incursion.

February 17.—President Nixon tells an impromptu news conference that "I am not going to place any limitations upon the use of air power" in Indochina, except to exclude the use of nuclear weapons. The President adds that a joint executive-congressional resolution stating that it is the policy of the United States to withdraw completely from Vietnam was "not needed," because "the policy of this government is for a total withdrawal, provided there is a withdrawal by the other side."

February 20–21.—Heavy North Vietnamese attacks force South Vietnamese rangers to abandon a fire base in Laos. South Vietnamese casualties are reported to be heavy.

February 24.—Gen. Creighton Abrams says that the South Vietnamese incursion into Laos is "critical" to the American troop withdrawal program but that the Laos operation's success or failure probably will not be apparent before the fall of 1971. Abrams denies that

the operation's purpose was to cut or block the Ho Chi Minh trail but states instead that the purpose is to prevent North Vietnam from launching an offensive in 1971 in northern South Vietnam.

February 26.—Pentagon spokesmon disclose that small teams of U.S. riflemen could be sent into Laos to help rescue downed American airmen; these would be regarded as "rescue forces, not combat troops."

March 2.—The United States signs an aid agreement with Cambodia to provide that country with $18.5 million in imports. The agreement is the first of a total of $70 million of economic aid voted to Cambodia by Congress.

March 4.—President Nixon tells a news conference that the South Vietnamese attack against North Vietnamese forces in Laos had "very seriously damaged" the Communists and that truck traffic down the Ho Chi Minh trail had been cut by 55 percent. The President asserts that there is no plan "under consideration in this government" for U.S. air support for a South Vietnamese invasion of North Vietnam but that President Thieu "has to consider the possibility of going against the North."

March 6.—South Vietnamese forces move into the Laotian town of Sepone, an enemy supply base which has been one of the major objectives of their move into Laos.

March 10.—William McMahon becomes the new Prime Minister of Australia and Liberal Party leader as John Gorton is removed from those posts by a 34–33 no-confidence vote. Gorton becomes deputy leader, a post held by McMahon. McMahon has been Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1969.

March 10.—North Vietnam and Communist China issue a joint communique signed by Premiers Pham Van Dong and Chou En-lai. China pledges support for North Vietnam and says that it would "never allow United States imperialism to . . . do what it pleases in Indochina."

March 16.—In a television interview, Secretary Laird says that President Nixon is committed to the present rate of withdrawal of Americans from Vietnam of 3,000 per week, and that it might be possible to increase the rate later in the year. He says that at that rate, fewer than 50,000 Americans will remain in Vietnam by the end of 1972.

March 16.—Secretary Rogers says in a news conference that reports of large oil deposits off the shore of South Vietnam "have absolutely no effect on United States policy."

March 19.—South Vietnamese sources in Saigon reports that a total of 5,000 South Vietnamese soldiers have been withdrawn from Laos, leaving 15,000–16,000 still there.

March 22.—In a television interview, President Nixon discusses American and South Vietnamese military action in Cambodia and Laos. He says that the operation in Laos has succeeded in its purpose of disrupting enemy supply lines and defending South Vietnam, and that the three long-term goals of the operation are to insure the continuation of American withdrawals, the protecting of American forces, and the ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves.

March 25.—The South Vietnamese drive in Laos, which began February 8, ends with the withdrawal of all but 500 South Vietnamese troops. Pentagon officials say that the strength of enemy resistance has shortened the duration of the campaign, but the South Vietnamese Command say that 80 to 90 percent of the objectives in the operation have been accomplished. South Vietnam reports that losses in the campaign total 1,146 killed, 245 missing and 4,235 wounded.

March 30.—American planes bomb North Vietnamese artillery in the northern half of Vietnam's Demilitarized Zone. The raid follows increased artillery attacks against targets in South Vietnam by North Vietnam.

April 4.—The Department of Defense announces that a total of 608 American helicopters have been damaged during the six-week Laotian offensive and 104 helicopters are permanently lost. In figures subsequently released for the period January 30–April 9, 1971, the Department of Defense discloses that 174 Americans have died in connection with U.S. air support of the limited Laos operation, a total that includes American deaths in South Vietnam resulting from Dewey Canyon II and Lam-Son 719.

April 7.—In an address to the nation, President Nixon says that 100,000 more American troops will be withdrawn from Vietnam by December 1971. He says that "Vietnamization has succeeded" and that American involvement in the war is ending. He says that he is able to increase the rate of American withdrawals because of South Vietnamese successes in the operations in Laos and Cambodia, but declines to announce a date for the total ending of American involvement.

April 16.—President Nixon tells the American Society of Newspaper Editors that a residual American force will remain in Vietnam "as long as there is still time needed for the South Vietnamese to develop the capability of self-defense," and that the United States will continue to use its air power against North Vietnamese forces as long as a single American prisoner of war is being held.

April 19.—In a speech, South Vietnamese President Ky attacks the Thieu government and says that there was a "good possibility" that he will run for president against President Thieu in the October elections.

April 20.—Cambodian Prime Minister Lon Nol and his 18-member cabinet resign. Lon Nol is later asked to form a new cabinet by Chief of State Cheng Heng.

April 24.—A crowd estimated to be between two to five hundred thousand rally in Washington to protest the war in Vietnam. Over 150,000 participate in a similar rally in San Francisco. The marches follow a week of Washington protests by about 1,000 Vietnam veterans, who stage a march of their own on April 19. Another week of protest by war opponents follows the mass demonstrations.

April 29.—In a news conference, President Nixon reaffirms his intention to continue his Vietnam policy of gradually withdrawing American forces but he says that "ending American withdrawal completely . . . will have to be delayed until we get, not just the promise

1971—Continued

to discuss the release of our prisoners, but a commitment to release our prisoners."

May 3.—President Nixon applauds press reports that the Government of Sweden has offered to provide internment of prisoners from the Vietnam war. He says that he hopes that North Vietnam will accept the Swedish offer and "move promptly to negotiate an agreement on this issue." Hanoi subsequently rejects the proposal.

May 3.—Under Secretary of State John Irwin says that the United States is using B–52 bombers in air strikes against "troop formations and supply lines" in northern Laos. It is the first Administration statement that B–52 saturation bombings are being carried out regularly in Laos.

May 6.—The Cambodian National Assembly gives an overwhelming vote of confidence to the new Cabinet headed by General Lon Nol and Sisowath Sirik Matak.

May 10.—The *New York Times* publishes an interview with American Ambassador to Saigon Ellsworth Bunker, who predicts that American air power and advisers will be required in Vietnam for several more years.

May 14.—Hanoi's official press agency says that North Vietnam will accept 750 sick and wounded prisoners of war from the Government of South Vietnam and gives detailed instructions for the arrangements surrounding the release.

May 31.—The United States "offered specifically to agree to a deadline for the withdrawal of all prisoners of war and a cease-fire." The offer was rejected on June 26 and a nine-point plan is proposed by the North Vietnamese. [These developments are revealed on January 26, 1972, when President Nixon discloses that secret peace negotiations have been held intermittently since August 4, 1969, when he sent Presidential Assistant Henry Kissinger to Paris on the first of 13 secret missions for this purpose, and reiterates the U.S. peace proposal previously made in the private negotiations.]

June 3.—North Vietnam announces that it will not accept 13 prisoners of war being returned by the South Vietnamese Government. The refusal is based on the decision of the remainder of the 570 prisoners to stay in South Vietnam.

June 10.—Le Van Thai, campaign manager for South Vietnamese Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, says that Ky has "worked out a deal with Gen. [Duong Van] Minh" to gain the number of National Assembly endorsements required by law for a presidential candidate. Although Ky has not formally announced his candidacy, supporters say that American Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker has encouraged him to enter the race in order to keep it from being a one-man affair.

June 13.—The *New York Times* releases the first of a series of articles revealing portions of a secret Pentagon study and supporting documents. The study, commissioned by former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, covers American involvement in Vietnam from the end of World War II until the summer of 1968. Portions of the documents are subsequently printed by The *Washington Post* and other major newspapers.

June 22.—Senator Mansfield proposes an amendment to the Military Selective Service Act (H.R. 6531) declaring it to be U.S. policy to

end the war in Indochina as soon as possible. The amendment is tentatively adopted on June 22 by a vote of 57 to 42 and is finally adopted by a vote of 61 to 38. Conferees soften the proposal to an expression of the sense of Congress. The House approves the conference report on August 4 and the Senate approves it on August 21. It becomes P.L. 92–129. The final text states that it is the sense of the Congress to terminate military operations in Indochina as soon as practicable and urges the President to begin negotiations for a cease-fire, the return of POW's, and the establishment of a withdrawal date, subject to the release of POW's.

June 23.—South Vietnamese President Thieu signs the law governing the South Vietnamese Presidential elections on October 3 which reqnires potential candidates to file endorsements by 40 members of the National Assembly or 100 provincial councilors by August 3.

July 1.—Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, Vietcong delegate to the Paris peace talks, proposes a new seven-point formula for ending the war. A new element in the proposal is an offer to release all prisoners of war simultaneously with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. The plan said: "The two operations will start on the same date and end on the same date." The proposal also demands that the United States withdraw its support of the Thieu government, and offers to negotiate the political future of Vietnam with a neutral coalition government. Other elements are similar to the Communist plan of September 1970. On July 15 U.S. Ambassador David Bruce responds to the seven-point peace plan with a list of criticisms and questions, but without rejecting the plan outright.

July 15.—The White House confirms reports that David Bruce will resign in August as American delegate to the Paris peace talks, and that he will be replaced by William J. Porter, American Ambassador to South Korea.

July 18.—President Nguyen Van Thieu rejects the prospect of a neutral South Vietnam or a coalition government with the Vietcong and affirms that he has no fears about South Vietnamese interests during the Nixon visit to Peking.

July 19.—North Vietnam, in an editorial in the official daily Nhan Dan, warns against the implications hidden in new U.S. policy moves, calling the Nixon Doctrine "the counter-revolutionary global strategy of U.S. imperialism, which consists of . . . dividing the socialist countries, winning over one section and pitting it against another in order to oppose the national liberation movement."

July 24.—President Thieu officially announces his candidacy for reelection and names as his running mate former Prime Minister Tran Van Huong.

July 29.—David K. E. Bruce, Chief American Delegate to the Vietnam peace talks, retires from his post after lodging a final protest against North Vietnam for its increased activity in and around the Demilitarized Zone.

August 3.—*Jenmin Jihpao*, a Peking newspaper, reveals that China continues to dismiss the possibility of a new Geneva-style conference on Indochina, although it supports the Vietcong's seven-point proposal, including the demand that a specific withdrawal date for U.S. troops be set.

1971—Continued

August 4.—Vice President Ky files incomplete papers as a presidential candidate and declares that if he is not permitted to run, South Vietnam's election procedures will stand exposed as fraudulent. On August 5 administrative officials of South Vietnam's Supreme Court rejects Ky's application to enter the presidential race.

August 10.—Cambodian Acting Prime Minister Sisowath Sirik Matak thanks President Nixon for military and economic aid and stresses that Cambodia cannot survive against Communist attack without continued U.S. assistance. The Administration has requested $321 million in military aid for Cambodia for fiscal 1972, the largest sum sought for any country other than Vietnam.

August 13.—The U.S. Embassy in Saigon orders all American officials to stay away from the Vietnamese Government Information Service until the presidential election is over because of the latter's alleged involvement in the Thieu campaign.

August 16.—Acting Cambodian Premier Sisowath Sirik Matak says that his government will ask South Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Cambodia by June 1972 owing to the Cambodian Army's growing ability to defend itself and the reports of burning and looting attributed to the South Vietnamese troops.

August 17.—The U.S. Command acknowledges for the first time that American B–52 bombing raids have been flown in the southern half of the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Vietnam.

August 18.—Australia and New Zealand announce that they will withdraw their forces from South Vietnam in the next few months.

August 19.—The U.S. Command discloses publicly for the first time that a Seventh Fleet task force in the Gulf of Tonkin has been striking at enemy rocket and mortar positions in the southern half of the Demilitarized Zone.

August 19.—Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker assures Gen. Duong Van Minh that the U.S. will remain neutral in the elections and makes a final effort to persuade him to remain as a candidate in the presidential race.

August 23.—Ambassador Bunker meets with Vice President Ky to try to persuade him to campaign in the South Vietnamese presidential election as a result of the reversal of the earlier Supreme Court decision that Ky lacks the number of endorsements to be eligible to run. Despite the reversal, Ky announces that he will not be a candidate.

August 27.—A South Vietnamese legislative committee composed of senators and deputies accuses the government of President Nguyen Van Thieu of irregularities and rigging of lower house and scheduled presidential elections.

August 31.—Preliminary figures released show that anti-government candidates scored impressive gains in the August 29 lower house elections of South Vietnam, but that President Thieu's supporters maintained a comfortable majority.

September 9.—President Thieu expresses concern that the U.S. Congress might cut off or drastically reduce aid to South Vietnam if he runs unopposed in the presidential election, adding that he would rather resign than have such aid terminated.

September 9.—The U.S. and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam revive two-year-old suggestions for secret

negotiations, the U.S. calling for participation by South and North Vietnam and the Vietcong asking for private consultations between the PRG and the U.S. Each side rejects the other's proposals.

September 11.—President Thieu announces that he will resign in the event of failure to receive 50 percent of the votes cast in the uncontested October 3 presidential election and notes that opposition to his candidacy can be registered by casting irregular ballots.

September 12.—The Soviet Union makes public the most detailed account to date of its military and economic support for North Vietnam, noting that approximately 10,000 Vietnamese citizens are undergoing vocational and technical training in the Soviet Union. According to U.S. estimates by Seretary Laird, annual military assistance totals $500 million.

September 16.—At the 129th session of the Paris peace talks, North Vietnamese negotiator Xuan Thuy and his spokesman, Nguyen Thanh Le, harden their position by renouncing all their recent hints of readiness to compromise and by declaring that the release of prisoners will be carried out only after the United States has simultaneously removed Thieu from office in Saigon and accomplished total troop withdrawal.

September 16.—President Thieu says that he still wants a residual force of 50,000 or more American troops left in South Vietnam through 1973, adding that his longstanding position of the "Four No's" was still non-negotiable, i.e., no non-elected coalition government with the Communists, no ceding of territory, no Communist activity permitted in South Vietnam, and no pro-Communist neutralism.

September 19.—President Thieu announces that street demonstrations by his critics will not be tolerated and mobilized riot equipped police and plainclothesmen to quell the disturbances.

September 23.—U.S. officials reportedly tell South Vietnamese generals that any coup d'etat against President Thieu will lead to the ending of American support and that U.S. troops will be alerted partly to keep them out of anti-government and anti-American demonstrations.

September 27.—Senator Mansfield again proposes an amendment stating U.S. policy to terminate military operations in Indochina. The amendment to the military procurement authorization bill (H.R. 8687) is adopted by the Senate on September 30 by a vote of 57 to 38. The Senate also adopts an amendment proposed by Senator Symington placing a ceiling on assistance for Laos. This amendment passes the Senate on October 4 by a vote of 67 to 11. House and Senate conferees modify the Mansfield and Symington amendments slightly and the House adopts the conference report on November 10, and the Senate on November 11. The bill becomes P.L. 92–156. The final version of the Mansfield amendment states it to be U.S. policy to terminate military operations in Indochina as soon as practicable and to withdraw U.S. forces by a date certain, subject to the release of American POW's and the accounting for of all Americans missing in action. The ceiling on U.S. expenditures in Laos states that all assistance-related activity in Laos is included in the $350 million limit, but that there is no intent to limit the necessary non-assistance-

related activities. On signing the bill into law on November 17, President Nixon explains that the Mansfield amendment does not represent the policies of the administration, "is without binding force or effect and . . . will not change the policies I have pursued and that I shall continue to pursue toward this end."

September 29.—Chinese and North Vietnamese delegates sign an agreement covering economic and military aid for 1972. Both sides stress the Vietnamese Communists' determination to continue fighting until victory and withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

October 2.—The Governments of Australia and New Zealand express irritation at the United States failure to notify them in advance of the China visit, at the unexpected economic measures, and the lack of consultation on plans to wind down the war in Vietnam.

October 3.—President Nguyen Van Thieu is elected to a four-year term, receiving over 90% of the vote. He is sworn into his second term of office on October 31.

October 4.—Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny, on a state visit to Hanoi, gives the Vietnamese Communists a strong pledge of continued support and assistance, expressing agreement with their demands for ending the war on the basis of a complete American withdrawal from Indochina.

October 7.—The chief U.S. negotiator at the Paris peace talks, William Porter, asks members of the Communist delegation for information about American prisoners known to be dead in Vietnam. The latest Washington figures showed 1,618 American servicemen missing in Southeast Asia, 339 of whom were known to be held in North Vietnam.

October 8.—Sgt. John C. Sexton, Jr., becomes the first American prisoner of war to be released by the Vietcong since December 1969.

October 20.—Cambodian Premier Lon Nol declares a state of emergency and appoints a new government to rule by ordinance rather than constitutional law, adding that he will no longer "play the game of democracy and freedom" since it stands in the way of wartime victory.

October 21.—In a formal statement the Cambodian Government denies that it intended to rule by dictatorship or abandon democracy, explaining that the National Assembly is not abolished but that the terms have expired. The statement adds that rule by decree is an established Cambodian precedent in lieu of a functioning parliament, denying that Cambodia has proclaimed an outright military dictatorship.

November 4.—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reports a substitute foreign aid bill (after having rejected H.R. 9910) that limits the funds that can be expended assisting Cambodia, and the number of U.S. Government employees in Cambodia. The report on this bill (S. 2819) is adopted by the Senate on December 17 and by the House on January 25, 1972. It becomes P.L. 92–226. The ceiling on assistance to Cambodia is set at $341 million and 200 is the maximum number of American Government employees that may serve in Cambodia.

November 7.—Australia's combat in the Vietnam war ends when 1,100 men of the 4th Battalion withdrew from Nuidat, the main Australian base in Vietnam for five years.

November 9.—Cambodia's new Constituent Assembly meets for the first time and elects In Tam, former First Vice Premier and a leading critic of the Lon Nol government, as its president.

November 12.—President Nixon announces that he has ordered 45,000 more American troops home from Vietnam in December and January, declaring that the U.S. ground offensive role had been concluded.

November 25.—Denmark and Norway announce that they have reached agreement with North Vietnam on the establishment of diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level, becoming the first members of NATO to do so.

December 22.—North Vietnam releases 1,001 letters from American prisoners of war.

December 23.—Secretary Rogers discounts the new Communist offensive in Laos and Cambodia as "a clear indication of the failure of their military activity in South Vietnam."

December 23.—Communist forces in the mountain regions of northern Laos are reportedly in a position to destroy the CIA-sponsored, pro-government Meo Army led by Gen. Vang Pao. U.S. sources in Vientiane say the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao have mobilized the largest, best-armed and best-equipped force ever used in northern Laos against the positions of Meo tribesmen and their Thai irregular allies.

December 26–30.—U.S. Air Force and Navy planes stage heavy attacks on military installations in North Vietnam in actions referred to by the American Command as protective reaction air strikes.

December 28.—Both the United States and North Vietnam cancel the Paris talks scheduled for December 30.

December 30.—American bombing of North Vietnam ceases after the five-day succession of strikes by hundreds of aircraft, with the U.S. Command in Saigon claiming three aircraft losses.

1972

January 2.—President Richard M. Nixon explains that accelerated Communist troop infiltration, firing at U.S. aircraft, and the shelling of Saigon prompted the December order to heavily bomb North Vietnam.

January 8.—South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam announces that his government will not allow the new Indian chairman of the International Control Commission to enter the country in reprisal for the Indian-North Vietnamese decision to exchange ambassadors. India's relations with South Vietnam remain on the consular level.

January 13.—President Nixon announces that 70,000 troops will be withdrawn from Vietnam over the next three months, creating a new troop ceiling of 69,000 by May 1.

January 21.—Senior U.S. sources in Bangkok report that the number of CIA supported Thai soldiers serving in Laos will be increased to

1972—Continued

contend with the worsening military situation in Laos. The unofficial present total of 4,800 to 6,000 Thais is expected to double, the sources estimate.

January 22.—Despite heavy losses of equipment and casualties suffered by Laotian Government troops and American-supported Thai irregulars during the North Vietnamese drive into the Plaine des Jarres, Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma says that he will not ask the United States for more military aid "unless the situation gets worse."

January 24.—Commenting on the $83.4 billion defense budget submitted by President Nixon to the Congress, Defense Comptroller Robert C. Moot says that the downward curve in Vietnam spending would continue, a figure estimated by a recent Cornell University scientists' study as about $4.5 billion for fiscal 1973.

January 25.—President Nixon in a major foreign policy address discloses that the United States had secretly offered proposals to end the Vietnam war to Communist leaders as early as August 1969, when Presidential Adviser Henry A. Kissinger made the first of 13 trips to Paris to carry on secret negotiations. He adds that his secret eight-point plan of October 1971 had been ignored at the same time that Hanoi was condemning the United States in public for not responding to Communist proposals. The plan incorporates an agreement by President Nguyen Van Thieu and Vice President Tran Van Huong to resign from office one month before an internationally supervised presidential election in South Vietnam in which all political forces including the Vietcong would participate. In addition, the plan as now announced includes the promise of total withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces within six months of an agreement parallel with "the release of all military men and innocent civilians captured throughout Indochina" and a cease-fire, all to be internationally supervised and given international guarantees.

January 25.—In a broadcast speech that coincides with President Nixon's address, President Thieu affirms that he will resign one month before an internationally supervised presidential election, adding that the National Liberation Front (NLF) will have to "give up violence and guarantee to respect the outcome of the election."

January 26.—Leaders of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia welcomes the President's eight-point peace plan as a positive approach to the problem of freeing prisoners of war.

January 26.—Presidential Adviser Kissinger in a news conference reviews President Nixon's eight-point peace plan and his own private efforts to end the deadlock at the Paris talks. He says that settlement on North Vietnam's nine-point plan, negotiated secretly for 30 months, is foreclosed on two counts: Hanoi's refusal to make concessions in return for American withdrawal and its insistence that the United States not only terminate all support for the Saigon Government but attempt to change it directly. The President is prepared at any time to revert to a simpler proposal like the one offered in private talks of May 31, 1971 calling for unilateral American troop withdrawal in return for cease-fire and prisoner exchange, Kissinger adds.

January 26.—The Communist negotiators at Paris denounce President Nixon's peace proposals as unacceptable. Radio Hanoi indicates that the proposals are unacceptable because of their failure to abandon the Vietnamization program or to withdraw support from President Thieu.

January 27.—In remarks to editors and broadcasters, Secretary of State William P. Rogers says that to walk out of South Vietnam unconditionally and permit "a Communist takeover" will undermine all U.S. world commitments and reduce U.S. credibility "to zero." In response to questions about the U.S.-proposed cease-fire for Indochina, Rogers states that it will include the use of American airpower flying from bases in Thailand and elsewhere.

January 27.—Hanoi press spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le denounces U.S. assertions that North Vietnam had broken off the secret peace talks in November 1971, explaining that chief negotiator Le Duc Tho had been prevented by illness from attending the meeting and that the United States had been so informed on November 17. Le says that Hanoi had proposed as a substitute a meeting between negotiator Xuan Thuy and Presidential Adviser Kissinger, but that the United States canceled the meeting on November 19.

January 28.—White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Zeigler confirms that President Nixon had in 1971 secretly offered North Vietnam $2.5 billion as part of a $7.5 billion package for Indochina reconstruction ($5 billion of which was earmarked for South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia).

January 28.—At a private meeting of relatives of American prisoners of war, Henry A. Kissinger expresses the opinion that the Senate defeat of the foreign aid bill in October was one of the factors leading to the suspension of the secret peace negotiations in November.

January 29.—President Nixon's peace plan for Indochina is received as a "new stratagem of U.S. imperialism" by Communist China in an official statement reiterating acceptance of the Vietcong proposals as the sole way to end the hostilities.

January 30.—Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma says that North Vietnamese gains in Laos are designed to guarantee a role for Hanoi in an Indochina settlement.

January 31.—A State Department official, Frank A. Sieverts, says that the Department will support an effort by Amnesty International to conduct an impartial inspection of prisoner-of-war camps in North and South Vietnam and that if North Vietnam will agree to such visits, pressure will be exerted on South Vietnam to reciprocate.

January 31.—North Vietnam makes public the nine point peace proposal it has secretly submitted to the United States in June 1971. It calls for "the withdrawal of the totality of U.S. forces," a simultaneous release of prisoners of war, an end to U.S. support of the Thieu government, the establishment of a coalition government, and a cease-fire. The proposal states that: "The above points form an integrated whole."

January 31.—Nguyen Thanh Le, spokesman at the Paris peace talks, says that North Vietnam wants "a large government of national accord" to succeed the Thieu Administration which "would be composed of personalities of various political and religious tendencies."

1972—Continued

February 1.—State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray confirms claims by the North Vietnamese that they offered to continue the secret Paris talks between Presidential Adviser Kissinger and Hanoi negotiator Xuan Thuy but that the U.S. declined to pursue the talks owing to its insistence that they continue either after the recovery of Le Duc Tho or with another Hanoi leader of similar rank.

February 1.—It is acknowledged for the first time that South Vietnamese bombers have been flying strikes in Laos since December 1, 1971.

February 1.—North Vietnam and Cambodia both deny reports that they have approached each other on the possibility of negotiating a peaceful settlement of the war.

February 3.—The Vietcong, with the support of the North Vietnamese, present a revised version of their July 1971 peace proposal in Paris. The new version calls for the immediate resignation of President Thieu in exchange for immediate discussion of a political settlement; a specific date for total withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops advisers, military personnel, weapons and war materials which will also be the date for the release of all military and civilian prisoners; and an end to the pacification policy. In addition, the proposal calls on Saigon to "end its warlike policy" and "disband at once its machine of oppression and constraint against the people." The plan is rejected by South Vietnam.

February 3.—Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird expresses the hope that the upcoming U.S.-Soviet talks in Moscow will include discussion of mutual restraint by both countries in supplying future military aid to both North and South Vietnam.

February 5.—Senator Edward M. Kennedy releases a report prepared by the General Accounting Office for use of his subcommittee on refugees which estimates that 2 million Cambodians, or one-third of the population, have been left homeless by the Indochina war since March 1970, and states that Cambodia is "following the tragic path of Vietnam and Laos."

February 6.—North Vietnam's chief delegate to the Paris peace talks, Xuan Thuy, reports that North Vietnam will not give up prisoners of war in return for withdrawal of all U.S. forces and that the military and political issues must be handled together.

February 7.—White House staff chief H. R. Haldeman said in a television interview that critics of the President's peace plan are "consciously aiding and abetting the enemy of the United States," a statement that is later characterized by White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler as Mr. Haldeman's "own personal point of view."

February 11.—Charles Bray 3d, a State Department spokesman, announces that Secretary Rogers will be available to give high-level briefings on Vietnam and other foreign policy issues to Democratic candidates for the Presidency.

February 13.—More than 1,200 delegates to the Paris World Assembly for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese Peoples condemn U.S. policies as "hypocritical and fallacious," accuse President Nixon of escalating the war, and back the North Vietnamese and Vietcong conditions for restoring peace.

February 22.—Tran Van Do, a South Vietnamese politician and diplomat, says that he met privately and unofficially with the chief North Vietnamese delegate to the Paris peace talks, Xuan Thuy, on December 19.

February 23.—Nguyen Chanh Thi, a former senior South Vietnamese Army commander with ties to the anti-Government Buddhists, is forbidden by the Saigon police chief to leave the airplane which is returning him from six years of exile in the United States. His plane flies to the United States, where he is allowed to return as a visitor.

February 23.—In a *New York Times* interview, President Nguyen Van Thieu asserts that the Soviet Union has urged North Vietnam to open a military offensive to prevent any efforts by the United States and China to end the Vietnam war during President Nixon's Peking talks, but that the threat did not materialize because of U.S. bombing and South Vietnamese Army attacks.

February 24.—In a report to Congress, General Accounting Office auditors call for a re-evaluation of a $37 million project to build living quarters for families of South Vietnamese military personnel. As of June 1, 1971, the project had cost the United States $13.9 million, but the G.A.O. questions whether it has raised the morale or reduced the desertion rate of the Vietnamese armed forces.

March 1.—A staff report of Senator Stuart Symington's subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee states that fighting in Laos and Cambodia is increasing under "deteriorating" conditions as the war is winding down in South Vietnam, and that as a result the United States is relying heavily on Thailand "as a base for continuing war" in Indochina. The report questions the extent of the Executive Branch's compliance with legislative restrictions on the level of warfare in Laos and Cambodia.

March 2.—A U.S. Embassy spokesman denies a Senate report which claims that there has been a heavy buildup of U.S. troop strength in Thailand as American forces leave Vietnam. The spokesman says that the present strength is about 32,000, a reduction from mid-1969 when there were 49,000 U.S. servicemen in Thailand, and this total has remained steady since early 1970.

March 7.—Hanoi Radio claims that U.S. planes have started a major, widescale bombing campaign in the north, hitting "many populated areas." The U.S. Command in Saigon does not comment on the charges, and Col. Phillip H. Stevens, chief of the information office, announces that the command will no longer disclose information on the number of American aircraft involved in raids on the north.

March 10.—The Mekong Committee, formed 15 years ago by Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and South Vietnam, releases a comprehensive report calling for a total investment of $12 billion in a plan for the development of the Mekong River basin over the next 30 years.

March 12.—After dissolving the National Assembly, which had been working on a new constitution and taking over from Cheng Heng as Chief of State, Marshal Lon Nol declares himself President of Cambodia, Commander in Chief of the armed forces and President of the Council of Ministers.

March 21.—President Lon Nol announces the formation of a new Cambodian government.

1972—Continued

March 21.—American officials in Bangkok disclose that 525 U.S. military men were advising and training Thai troops in counterinsurgency operations in Thailand.

March 23.—Ambassador William J. Porter announces at the 147th session of the Paris peace talks that no further meetings will be held until the Vietnamese Communists show willingness for "serious discussion" on concrete issues defined in advance.

March 26.—On the second anniversary of the 3-year "Land to the Tiller" redistribution program, U.S. officials in Vietnam report that so far 361,000 farmers have received 972,400 acres of land, 70 percent of it in the Mekong Delta, and over 30,000 landlords have been paid for the land. Over half of the land is yet to be redistributed, mostly in areas which are still insecure or where the identity of owners and farmers have been obscured due to the war.

March 30.—North Vietnamese use guns with 17-mile ranges in major attacks against the northern line of South Vietnamese bases along the DMZ, while enemy infantrymen simultaneously attack fire support bases farther south. Ten of the bases are abandoned by the South Vietnamese, although they received support of U.S. tactical air strikes and naval gunfire. The last U.S. combat troops were removed from the DMZ area in 1971 and only advisers remained stationed with the South Vietnamese troops there.

April 3.—The Northern half of Quangtri Province is abandoned by South Vietnamese forces as North Vietnamese troops continue an advance southward from the demilitarized zone which began on April 1.

April 6.—American planes and destroyers begin systematic bombardment of surface-to-air missile sites north of the demilitarized zone in North Vietnam. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, says in Washington that the resumed bombing will continue "as long as there are valid military targets supporting this offensive." Heavy ground fighting continues in the area of Loc Ninh, north of Saigon, and in the area south of the demilitarized zone.

April 8.—A Communist offensive gains in intensity along Highway 13, which connects Saigon with Cambodia, and slackens off somewhat in the demilitarized zone area. United States rushes additional planes and ships to Indochina to facilitate the intensified bombing effort. White House press spokesman, Ziegler, says that United States will do "what is necessary" in terms of air power, fire power and logistical support to help South Vietnam stop the current offensive.

April 10.—At a ceremony for the signing of a U.N. convention prohibiting biological and toxic weapons, President Nixon indirectly criticizes the Soviet Union's support of North Vietnam. He says that "every great power must follow the principle that it should not encourage directly or indirectly any other nation to use force or armed aggression against one of its neighbors."

April 11.—U.S. Government sources disclose figures prepared within the intelligence community before the current North Vietnamese offensive which show that total aid to North Vietnam from the Soviet Union was $705 million in 1967, $415 million in 1970, and $415 million again in 1971.

April 14.—Administration officials reveal that President Nixon has ordered strikes by B–52 bombers throughout the southern panhandle of North Vietnam.

April 16.—The U.S. military command in Saigon announces that B–52's and tactical aircraft have struck "military targets in the vicinity of Haiphong and other areas of North Vietnam." Targets are listed as "logistical facilities such as fuel dumps, warehouses, truck parks and other activities." Subsequently the command announces that Hanoi has been bombed as well, and that two U.S. warplanes have been shot down.

April 17.—In a formal protest note from the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the USSR claims that four Soviet merchant ships are damaged by U.S. air strikes over Haiphong. The State Department replies that any damage that might have been done was "inadvertent and regrettable," but that "countries which supply offensive equipment to the North Vietnamese and enable them to mount an invasion of South Vietnam share responsibility."

April 17.—Speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Rogers says that the United States will take "whatever military action is necessary" against the North Vietnamese offensive, and rules out negotiations "while this major invasion is under way." He says that there are "only two announcements about what we are going to do. . . . We are not going to reintroduce American ground combat troops and we are not going to introduce nuclear weapons into North or South Vietnam."

April 18.—Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of Defense Laird says that he "would not rule out" contingency plans to have the Navy blockade or mine Haiphong Harbor. He also says that: "Any area in North Vietnam, as long as this invasion across the DMZ continues, is subject to attack" by U.S. planes.

April 22.—Anti-war demonstrators hold marches and rallies throughout the United States to protest the increased U.S. bombing of North Vietnam. The largest turnout is in New York City, where a crowd estimated at 30,000 to 100,000 gathers. Other demonstrations occurred in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, and in various state capitals and college towns.

April 24.—Jack Anderson reveals partial contents of secret 1969 Vietnam study commissioned by President Nixon before he was sworn in. The National Security Study Memorandum, which the *Washington Post* printed on April 25, cites sharp differences of opinion over various aspects of U.S. policy in Vietnam among the CIA, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the U.S. Embassy in Saigon.

April 25.—In a joint statement, the United States and South Vietnam announce that they will return to the Paris peace talks and that "the first item of business in these talks must be the discussion of measures which will put an end to the flagrant North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam which was launched earlier this month."

April 26.—President Nixon announces that 10,000 troops per month will be withdrawn from Vietnam in the next 2 months, bringing the total down to 49,000 by July 1. He also expresses his "firm expecta-

92-981 O - 75 - 11

tion" that resumption of the Paris talks will lead to progress, and declares that "we will not be defeated" in Vietnam.

April 30.—In a question-and-answer session with prominent Texas Democrats and Republicans, President Nixon discusses his Vietnam policies and his desire to uphold the "respect" of the presidential office. Regarding bombing targets in North Vietnam, he says "we are prepared to use our military and naval strength against military targets throughout North Vietnam, and we believe that the North Vietnamese are taking a very great risk if they continue their offensive in the South."

April 30.—Appearing on the television program "Meet the Press," Secretary of State Rogers says that the bombing of targets in North Vietnam weakens the North Vietnamese military effort in South Vietnam. He points out that no provincial capitals have yet been taken, although this has been the goal of the enemy.

April 30.—North Vietnamese Politburo member Le Duc Tho arrives in Paris and says that he is there to negotiate with the United States to find a "just and equitable peaceful solution to the Vietnamese problem." He demands an end to U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, an end to the Vietnamization policy, the resignation of President Thieu, a "change of policy of the Saigon Administration and the abolition of any form of coercion and oppression of the people." He proposes a "government of national harmony with three components" for South Vietnam and says "We in no way want to impose a 'Communist regime' in South Vietnam such as Mr. Nixon has fabricated."

May 1.—Quangtri, South Vietnam's northernmost provincial capital, is abandoned by South Vietnamese forces and their American advisers after 5 days of intensive fighting, giving the North Vietnamese their most important victory of the current offensive. The fall of Quangtri increases the threat to Hue.

May 3.—The command of the South Vietnamese Army is given a shake-up by President Thieu in light of the South Vietnamese setbacks in Quangtri province. Lieut. Gen. Hoang Xuan Lam, commander of the northern military region, is replaced by Maj. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, hero of the defense of Hue in 1968. Brig. Gen. Vu Van Giai, commander of the Third Division which retreated from Quangtri, is relieved of his post and placed under investigation.

May 4.—The Paris peace talks are broken off again for an indefinite period because of what U.S. ambassador Porter described as "a complete lack of progress in every available channel."

May 4.—More than 50 additional fighter-bombers are ordered to Thailand from the United States and a sixth aircraft carrier is ordered to begin operations off Vietnam, thus bringing the total American air strength in Indochina to nearly 1,000 combat aircraft.

May 5.—Defense Department spokesman, Jerry Friedheim, says that U.S. Marines currently aboard American warships stationed in the Gulf of Tonkin might be landed in South Vietnam to protect withdrawing American forces. "It is not our intention to resume ground combat responsibility," he says.

May 8.—President Nixon, in a broadcast address on Indochina, says that "Hanoi must be denied the weapons and supplies it needs to

continue the aggression." He announces that to achieve this goal, he has ordered all entrances to North Vietnamese ports to be mined; "appropriate measures" to be taken "within the internal and claimed territorial waters of North Vietnam to interdict the delivery of any supplies"; and rail and other communications to be cut off "to the maximum extent possible." Air and naval strikes against military targets in North Vietnam will continue. These measures will be discontinued upon the return of all American prisoners of war and the beginning of an internationally supervised cease-fire, at which time the U.S. would "stop all acts of force throughout Indochina" and proceed with "a complete withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam within four months."

May 9.—Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger says in a news conference that the mining of North Vietnamese harbors is not viewed by the administration as a confrontation with the Soviet Union. While he does not believe that the mining will affect the battles taking place in South Vietnam within the coming 3 weeks, Kissinger says it should "affect the next round." If lightening of ships carrying cargoes are to occur outside the mined area "we would interfere with it to the maximum degree possible," he says.

May 9.—The North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris talks reacts to President Nixon's announcement of the mining of Haiphong and stepping up of the air war by saying that "the Vietnamese people will never accept Mr. Nixon's ultimatum."

May 9.—The Senate Democratic Caucus votes by 29 to 14 to "disapprove" of the President's "escalation of the war." By a vote of 35 to 8, the Caucus approves the modified fund cutoff proposed by Senators Church and Case, which will stop all funds for all U.S. land, sea and air combat operations in Indochina 4 months after North Vietnam agrees to release U.S. prisoners. The caucus also votes 44 to 0 against postponing a Senate floor vote on the fund cutoff until the President returns from his scheduled trip to Moscow.

May 9.—South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu in a televised speech asks for emergency powers that will allow him to issue decrees subject to subsequent approval by the National Assembly.

May 10.—White House press secretary Ziegler announces that the President is receiving "substantial support" on his decision to mine North Vietnamese harbors. Citing about 20,000 telegrams already received, he says that the ratio of support to non-support is about "5 or 6 to 1."

May 10.—Defense Secretary Laird tells a news conference that "we will take those actions that are necessary to stop the supplies of equipment to North Vietnam," whether by airlift or by any ships that might evade U.S. mines.

May 10.—President Thieu declares martial law in South Vietnam for the first time since the Tet offensive of 1968.

May 11.—The South Vietnamese government announces stringent new measures expanding the draft and imposing economic and social restrictions on the population. The regulations include requisitioning of personal property, a ban on foreign travel for persons 17-48 years old, closing of night clubs and other places of entertainment,

and reassigning of soldiers in civilian ministries to active duty in the army.

May 12.—Defense Department spokesman Jerry Friedheim says that "several" of the 25 merchant ships reportedly heading for North Vietnamese ports have changed course because of the U.S. mine blockade. He also discloses that a total of seven or eight vessels left Haiphong harbor before the mines activated, and that no apparent attempt had been made by any of the 31 foreign ships remaining in Haiphong harbor to run the minefield.

May 14.—The lower house of the South Vietnamese National Assembly approves a bill granting President Thieu the right to rule by decree with subsequent approval by the National Assembly for 6 months, with the exception of ratification of treaties and declarations of war or negotiations to make peace.

May 15.—Pentagon spokesman Jerry Friedheim discloses that the waterways of North Vietnam which have been mined include the Red River and other inland waterways, in order to cut off movement of supplies within North Vietnam.

May 16.—The United States and South Vietnam refuse to resume the Paris peace talks in response to a Communist proposal to that effect.

May 24.—The Pentagon announces that a seventh aircraft carrier and additional B–52's will be sent to the war zone to join the record number of nearly 140 B–52's already in Guam and Thailand.

May 24.—Senator Edward Kennedy releases estimates made by his refugee subcommittee staff on civilian war casualties. The renewed fighting since the end of March has resulted in 40–50,000 casualties, including 15,000 dead as of the first week in May and 40–50,000 additional casualties are expected by the first week in June, according to the subcommittee. New refugees caused by the fighting are believed to number a million.

May 24.—The United States and South Vietnam turn down a request of the previous day by the Communist side to resume the suspended Paris peace talks on May 25.

June 2.—The South Vietnamese Senate, by a 27–21 vote, rejects President Thieu's request that he be granted authority to rule by decree for 6 months because of the Communist offensive.

June 3.—In a lengthy interview with newsmen in Paris, North Vietnam Politburo member Le Duc Tho says that despite "difficulties" caused by bombing and mining, the offensive in South Vietnam can be maintained through the November U.S. presidential election or longer if necessary.

June 5.—The *New York Times* report that a classified summary of the Army's inquiry into the Mylai incident reveal that a second massacre, involving the killing of as many as 90 civilians, "did in fact" take place in Mykhe 4, about 2 miles from Mylai on the same morning, March 16, 1968.

June 7.—According to unofficial figures released by the Cambodian Information Ministry, Marshal Lon Nol wins the presidential election held on June 4, with slightly less than 55 percent of the vote. About a million citizens, or less than half the number of eligible voters out of the country's 7 million population, participated in the

election. In Tam, former National Assembly persident, came in second with about 25 percent of the vote and Keo An, a "peace candidate" who openly advocates the return of exiled Prince Shianouk to Cambodia as a private citizen, received about one fifth of the vote.

June 8.—The North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris talks charges that American planes have intentionally and heavily bombed dikes and waterworks of the Red River and other streams from April 10 to May 24. In Washington, Vice Adm. William P. Mack and AF Gen. George J. Eade deny that dikes are among the targets struck by Navy and Air Force bombers.

June 9.—John Paul Vann, chief U.S. adviser in South Vietnam's Military Region II, which included the Central Highlands and the provincial capital of Kontum, is killed in a helicopter crash as he is travelling from Pleiku to Kontum. The highest-ranking American civilian to die in the war, Vann had assumed direct personal control of the defense of the Central Highlands in what is generally regarded as the region having the weakest South Vietnamese military leadership.

June 10.—Pentagon sources say that in order to cut U.S. troop strength in Vietnam to the 49,000-man level announced by President Nixon for July 1, several Air Force and Marine fighter units will be shifted to Thailand.

June 10.—The lower house of the South Vietnamese National Assembly fails by 26 votes to override the Senate's rejection of a Special Powers Bill which would give President Thieu the power to levy new taxes, censor the press, freeze private bank accounts, draft veterans and revalue the piaster. The House approves a compromise bill granting Thieu special powers in matters of national defense, security, economy and finance.

June 12.—Testifying before a House Armed Services investigating subcommittee headed by Rep. F. Edward Hébert, General John D. Lavelle acknowledges that he was dismissed in March as commander of the Seventh Air Force with headquarters in Saigon after he ordered planes to make around 20 unauthorized raids in North Vietnam between November 8, 1971, and March 8, 1972 and reported them as "protective-reaction" missions. He says that at times his actions were "probably beyond the literal intention of the rules" governing bombing of the North.

June 13.—About 1,500 South Vietnamese troops are sent into Anloc to rout the remaining North Vietnamese troops still manning posts around the city, thus signalling the end of 68 days of fierce battling.

June 13.—The Cambodian government closes down two daily newspapers, including one that is operated by In Tam, runner up in the presidential elections.

June 14.—U.S. bombing of Hanoi and its environs is called to a halt for a 4-day period coinciding with the visit of Soviet President Podgorny to that city. Air Force officers at the Danang air base add, however, that the halt does not extend to all of North Vietnam but only to the regions around the capital.

June 18.—At the close of his 3-day mission to Hanoi, Soviet President Podgorny predicts that the Paris peace talks will soon resume

and says that "The Soviet Union will do everything possible for a de-escalation of the Vietnam war."

June 20.—U.S. military sources disclose that the North Vietnamese are making an effort to cut the effectiveness of American mining of harbors by using barges to carry cargo from Chinese freighters anchored outside the blockaded ports. This effort is largely unsuccessful, according to the sources, because Navy carrier-based planes are interdicting them before they reach their sources.

June 24.—The Pentagon says that an attorney acting on behalf of Senator Edward Kennedy has received a list of 24 Air Force and Navy officers identified by North Vietnam as having been captured since 1970. The list is obtained from the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris and is given to the U.S. Embassy. Fifteen of the 24 had previously been listed as prisoners and 9 as missing in action.

June 25.—The Seventh Air Force in Saigon announces that U.S. jets have dropped laser-guided "smart" bombs on the Thai Nguyen steel plant 30 miles north of Hanoi, destroying North Vietnam's entire steel-producing capacity.

June 27.—The *Washington Post* and *New York Times* begin publishing excerpts from copies of the previously undisclosed 4 volumes of the Pentagon Papers dealing with the secret peace negotiations since 1967.

June 27.—The South Vietnamese Senate votes 26–0 to give President Thieu authority to rule by decree on matters of defense and economics for 6 months.

June 28.—White House press secretary Ziegler announces that 10,000 additional men would be withdrawn from South Vietnam by September 1, reducing U.S. military strength there to 39,000 by that date. In addition, he says that the President orders no further draftees to be sent to Vietnam unless they volunteer for duty there. This announcement does not affect the 4,000 draftees currently in Vietnam or those already under orders to go there.

June 28.—A force of about 10,000–20,000 South Vietnamese paratroopers and marines begin a drive to retake Quangtri Province by launching a counteroffensive across the Mychanh River.

June 28.—A staff report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asserts that the Defense Department in effect made a $155 million subsidy to the Saigon government in 1971 by devising a system of separate exchange rates for private and official transactions. After devaluation of the piaster, official transactions of DOD are made according to the pre-devaluation rate of 118 piasters to the dollar as a way of pumping dollars into the South Vietnamese economy, according to the report.

June 29.—In a televised press conference, President Nixon announces that the United States and North Vietnam will resume the Paris peace talks on July 13. The return to the negotiating table will be made "on the assumption that the North Vietnamese are prepared to negotiate in a constructive and serious way," the President says, but if the North Vietnamese would not proceed "on that basis," he says that American bombing and other forms of military pressure will continue.

June 30.—The Paris delegations of North Vietnam and the Vietcong issue statements indicating their readiness to return to the peace con-

ference. The Communists say, however, that the Vietcong seven-point peace plan proposed a year ago remains the "correct and realistic basis for a settlement of the Vietnamese problem."

July 5.—South Vietnamese troops move into several key sections of Quangtri city.

July 7.—Prince Souphanouvong, head of the Pathet Lao, agrees in a cabled message to his half brother, Lao Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, to send Prince Souk Vongsak to Vientiane in order to discuss possible negotiations to end the Laotian war.

July 19.—National security adviser Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese Politburo member Le Duc Tho meet privately for the 14th time for 6 and one-half hours of talks in Paris. White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler says upon Kissinger's return to Washington that "Further meetings will be announced as they are held. By mutual agreement, neither side will reveal the substance of these meetings."

July 24.—UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim says that he has "private and unofficial information" from Hanoi that the United States was bombing the dikes of North Vietnam. While he did not claim that the bombing was intentional, he appealed to the United States to "avoid this kind of action, which could lead to enormous disaster and enormous human suffering."

July 24.—The *New York Times* reports that a Cabinet-level report, prepared by the CIA, Defense Department and State Department and dated February 21, 1972, says that there is "no prospect" of stemming the smuggling of narcotics in Southeast Asia "under any conditions that can realistically be projected." The reason for the pessimism, according to the report, is "the corruption, collusion and indifference at some places in some governments, particularly Thailand and South Vietnam."

July 25.—Nelson G. Gross, the State Department's senior drugs adviser, says that in light of steps taken by the United States, the United Nations and local governments, the pessimistic Cabinet-level report on the Southeast Asian drug situation was "completely out of date." Presidential assistant Egil Krogh, Jr., says that "substantial progress" has been made in stemming illegal narcotics during the preceding 4 months.

July 26.—State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray says that an Administration study shows that only "the most incidental and minor impact on the system of levees" of North Vietnam has resulted from American bombing. Prior to Bray's announcement, officials had publicly stated only that dikes "may have been hit" unintentionally by bombs aimed at military installations or military traffic.

July 27.—In a news conference, President Nixon reiterates that U.S. policy has never been and will not be to bomb the dikes of North Vietnam. He cites recent official figures of civilian casualties caused by the current offensive as 45,000 including 15,000 deaths, and places the number of refugees at 860,000, most of whom are still in refugee camps.

July 27.—South Vietnamese paratroopers are forced to abandon their foothold in Quangtri's Citadel.

July 27.—Thailand's armed forces chief of staff, in an interview with the Bangkok Post, says that his government will ask the United

1972—Continued

States to withdraw its forces from Thailand if Senator George McGovern is elected President.

July 28.—The *New York Times* reports that a secret analysis compiled in June by the Strategic Intelligence Office of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs concludes that the amount of high-quality heroin smuggled into the United States from Southeast Asia "is greater than previously realized."

July 28.—The Administration releases an intelligence report, prepared largely by the CIA, which asserts that on the basis of photographic evidence, U.S. bombing had damaged North Vietnam's dike system at 12 points. However, the report concludes the hits were unintentional, their impact is minor and easily repairable, and "no major dike has been breached."

August 5.—South Vietnam's President Thieu issues a decree requiring every daily newspaper to deposit in the treasury within 30 days the equivalent of $47,000, which will be a guarantee to cover possible future fines and court charges arising from the government's press code. The decree also calls for the Interior Ministry to shut down papers after the second government confiscation of an issue containing "articles detrimental to the national security and public order."

August 6.—Cambodia's Democratic Party announces that it will boycott the September 3 National Assembly election. The announcement follows by a week a similar move by the Republican Party, the other major opposition to the ruling Social Republican Party, which is headed by President Lon Nol. Both groups charge that the election law gives the government an unfair advantage at the polls.

August 14.—The South Vietnamese government news agency announces that President Thieu, as part of his special emergency powers to legislate by decree, has signed a narcotics law demanding the death penalty for trafficking in hard drugs such as heroin and cocaine. The new law provided for trial in military courts, and specifically prohibits suspended sentences.

August 12.—The Third Battalion of the 21st Infantry holds a stand down ceremony in Danang, and becomes the last U.S. ground troops to leave Vietnam. Remaining in Vietnam are around 43,500 service personnel in administrative and supply jobs, several hundred advisers, and pilots and crews of about 600 helicopters and 200 other combat planes.

August 13.—Former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark returns from a 2-week visit to North Vietnam, where he has talked with numerous officials including the foreign minister and prime minister, and says that he is assured that U.S. POWs will be released "when we stop this senseless, murderous bombing and end the war and get out."

August 16.—Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger arrives in Saigon. The purpose of his trip is not made known. At the same time, North Vietnamese Politburo member Le Duc Tho returns from Paris to Hanoi, but he says that speculations concerning the timing of the two trips "do not correspond to reality," and that his visit is "routine and has no other significance."

August 21.—Gerald L. Warren, deputy White House press secretary, seeks to discourage speculation of an imminent breakthrough in

Vietnam peace negotiations which was suggested by Secretary of State Rogers in a published interview. Warren says that the Secretary "was expressing the hope of the Administration," and that "he was not making a prediction based on any event or any exchange that may or may not have occurred."

August 22.—The South Vietnamese government offers, for "humanitarian" reasons, to return 600 seriously ill and wounded North Vietnamese prisoners of war to their homeland. State Department spokesman John King says that Saigon is acting in consultation with Washington on this matter and expresses hope that Hanoi will reciprocate the prisoner release offer, but says there is no "hard evidence" that this will occur.

August 24.—Names of 10 Air Force and Navy officers allegedly captured during June and July are released to the Pentagon and to Senator Kennedy by the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris. All 10 have been listed by the United States as missing in action; the information given by the North Vietnamese indicates that the officers are "alive and held prisoner in North Vietnam," according to Richard Drayne, an aide to Sen. Kennedy.

August 24.—The North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris peace talks rejects South Vietnam's offer to release 600 seriously ill and wounded North Vietnamese prisoners of war, characterizing it as a "well-known tactic."

August 26.—President Thieu, acting under the special powers granted him in June, issues a new anti-corruption decree for South Vietnam which bans the giving or taking of bribes, embezzlement and the abuse of official power. Penalties range from the death sentence to indeterminate prison terms, fines and confiscation of property.

August 28.—Defense Department sources say that a small Chinese minesweeper entered Haiphong harbor about a week ago but that it had done nothing about ridding the harbor of mines placed there by the United States.

August 29.—President Nixon announces that 12,000 additional troops will be withdrawn from Vietnam by December 1, reducing the total U.S. troop strength there to 27,000 men. At a news conference, he says that he does not intend to halt the bombing in Vietnam before a negotiated settlement is reached, but that it is "quite ridiculous" to think that the bombing will still be going on in 2 or 3 years.

August 29.—The *Washington Post* reports that, according to "highly placed Laotian sources," Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphanouvong rejected Laotian Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's proposal for conducting peace negotiations on a two-track basis, separating military and political issues.

September 2.—The North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry announces that it will release 3 captured American pilots held as prisoners of war and that they will be turned over to "a U.S. social organization animated with good will and a desire to bring about an early end to the U.S. war in Vietnam." David Dellinger and Cora Weiss, co-chairmen of the group through whom the release was to be made, say that if the pilots are used to "slander" North Vietnam or to train U.S. pilots for bombing raids, they will be the last POWs released until the end of the war.

1972—Continued

September 7.—South Korea announces that it will withdraw its 37,000 troops remaining in South Vietnam beginning in December, and that the pullout will be completed by spring of 1973.

September 7.—The *New York Times* reports that according to an August 22 announcement by South Vietnamese Premier Tran Thien Khiem, popular democratic elections of hamlet officials will be abolished. Under the new system, to be set up within 2 months, the 44 province chiefs, appointed by President Thieu, will in turn appoint the hamlet officials.

September 11.—The Provisional Revolutionary Government makes what it calls an "important statement" of peace terms in a Hanoi broadcast which is later endorsed by North Vietnam. The broadcast says that the PRG "is prepared to reach agreements to the effect that neither a Communist regime nor a U.S. stooge regime shall be imposed in South Vietnam."

September 11.—The Harris Survey reports that in a poll of 1,600 "likely voters" conducted August 30–September 1, a 55%–32% majority support continued heavy bombing of North Vietnam and a 64%–22% majority is in favor of mining North Vietnamese harbors.

September 15.—Fourteen of South Vietnam's 42 daily newspapers fold due to inability of their publishers to deposit funds with the government as a guarantee that censorship fines will be paid. Four of the 6 antigovernment newspapers are among those forced to shut down.

September 15.—South Vietnamese troops recapture the Citadel and the rest of Quangtri city, U.S. and South Vietnamese military spokesmen say.

September 17.—Two U.S. Navy lieutenants and an Air Force major held by North Vietnam are released in a formal ceremony in Hanoi prior to a tour of bombed areas. They are accompanied by 4 U.S. anti-war activists and two of the men are reunited with members of their families.

September 21.—The U.S. command in Saigon announces that, for the first week since March 1, 1965, there are no Americans killed in action in Vietnam. The weekly U.S. casualty figures are the lowest since the Command began keeping records on January 1, 1965. Total Americans killed since that time stands at 45,857.

September 28.—The 3 U.S. pilots released on September 17 by the North Vietnamese land at Kennedy International Airport in New York, having arrived from Hanoi via China, the Soviet Union, and Denmark.

October 5.—President Nixon says in a news conference that the upcoming presidential election will have no bearing on the timing of a peace settlement in Vietnam.

October 10.—Democratic presidential candidate George McGovern, in a televised speech, outlines his 7-point plan for disengagement from Vietnam. The plan includes: halting of bombing and total withdrawal from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia within 90 days; acceptance of North Vietnam's reported 1971 proposal to return POWs simultaneously with U.S. withdrawal; and closing U.S. bases in Thailand after release of POWs.

October 11.—Defense Secretary Laird says at a Pentagon news conference, that Senator McGovern's plan to end the war in Vietnam is "a program of unconditional surrender." He accuses McGovern of undermining the Vietnamization program and the peace talks in Paris "in favor of a pure giveaway program with guarantees for absolutely nothing."

October 11.—The French diplomatic mission in Hanoi is heavily damaged by U.S. bombing, and the chief of mission is killed. France issues a protest to the United States concerning the incident, and the United States apologizes for the damages and casualties, although Secretary Laird implies that the cause may not be U.S. bombs.

October 12.—Henry Kissinger returns to Washington after an unprecedented 4-day series of private talks with Le Duc Tho in Paris. Neither U.S. nor North Vietnamese spokesmen divulged any details of the latest talks.

October 14.—A delegation of Pathet Lao arrives in Vientiane from Hanoi to begin negotiations on October 17 with the Laotian government.

October 22.—The United States informs North Vietnam that bombing will be restricted to those areas south of the 20th parallel, according to an announcement by Henry Kissinger in his news conference of October 26.

October 23.—Henry Kissinger returns to Washington after 5 days of discussions in Saigon with President Thieu regarding the latest Hanoi proposals for a negotiated settlement. In a subsequent address to his nation, President Thieu attacks most of the political proposals but does not condemn the possibility of a cease-fire.

October 26.—At a news conference, Henry Kissinger confirms a Radio Hanoi broadcast which announces that a breakthrough had been achieved at the Paris peace talks on October 8. He outlines the main points in the draft agreement reached with North Vietnam, including: a cease-fire in place in South Vietnam; withdrawal of U.S. forces within 60 days; prohibition of reinforcement of troops; one-to-one replacement of existing military equipment; repatriation of military and civilian POWs within 60 days; release of and accounting for all U.S. POWs and MIAs throughout Indochina; establishment of an "administrative structure," the Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, to help maintain the cease-fire and supervise elections to be agreed upon through negotiations between the Vietcong and Saigon; setting up a 4-sided commission to guarantee terms of the agreement, and an international commission to which disagreements could be referred. Mr. Kissinger says that the remaining points of dispute could be cleared up after one more negotiating session of 3–4 days duration. Hanoi asserts that the agreement was to be signed by October 31.

October 30.—In a speech before the South Vietnamese Senate, Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam says that the North Vietnamese must agree to withdraw their troops from the South and recognize the demilitarized zone before South Vietnam could sign a peace agreement. He also objects to the proposed Council of Reconciliation as a "coalition government in disguise."

1972—Continued

November 1.—In a radio address marking South Vietnam's national day, President Thieu reiterates his objections to the draft agreement worked out by the United States and North Vietnam. His main criticisms are directed against the provision that U.S. troops would withdraw from South Vietnam but North Vietnamese troops would not have to withdraw across the demilitarized zone; and the 3-segment "administrative structure" to preside over the political settlement, which he characterizes as a "dictatorial regime."

November 4.—Cambodian President Lon Nol, in a radio broadcast, offers complete amnesty to the estimated 30,000 members of the Khmer Rouge, who have been fighting as allies of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. The president offers the rebels positions in the Cambodian Army, or jobs and land if they should desire to return to civilian status, and announces the formation of a committee, to be headed by himself, to handle problems of reconciliation and reconstruction after an Indochina cease-fire.

November 8.—Cambodian Foreign Minister Long Boret, after consultation with Secretary of State Rogers on the progress of negotiations toward an Indochina settlement, expresses reservations about North Vietnamese compliance with the terms of a possible peace agreement. "The problem for us is the sincerity of the North Vietnamese on the one side and efficiency of the supervisory arrangement on the other," he says.

November 11.—The Longbinh base, headquarters for the USARV since 1965, is turned over to the South Vietnamese Army, symbolizing the end of direct U.S. Army participation in the Vietnam war. Remaining in Vietnam are around 19,000 Army personnel in non-combat positions; 10,000 Air Force personnel, 1,300 Marines, 1,800 sailors, and 100 Coast Guardsmen.

November 12.—The U.S. Command announces that bombing of North Vietnam is the heaviest since restriction of targets to those below the 20th parallel. Tactical strikes are increased in order to halt the flow of fresh war materiel being sent by the North Vietnamese into South Vietnam.

November 15.—The State Department announces that Canada, Hungary, Indonesia and Poland have agreed in principle to participate in the new international commission to supervise the expected cease-fire in Vietnam.

November 20.—Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho begin another round of secret negotiations near Paris.

November 20.—The South Vietnamese Senate passes a resolution, 36–8, saying that South Vietnam should not adopt a peace agreement unless all North Vietnamese troops are withdrawn, the demilitarized zone is reestablished, and South Vietnam itself approves the agreement. This statement of support for President Thieu's position follows by 3 weeks a similarly-worded resolution approved by the lower house of the National Assembly.

November 20.—Defense Department spokesman Jerry Friedheim says that the accelerated three-week supply build-up in South Vietnam is essentially completed, except for "a few things" still on the way, and that U.S. military aid will revert to regular levels. Included in the new equipment are about 600 planes and helicopters, making the South Vietnamese air force the fourth largest in the world.

November 25.—After six meetings, Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho recess their secret negotiations but announce that talks will be resumed on December 4. No announcements are made concerning what progress may have been made.

December 4.—Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho resume their private peace talks near Paris.

December 9.—The Soviet Union and North Vietnam conclude a new agreement for economic and military aid in unspecified amounts. The public announcement of the pact says that "large-scale deliveries of goods, equipment and other property" for development of North Vietnam's economy will be made, and that the USSR will "give necessary assistance in the strengthening of its defense capacity."

December 13.—Henry Kissinger returns to Washington after a series of private talks with Le Duc Tho. Talks on the "technical" level are scheduled to continue.

December 16.—Henry Kissinger holds a press conference to clarify the status of the private peace negotiations with North Vietnam. He says that the talks have failed to reach an agreement because of changes and reintroduction of previously settled issues by Hanoi. Describing the agreement as "99 percent settled," he says that both parties will "remain in contact through messages" and will "then decide whether or when to meet again."

December 16.—Thai Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn says that he has given approval to the United States to move military headquarters from Saigon to Nakorn Phanom air base, located 60 miles from North Vietnam, in the event of a cease-fire in Vietnam. He says that some U.S. troops will be withdrawn but that upon arrival in Thailand of those troops currently in Vietnam, the total number in Thailand would remain approximately the same, about 45,000.

December 18.—After a 2-month cessation of bombing north of the 20th parallel, the White House orders resumption of bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area and the laying of new mines in ports north of the parallel. Press secretary Ronald Zeigler announces that bombing and mining will continue "until such time as a settlement is arrived at," and that the United States will not "allow the peace talks to be used as a cover for another offensive [by North Vietnam]."

December 27.—On the eve of the expiration date of his special powers, President Thieu signs a law that requires that each South Vietnamese political party create branches in at least one-fourth of the villages in half the provinces, and in every city, within 3 months; run candidates in all National Assembly elections and win at least 20% of the seats, or be dissolved; and, if running candidates for President, win at least 25% of the total vote.

December 29.—The Swedish foreign ministry confirms that the State Department has "expressed a wish" that arrival in the United States of the new Swedish ambassador be delayed. Sweden had already been notified that the acting U.S. charge d'affaires in Sweden would delay his return there from a vacation. These actions follow a strongly-worded criticism by Swedish Premier Palme of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

1972—Continued

December 30.—In a news conference, deputy Presidential press secretary Gerald L. Warren announces that negotiations between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho will be resumed on January 8, 1973, that technical talks will be resumed January 2, and that the President has ordered a halt to bombing above the 20th parallel.

1973

January 2.—Pentagon spokesman Jerry Friedheim confirms that damage has been done to the Bach Mai hospital and Gia Lam Airport in Hanoi during the heavy December air raids over North Vietnam, but says that the damage has been neither massive nor intentional.

January 2.—Jean-Pierre Debris and Andre Menras, two Frenchmen released after 2½ years of imprisonment in Saigon, say in a Paris press conference that South Vietnamese authorities are reclassifying political prisoners as common criminals in order to avoid having to release them when the cease-fire comes into effect.

January 2.—The House Democratic Caucus votes 154–75 to declare its policy in favor of ending U.S. military operations in Vietnam "immediately," subject to "arrangements necessary to insure the safe withdrawal of American troops and the return of American prisoners of war." The resolution, sponsored by Rep. Nedzi, also criticizes bombing of North Vietnam as "unprecedented and reprehensible."

January 4.—Senate Democrats, by a 36–12 vote, pass a resolution sponsored by Senator Kennedy calling for all U.S. operations in Indochina to be stopped "immediately" subject to arrangements for the release of prisoners of war and an accounting for missing in action.

January 4.—A Hanoi radio broadcast says that a survey by a special investigating committee shows results of 10 days of heavy U.S. bombing of Hanoi beginning December 18 to be 1,318 persons killed and 1,261 wounded.

January 8.—Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird says that "from a military standpoint, the Vietnamization program has been completed," and that with the arrival of $5.3 billion worth of new equipment, the South Vietnamese armed forces are "fully capable" of providing security against the North Vietnamese within the borders of South Vietnam.

January 8.—Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho resume their private negotiations for a cease-fire, meeting for 4½ hours in Paris.

January 15.—White House press secretary Ziegler announces that, due to "progress made in the negotiations between Dr. Kissinger and special adviser Le Duc Tho," all bombing, shelling and mining of North Vietnam has been suspended by the President. He says that Kissinger will return to Paris in the "relatively near future."

January 16.—For the first time in 14 weeks of negotiations, the Pathet Lao delegation leaves Vientiane for consultations in their headquarters at Samneua, in northern Laos.

January 18.—White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler reads a joint announcement by the United States and North Vietnam that

Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho will resume private talks on January 23 "for the purpose of completing the text of an agreement."

January 18.—The *Washington Post* reports South Vietnamese and American sources as having said that President Thieu has given province chiefs authority to make political arrests and to "shoot troublemakers" after the cease-fire. The sources say that those arrested will be charged with criminal rather than political offenses, and that the only condition placed upon arrests will be to inform local prosecutors within 24 hours.

January 23.—In a televised address, President Nixon announces that Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho have initialed an agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam, to be formally signed and to take effect on January 27. He says that all the "goals that we considered essential for peace with honor" have been met in the agreement, including return of American POWs within 60 days, an internationally supervised cease-fire, and withdrawal of remaining U.S. forces within 60 days.

January 24.—Henry Kissinger holds a news conference in which he describes the provisions of the agreement reached with North Vietnam, and the protocols to the agreement.

January 27.—In accord with Article 19 of the peace agreement, the United States formally proposes that the 12-member conference on maintaining peace in Vietnam be convened on February 26. The following parties are scheduled to participate: China, France, the Soviet Union, Britain, Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, Poland, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, the Vietcong, and the United States. UN Secretary General Waldheim will also be asked to take part.

January 28.—William Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, says that U.S. planes are continuing to bomb Communist positions and supply lines in Laos and that bombing will continue until a cease-fire is reached there. He says that a "fairly significant Communist offensive" is occurring in Laos and that the terms of the Vietnam cease-fire do not prohibit bombing in Laos or Cambodia.

January 28.—Cambodian President Lon Nol orders his government troops to suspend military activities and calls on North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces to stop fighting and leave Cambodian territory. He also appeals to all Cambodians fighting against his government to cease hostile actions and join "against the expansionist and imperialist aims of our enemies," giving a promise of no punishment.

January 28.—William Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, says that U.S. planes are continuing to bomb Communist positions and supply lines in Laos and indicates that bombing will continue until a cease-fire is reached there. He says that a "fairly significant Communist offensive" is occurring in Laos, and that the terms of the Vietnam cease-fire do not prohibit bombing in Laos or Cambodia.

January 31.—In a news conference, President Nixon announces that Henry Kissinger will go to Hanoi to make efforts on behalf of a more stable peace in Vietnam and to lay the groundwork for reconstruction of the area. He says that while the agreement is designed to bring a lengthy peace to Indochina, "incentives to peace" will be necessary to ensure that it lasts. He adds that he will attempt to

persuade Congress to agree to an Indochina-wide program of reconstruction.

January 31.—Cambodian Information Minister Keam Reth says that since the halt in offensive military operations, "promising" contacts have been established between pro- and anti-Government forces. In Hanoi, Prince Norodom Sihanouk says that his forces will "not launch offensive actions" due to a policy of "reevaluation" that envisions restoring good relations with the United States, but that Cambodian problems will not be solved without the departure of "Lon Nol and his clique of traitors."

January 31.—The first in a series of private peace talks between the Vientiane Government and the Pathet Lao is held. Negotiating teams say that subcommissions will be named to deal separately with political and military issues. Previously, the Pathet Lao insisted that these two aspects of the talks could not be separated.

February 1.—The North Vietnamese government issues a statement on Cambodia expressing support for Prince Sihanouk's "correct position," which was characterized as "peaceful, independent, and neutral," and stating that "Cambodia's internal affairs should be settled by the Cambodian people themselves without foreign interference." The Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia is the "sole legitimate and genuine government of the Cambodian people," according to Hanoi.

February 5.—Fifty U.S. Seventh Fleet ships arrive at the Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines for mine-clearing operations in North Vietnam. A team of U.S. Navy demolition experts meet in Haiphong with North Vietnamese officials to discuss plans for clearing away mines and reopening North Vietnamese waterways.

February 6.—Representatives of the South Vietnamese Government and the Vietcong Provisional Revolutionary Government meet alone in Paris for the first time, in order to prepare for the political negotiations called for in the cease-fire agreement.

February 7.—A South Vietnamese Government spokesman says that 10,600 Vietcong prisoners of war were released in the past two weeks, and that all of them applied in writing for permission to enter the "open arms" program. Permission was granted by President Thieu on January 25, prior to the effective date of the cease-fire, so failure to send them back into the Vietcong military ranks was not a violation of the peace agreement, according to the spokesman.

February 7.—Canada extends formal diplomatic recognition to North Vietnam, thus giving it "equal diplomatic status" with South Vietnam.

February 8.—Secretary of State William Rogers appears before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and gives generally optimistic report of developments since the cease-fire went into effect. He describes the President's proposed aid to North Vietnam, as an "investment for peace".

February 11.—Lieut. Gen. Ngo Dzu, the head of the South Vietnamese delegation of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, is removed from his post because of "physical reasons," and is replaced by Lieut. Gen. Du Quoc Dong. General Dzu was dis-

missed as commander of Military Region II in 1972 after a series of combat losses.

February 12.—The first American prisoners of war are released. A group of 116 men held in North Vietnam and 27 men held by the Vietcong in South Vietnam are released in separate proceedings and are promptly flown to Clark Air Base in the Philippines. In addition, 140 South Vietnamese prisoners are returned by the North Vietnamese, and 250 North Vietnamese and Vietcong are returned by the South Vietnamese.

February 14.—In a joint communique issued after a 4-day visit by Henry Kissinger to Hanoi, the United States and North Vietnam announce that they have agreed to establish a Joint Economic Commission to develop economic relations between the two countries and that they have "exchanged views on the manner in which the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to post-war economic reconstruction in North Vietnam."

February 15.—A Pentagon spokesman announces that air strikes against North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troop movements in Laos have increased by 100 a day from an average of 280 a day the previous week. The reason given is "increased enemy activity and further requests for assistance by the royal Lao Government."

February 15.—Secretary Rogers, in a State Department news conference, again acknowledges that getting Congressional approval for aid to North Vietnam will be difficult, but that he expects the Congress to "react responsibly." He says that the Administration will prefer to channel such aid through an international agency, but that direct U.S. grants may be necessary.

February 20.—The Cambodian Information Minister says that his government is in the process of negotiating with non-Communist opposition parties to set up a council of national reconciliation.

February 21.—The Pathet Lao and the government of Premier Souvanna Phouma sign a cease-fire agreement providing for an equal sharing of power. The agreement calls for formation of a 3-part government composed of Communists, neutralists and rightists, thirty days after the cease-fire takes effect. All foreign forces would leave Laos 90 days after formation of the 3-part government.

March 2.—In a news conference, President Nixon says that "the key thing" in evaluating prospects for a successful cease-fire in Laos and Cambodia is the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from those countries. Regarding aid to North Vietnam, he indicates that any funds for such purposes would "not come out of the domestic side of the budget" but would rather be "covered by the existing levels for the budget which we have in for national security purposes."

March 2.—Participants in the 5-day, 12-nation conference on Vietnam sign an agreement in Paris, obliging themselves to respect the Vietnam cease-fire agreement scrupulously and to do nothing to upset it. Signatories include the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and 9 others. Procedures are established for reconvening the conference in case of violations of the cease-fire, and parties are called upon to respect the "independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and neutrality of Cambodia and Laos," as stipulated in the Vietnam agreement.

42-911 O - 75 - 12

1973—Continued

March 4.—The second group of U.S. fliers released by North Vietnam arrives at the Clark Air Base in the Philippines. The total number of Americans released thus far stands at 242, leaving 234 men in Communist captivity.

March 8.—The United States and North Vietnam name the members of the joint commission to discuss economic relations between the two countries, they say that the first session will occur in one week.

March 15.—At a White House press conference, President Nixon says that he is more concerned with North Vietnamese infiltration than with cease-fire violations. U.S. "concern" over infiltration of weapons has been conveyed to North Vietnam and to "other interested parties," he says, and "based on my actions over the past four years, . . . the North Vietnamese should not lightly disregard such expressions of concern, when they are made, with regard to a violation."

March 17.—A Cambodian air force T–28 fighter plane drops two bombs on the presidential palace in Phnom Penh, killing 43 people but not injuring the President. The pilot of the plane, So Potra, ex-husband of one of former Prince Sihanouk's daughters, escapes into Communist-held territory.

March 18.—President Lon Nol, acting under a state of emergency and siege, orders suspension of publication of all newspapers except those published by the Government, puts under house arrest a number of members of the former royal family, and orders all teachers, who have been striking for a month, to resume work.

March 19.—Pheng Phongsavan, Lao Interior Minister, announces that Prince Souvanna Phouma has sent a message to Pathet Lao leader, Prince Souphanouvong, urging quick settlement of remaining problems in implementing the cease-fire. The chief Pathet Lao negotiator, Phomi Vongvichit, has still not returned to Vientiane from Samneua. The Interior Minister speculates that one reason for Mr. Phomi's long absence is that "the North Vietnamese may want to induce the Pathet Lao to stall agreements as long as they can. Once a government is formed, the 60-day period begins in which the North Vietnamese will have to leave."

March 22.—One day before the March 23 deadline for forming a new provisional coalition government for Laos, the head of the Pathet Lao negotiating team Gen. Phoune Sipraseuth, leaves Vientiane. The Pathet Lao spokesman says that he and Phoumi Vongvichit, Secretary General of the Pathet Lao's Neo Lao Hak Xat party, will return only after two subcommissions negotiating the terms of military and political protocols have made more substantive progress. Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma says that progress can occur only after Mr. Phoumi Vongvichit returns.

March 22.—A Cambodian government spokesman says that former Premier Sisowath Sirik Matak has been placed under "protective" confinement at his home. Information Minister Kam Reth denies that he is under house arrest.

March 23.—Secretary of Defense Richardson, appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, asserts that the President has constitutional authority to continue bombing Cambodia, and that

the bombing will not have to stop once all American troops leave Vietnam. Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green testifies before a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee that the bombing is "related to our desire to see a cease-fire brought about in Cambodia. . . ."

March 28.—In an address broadcast to the nation, President Nixon says that "we have achieved our goal" in Vietnam, although there are still some "problem areas": accounting for all MIA's in Indochina, compliance with provisions of the agreement on Laos and Cambodia, and infiltration from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. He says that North Vietnamese leaders "should have no doubt as to the consequences if they fail to comply with the agreement."

March 29.—The last 67 American prisoners of war held by North Vietnam fly out of Hanoi.

March 29.—Gen. Frederick Weyand presides over a ceremony furling the flag of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, as the last American troops leave South Vietnam. U.S. personnel remaining in Vietnam under the Defense Attache Office fall into three categories, for each of which a ceiling is fixed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 50 U.S. military personnel, 1,200 DOD direct hire civilians, and 5,500 DOD contractor personnel. In addition, 183 AID and Foreign Service personnel remain under the Office of the Special Assistant to the Ambassador for Field Operations, performing some duties previously carried out by the CORDS program.

April 1.—U.S. Army Capt. Robert T. White, the last known U.S. prisoner of the Indochina war, arrives at Clark Air Base in the Philippines, the 588th American freed by Indochinese Communist forces since the prisoner exchanges began on February 12.

April 3.—After 2 days of talks in San Clemente, Presidents Nixon and Thieu issue a joint communique. The statement charges North Vietnam with infiltration of men and weapons into South Vietnam and says that continued violations "would call for appropriately vigorous reactions." Continued economic assistance is pledged to South Vietnam for the current year, and President Nixon expresses "his intention to seek congressional support for a longer range program for the economic development of South Vietnam now that the war has ended." In addition, the communique says that all of Indochina will require external assistance.

April 3.—Appearing before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, Secretary Richardson says that the United States will not consider renewing the bombing of Vietnam unless the North Vietnamese commit a "flagrant" violation of the cease-fire, such as a full-scale invasion of the South.

April 4.—The Cambodian Parliament votes to extend for 6 months the state of emergency proclaimed after the March 17 bombing of the presidential palace. Brig. Gen. Lon Non, brother of President Lon Nol, resigns his Cabinet position, but is expected to remain Lon Nol's closest advisor and the commander of the army's third division.

April 5.—In a speech before the National Press Club, President Thieu says that he will "never, never" ask U.S. troops to return to

Vietnam, and that his Government can survive after the cease-fire without continued American air support, even if North Vietnam begins a new invasion. Also, he expresses confidence in South Vietnam's economic recovery after an initial period of assistance from abroad and asserts that there are no political prisoners in South Vietnam's prisons.

April 5.—The Senate votes 88–3 to bar any U.S. aid to North Vietnam unless specifically authorized by Congress. The vote is taken on an amendment sponsored by Senator Harry Byrd to the dollar-devaluation bill.

April 7.—White House Press Secretary Ziegler announces that President Nixon has sent Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr. to Southeast Asia to make a "general assessment of the situation" there. Ziegler says there are "no plans to introduce ground forces into Southeast Asia."

April 7.—All 9 persons aboard an ICCS helicopter are killed as it is shot down by Vietcong fire over South Vietnam. The Vietcong claim that the craft had wandered off course.

April 9.—All helicopter flights over South Vietnam by the International Commission for Control and Supervision are suspended as a result of attacks on 3 flights in the past 2 days. A Canadian official charges that the helicopter which crashed killing 9 persons was struck by a heat-seeking missile. In Ottawa, Foreign Secretary Mitchell Sharp says that Canada will withdraw from the ICCS unless conditions "improve very substantially."

April 9.—In a speech broadcast by Radio Hanoi on April 10, Prince Sihanouk says that under no circumstances will the insurgent groups in Cambodia accept a cease-fire with the government of President Lon Nol and that the antigovernment forces have been provided by North Vietnam and China with enough weapons to continue fighting until 1975. Prince Sihanouk also denies that the insurgents are split into a number of groups but rather asserts that they are held together by the political program of the National United Front of Cambodia.

April 10.—Defense Secretary Richardson, after testifying before the House Armed Services Committee in closed session, says that the amount of Soviet and Chinese arms shipped to North Vietnam will largely determine how long fighting will go on in Cambodia. He states that the Russians and Chinese "could unquestionably exercise influence" over the flow of weapons that go to Cambodia through North Vietnam.

April 10.—Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green in a speech before the Overseas Writers Club says that the Cambodian insurgents are split into three groups: a group loyal to Hanoi whose leadership was trained in North Vietnam; the Khmer Rouge, an indigenous anti-Sihanouk group; and a small group, the Khmer Rumbah, loyal to Prince Sihanouk and oriented toward Peking.

April 12.—Dr. Roger Shields, Pentagon official in charge of the prisoner recovery operation, says that none of the 1,359 Americans listed as missing in action are technically considered prisoners. He states: "We have no indication at this time that there are any Americans missing alive in Indochina."

April 13.—Michael Gauvin, head of the Canadian delegation to the International Commission of Control and Supervision, for the first time backs U.S. charges that North Vietnam is violating the Paris agreement by sending fresh troops into South Vietnam. He also says that the Polish and Hungarian delegations have blocked investigation of charges that North Vietnam has installed missiles in Northwestern South Vietnam.

April 13.—Prince Sihanouk in Peking shows a film of his recent trip to Communist-held areas of Cambodia. The film contains scenes of Sihanouk meeting with the three main leaders of the insurgent movement, who had been reported to be dead by the Lon Nol government: Vice-Premier Khieu Samphan, Information Minister Hu Nim, and Interior Minister Hou Yon.

April 14.—President Thieu returns to Saigon after a 15-day visit to the United States, Italy, West Germany, France, South Korea and Taiwan. He says that the Thieu-Nixon communique let the Communists know that "adequate and strong measures will be taken" if they continue to violate the Paris agreement; that the Nixon Doctrine "would continue to be a policy base for Vietnam during peacetime, in order to help South Vietnam maintain peace, independence and freedom."

April 16.—At a hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees, Robert H. Nooter, assistant administrator of the AID, announces that the United States has for the first time committed funds—a total of $1.15 million—for humanitarian assistance to refgees in Cambodia. Wells Klein, of the American Council for Nationalities Service, estimates that there are 500,000 registered refugees, 500,000 non-registered refugees, 250,000 Vietnamese who fled Cambodia to South Vietnam, and 500,000 displaced military dependents in Cambodia, in addition to a possible 1 million persons dislocated in Communist-controlled areas.

April 17.—Cambodian President Lon Nol announces that Prime Minister Hang Thun Hak has resigned as a "nationalistic gesture" and that a new, 11-member high political council will be formed consisting of important political figures and representatives of various political parties. "Senior government officials" report that the move was made to comply with U.S. pressure conveyed during the visit of President Nixon's emissary, Gen. Alexander M. Haig.

April 17.—The U.S. Pacific Command announces that B–52 bombing of Laos has occurred for the second day, after a 7-week pause, "at the request of the Royal Lao government." Defense Secretary Richardson refuses to elaborate on U.S. policy in Laos, repeating a previous statement that North Vietnam violated the Laotian cease-fire by attacking Tha Vieng, southeast of the Plain of Jars. For the first time since the Vietnam cease-fire, Canada openly critizes U.S. actions, saying that both the United States and North Vietnam are violating provisions of the accord.

April 18.—President Lon Nol consults with Sirik Matak and In Tam, two of the most prominent opposition figures, and asks them to join a new 11-member High Political Council. In Tam says in an interview that he and Sirik Matak have refused, and have counterproposed that a 4-member "organ of decision" be instituted instead.

1973—Continued

April 19.—The Pentagon announces that U.S. mine clearing operations in North Vietnam have been suspended for the second time since the Vietnam cease-fire in response to continued Communist cease-fire violations in South Vietnam and Laos. Hanoi says that its Foreign Ministry has issued a statement denouncing the suspension as a "blatant violation" of the Paris accord.

April 20.—U.S. Embassy sources in Phnom Penh say that there is no verifiable evidence that the 40,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops in Cambodia are engaged in combat activities in Cambodia. Defense Department spokesman Jerry Friedheim, when asked whether the embassy's version or Secretary Richardson's version is true, replies that North Vietnamese are fighting alongside as well as training and advising the Cambodian insurgents.

April 23.—The State Department claims that information on the nationality of insurgents in Cambodia reported by the American Embassy in Phnom Penh was "somewhat out of context" and that the Khmer insurgents are being "trained, supplied and supported by the North Vietnamese army and also perhaps the VC, from whom they also draw some of their cadre," and who "generally man the crew-served weapons which are being used in support of the insurgents."

April 24.—The State Department makes public the texts of North Vietnamese and U.S. notes distributed to the countries that participated in the Paris conference on Vietnam. The North Vietnamese note contends that the United States and South Vietnam have "brazenly and systematically violated many essential provisions" of the cease-fire agreement. The U.S. note constitutes a rebuttal of Hanoi's charges and makes counter-accusations that Hanoi has violated the agreement.

April 24.—A four-man council, composed of President Lon Nol and three members of what had been his opposition, is formally instituted to govern Cambodia. Cheng Heng, In Tam, and Sirik Matak announced that the President accepted the conditions they had set for their participation: equal sharing of power, and suspension of the National Assembly.

April 28.—Prince Sihanouk tells newsmen in Peking that his forces will not stage an assault on the encircled city of Phnom Penh but will "completely isolate Phnom Penh and wait until it falls like a ripe fruit."

April 30.—President Thieu tells leaders of his Democratic party that President Nixon has "renewed his pledge for generous assistance to the Republic of Vietnam and that he [will] retaliate when the Communists violated the cease-fire." He also announces that he will reorganize the South Vietnamese government "along military lines."

April 30.—Gen. Lon Non, brother of Cambodian President Lon Nol, leaves Cambodia on what is widely seen as an enforced exile trip to Paris and the United States. Gen. Lon Non denies that his departure is in any way the result of American pressure.

April 30.—Secretary of State Rogers appears before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and delivers a legal memorandum prepared by State Department advisors justifying the President's authority to bomb Cambodia.

May 1.—President Nixon's military and economic aid bill presented to Congress omits any reconstruction assistance for North Vietnam. He says that aid to North Vietnam will be considered "if and when" such time as "all parties adhere fully to the Paris agreements."

May 3.—By a 31–14 vote, the House Appropriations Committee rejects a proposal to deny the Defense Department authority to transfer $500 million within the Defense budget to pay for the bombing of Cambodia. The vote comes during consideration of H.R. 7447. The committee reduces the Administration's request to $430 million, and the issue remains to be settled on the House floor. By an 18–3 vote, the Democratic Policy and Steering Committee adopts a resolution urging House Democrats to delete the spending authority.

May 3.—The Pathet Lao issue an 8-section proposal. Cabinet posts would be divided into 3 levels of importance, with each side sharing equally in each level; a Pathet Lao Vice Premier would serve under Souvanna Phouma; the president of the provisional Political Consultative Council would be a Pathet Lao; Vientiane and Luang Prabang would be "neutralized" with Pathet Lao troops stationed and Vientiane Government troops withdrawn, and a mixed police force created; a "provisional" demarcation line would be fixed between the two sides; civil rights and democratic procedures would be guaranteed; foreign troops would be withdrawn and prisoners and refugees would be returned.

May 7.—Defense Secretary tells the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that congressional refusal to allow transfer of money for Cambodian bombing from other parts of the defense budget would not result in a cessation of bombing in Cambodia but rather would have an impact "across the board on operations of our baseline forces."

May 8.—Defense Secretary Richardson, appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, says that U.S. bombing of Cambodia was motivated solely by a desire to maintain an independent government that could keep the country from falling into North Vietnamese hands. Secretary of State Rogers, appearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee, likewise says that "the choice before us today is whether to allow a military takeover of Cambodia by North Vietnam and its allies or insists on observation of a negotiated peace."

May 8.—Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Dennis J. Doolin reports that U.S. planes dropped 82,837 tons of bombs on Cambodia in over 12,000 strikes, from January 27 to April 30, at a cost of $159.5 million. In Laos, 63,082 tons were dropped at a cost of $99.2 million for the same period, he says.

May 9.—The Pentagon supplies details on U.S. bombing of Laos and Cambodia between January 27 and April 30. In Laos, where the major campaign occurred before February 22, total cost was over $99 million and 8,985 sorties dropped 63,082 tons of bombs. In Cambodia, the cost was over $159 million and 12,136 sorties dropped 82,837 tons of ordnance.

May 10.—The House passes H.R. 7447—second supplemental appropriations bill for FY 1973—after agreeing (194–187) to an

amendment deleting language which would authorize transfer of $430 million by the Department of Defense, and agreeing (224–172) to an amendment prohibiting the use of funds by the Department of Defense to finance combat activities in or over Cambodia by U.S. forces. An amendment prohibiting the use of funds for reconstruction aid to North Vietnam is also agreed to, by voice vote.

May 11.—Cambodia's four-man governing council takes a step towards formation of a new cabinet by naming In Tam as Premier-designate and asking him to form a cabinet, which would be subject to approval by President Lon Nol. The country has been without cabinet ministers to head government departments since April 18.

May 14.—Thailand's Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn says that his country's military facilities will continue to be made available to the United States, "despite all serious disadvantages we have to suffer," as long as there continue to be violations of the cease-fire agreements in Indochina. "We consider the present precarious situation in . . . [Laos and Cambodia] to directly affect the security and stability in Thailand and of the entire region," he says.

May 14.—The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations orders favorably reported S. 1248—State Department authorizations—with a committee amendment prohibiting expenditures for U.S. military forces in hostilities in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia, unless specifically authorized by Congress.

May 15.—The House passes (266–123) H.R. 6768—providing for U.S. participation in the U.N. Environmental Program—after agreeing to an amendment forbidding the use of funds in the bill for reconstruction aid to North Vietnam.

May 16.—Cambodian Premier In Tam announces formation of a new 24-member Cabinet under himself.

May 16.—White House Press Secretary Ziegler reads a message from President Nixon accusing the Congress of "action that could severely undermine" the restoration of peace in Indochina. He says that congressional action to halt the bombing of Cambodia was harmful because it came "on the very eve of negotiations to achieve compliance" with the Paris agreement.

May 21.—Cambodian Information Minister Sum Chhum tells a news conference in Phnom Penh that his government is taking steps toward talks with insurgent elements, but that "wherever the aggressors of North Vietnam and the Vietcong are still in our republic, it is very difficult to have negotiations between Khmer and Khmer."

May 23.—Henry Kissinger, leaving Paris after a week of intensive talks with Le Duc Tho, says that "significant progress" has been made and that another series of talks will begin on June 6.

May 29.—Canada announces that it will pull its 280 members out of the International Commission for Control and Supervision in Vietnam, by the end of July. External Affairs Secretary Mitchell Sharp says that the Canadian concept of the ICCS as an "impartial fact-finding body" is not shared by other members, notably Poland and Hungary, who consider themselves to be "representatives of North Vietnam."

May 29.—At a news conference in Morocco, Prince Sihanouk offers to discuss "peace with honor" with President Nixon and immediately reestablish normal diplomatic ties with the United States, but he rejects the idea of talks with President Lon Nol.

May 30.—The Cambodian government releases 30 people, including members of the royal family, who were arrested in the wake of the March 17 bombing incident.

May 31.—The International Commission of Control and Supervision adjourns indefinitely pending settlement of a procedural dispute, but Canadian officials say that it will continue to function in the countryside. The dispute involves Polish and Hungarian blocking of consideration of Canadian and Indonesian reports that interviews with Communist prisoners had documented North Vietnamese infiltration in South Vietnam.

May 31.—The Senate passes H.R. 7447, after adopting (63–19) a Foreign Relations Committee (Eagleton) amendment adding a new section 305 to bar the use of any funds to support combat activities in, over, or from off the shores of Cambodia or Laos; a committee amendment to include Laos in the prohibition against the use of funds to support combat activities by U.S. forces; and a committee amendment prohibiting transfer of funds for purposes of supporting combat activities of U.S. forces in Cambodia and Laos. Conferees are appointed.

June 4.—Former South Vietnamese chief of state Duong Van Minh urges the Thieu government to "abolish all laws and measures infringing the basic freedoms of man," and to immediately release all political prisoners, as steps necessary so that the people of South Vietnam will see "the goodwill of the two opposing sides of South Vietnam." The Thieu administration issues a denial that it holds any political prisoners but acknowledges restrictions on individual liberties.

June 4.—The North Vietnamese News Agency reports that the National Liberation Front's Central Committee president, Nguyen Huu Tho, told a Hanoi newspaper that the Vietcong "stand for the establishment of normal economic relations between North and South . . . and receipt of economic and technical aid from all countries without any political conditions attached."

June 6.—Jim Cairns, Australian Overseas Trade Minister, says that he has been requested by Pen Nouth, Prime Minister of Prince Sihanouk's exile government, to help arrange discussions with the government of President Lon Nol for the purpose of organizing a new Cambodian government.

June 6.—South Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman Pham Dang Sum says that Saigon asked Japan to replace Canada on the International Commission of Control and Supervision, but Japan replied that its Constitution forbids international military activities.

June 7.—The House passes (331–57) H.R. 7645—State Department authorizations—after agreeing to an amendment prohibiting the use of funds for reconstruction aid to North Vietnam.

June 9.—Fighting in South Vietnam reaches its highest level since mid-February, as both sides appear to be vying for more favorable territorial positions in anticipation of a new agreement in Paris.

June 10.—The *New York Times* quotes an "authoritative American source" as saying that 10,000 Communist troops have been killed

and 10,000 wounded as a result of the past 4 months of bombing Cambodia. The number of active troops fighting against the Cambodian Government is given as 30,000, including 5,000 North Vietnamese, in addition to 70,000–80,000 supply troops and others.

June 11.—A State Department spokesman says that the United States has rejected efforts made by Prince Sihanouk during his African travels to initiate negotiations directly with Washington to bring about a Cambodian peace agreement. "The United States believes the Cambodian people themselves should negotiate to resolve their differences without outside interference," the spokesman says.

June 11.—The Senate begins consideration of S. 1248 (State Department authorizations) and adopts a Fulbright amendment providing $4.5 million for the U.S. share of the expenses of the international Commission of Control and Supervision in Vietnam.

June 13.—The parties signatory to the Paris peace agreement of January issued a joint communique concerned with implementation of the original agreement. The document calls for resumption by the United States of mine-clearing operations in North Vietnam; sets a new deadline for observance of the cease-fire; provides for the Two-Party Joint Military Commission to determine the areas of control of the two South Vietnamese parties; calls on the South Vietnamese to "do their utmost" to return all civilian prisoners within 45 days and to arrive at a political settlement within the same period; and provides for resumption of meetings of the North Vietnam-United States Joint Economic Commission.

June 13.—Henry Kissinger holds a news conference to report on the results of his talks with Le Duc Tho on implementation of the cease-fire agreement and the resulting joint communique. He says that the major points of concern of the United States had reached a "satisfactory conclusion." These were: Inadequate implementation of the cease-fire; infiltration into South Vietnam and the use of Laos and Cambodia as corridors; accounting for MIAs; violation of the DMZ; inadequate cooperation of the International Control Commission; and violations of Article 20, pertaining to withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodia and Laos.

June 14, 1973.—The Senate confirms the nomination of Graham A. Martin, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam.

June 15.—U.S. officials in Vientiane say that as of June 13, Nguyen Giap, the North Vietnamese charge d'affaires has suggested that the two Lao factions should "work together" to form a coalition government. Prior to June 13, his comments had been restricted to denunciations of Lao rightists, the officials say.

June 20.—The Department of Defense declassifies documents giving a detailed month-by-month breakdown of bombing tonnages and numbers of attacks for each of the countries of Indochina. In seven years of war, the statistics show that 3.2 million tons of bombs had been dropped on South Vietnam, 2.1 million tons on Laos, and 840,000 tons on North Vietnam.

June 25.—The House agrees to the conference report on H.R. 7447 after voting 235–172 to accept the Senate-passed (Eagleton) amendment cutting off funds to support combat activities in, over,

or from off the shores of Cambodia or Laos; and rejecting (204–204) a motion to extend until September 1, 1973 the bombing fund cutoff date.

June 26.—The House passes (325–86) H.J. Res. 636—continuing appropriations for FY 1974—after agreeing (218–194) to a Long amendment prohibiting all funds appropriated by the resolution and all funds previously appropriated from being used for combat activities in Cambodia or Laos.

June 26.—The Senate agrees (81–11) to the conference report on H.R. 7447.

June 27.—The Pentagon announces that Haiphong Harbor has been completely cleared of U.S. mines and that U.S. ships and minesweeping helicopters are moving south to Vinh to begin clearing operations there. Officials say that all of the 11,000 mines placed in North Vietnamese waters will be cleared within the 30-day limit specified in the second Paris peace accords.

June 27.—The Senate passes (72–19) H.R. 8410—extending the temporary public debt ceiling through November 30, 1972—after adopting (67–29) an Eagleton amendment, barring the use of any funds to support combat activities in, over, or from off the shores of Cambodia or Laos. Conferees are appointed.

June 27.—The President vetoes H.R. 7447. In his veto message, he says that a total halt in bombing operations in Cambodia would "virtually remove Communist incentive to negotiate," jeopardize the ability of Cambodian forces to prevent "installation of a Hanoi-controlled government in Phnom Penh," threaten the "fragile balance" on which overall peace in Southeast Asia depends, and "call into question our national commitment" to present and future settlements throughout the world.

June 27.—The House, by a 241–173 vote, fails to override the President's veto of H.R. 7447, two-thirds of those present not having voted in the affirmative. The bill and the President's veto message are referred to the Committee on Appropriations.

June 29.—The House passes (370–11) H.R. 8916—State, Justice, Commerce and Judiciary appropriations—after rejecting (31–352) an amendment to prohibit the use of any funds to aid in the reconstruction of North Vietnam.

June 29.—The House passes (278–124) H.R. 9055—revised version of H.R. 7447—after agreeing to an amendment adding North and South Vietnam to the areas included in a ban on combat activities imposed after August 15 and rejecting (169–236) an amendment to provide for immediate and complete cutoff of funds for combat activities in Cambodia and Laos. The Senate then passes H.R. 9055 by a vote of 72–14, clearing the measure for the White House, which has announced that it would not veto the bill if it contained an August 15 compromise deadline for cessation of bombing.

June 29.—The Senate passes H.J. Res. 636 by a 73–16 vote, after agreeing (93–0) to a Church amendment adding a new section to prevent the use of funds for North Vietnam unless specifically authorized by Congress; and (64–26) to a Fulbright amendment adding section 109, to bar the use of any funds to finance any U.S. forces in or over North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia after August 15, 1973. Conferees are appointed.

1973—Continued

July 5.—Prince Sihanouk says that he does not intend to talk with Dr. Henry Kissinger during Kissinger's forthcoming visit to Peking. "We will continue our armed struggle—there is no time for talk," he says. He predicts that Kissinger's goal would be to "compromise and divide" Cambodia, a prospect which Sihanouk rejects.

July 6.—Huang Chen, China's special emissary to the United States, confers in San Clemente with President Nixon and Dr. Henry Kissinger. Kissinger reports that Cambodian negotiations are "now going on," but that he will not speculate on the role of China in trying to bring about a settlement in that country.

July 6.—Cambodian Foreign Minister Long Boret puts forward a proposal for an immediate cease-fire and negotiations to end the fighting. While the Government in the past has refused to consider negotiating with Prince Sihanouk, the latest offer asks only that the Prince be regarded as spokesman for the Cambodian insurgents rather than the legitimate head of government. Boret says in addition that prior withdrawal of 40,000 North Vietnamese from Cambodia would not be a condition for his cease-fire proposal.

July 8.—Cambodian Premier In Tam says in an interview that his government is not involved in any negotiations, "delicate or otherwise," and that the major powers are doing whatever negotiating is going on, without consulting with the Cambodian government. An American Embassy source notes that a solution cannot be worked out by the Khmers unless it is "in a framework established by the great powers and others."

July 9.—State Department spokesman Paul J. Hare endorses the Cambodian government's call for a cease-fire and negotiations. Characterizing the proposal as a "constructive step," he invites the Lon Nol government's "adversaries" to show good will and suggests that the proposal would "receive serious and favorable consideration by interested members of the international community."

July 11.—Prince Sihanouk, in an Agence France-Presse interview, changes his position on the possibility of negotiations with the United States. He suggests that Henry Kissinger use Chinese Premier Chou En-lai as an intermediary to put forward proposals for negotiating with the Khmer Rouge, thus "leaving open a tiny door" for getting results through negotiations.

July 13.—Prince Sihanouk announces that he will spend three weeks in North Korea and that he will not confer with Henry Kissinger when Kissinger visits Peking during August, since any meeting would give President Nixon an excuse to tell Congress and the U.S. public that negotiations are going on. In addition, he again appeals for more supplies of ammunition which are necessary in order for his forces to take Phnom Penh.

July 14.—Senate Armed Services Committee, in closed hearings, presents accusations made by former AF Major Hal M. Knight that he had been ordered, prior to the invasion of Cambodia in May 1970, to participate in a falsified system of target reporting designed to make it appear that the attacks occurred in South Vietnam. The Pentagon subsequently admits that secret bombing had been ordered since March 1969, concurrent with the first withdrawals of U.S. troops from Vietnam.

July 23.—Senate Committee on Armed Services resumes executive consideration of U.S. bombing operations in Cambodia.

July 24.—Pentagon spokesman Jerry Friedheim reveals that 81 U.S. servicemen were killed on clandestine missions within Laos and Cambodia since 1965, but that their families were informed that the deaths occurred in South Vietnam. He adds that these missions were approved by high civilian authorities, and that "selected" Congressmen were aware of them.

July 24.—Appearing before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger says that the bombing of Cambodia in the 14 months prior to May 1970 was "authorized at the highest level," and that there was "no usurption of civilian authority."

July 24.—House-appointed conferees for S. 1888—Agriculture and Consumer Protection act—are instructed to insist on language in the House amendment which prohibits sale of agricultural commodities to North Vietnam. Motion passes by a 371–35 vote.

July 25.—On the basis of excerpts of testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April 1970, the New York Times states that Secretary Rogers had indicated that the Cambodian government did not object to U.S. bombing of Cambodia if no Cambodians were in the area. The State Department acknowledges that although several committee members questioned Rogers, he did not volunteer details of the bombing.

July 25.—Senate Committee on Armed Services in closed session hears testimony on certain bombing operations in Cambodia.

July 26.—House passes (188–183) H.R. 9360—Foreign Assistance, after agreeing to an amendment prohibiting the use of any of the authorized funds to aid in reconstruction of North Vietnam unless Congress so authorizes, rejecting (26–105) an amendment that sought to add language providing that no funds authorized for military assistance could be used for aid to Cambodia, and rejecting (10–79) one that sought to reduce authorization for Indochina postwar reconstruction by $191 million.

July 27.—White House Deputy Press Secretary Gerald L. Warren, asked whether the administration's position still included claims of participation in sensitive negotiations concerning Cambodia, says that he is "not in a position to speak to that subject."

July 30.—Senate Committee on Armed Services holds hearings on Cambodia bombing, receiving testimony from Gen. Earle G. Wheeler.

August 3.—House reads a letter from the President expressing his intention to comply with the August 15 Cambodia bombing halt, despite his reservations on the long-range wisdom of such action.

August 6.—Prince Sihanouk issues a statement from North Korea rejecting any talk of "compromise" in the Cambodian war, asserting that the Khmer Rouge forces are "fighting not to stay around Phnom Penh but to liberate Phnom Penh," and refusing to meet with Henry Kissinger "or any other who is a servant of Nixon." The statement is in response to an offer by Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik to utilize Indonesia's "good office" to help resolve the Cambodian conflict.

1973—Continued

August 7.—The Senate Armed Services Committee hears testimony from former servicemen which reveals that U.S. ground troops were operating in Cambodia and Laos as early as 1966, and that U.S. bombers were striking deeper within neutral Cambodia in 1970 than official reports had indicated.

August 11.—Prince Sihanouk, in a cable to Senator Mike Mansfield sent from Pyongyang, North Korea, says that he would be willing to forget the "unhappy past" and establish diplomatic relations with the United States, if the latter would withdraw all support from the Lon Nol government.

August 13.—Cambodian Minister of Information Sum Chhum says that his government would like "peace with honor," but that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong have been preventing contacts between loyalist and Khmer Rouge forces for purposes of negotiations.

August 15.—The White House releases a statement on the end of U.S. bombing in Cambodia. The President expresses concern that Congress has "eliminated an important incentive for a negotiated settlement in Cambodia and weakened the security of Cambodia's neighbors . . . and . . . eroded the structure of peace in Indochina laid down in the agreements of January 27." The United States "will stand firm with the Khmer Republic . . . and will continue to provide the maximum amount of economic and military assistance permitted by present legal constraints," the statement continues.

B. OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS AND STATEMENTS ON UNITED STATES-VIETNAM RELATIONS [1]

(On March 8, 1949, France signed an agreement with the state of Vietnam under Bao Dai, agreeing to recognize the independence of Vietnam. Similar agreements were later signed with Cambodia and Laos.)

UNITED STATES RECOGNITION OF VIET-NAM, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA: Statement by the Department of State, February 7, 1950 [2]

The Government of the United States has accorded diplomatic recognition to the Governments of the State of Viet Nam, the Kingdom of Laos, and the Kingdom of Cambodia.

The President, therefore, has instructed the American consul general at Saigon to inform the heads of Government of the State of Viet Nam, the Kingdom of Laos, and the Kingdom of Cambodia that we extend diplomatic recognition to their Governments and look forward to an exchange of diplomatic representatives between the United States and these countries.

Our diplomatic recognition of these Governments is based on the formal establishment of the State of Viet Nam, the Kingdom of Laos, and the Kingdom of Cambodia as independent states within the French Union; this recognition is consistent with our fundamental policy of giving support to the peaceful and democratic evolution of dependent peoples toward self-government and independence.

In June of last year, this Government expressed its gratification at the signing of the France-Viet Namese agreements of March 8, which provided the basis for the evolution of Viet Namese independence within the French Union. These agreements, together with similar accords between France and the Kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia, have now been ratified by the French National Assembly and signed by the President of the French Republic. This ratification has established the independence of Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia as associated states within the French Union.

It is anticipated that the full implementation of these basic agreements and of supplementary accords which have been negotiated and are awaiting ratification will promote political stability and the growth of effective democratic institutions in Indochina. This Government is considering what steps it may take at this time to further these objectives and to assure, in collaboration with other like-minded nations, that this development shall not be hindered by internal dissension fostered from abroad.

---

[1] The matter printed in italics is a staff note on the documents and not part of the official text.

[2] Department of State *Bulletin*, Feb. 20, 1950, pp. 291–292.

The status of the American consulate general in Saigon will be raised to that of a legation, and the Minister who will be accredited to all three states will be appointed by the President.

ECONOMIC AID PROGRAM: Note From the American Chargé d'Affaires at Saigon to the Chiefs of State of Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia, May 24, 1950 [1]

I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the United States has decided to initiate a program of economic aid to the States of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. My Government has reached this decision in order to assist Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to restore stability and pursue their peaceful and democratic development.

With these purposes in mind, the United States Government is establishing, with headquarters in Saigon and associated with the United States Legation, a special economic mission to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. This mission will have the responsibility of working with the Governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and with the French High Commissioner in developing and carrying out a coordinated program of economic aid designed to assist the three countries in restoring their normal economic life. The members of the American economic mission will, at all times, be subject to the authority of the Government of the United States and will not become a part of the administrations of the Associated States.

The Government of the United States recognizes that this American assistance will be complementary to the effort made by the three Associated States and France, without any intention of substitution. American aid is designed to reinforce the joint effort of France and the Governments and peoples of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, on whom rests the primary responsibility for the restoration of security and stability.

United States economic aid will be granted in accordance with separate bilateral agreements between each of the Associated States and the United States of America. The approval of these agreements will be subject to legal conventions existing between the Associated States and France. Initial economic aid operations, however, may begin prior to the conclusion of these agreements.

The United States Government is of the opinion that it would be desirable for the three governments and the French High Commissioner to reach agreement among themselves for the coordination of those matters relating to the aid program that are of common interest. The American economic mission will maintain contact with the three Associated States, with the French High Commissioner in Indochina and, if desired, with any body which may be set up by the Associated States and France in connection with the aid program.

---

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, June 12, 1950, pp. 977–978. David Bruce, the American Ambassador of Paris, simultaneously delivered an identical note to the President of the French Union.

Mr. Robert Blum has been appointed Chief of the United States special economic mission to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

Identical letters are being addressed today to the governments of Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and the President of the French Union.

THE DEFENSE OF INDOCHINA: Communiqué Regarding Discussions Between Representatives of the United States, France, Viet-Nam, and Cambodia, June 18, 1952[1]

Mr. Jean Letourneau, Minister in the French Cabinet for the Associated States in Indochina, has just concluded a series of conversations with U.S. Government officials from the Department of State, Department of Defense, the Office of Director for Mutual Security, the Mutual Security Agency, and Department of the Treasury. The Ambassadors of Cambodia and Viet-Nam have also participated in these talks.

The principle which governed this frank and detailed exchange of views and information was the common recognition that the struggle in which the forces of the French Union and the Associated States are engaged against the forces of Communist aggression in Indochina is an integral part of the world-wide resistance by the Free Nations to Communist attempts at conquest and subversion. There was unanimous satisfaction over the vigorous and successful course of military operations, in spite of the continuous comfort and aid received by the Communist forces of the Viet-Minh from Communist China. The excellent performance of the Associated States' forces in battle was found to be a source of particular encouragement. Special tribute was paid to the 52,000 officers and men of the French Union and Associated States' armies who have been lost in this six years' struggle for freedom in Southeast Asia and to the 75,000 other casualties.

In this common struggle, however, history, strategic factors, as well as local and general resources require that the free countries concerned each assume primary responsibility for resistance in the specific areas where Communism has resorted to force of arms. Thus the United States assumes a large share of the burden in Korea while France has the primary role in Indochina. The partners, however, recognize the obligation to help each other in their areas of primary responsibility to the extent of their capabilities and within the limitations imposed by their global obligations as well as by the requirements in their own areas of special responsibility. It was agreed that success in this continuing struggle would entail an increase in the common effort and that the United States for its part will, therefore, within the limitations set by Congress, take steps to expand its aid to the French Union. It was further agreed that this increased assistance over and above present U.S. aid for Indochina, which now approximates one third of the total cost of Indochina operations, would be especially devoted to assisting France in the building of the national armies of the Associated States.

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, June 30, 1952, p. 1010.

82-901 O - 75 - 13

Mr. Letourneau reviewed the facts which amply demonstrate the determination of the Associated States to pursue with increased energy the strengthening of their authority and integrity both against internal subversion and against external aggression.

In this connection Mr. Letourneau reminded the participants that the accords of 1949, which established the independence within the French Union of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, have been liberally interpreted and supplemented by other agreements, thus consolidating this independence. Mr. Letourneau pointed out that the governments of the Associated States now exercise full authority except that a strictly limited number of services related to the necessities of the war now in progress remain temporarily in French hands. In the course of the examination of the Far Eastern economic and trade situation, it was noted that the Governments of the Associated States are free to negotiate trade treaties and agreements of all kinds with their neighbors subject only to whatever special arrangements may be agreed between members of the French Union.

It was noted that these states have been recognized by thirty-three foreign governments.

The conversations reaffirmed the common determination of the participants to prosecute the defense of Indochina and their confidence in a free, peaceful and prosperous future for Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam.

Mr. Letourneau was received by the President, Mr. Acheson, and Mr. Foster, as Acting Secretary of Defense. Mr. John Allison, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, acted as Chairman of the U.S. Delegation participating in the conversations.

ADDITIONAL UNITED STATES AID FOR FRANCE AND INDOCHINA: Joint Franco-American Communiqué, September 30, 1953 [1]

The forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina have for 8 years been engaged in a bitter struggle to prevent the engulfment of Southeast Asia by the forces of international communism. The heroic efforts and sacrifices of these French Union allies in assuring the liberty of the new and independant states of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam has earned the admiration and support of the free world. In recognition of the French Union effort the United States Government has in the past furnished aid of various kinds to the Governments of France and the Associated States to assist in bringing the long struggle to an early and victorious conclusion.

The French Government is firmly resolved to carry out in full its declaration of July 3, 1953, by which is announced its intention of perfecting the independence of the three Associated States in Indochina, through negotiations with the Associated States.

The Governments of France and the United States have now agreed that, in support of plans of the French Government for the intensified prosecution of the war against the Viet Minh, the United

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 12, 1953, pp. 486–487.

States will make available to the French Government prior to December 31, 1954 additional financial resources not to exceed $385 million. This aid is in addition to funds already earmarked by the United States for aid to France and the Associated States.

The French Government is determined to make every effort to break up and destroy the regular enemy forces in Indochina. Toward this end the government intends to carry through, in close cooperation with the Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese Governments, the plans for increasing the Associated States forces while increasing temporarily French forces to levels considered necessary to assure the success of existing military plans. The additional United States aid is designed to help make it possible to achieve these objectives with maximum speed and effectiveness.

The increased French effort in Indochina will not entail any basic or permanent alteration of the French Government's plans and programs for its NATO forces.

(*On May 7, 1954 Dien Bien Phu fell to Viet Minh Forces after a long siege. This development led France to submit armistice proposals to the Geneva Conference convened the previous month to discuss Korea and "peace in Indochina." This statement sets forth the United States position on the Geneva negotiations.*)

* * * * * * *

THE THREAT OF DIRECT CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA: Address by the Secretary of State, June 11, 1954 (Excerpt)[1]

At the moment, Indochina is the area where international communism most vigorously seeks expansion under the leadership of Ho Chi-Minh. Last year President Eisenhower, in his great "Chance for Peace" address, said that "aggression in Korea and Southeast Asia are threats to the whole free community to be met by united action." But the French were then opposed to what they called "internationalizing" the war. They preferred to treat it as a civil war of rebellion. However, on July 3, 1953, the French Government made a public declaration of independence for the three Associated States, and in September it adopted the so-called Navarre plan, which contemplated a rapid buildup of national native forces. The United States then agreed to underwrite the costs of this plan.

But last winter the fighting was intensified and the long strain began to tell in terms of the attitude of the French people toward a war then in its eighth year. Last March, after the siege of Dien-Bien-Phu had begun, I renewed President Eisenhower's proposal that we seek conditions which would permit a united defense for the area. I went to Europe on this mission, and it seemed that there was agreement on our proposal. But when we moved to translate that proposal into reality, some of the parties held back because they had concluded that any steps to create a united defense should await the results of the Geneva Conference.

[1] Delivered before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, Department of State *Bulletin*, June 28, 1954, pp. 971–973.

Meanwhile, the burdens of a collective defense in Indochina have mounted. The Communists have practiced dilatory negotiating at Geneva, while intensifying their fighting in Indochina. The French and national forces feel the strain of mounting enemy power on their front and of political uncertainty at their rear. I told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week that the situation is grave but by no means hopeless. The future depends largely on decision awaited at Paris, London, and Geneva.

The situation in Indochina is not that of open military aggression by the Chinese Communist regime. Thus, in Indochina, the problem is one of restoring tranquillity in an area where disturbances are fomented from Communist China, but where there is no open invasion by Communist China. This task of pacification, in our opinion, cannot be successfully met merely by unilateral armed intervention. Some other conditions need to be established. Throughout these Indochina developments, the United States has held to a stable and consistent course and has made clear the conditions which, in its opinion, might justify intervention. These conditions were and are (1) an invitation from the present lawful authorities; (2) clear assurance of complete independence to Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam; (3) evidence of concern by the United Nations; (4) a joining in the collective effort of some of the other nations of the area; and (5) assurance that France will not itself withdraw from the battle until it is won.

Only if these conditions were realized could the President and the Congress be justified in asking the American people to make the sacrifices incident to committing our Nation, with others, to using force to help to restore peace in the area.

Another problem might, however, arise. If the Chinese Communist regime were to show in Indochina or elsewhere that it is determined to pursue the path of overt military aggression, then the situation would be different and another issue would emerge. That contingency has already been referred to publicly by the President and myself. The President, in his April 16, 1953, address, and I myself, in an address of September 2, 1953, made clear that the United States would take a grave view of any future overt military Chinese Communist aggression in relation to the Pacific or Southeast Asia area. Such an aggression would threaten island and peninsular positions which secure the United States and its allies.

If such overt military aggression occurred, that would be a deliberate threat to the United States itself. The United States would of course invoke the processes of the United Nations and consult with its allies. But we could not escape ultimate responsibility for decisions closely touching our own security and self-defense.

There are some, particularly abroad, who seem to assume that the attitude of the United States flows from a desire for a general war with Communist China. That is clearly false. If we had wanted such a war, it could easily have been based on the presence of Chinese aggressors in Korea. But last July, in spite of difficulties which at times seemed insuperable, we concluded a Korean armistice with Communist China. How could it be more surely demonstrated that we have both the will to make peace and the competence to make peace?

Your Government wants peace, and the American people want peace. But should there ever be openly launched an attack that the American people would clearly recognize as a threat to our own security, then the right of self-preservation would demand that we —regardless of any other country—meet the issue squarely.

It is the task of statesmanship to seek peace and deter war, while at the same time preserving vital national interests. Under present conditions that dual result is not easy to achieve, and it cannot be achieved at all unless your Government is backed by a people who are willing, if need be, to sacrifice to preserve their vital interests.

At the Geneva Conference I said: "Peace is always easy to achieve—by surrender." Your Government does not propose to buy peace at that price. We do not believe that the American people want peace at that price. So long as that is our national will, and so long as that will be backed by a capacity for effective action, our Nation can face the future with that calm confidence which is the due of those who, in a troubled world, hold fast that which is good.

(The Geneva Agreements theoretically ended the war between French Union forces and the Vietminh in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. These states were to become fully independent countries, with the last-named partitioned near the 17th parallel into two states pending reunification through "free elections" to be held by July 20, 1956. The United States and Vietnam are not signatories to these agreements.)

AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN VIET-NAM, July 20, 1954 [1]

Chapter I—Provisional Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone

Article 1

A provisional military demarcation line shall be fixed, on either side of which the forces of the two parties shall be regrouped after their withdrawal, the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam to the north of the line and the forces of the French Union to the south.

The provisional military demarcation line is fixed as shown on the map attached (omitted).

It is also agreed that a demilitarized zone shall be established on either side of the demarcation line, to a width of not more than 5 kms. from it, to act as a buffer zone and avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities.

Article 2

The period within which the movement of all the forces of either party into its regrouping zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line shall be completed shall not exceed three

[1] IC/42/Rev. 2, 20 July 1954.

hundred (300) days from the date of the present Agreement's entry into force.

Article 3

When the provisional military demarcation line coincides with a waterway, the waters of such waterway shall be open to civil navigation by both parties wherever one bank is controlled by one party and the other bank by the other party. The Joint Commission shall establish rules of navigation for the stretch of waterway in question. The merchant shipping and other civilian craft of each party shall have unrestricted access to the land under its military control.

Article 4

The provisional military demarcation line between the two final regrouping zones is extended into the territorial waters by a line perpendicular to the general line of the coast.

All coastal islands north of this boundary shall be evacuated by the armed forces of the French Union, and all islands south of it shall be evacuated by the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam.

Article 5

To avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities, all military forces, supplies and equipment shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within twenty-five (25) days of the present Agreement's entry into force.

Article 6

No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the provisional military demarcation line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission.

Article 7

No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the demilitarized zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Joint Commission.

Article 8

Civil administration and relief in the demilitarized zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line shall be the responsibility of the Commanders-in-Chief of the two parties in their respective zones. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the demilitarized zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed at any one time a figure to be determined by the Trung Gia Military Commission or by the Joint Commission. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be determined by the Joint Commission. No one else shall carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission.

Article 9

Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as limiting the complete freedom of movement, into, out of or within the demil-

itarized zone, of the Joint Commission, its joint groups, the International Commission to be set up as indicated below, its inspection teams and any other persons, supplies or equipment specifically authorized to enter the demilitarized zone by the Joint Commission. Freedom of movement shall be permitted across the territory under the military control of either side over any road or waterway which has to be taken between points within the demilitarized zone when such points are not connected by roads or waterways lying completely within the demilitarized zone.

CHAPTER II—PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURE GOVERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT

Article 10

The Commanders of the Forces on each side, on the one side the Commander-in-Chief of the French Union forces in Indo-China and on the other side the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army of Viet-Nam, shall order and enforce the complete cessation of all hostilities in Viet-Nam by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval and air forces.

Article 11

In accordance with the principle of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indo-China, the cessation of hostilities shall be simultaneous throughout all parts of Viet-Nam, in all areas of hostilities and for all the forces of the two parties.

Taking into account the time effectively required to transmit the cease-fire order down to the lowest echelons of the combatant forces on both sides, the two parties are agreed that the cease-fire shall take effect completely and simultaneously for the different sectors of the country as follows:

Northern Viet-Nam at 8:00 a. m. (local time) on 27 July 1954
Central Viet-Nam at 8:00 a. m. (local time) on 1 August 1954
Southern Viet-Nam at 8:00 a. m. (local time) on 11 August 1954

It is agreed that Pekin mean time shall be taken as local time.

From such time as the cease-fire becomes effective in Northern Viet-Nam, both parties undertake not to engage in any large-scale offensive action in any part of the Indo-Chinese theatre of operations and not to commit the air forces based on Northern Viet-Nam outside that sector. The two parties also undertake to inform each other of their plans for movement from one regrouping zone to another within twenty-five (25) days of the present Agreement's entry into force.

Article 12

All the operations and movements entailed in the cessation of hostilities and regrouping must proceed in a safe and orderly fashion:

(a) Within a certain number of days after the cease-fire Agreement shall have become effective, the number to be determined on the spot by the Trung Gia Military Commission, each party shall be responsible for removing and neutralizing mines

(including river- and sea-mines), booby traps, explosives and any other dangerous substances placed by it. In the event of its being impossible to complete the work of removal and neutralization in time, the party concerned shall mark the spot by placing visible signs there. All demolitions, mine fields, wire entanglements and other hazards to the free movement of the personnel of the Joint Commission and its joint groups, known to be present after the withdrawal of the military forces, shall be reported to the Joint Commission by the Commanders of the opposing forces;

(b) From the time of the cease-fire until regrouping is completed on either side of the demarcation line:

16(1) The forces of either party shall be provisionally withdrawn from the provisional assembly areas assigned to the other party.

(2) When one party's forces withdraw by a route (road, rail, waterway, sea route) which passes through the territory of the other party (see Article 24), the latter party's forces must provisionally withdraw three kilometres on each side of such route, but in such a manner as to avoid interfering with the movements of the civil population.

Article 13

From the time of the cease-fire until the completion of the movements from one regrouping zone into the other, civil and military transport aircraft shall follow air-corridors between the provisional assembly areas assigned to the French Union forces north of the demarcation line on the one hand and the Laotian frontier and the regrouping zone assigned to the French Union forces on the other hand.

The position of the air-corridors, their width, the safety route for single-engined military aircraft transferred to the south and the search and rescue procedure for aircraft in distress shall be determined on the spot by the Trung Gia Military Commission.

Article 14

Political and administrative measures in the two regrouping zones, on either side of the provisional military demarcation line:

(a) Pending the general elections which will bring about the unification of Viet-Nam, the conduct of civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present Agreement;

(b) Any territory controlled by one party which is transferred to the other party by the regrouping plan shall continue to be administered by the former party until such date as all the troops who are to be transferred have completely left that territory so as to free the zone assigned to the party in question. From then on, such territory shall be regarded as transferred to the other party, who shall assume responsibility for it.

Steps shall be taken to ensure that there is no break in the transfer of responsibilities. For this purpose, adequate notices shall be given by the withdrawing party to the other party,

which shall make the necessary arrangements, in particular by sending administrative and police detachments to prepare for the assumption of administrative responsibility. The length of such notice shall be determined by the Trung Gia Military Commission. The transfer shall be effected in successive stages for the various territorial sectors.

The transfer of the civil administration of Hanoi and Haiphong to the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam shall be completed within the respective time-limits laid down in Article 15 for military movements.

(c) Each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee their democratic liberties.

(d) From the date of entry into force of the present agreement until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a district controlled by one party who wish to go and live in the zone assigned to the other party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district.

Article 15

The disengagement of the combatants, and the withdrawals and transfers of military forces, equipment and supplies shall take place in accordance with the following principles:

(a) The withdrawals and transfers of the military forces, equipment and supplies of the two parties shall be completed within three hundred (300) days, as laid down in Article 2 of the present Agreement;

(b) Within either territory successive withdrawals shall be made by sectors, portions of sectors or provinces. Transfers from one regrouping zone to another shall be made in successive monthly installments proportionate to the number of troops to be transferred;

(c) The two parties shall undertake to carry out all troop withdrawals and transfers in accordance with the aims of the present Agreement, shall permit no hostile act and shall take no step whatsoever which might hamper such withdrawals and transfers. They shall assist one another as far as this is possible;

(d) The two parties shall permit no destruction or sabotage of any public property and no injury to the life and property of the civil population. They shall permit no interference in local civil administration;

(e) The Joint Commisssion and the International Commission shall ensure that steps are taken to safeguard the forces in the course of withdrawal and transfer:

(f) The Trung Gia Military Commission, and later the Joint Commission, shall determine by common agreement the exact procedure for the disengagement of the combatants and for troop withdrawals and transfers, on the basis of the principles mentioned above and within the framework laid down below:

1. The disengagement of the combatants, including the concentration of the armed forces of all kinds and also each

party's movements into the provisional assembly areas assigned to it and the other party's provisional withdrawal from it, shall be completed within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days after the date when the cease-fire becomes effective.

The general delineation of the provisional assembly areas is set out in the maps [1] annexed to the present Agreement.

In order to avoid any incidents, no troops shall be stationed less than 1,500 metres from the lines delimiting the provisional assembly areas.

During the period until the transfers are concluded, all the coastal islands west of the following lines shall be included in the Haiphong perimeter:

—meridian of the southern point of Kebao Island

—northern coast of the Ile Rousse (excluding the island), extended as far as the meridian of Campha-Mines

—meridian of Champha-Mines.

2. The withdrawals and transfers shall be effected in the following order and within the following periods (from the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement):

Forces of the French Union	*Days*
Hanoi perimeter	80
Haidnong perimeter	100
Haiphong perimeter	300

Forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam	
Ham Tan and Xuyenmec provisional assembly area	80
Central Viet-Nam provisional assembly area—first installment	80
Plaine des Jones provisional assembly area	100
Point Camau provisional assembly area	200
Central Viet-Nam Provisional assembly area—last installment	300

Chapter III—Ban on Introduction of Fresh Troops, Military Personnel, Arms and Munitions, Military Bases

Article 16

With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Viet-Nam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited.

It is understood, however, that the rotation of units and groups of personnel, the arrival in Viet-Nam of individual personnel on a temporary duty basis and the return of Viet-Nam of individual personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside Viet-Nam shall be permitted under the conditions laid down below:

(a) Rotation of units (defined in paragraph (c) of this Article) and groups of personnel shall not be permitted for French Union troops stationed north of the provisional military demarcation line laid down in Article 1 of the present Agreement, during the withdrawal period provided for in Article 2.

[1] Not reprinted here.

However, under the heading of individual personnel not more than fifty (50) men, including officers, shall during any one month be permitted to enter that part of the country north of the provisional military demarcation line on a temporary duty basis or to return there after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside Viet-Nam.

(b) "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units or groups of personnel by other units of the same echelon or by personnel who are arriving in Viet-Nam territory to do their overseas service there;

(c) The units rotated shall never be larger than a battalion —or the corresponding echelon for air and naval forces;

(d) Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis, provided, however, that in any one quarter neither party shall introduce more than fifteen thousand five hundred (15,500) members of its armed forces into Viet-Nam under the rotation policy.

(e) Rotation units (defined in paragraph (c) of this Article) and groups of personnel, and the individual personnel mentioned in this Article, shall enter and leave Viet-Nam only through the entry points enumerated in Article 20 below:

(f) Each party shall notify the Joint Commission and the International Commission at least two days in advance of any arrivals or departures of units, groups of personnel and individual personnel in or from Viet-Nam. Reports on the arrivals or departures of units, groups of personnel and individual personnel in or from Viet-Nam shall be submitted daily to the Joint Commission and the International Commission.

All the above-mentioned notifications and reports shall indicate the places and dates of arrival or departure and the number of persons arriving or departing.

(g) The International Commission, through its Inspection Teams, shall supervise and inspect the rotation of units and groups of personnel and the arrival and departure of individual personnel as authorized above, at the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below.

Article 17

(a) With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Viet-Nam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, munitions and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines and jet weapons and armoured vehicles, is prohibited.

(b) It is understood, however, that war material, arms and munitions which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cessation of hostilities may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same type and with similar characteristics. Such replacements of war material, arms and munitions shall not be permitted for French Union troops stationed north of the provisional military demarcation line laid down in

Article 1 of the present Agreement, during the withdrawal period provided for in Article 2.

Naval craft may perform transport operations between the regrouping zones.

(c) The war material, arms and munitions for replacement purposes provided for in paragraph (b) of this Article, shall be introduced into Viet-Nam only through the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below. War material, arms and munitions to be replaced shall be shipped from Viet-Nam only through the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below;

(d) Apart from the replacements permitted within the limits laid down in paragraph (b) of this Article, the introduction of war material, arms and munitions of all types in the form of unassembled parts for subsequent assembly is prohibited;

(e) Each party shall notify the Joint Commission and the International Commission at least two days in advance of any arrivals or departures which may take place of war material, arms and munitions of all types.

In order to justify the requests for the introduction into Viet-Nam of arms, munitions and other war material (as defined in paragraph (a) of this Article) for replacement purposes, a report concerning each incoming shipment shall be submitted to the Joint Commission and the International Commission. Such reports shall indicate the use made of the items so replaced.

(f) The International Commission, through its Inspection Teams, shall supervise and inspect the replacements permitted in the circumstances laid down in this Article, at the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below.

Article 18

With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout Viet-Nam territory.

Article 19

With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zone of either party; the two parties shall ensure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy.

Article 20

The points of entry into Viet-Nam for rotation personnel and replacements of material are fixed as follows:

—Zones to the north of the provisional military demarcation line: Laokay, Langson, Tien-Yen, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong-Hoi, Muong-Sen;

—Zone to the south of the provisional military demarcation line: Tourane, Quinhon, Nhatrang, Bangoi, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques, Tanchau.

Chapter IV—Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees

Article 21

The liberation and repatriation of all prisoners of war and civilian internees detained by each of the two parties at the coming into force of the present Agreement shall be carried out under the following conditions:

(a) All prisoners of war and civilian internees of Viet-Nam, French and other nationalities captured since the beginning of hostilities in Viet-Nam during military operations or in any other circumstances of war and in any part of the territory of Viet-Nam shall be liberated within a period of thirty (30) days after the date when the cease-fire becomes effective in each theatre.

(b) The term "civilian internees" is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason and have been kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.

(c) All prisoners of war and civilian internees held by either party shall be surrendered to the appropriate authorities of the other party, who shall give them all possible assistance in proceeding to their country of origin, place of habitual residence or the zone of their choice.

Chapter V—Miscellaneous

Article 22

The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall ensure that persons under their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of the present Agreement are suitable punished.

Article 23

In cases in which the place of burial is known and the existence of graves has been established, the Commander of the Forces of either party shall, within a specific period after the entry into force of the Armistice Agreement, permit the graves service personnel of the other party to enter the part of Viet-Nam territory under their military control for the purpose of finding and removing the bodies of deceased military personnel of that party, including the bodies of deceased prisoners of war. The Joint Commission shall determine the procedures and the time limit for the performance of this task. The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall communicate to each other all information in their possession as to the place of burial of military personnel of the other party.

Article 24

The present Agreement shall apply to all the armed forces of either party. The armed forces of each party shall respect the demilitarized zone and the territory under the military control of the other party, and shall commit no act and undertake no operation against the other party and shall not engage in blockade of any kind in Viet-Nam.

For the purposes of the present Article, the word "territory" includes territorial waters and air space.

Article 25

The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall afford full protection and all possible assistance and co-operation to the Joint Commission and its joint groups and to the International Commission and its inspection teams in the performance of the functions and tasks assigned to them by the present Agreement.

Article 26

The costs involved in the operations of the Joint Commission and joint groups and of the International Commission and its Inspection Teams shall be shared equally between the two parties.

Article 27

The signatories of the present Agreement and their successors in their functions shall be responsible for ensuring and observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof. The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall, within their respective commands, take all steps and make all arrangements necessary to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the present Agreement by all elements and military personnel under their command.

The procedures laid down in the present Agreement shall, whenever necessary, be studied by the Commanders of the two parties and, if necessary, defined more specifically by the Joint Commission.

Chapter VI—Joint Commission and International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam

28. Responsibility for the execution of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall rest with the parties.

29. An International Commission shall ensure the control and supervision of this execution.

30. In order to facilitate, under the conditions shown below, the execution of provisions concerning joint actions by the two parties, a Joint Commission shall be set up in Viet-Nam.

31. The Joint Commission shall be composed of an equal number of representatives of the Commanders of the two parties.

32. The Presidents of the delegations to the Joint Commission shall hold the rank of General.

The Joint Commission shall set up joint groups the number of which shall be determined by mutual agreement between the parties. The joint groups shall be composed of an equal number of officers from both parties. Their location on the demarcation line between the regrouping zones shall be determined by the parties whilst taking into account the powers of the Joint Commission.

33. The Joint Commission shall ensure the execution of the following provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities:

(a) A simultaneous and general cease-fire in Viet-Nam for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties.

(b) A re-groupment of the armed forces of the two parties.

(c) Observance of the demarcation lines between the regrouping zones and of the demilitarized sectors.

Within the limits of its competence it shall help the parties to execute the said provisions, shall ensure liaison between them for the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the application of these provisions, and shall endeavor to solve such disputed questions as may arise between the parties in the course of executing these provisions.

34. An International Commission shall be set up for the control and supervision over the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam. It shall be composed of representatives of the following States: Canada, India and Poland.

It shall be presided over by the Representative of India.

35. The International Commission shall set up fixed and mobile inspection teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned States. The fixed teams shall be located at the following points: Laokay, Langson, Tien-Yen, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong-Hoi, Muong-Sen, Tourane, Quinhon, Nhatrang, Bangoi, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques, Tranchau. These points of location may, at a later date, be altered at the request of the Joint Commission, or of one of the parties, or of the International Commission itself, by agreement between the International Commission and the command of the party concerned. The zones of action of the mobile teams shall be the regions bordering the land and sea frontiers of Viet-Nam, the demarcation lines between the re-grouping zones and the demilitarizes zones. Within the limits of these zones they shall have the right to move freely and shall receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may require for the fulfilment of their tasks (provision of personnel, placing at their disposal documents needed for supervision, summoning witnesses necessary for holding enquiries, ensuring the security and freedom of movement of the inspection teams etc. . . .). They shall have at their disposal such modern means of transport, observation and communication as they may require. Beyond the zones of action as defined above, the mobile teams may, by agreement with the command of the party concerned, carry out other movements within the limits of the tasks given them by the present agreement.

36. The International Commission shall be responsible for supervising the proper execution by the parties of the provisions of the agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfill the tasks of control, observation, inspection and investigation connected with the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and it shall in particular:

(a) Control the movement of the armed forces of the two parties, effected within the framework of the regroupment plan.

(b) Supervise the demarcation lines between the re-grouping areas, and also the demilitarized zones.

(c) Control the operations of releasing prisoners of war and civilian internees.

(d) Supervise at ports and airfields as well as along all frontiers of Viet-Nam the execution of the provisions of the agree-

ment on the cessation of hostilities, regulating the introduction into the country of armed forces, military personnel and of all kinds of arms, munitions and war material.

37. The International Commission shall, through the medium of the inspection teams mentioned above, and as soon as possible either on its own initiative, or at the request of the Joint Commission, or of one the parties, undertake the necessary investigations both documentary and on the ground.

38. The inspection teams shall submit to the International Commission the results of their supervision, their investigation and their observations, furthermore they shall draw up such special reports as they may consider necessary or as may be requested from them by the Commission. In the case of a disagreement within teams, the conclusions of each member shall be submitted to the Commission.

39. If any one inspection team is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or a threat of a serious violation the international Commission shall be informed; the latter shall study the reports and the conclusions of the inspection teams and shall inform the parties of the measures which should be taken for the settlement of the incident, ending of the violation or removal of the threat of violation.

40. When the Joint Commission is unable to reach an agreement on the interpretation to be given to some provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.

41. The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by majority vote, subject to the provisions contained in article 42. If the votes are divided the chairman's vote shall be decisive.

The International Commission may formulate recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam, in order to ensure a more effective execution of that agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

42. When dealing with questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, namely:

(a) Refusal by the armed forces of one party to effect the movements provided for in the regroupment plan;

(b) Violation by the armed forces of one of the parties of the regrouping zones, territorial waters, or air space of the other party;

the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous.

43. If one of the parties refuses to put into effect a recommendation of the International Commission, the parties concerned or the Commission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.

If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in article 42, it shall submit a majority report and one or more minority reports to the members of the Conference.

The International Commission shall inform the members of the Conference in all cases where its activity is being hindered.

44. The International Commission shall be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China in order that it should be able to fulfill the tasks provided for in article 36.

45. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam shall act in close co-operation with the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos.

The Secretaries-General of these three Commissions shall be responsible for co-ordinating their work and for relations between them.

46. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam may, after consultation with the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos, and having regard to the development of the situation in Cambodia and Laos, progressively reduce its activities. Such a decision must be adopted unanimously.

47. All the provisions of the present Agreement, save the second sub-paragraph of Article 11, shall enter into force at 2400 hours (Geneva time) on 22 July 1954.

Done in Geneva at 2400 hours on the 20th of July 1954 in French and in Viet-Namese, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army of Viet-Nam	For the Commander-in-Chief of the French Union Forces in Indo-China
TA-QUANG BUU,	Brigadier-General DELTEIL.
Vice-Minister of National Defence of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam	

ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN VIET-NAM

I. DELINEATION OF THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE

(Article 1 of the Agreement: Reference May: Indo-China 1/100,000)

(a) The provisional military demarcation line is fixed as follows, reading from east to west:

the mouth of the Song Ben Hat (Cua Tung River) and the course of that river (known as the Rao Thanh in the mountains) to the village of Bo Ho Su, then the parallel of Bo Ho Su to the Laos-Viet-Nam frontier.

(b) The demilitarized zone shall be delimited by Trung Gia Military Commission in accordance with the provisions of article 1 of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam.

32-0-1 (I - 35 - 14

II. General Delineation of the Provisional Assembly Areas

(Article 15 of the Agreement; Reference Maps: Indo-China 1/400,000)

(a) NORTH VIET-NAM

Delineation of the boundary of the provisional assembly area of the French Union forces

1. The perimeter of Hanoi is delimited by the arc of a circle with a radius of 15 kilometres, having as its centre the right bank abutment of Doumer Bridge and running westwards from the Red River to the Rapids Canal in the northeast.

In this particular case no forces of the French Union shall be stationed less than 2 kilometres from this perimeter, on the inside thereof.

2. The perimeter of Haiphong shall be delimited by the Song-Van-Uc as far as Kim Thanh and a line running from the Son-Van-Uc three kilometres northeast of Kim Thanh to cut Road No. 18 two kilometres east of Mao-Khe. Thence a line running three kilometres north of Road 18 to Cho-Troi and a straight line from Cho-Troi to the Mong-Duong ferry.

3. *A corridor contained between:*

In the south, the Red River from Thanh-Tri to Bang-Nho, thence a line joining the latter point to Do-My (South-west of Kesat), Gia-Loc and Tien Kieu;

In the north, a line running the Rapids Canal at a distance of 1,500 metres to the north of the Canal, passing three kilometres north of Pha-Lai and Seven Pagodas and thence parallel to Road No. 18 to its point of intersection with the perimeter of Haiphong.

Note: Throughout the period of evacuation of the perimeter of Hanoi, the river forces of the French Union shall enjoy complete freedom of movement on the Song-Van-Uc. And the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam shall withdraw three kilometres south of the south bank of the Song-Van-Uc.

Boundary between the perimeter of Hanoi and the perimeter of Haiduong

A straight line running from the Rapids Canal three kilometres west of Chi-ne and ending at Do-My (eight kilometres south-west of Kesat).

(b) CENTRAL VIET-NAM

Delineation of the boundary of the provisional assembly area of the forces of the Viet-Nam People's Army south of the Col des Nuages parallel

The perimeter of the Central Viet-Nam area shall consist of the administrative boundaries of the provinces of Quang-Ngai and Binh-Dinh as they were defined before the hostilities.

(c) SOUTH VIET-NAM

Three provisional assembly areas shall be provided for the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam.

The boundaries of these areas are as follows:

1. *Xuyen-Moc, Ham-Tan Area*

Western boundary: The course of the Song-Ray extended northwards as far as Road No. 1 to a point thereon eight kilometres east of the intersection of Road No. 1 and Road No. 3.

Northern boundary: Road No. 1 from the above-mentioned intersection to the intersection with Route Communale No. 9 situated 27 kilometres west-south-west of Phanthiet and from that intersection a straight line to Kim Thanh on the coast.

2. *Plain des Joncs Area*

Northern boundary: The Viet-Nam-Cambodia frontier.

Western boundary: A straight line from Tong-Binh to Binh-Thanh.

Southern boundary: Course of the Fleuve Anterieur (Me-Kong) to ten kilometres south-east of Cao Lanh. From that point, a straight line as far as Ap-My-Dien, and from Ap-My-Dien a line parallel to and three kilometers east and then south of the Tong Doc-Loc Canal, this line reaches My-Hanh-Dong and thence Hung-Thanh-My.

Eastern boundary: A straight line from Hung-Thanh-My running northwards to the Cambodian frontier south of Doi-bao-Voi.

3. *Point Camau Area*

Northern boundary: The Song-Cai-lon from its mouth to its junction with the Rach-Nuoc-Trong, thence the Rach-Nuoc-Trong to the bend five kilometers north-east of Ap-Xeo-La. Thereafter a line to the Ngan-Dua Canal and following that Canal as far as Vinh-Hung. Finally, from Vinh-Hung a north-south line to the sea.

AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN CAMBODIA, JULY 20, 1954 [1]

CHAPTER I.—PRINCIPLES AND CONDITIONS GOVERNING EXECUTION OF THE CEASE-FIRE

Article 1

As from twenty-third July 1954 at 0800 hours (Pekin mean time) complete cessation of all hostilities throughout Cambodia shall be ordered and enforced by the Commanders of the Armed Forces of the two parties for all troops and personnel of the land, naval and air forces under their control.

---

[1] IC/52, 21 July, 1954. Original: French.

Article 2

In conformity with the principle of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indo-China, there shall be a simultaneous cessation of hostilities throughout Cambodia, in all the combat areas and for all the forces of the two parties.

To obviate any mistake or misunderstanding and to ensure that both the ending of hostilities and all other operations arising from cessation of hostilities are in fact simultaneous,

(a) due allowance being made for the time actually required for transmission of the cease-fire order down to the lowest echelons of the combatant forces of both sides, the two parties are agreed that the complete and simultaneous cease-fire throughout the territory of Cambodia shall become effective at 8 hours (local time) on 7 August 1954. It is agreed that Pakin mean time shall be taken as local time.

(b) Each side shall comply strictly with the time-table jointly agreed upon between the parties for the execution of all operations connected with the cessation of hostilities.

Article 3

All operations and movements connected with the execution of the cessation of hostilities must be carried out in a safe and orderly fashion.

(a) Within a number of days to be determined by the Commanders of both sides, after the cease-fire has been achieved, each party shall be responsible for removing and neutralizing mines, booby traps, explosives and any other dangerous devices placed by it. Should it be impossible to complete removal and neutralization before departure, the party concerned will mark the spot by placing visible signs. Sites thus cleared of mines and any other obstacles to the free movement of the personnel of the International Commission and the Joint Commission shall be notified to the latter by local military Commanders.

(b) Any incidents that may arise between the forces of the two sides and may result from mistakes or misunderstandings shall be settled on the spot so as to restrict their scope.

(c) During the days immediately preceding the cease-fire each party undertakes not to engage in any large-scale operation between the time when the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities is signed at Geneva and the time when the cease-fire comes into effect.

CHAPTER II—PROCEDURE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FOREIGN ARMED FORCES AND FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM THE TERRITORY OF CAMBODIA

Article 4

1. The withdrawal outside the territory of Cambodia shall apply to:

(a) the armed forces and military combatant personnel of the French Union;

(b) the combatant formations of all types which have entered the territory of Cambodia from other countries or regions of the peninsula;

(c) all the foreign elements (or Cambodians not natives of Cambodia) in the military formations of any kind or holding supervisory functions in all political or military, administrative, economic, financial or social bodies, having worked in liaison with the Viet-Nam military units.

2. The withdrawals of the forces and elements referred to in the foregoing paragraphs and their military supplies and materials must be completed within 90 days reckoning from the entry into force of the present Agreement.

3. The two parties shall guarantee that the withdrawals of all the forces will be effected in accordance with the purposes of the Agreement, and that they will not permit any hostile action or take any action likely to create difficulties for such withdrawals. They shall assist one another as far as possible.

4. While the withdrawals are proceeding, the two parties shall not permit any destruction or sabotage of public property or any attack on the life or property of the civilian population. They shall not permit any interference with the local civil administration.

5. The Joint Commission and the International Supervisory Commission shall supervise the execution of measures to ensure the safety of the forces during withdrawal.

6. The Joint Commission in Cambodia shall determine the detailed procedures for the withdrawals of the forces on the basis of the above-mentioned principles.

Chapter III—Other Questions

A. The Khmer Armed Forces, Natives of Cambodia

Article 5

The two parties shall undertake that within thirty days after the cease-fire order has been proclaimed, the Khmer Resistance Forces shall be demobilized on the spot; simultaneously, the troops of the Royal Khmer Army shall abstain from taking any hostile action against the Khmer Resistance Forces.

Article 6

The situation of these nationals shall be decided in the light of the Declaration made by the Delegation of Cambodia at the Geneva Conference, reading as follows:

"The Royal Government of Cambodia,

In the desire to ensure harmony and agreement among the peoples of the Kingdom.

Declares itself resolved to take the necessary measures to integrate all citizens, without discrimination, into the national community and to guarantee them the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms for which the Constitution of the Kingdom provides;

Affirms that all Cambodian citizens may freely participate as electors or candidates in general elections by secret ballot."

No reprisals shall be taken against the said nationals or their families, each national being entitled to the enjoyment, without any discrimination as compared with other nationals, of all constitutional guarantees concerning the protection of person and property and democratic freedoms.

Applicants therefore may be accepted for service in the Regular Army or local police formations if they satisfy the conditions required for current recruitment of the Army and Police Corps.

The same procedure shall apply to those persons who have returned to civilian life and who may apply for civilian employment on the same terms as other nationals.

B. BAN ON THE INTRODUCTION OF FRESH TROOPS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMAMENTS AND MUNITIONS, MILITARY BASES

Article 7

In accordance with the Declaration made by the Delegation of Cambodia at 2400 hours on 20 July 1954 at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers:

"The Royal Government of Cambodia will not join in any agreement with other States, if this agreement carries for Cambodia the obligation to enter into a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or, as long as its security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian territory for the military forces of foreign powers.

"During the period which will elapse between the date of the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam and that of the final settlement of political problems in this country, the Royal Government of Cambodia will not solicit foreign aid in war material, personnel or instructors except for the purpose of the effective defense of the territory."

C. CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND PRISONERS OF WAR—BURIAL

Article 8

The liberation and repatriation of all civilian internees and prisoners of war detained by each of the two parties at the coming into force of the present Agreement shall be carried out under the following conditions:

(a) All prisoners of war and civilian internees of whatever nationality, captured since the beginning of hostilities in Cambodia during military operations or in any other circumstances of war and in any part of the territory of Cambodia shall be liberated after the entry into force of the present Armistice agreement.

(b) The term "civilian internees" is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason or kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.

(c) All foreign prisoners of war captured by either party shall be surrendered to the appropriate authorities of the other party, who shall give them all possible assistance in proceeding to the destination of their choice.

Article 9

After the entry into force of the present Agreement, if the place of burial is known and the existence of graves has been established, the Cambodian commander shall, within a specified period, authorize the exhumation and removal of the bodies of deceased military personnel of the other party, including the bodies of prisoners of war or personnel deceased and buried on Cambodian territory.

The Joint Commission shall fix the procedures by which this task is to be carried out and the time limit within which it must be completed.

CHAPTER IV—JOINT COMMISSION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN CAMBODIA

Article 10

Responsibility for the execution of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall rest with the parties.

Article 11

An International Commission shall be responsible for control and supervision of the application of the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia. It shall be composed of representatives of the following States: Canada, India and Poland. It shall be presided over by the representative of India. Its headquarters shall be at Phnom-Penh.

Article 12

The International Commission shall set up fixed and mobile inspection teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned States.

The fixed teams shall be located at the following points: Phnom-Penh, Kompong-Cham, Kratie, Svay-Rieng, Kampot. These points of location may be altered at a later date by agreement between the Government of Cambodia and the International Commission.

The zones of action of the mobile teams shall be the regions bordering on the land and sea frontiers of Cambodia. The mobile teams shall have the right to move freely within the limits of their zones of action, and they shall receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may require for the fulfillment of their tasks (provision of personnel, access to documents needed for supervision, summoning of witnesses needed for enquiries, security and freedom of movement of the inspection teams, etc.). They shall have at their disposal such modern means of transport, observation and communication as they may require.

Outside the zones of action defined above, the mobile teams may, with the agreement of the Cambodian command, move about as required by the tasks assigned to them under the present Agreement.

Article 13

The International Commission shall be responsible for supervising the execution by the parties of the provisions of the present Agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfill the functions of control, observation, inspection and investigation connected with the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and shall in particular:

(a) control the withdrawal of foreign forces in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities and see that frontiers are respected;

(b) control the release of prisoners of war, and civilian internees;

(c) supervise, at ports and airfields and along all the frontiers of Cambodia, the application of the Cambodian declaration concerning the introduction into Cambodia of military personnel and war materials on grounds of foreign assistance.

Article 14

A Joint Commission shall be set up to facilitate the implementation of the clauses relating to the withdrawal of foreign forces.

The Joint Commission may form joint groups the number of which shall be decided by mutual agreement between the parties.

The Joint Commission shall facilitate the implementation of the clauses of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities relating to the simultaneous and general cease-fire in Cambodia for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties.

It shall assist the parties in the implementation of the said clauses; it shall ensure liaison between them for the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the implementation of the said clauses; it shall endeavor to settle any disputes between the parties arising out of the implementation of these clauses. The Joint Commission may send joint groups to follow the forces in their movements; such groups shall be disbanded once the withdrawal plans have been carried out.

Article 15

The Joint Commission shall be composed of an equal number of representatives of the Commands of the parties concerned.

Article 16

The International Commission shall, through the medium of the inspection teams mentioned above and as soon as possible, either on its own initiative or at the request of the Joint Commission or of one of the parties, undertake the necessary investigations both documentary and on the ground.

Article 17

The inspection teams shall transmit to the International Commission the results of their supervision, investigations and observations; furthermore, they shall draw up such special reports as they may consider necessary or as may be requested from them by the Commission. In the case of a disagreement within the teams, the findings of each member shall be transmitted to the Commission.

Article 18

If an inspection team is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or threat of a serious violation, the International Commission shall be informed; the Commission shall examine the reports and findings of the inspection teams and shall inform the parties of the measures to be taken for the settlement of the incident, ending of the violation or removal of the threat of violation.

Article 19

When the Joint Commission is unable to reach agreement on the interpretation of a provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.

Article 20

The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by a majority vote, subject to the provisions of article 21. If the votes are equally divided, the Chairman's vote shall be decisive.

The International Commission may make recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, in order to ensure more effective execution of the said Agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

Article 21

On questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, and in particular,

(a) refusal by foreign armed forces to effect the movements provided for in the withdrawal plan,

(b) violation or threats of violation of the country's integrity by foreign armed forces,

the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous.

Article 22

If one of the parties refuses to put a recommendation of the International Commission into effect, the parties concerned or the Commission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.

If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in article 21, it shall transmit a majority report and one or more minority reports to members of the Conference.

The International Commission shall inform the members of the Conference of all cases in which its work is being hindered.

Article 23

The International Commission shall be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China in order that it may be able to perform the tasks prescribed in article 13.

Article 24

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia shall act in close cooperation with the International Commissions in Viet-Nam and Laos.

The Secretaries-General of those three Commissions shall be responsible for coordinating their work and for relations between them.

Article 25

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia may, after consultation with the International Commissions in Viet-Nam and in Laos, and having regard to the development of the situation in Viet-Nam and in Laos, progressively reduce its activities. Such a decision must be adopted unanimously.

Chapter V—Implementation

Article 26

The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall ensure that persons under their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of the present Agreement are suitably punished.

Article 27

The present Agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall apply to all the armed forces of either party.

Article 28

The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall afford full protection and all possible assistance and co-operation to the Joint Commission and to the International Commission and its inspection teams in the performance of their functions.

Article 29

The Joint Commission, composed of an equal number of representatives of the Commands of the two parties, shall assist the parties in the implementation of all the clauses of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities, ensure liaison between the two parties, draw up plans for the implementation of the Agreement, and endeavour to settle any dispute arising out of the implementation of the said clauses and plans.

Article 30

The costs involved in the operation of the Joint Commission shall be shared equally between the two parties.

Article 31

The signatories of the present Agreement on the cessation of hostilities and their successors in their functions shall be responsible for the observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof. The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall, within their respective commands, take all steps and make all arrangements necessary to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the present Agreement by all personnel under their command.

Article 32

The procedures laid down in the present Agreement shall, whenever necessary be examined by the Commands of the two parties and, if necessary, defined more specifically by the Joint Commission.

Article 35

All the provisions of the present Agreement shall enter into force at 00 hours (Geneva time) on 28 July 1954.

Done at Geneva on 20 July 1954.

For the Commander-in-Chief of the Units of the Khmer Resistance Forces and for the Commander-in-Chief of the Viet-Namese Military Units
(signed) TA-QUANG-BUU
Vice-Minister of National Defence of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam

For the Commander-in-Chief of the Khmer National Armed Forces
(signed) General NHIEK TIOULONG

AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN LAOS, JULY 20, 1954 [1]

CHAPTER I—CEASE-FIRE AND EVACUATION OF FOREIGN ARMED FORCES AND FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL

Article 1

The Commanders of the armed forces of the parties in Laos shall order and enforce the complete cessation of all hostilities in Laos by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval and air forces.

Article 2

In accordance with the principle of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indo-China the cessation of hostilities shall be simultaneous throughout the territory of Laos in all combat areas and for all forces of the two parties.

In order to prevent any mistake or misunderstanding and to ensure that both the cessation of hostilities and the disengagement and movements of the opposing forces are in fact simultaneous.

(a) Taking into account the time effectively required to transmit the cease-fire order down to the lowest echelons of the combatant forces on both sides, the two parties are agreed that the complete and simultaneous cease-fire throughout the territory of Laos shall become effective at 8 hours (local time) on 6 August 1954. It is agreed that Pekin meantime shall be taken as local time.

(b) The Joint Commission for Laos shall draw up a schedule for the other operations resulting from the cessation of hostilities.

Note: The cease-fire shall become effective 15 days after the entry into force of the present Agreement.

Article 3

All operations and movements entailed by the cessation of hostilities and regrouping must proceed in a safe and orderly fashion:

(a) Within a number of days to be determined on the spot by the Joint Commission in Laos each party shall be responsible

[1] IC/51, Rev. 1, 20 July 1954, Original: French.

for removing and neutralizing mines, booby traps, explosives and any other dangerous substance placed by it. In the event of its being impossible to complete the work of removal and neutralization in time, the party concerned shall mark the spot by placing visible signs there.

(b) As regards the security of troops on the move following the lines of communication in accordance with the schedule previously drawn up by the Joint Armistice Commission in Laos, and the safety of the assembly areas, detailed measures shall be adopted in each case by the Joint Armistice Commission in Laos. In particular, while the forces of one party are withdrawing by a line of communication passing through the territory of the other party (road or waterways) the forces of the latter party shall provisionally withdraw two kilometres on either side of such line of communication, but in such a manner as to avoid interfering with the movement of the civil population.

Article 4

The withdrawals and transfers of military forces, supplies and equipment shall be effected in accordance with the following principles:

(a) The withdrawals and transfers of the military forces, supplies and equipment of the two parties shall be completed within a period of 120 days from the day on which the Armistice Agreement enters into force.

The two parties undertake to communicate their transfer plans to each other, for information, within 25 days of the entry into force of the present Agreement.

(b) The withdrawals of the Viet-Namese People's Volunteers from Laos to Viet-Nam shall be effected by provinces. The position of those volunteers who were settled in Laos before the hostilities shall form the subject of a special convention.

(c) The routes for the withdrawal of the forces of the French Union and Viet-Namese People's Volunteers in Laos from Laotian territory shall be fixed on the spot by the Joint Commission.

(d) The two parties shall guarantee that the withdrawals and transfers of all forces will be effected in accordance with the purposes of this Agreement, and that they will not permit any hostile action or take action of any kind whatever which might hinder such withdrawals or transfers. The parties shall assist each other as far as possible.

(e) While the withdrawals and transfers of the forces are proceeding, the two parties shall not permit any destruction or sabotage of any public property or any attack on the life or property of the local civilian population. They shall not permit any interference with the local civil administration.

(f) The Joint Commission and the International Commission shall supervise the implementation of measures to ensure the safety of the forces during withdrawal and transfer.

(g) The Joint Commission in Laos shall determine the detailed procedures for the withdrawals and transfers of the forces in accordance with the above-mentioned principles.

Article 5

During the days immediately preceding the cease-fire each party undertakes not to engage in any large-scale operation between the time when the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities is signed at Geneva and the time when the cease-fire comes into effect.

CHAPTER II—PROHIBITION OF THE INTRODUCTION OF FRESH TROOPS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMAMENTS AND MUNITIONS

Article 6

With effect from the proclamation of the cease-fire the introduction into Laos of any reinforcements of troops or military personnel from outside Laotian territory is prohibited.

Nevertheless, the French High Command may leave a specified number of French military personnel required for the training of the Laotian National Army in the territory of Laos; the strength of such personnel shall not exceed one thousand five hundred (1,500) officers and non-commissioned officers.

Article 7

Upon the entry into force of the present Agreement, the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout the territory of Laos.

Article 8

The High Command of the French forces shall maintain in the territory of Laos the personnel required for the maintenance of two French military establishments, the first at Seno and the second in the Mekong valley, either in the province of Vientiane or downstream from Vientiane.

The effectives maintained in these military establishments shall not exceed a total of three thousand five hundred (3,500) men.

Article 9

Upon the entry into force of the present Agreement and in accordance with the declaration made at the Geneva Conference by the Royal Government of Laos on 20 July 1954, the introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and military equipment of all kinds is prohibited, with the exception of a specified quantity of armaments in categories specified as necessary for the defence of Laos.

Article 10

The new armaments and military personnel permitted to enter Laos in accordance with the terms of Article 9 above shall enter Laos at the following points only: Luang-Prabang, Xieng-Khouang, Vientiane, Seno, Paksé, Savannakhet and Tchépone.

CHAPTER III—DISENGAGEMENT OF THE FORCES—ASSEMBLY AREAS—CONCENTRATION AREAS

Article 11

The disengagement of the armed forces of both sides, including concentration of the armed forces, movements to rejoin the provi-

sional assembly areas allotted to one party and provisional withdrawal movements by the other party, shall be completed within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days after the cease fire.

Article 12

The Joint Commission in Laos shall fix the site and boundaries:

—of the five (5) provisional assembly areas for the reception of the Vietnamese People's Volunteer Forces,

—of the five (5) provisional assembly areas for the reception of the French forces in Laos,

—of the twelve (12) provisional assembly areas, one to each province, for the reception of the fighting units of "Pathet Lao".

—The forces of the Laotian National Army shall remain *in situ* during the entire duration of the operations of disengagement and transfer of foreign forces and fighting units of "Pathet Lao".

Article 13

The foreign Forces shall be transferred outside Laotian territory as follows:

(1) *French Forces:* The French forces will be moved out of Laos by road (along routes laid down by the Joint Commission in Laos) and also by air and inland waterway;

(2) *Vietnamese People's Voulnteer forces:* These forces will be moved out of Laos by land, along routes and in accordance with a schedule to be determined by the Joint Commission in Laos in accordance with principle of simultaneous withdrawal of foreign forces.

Article 14

Pending a political settlement, the fighting units of "Pathet Lao", concentrated in the provisional assembly areas, shall move into the Provinces of Phongsaly and Sam-Neua, except for any military personnel who wish to be demobilised where they are. They will be free to move between these two Provinces in a corridor along the frontier between Laos and Viet-Nam bounded on the south by the Line SOP KIN, NA MI-SOP SANG, MUONG SON.

Concentration shall be completed within one-hundred-and-twenty (120) days from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement.

Article 15

Each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations for their activities during the hostilities and also undertakes to guarantee their democratic freedoms.

Chapter IV—Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees

Article 16

The liberation and repatriation of all prisoners of war and civilian internees detained by each of the two parties at the coming into

force of the present Agreement shall be carried out under the following conditions:

(a) All prisoners of war and civilian internees of Laotian and other nationalities caputed since the beginning of hostilities in Laos, during military operations or in any other circumstances of war and in any part of the territory of Laos, shall be liberated within a period of thirty (30) days after the date when the cease-fire comes into effect.

(b) The term "civilian internees" is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed strife between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason or kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.

(c) All foreign prisoners of war captured by either party shall be surrendered to the appropriate authorities of the other party, who shall give them all possible assistance in proceeding to the destination of their choice.

Chapter V—Miscellaneous

Article 17

The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall ensure that persons under their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of the present Agreement are suitably punished.

Article 18

In cases in which the place of burial is known and the existence of graves has been established, the Commander of the forces of either party shall, within a specified period after the entry into force of the present Agreement, permit the graves service of the other party to enter that part of Laotian territory under his military control for the purpose of finding and removing the bodies of deceased military personnel of that party, including the bodies of deceased prisoners of war.

The Joint Commission shall fix the procedures by which this task is carried out and the time limits within which it must be completed. The Commanders of the forces of each party shall communicate to the other all information in his possession as to the place of burial of military personnel of the other party.

Article 19

The present Agreement shall apply to all the armed forces of either party. The armed forces of each party shall respect the territory under the military control of the other party, and engage in no hostile act against the other party.

For the purpose of the present article the word "territory" includes territorial waters and air space.

Article 20

The Commander of the forces of the two parties shall afford full protection and all possible assistance and co-operation to the Joint Commission and its joint organs and to the International Commission and its inspection teams in the performance of the functions and tasks assigned to them by the present Agreement.

Article 21

The costs involved in the operation of the Joint Commission and its joint groups and of the International Commission and its inspection teams shall be shared equally between the two parties.

Article 22

The signatories of the present Agreement and their successors in their functions shall be responsible for the observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof. The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall, within their respective commands, take all steps and make all arrangements necessary to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the present Agreement by all military personnel under their command.

Article 23

The procedures laid down in the present Agreement shall, whenever necessary, be examined by the Commanders of the two parties and, if necessary, defined more specifically by the Joint Commission.

CHAPTER VI—JOINT COMMISSION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN LAOS

Article 24

Responsibility for the execution of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall rest with the parties.

Article 25

An International Commission shall be entrusted with control and supervision over the application of the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos. It shall be composed of representatives of the following States: Canada, India and Poland. It shall be presided over by the representative of India. Its headquarters shall be at Vientiane.

Article 26

The International Commission shall set up fixed and mobile inspection teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned States.

The fixed teams shall be located at the following points: Pakse, Seno, Tchepone, Vientiane, Xieng-Khouang, Phongsaly, Sophao (province of Samneua). These points of location may, at a later date, be altered by agreement between the Government of Laos and the International Commission.

The zones of action of the mobile teams shall be regions bordering the land frontiers of Laos. Within the limits of their zones of action, they shall have the right to move freely and shall receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may require for the fulfilment of their tasks (provisions of personnel, access to documents needed for supervision, summoning of witnesses needed for holding enquiries, the security and freedom of movement of the inspection teams etc. . . .). They shall have at their disposal such modern means of transport, observation and communication as they may require.

Outside the zones of action defined above, the mobile teams may, with the agreement of the Command of the party concerned, move about as required by the tasks assigned to them by the present Agreement.

Article 27

The International Commission shall be responsible for supervising the execution by the parties of the provisions of the present Agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfill the functions of control, observation, inspection and investigation connected with the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and shall in particular:

(a) Control the withdrawal of foreign forces in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities and see that frontiers are respected:

(b) Control the release of prisoners of war and civilian internees:

(c) Supervise, at ports and airfields and along all the frontiers of Laos, the implementation of the provisions regulating the introduction into Laos of military personnel and war materials;

(d) Supervise the implementation of the clauses of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities relating to rotation of personnel and to supplies for French Union security forces maintained in Laos.

Article 28

A Joint Commission shall be set up to facilitate the implementation of the clauses relating to the withdrawal of foreign forces.

The Joint Commission shall form joint groups, the number of which shall be decided by mutual agreement between the parties.

The Joint Commission shall facilitate the implementation of the clauses of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities relating to the simultaneous and general cease-fire in Laos for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties.

It shall assist the parties in the implementation of the said clauses; it shall ensure liaison between them for the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the implementation of the said clauses; it shall endeavour to settle any disputes between the parties arising out of the implementation of these clauses. The joint groups shall follow the forces in their movements and shall be disbanded once the withdrawal plans have been carried out.

Article 29

The Joint Commission and the joint groups shall be composed of an equal number of representatives of the commands of the parties concerned.

Article 30

The International Commission shall, through the medium of the inspection teams mentioned above, and as soon as possible, either on its own initiative, or at the request of the Joint Commission, or of one of the parties, undertake the necessary investigations both documentary and on the ground.

82-991 O - 75 - 15

Article 31

The inspection teams shall submit to the International Commission the results of their supervision, investigation and observations; furthermore, they shall draw up such special reports as they may consider necessary or as may be requested from them by the Commission. In the case of a disagreement within the teams, the findings of each member shall be transmitted to the Commission.

Article 32

If an inspection team is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or a threat of a serious violation, the International Commission shall be informed; the latter shall examine the reports and findings of the inspection teams and shall inform the parties of the measures which should be taken for the settlement of the incident, ending of the violation or removal of the threat of violation.

Article 33

When the Joint Commission is unable to reach an agreement on the interpretation of a provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.

Article 34

The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by majority vote, subject to the provisions contained in article 35. If the votes are equally divided, the chairman's vote shall be decisive.

The International Commission may make recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos, in order to ensure more effective execution of the said Agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

Article 35

On questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, and in particular,

(a) refusal by foreign armed forces to effect the movements provided for in the withdrawal plan;

(b) violation or threat of violation of the country's integrity by foreign armed forces,

the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous.

Article 36

If one of the parties refuses to put a recommendation of the International Commission into effect, the parties concerned or the Commission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.

If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in article 35, it shall transmit a majority report and one or more minority reports to the members of the Conference.

The International Commission shall inform the members of the Conference of all cases in which its work is being hindered.

Article 37

The International Commission shall be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China in order that it may be able to fulfill the tasks prescribed in article 27.

Article 38

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos shall act in close co-operation with the International Commissions in Viet-Nam and Cambodia.

The Secretaries-General of these three Commissions shall be responsible for co-ordinating their work and for relations between them.

Article 39

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos may, after consultation with the International Commissions in Cambodia and Viet-Nam, having regard to the development of the situation in Cambodia and Viet-Nam, progressively reduce its activities. Such a decision must be reduced unanimously. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

CHAPTER VII

Article 40

All the provisions of the present Agreement, save paragraph (a) of Article 2, shall enter into force at 24 hours (Geneva time) on 22 July 1954.

Article 41

Done in Geneva (Switzerland) on 20 July 1954, at 24 hours, in the French language.

FINAL DECLARATION OF GENEVA CONFERENCE, JULY 21, 1954[1]

Final declaration, dated July 21, 1954, of the Geneva Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China, in which the representatives of Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, France, Laos, the People's Republic of China, the State of Viet-Nam, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America took part.

1. The Conference takes note of the agreements ending hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam and organizing international control and the supervision of the execution of the provisions of these agreements.

2. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam; the Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam henceforth to play their part,

---

[1] IC/45/Rev. 2, 21 July 1954, Original: French.

in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations.

3. The Conference takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measures permitting all citizens to take their place in the national community, in particular by participating in the next general elections, which, in conformity with the constitution of each of these countries, shall take place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in conditions of respect for fundamental freedoms.

4. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam prohibiting the introduction into Viet-Nam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions. The Conference also takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors except for the purpose of the effective defence of their territory and, in the case of Laos, to the extent defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos.

5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam to the effect that no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The Conference also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign Powers.

6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Viet-Nam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. The Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Viet-Nam.

7. The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Viet-Namese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the

supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards.

8. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Viet-Nam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live.

9. The competent representative authorities of the Northern and Southern zones of Viet-Nam, as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with one of the parties during the war, or against members of such persons' families.

10. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the French Republic to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, at the request of the governments concerned and within periods which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties except in the cases where, by agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time.

11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to the effect that for the settlement of all the problems connected with the re-establishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, the French Government will proceed from the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam.

12. In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned states, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

13. The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on any question which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission in order to study such measures as may prove necessary to ensure that the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam are respected.

THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENTS IN INDOCHINA: Statement by the President, July 21, 1954 [1]

I am glad, of course, that agreement has been reached at Geneva to stop the bloodshed in Indochina.

The United States has not been a belligerent in the war. The primary responsibility for the settlement in Indochina rested with those nations which participated in the fighting. Our role at Geneva

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 2, 1954, p. 168.

has been at all times to try to be helpful where desired and to aid France and Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam to obtain a just and honorable settlement which will take into account the needs of the interested people. Accordingly, the United States has not itself been party to or bound by the decisions taken by the Conference, but it is our hope that it will lead to the establishment of peace consistent with the rights and the needs of the countries concerned. The agreement contains features which we do not like, but a great deal depends on how they work in practice.

The United States is issuing at Geneva a statement to the effect that it is not prepared to join in the Conference declaration, but, as loyal members of the United Nations, we also say that, in compliance with the obligations and principles contained in article 2 of the United Nations Charter, the United States will not use force to disturb the settlement. We also say that any renewal of Communist aggression would be viewed by us as a matter of grave concern.

As evidence of our resolve to assist Cambodia and Laos to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of free nations, we are requesting the agreement of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to our appointment of an Ambassador or Minister to be resident at their respective capitals (Phnom Penh and Vientiane). We already have a Chief of Mission at Saigon, the capital of Viet-Nam, and this Embassy will, of course, be maintained.

The United States is actively pursuing discussions with other free nations with a view to the rapid organization of a collective defense in Southeast Asia in order to prevent further direct or indirect Communist aggression in that general area.

(*This unilateral declaration by the United States Government sets forth its position with regard to the Geneva Accords, which it did not sign.*)

STATEMENT BY THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE[1] AT THE CONCLUDING PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, JULY 21, 1954[2]

As I stated on July 18, my Government is not prepared to join in a declaration by the Conference such as is submitted. However, the United States makes this unilateral declaration of its position in these matters:

Declaration

The Government of the United States being resolved to devote its efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations takes note of the agreements concluded at Geneva on July 20 and 21, 1954 between (a) the Franco-Laotian Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam; (b) the Royal Khmer Army Command and the Com-

[1] Walter Bedell Smith.
[2] Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 2, 1954, pp., 162–163.

mand of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam; (c) Franco-Vietnamese Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam and of paragraphs 1 to 12 inclusive of the declaration presented to the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954 declares with regard to the aforesaid agreements and paragraphs that (i) it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force; and (ii) it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

In connection with the statement in the declaration concerning free elections in Viet-Nam my Government wishes to make clear its position which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington on June 29, 1954, as follows:

> In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly.

With respect to the statement made by the representative of the State of Viet-Nam, the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. Nothing in its declaration just made is intended to or does indicate any departure from this traditional position.

We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the peoples of that area to determine their own future.

(This treaty was envisaged by the United States several years before its creation but was especially sought by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles after the Geneva Conference. The treaty entered into force on February 19, 1955.)

SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY AND PROTOCOL THERETO, SEPTEMBER 8, 1954[1]

Text of Treaty

The Parties to this Treaty,

Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the Parties,

Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly strive by

[1] 6 UST 81; Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3170.

every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities,

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the treaty area,

Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the Parties stand together in the area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article II

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

Article III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.

Article IV

1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independ-

ence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

ARTICLE V

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagements in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE VII

Any other State in a position to further the objectives of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be invited to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE VIII

As used in this Treaty, the "treaty area" is the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include

within the treaty area the territory of any State acceding to this Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise to change the treaty area.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that government to the other signatories.

2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all of the other signatories of such deposit.

3. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect to each other State on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE XI

The English text of this Treaty is binding on the Parties, but when the Parties have agreed to the French text thereof and have so notified the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be equally authentic and binding on the Parties.

Understanding of the United States of America

The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

For Australia:
R. G. CASEY

For France:
G. LA CHAMBRE

For New Zealand:
CLIFTON WEBB

For Pakistan:

Signed for transmission to my Government for its consideration and action in accordance with the Constitution of Pakistan.

ZAFRULLA KHAN

For the Republic of the Philippines:

CARLOS P. GARCIA
FRANCISCO A. DELGADO
TOMAS L. CABILI
LORENZO M. TAÑADA
CORNELIO T. VILLAREAL

For the Kingdom of Thailand:

WAN WAITHAYAKON KROMMUN NARADHIP BONGSPRABANDH

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

READING

For the United States of America:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES
H. ALEXANDER SMITH
MICHAEL J. MANSFIELD

I CERTIFY THAT the foregoing is a true copy of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty concluded and signed in the English language at Manila, on September 8, 1954, the signed original of which is deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Department of Foreign Affairs to be affixed at the City of Manila, this 14th day of October, 1954.

[SEAL]

Raul S. Manglapus
RAUL S. MANGLAPUS
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs

Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty

DESIGNATION OF STATES AND TERRITORY AS TO WHICH PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE IV AND ARTICLE III ARE TO BE APPLICABLE

The Parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty unanimously designate for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam.

The Parties further agree that the above mentioned states and territory shall be eligible in respect of the economic measures contemplated by Article III.

This Protocol shall enter into force simultaneously with the coming into force of the Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

(*With the Geneva accords, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia became fully independent states. Accordingly this communique announced agreement by France and United States to channel U.S. assistance directly to these countries.*)

DIRECT AID TO THE ASSOCIATED STATES: Communiqué Regarding Franco-American Conversations, September 29, 1954 [1]

Representatives of the two Governments have had very frank and useful talks which have shown the community of their views, and are in full agreement on the objectives to be attained.

The conclusion of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in Manila on September 8, 1954, has provided a firmer basis than heretofore to assist the free nations of Asia in developing and maintaining their independence and security. The representatives of France and the United States wish to reaffirm the support of their Governments for the principles of self-government, independence, justice and liberty proclaimed by the Pacific Charter in Manila on September 8, 1954.

The representatives of France and the United States reaffirm the intention of their governments to support the complete independence of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam. Both France and the United States will continue to assist Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam in their efforts to safeguard their freedom and independence and to advance the welfare of their peoples. In this spirit France and the United States are assisting the Government of Viet-Nam in the resettlement of the Vietnamese who have of their own free will moved to free Viet-Nam and who already number some 300,000.

In order to contribute to the security of the area pending the further development of national forces for this purpose, the representatives of France indicated that France is prepared to retain forces of its Expeditionary Corps, in agreement with the government concerned, within the limits permitted under the Geneva agreements and to an extent to be determined. The United States will consider the question of financial assistance for the Expeditionary Corps in these circumstances in addition to support for the forces of each of the three Associated States. These questions vitally affect each of the three Associated States and are being fully discussed with them.

The channel for French and United States economic aid, budgetary support, and other assistance to each of the Associated States will be direct to that state. The United States representatives will begin discussions soon with the respective governments of the Associated States regarding direct aid. The methods for efficient coordination of French and United States aid programs to each of the three Associated States are under consideration and will be developed in discussions with each of these states.

After the bilateral talks, the chiefs of diplomatic missions in Washington of Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam were invited to a final meeting to have an exchange of views and information on these

[1] Issued at Washington: Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 11, 1954, p. 534. The United States was represented by Acting Secretary Smith and France by Guy LaChambre, Minister of State for Relations with the Three Associated States, and Edgar Faure, Finance Minister.

matters. The representatives of all five countries are in complete agreement on the objectives of peace and freedom to be achieved in Indochina.

AID TO THE STATE OF VIET-NAM: Message From the President of the United States to the President of the Council of Ministers of Viet-Nam, October 23, 1954 [1]

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Viet-Nam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. The implications of the agreement concerning Viet-Nam have caused grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping, weakened by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their subversive collaborators within.

Your recent requests for aid to assist in the formidable project of the movement of several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese citizens away from areas which are passing under a *de facto* rule and political ideology which they abhor, are being fulfilled. I am glad that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort.

We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Viet-Nam to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Viet-Nam. I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Government, how an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Viet-Nam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied.

The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Viet-Nam in undertaking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent Viet-Nam endowed with a strong government. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people.

MISSION OF THE SPECIAL UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE IN VIET-NAM: [2] Statement Issued by the White House, November 3, 1954 [3]

The President on November 3 designated Gen. J. Lawton Collins as Special United States Representative in Viet-Nam with the per-

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 15, 1954, pp. 735–736.
[2] Gen. J. Lawton Collins.
[3] Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 22, 1954, pp. 777–778.

sonal rank of Ambassador, to undertake a diplomatic mission of limited duration. He will coordinate the operations of all U.S. agencies in that country.

General Collins will proceed immediately to Saigon, where he will confer with Ambassador Donald R. Heath prior to the latter's already scheduled return to the United States for reassignment following 4½ years of distinguished service in Indochina. For the duration of this assignment General Collins will relinquish his other duties, including that of U.S. representative on the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Since the conclusion of hostilities in Indochina, the U.S. Government has been particularly concerned over developments in Viet-Nam, a country ravaged by 8 years of war, artificially divided into armistice zones, and confronted by dangerous forces threatening its independence and security.

The U.S. Government is fully aware of the immense tasks facing the Government of Viet-Nam in its effort to achieve solidarity, internal security, and economic rehabilitation. The United States has already played an important role in the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Communist rule in North Viet-Nam.

Moreover, as the President told Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem in his letter of October 23d, U.S. representatives in Viet-Nam have been instructed to consider with the Vietnamese authorities how a program of American aid given directly to Viet-Nam can best assist that country. General Collins will explore this matter with Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem and his Government in order to help them resolve their present critical problems and to supplement measures adopted by the Vietnamese themselves.

In executing his temporary mission, General Collins will maintain close liaison with the French Commissioner General, Gen. Paul Ely, for the purpose of exchanging views on how best, under existing circumstances, the freedom and welfare of Viet-Nam can be safeguarded.

(A national referendum on October 23, 1955 deposed Bao Dai, former Emperor and since March 7, 1949, head of state of Vietnam, who had lived mostly abroad. On October 26, Diem became first President of South Vietnam and proclaimed a Republic.)

RECOGNITION OF THE NEW CHIEF OF STATE OF VIET-NAM: Statement by the Department of State, October 26, 1955 [1]

On October 26, the Government of Viet-Nam sent the following communication to the American Embassy at Saigon:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to inform the United States Embassy that by referendum October 23 the Vietnamese people have pronounced themselves in favor of the deposition of Bao Dai and have recognized President Diem as Chief of State. It is hoped that the Government of the United States will continue as

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 7, 1955, p. 760.

in the past to entertain diplomatic relations with the new Government of the State of Viet-Nam."

U.S. Ambassador G. Frederick Reinhardt, under instructions, has replied as follows:

"The Government of the United States looks forward to maintaining with the new Government of Viet-Nam the same cordial and friendly relations which have in the past so happily existed between the two governments."

The United States affirms its intention to maintain friendly relations with the Government of Viet-Nam. We are glad to see the evolution of orderly and effective democratic processes in an area of Southeast Asia which has been and continues to be threatened by Communist efforts to impose totalitarian control.

(This address by Assistant Secretary of State Robertson restated American policy and was delivered at a time of relative stability in South Vietnam.)

UNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO VIET-NAM: Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Washington, June 1, 1956[1]

This past March, I had the pleasure of accompanying the Secretary of State on his visit to Saigon where we conversed with President Diem on the present and future problems of Viet-Nam. I was struck, as so many other recent observers have been, at the progress Free Viet-Nam has made in a few short months toward stability, security, and strength. President Diem seemed to reflect this progress in his own person. On the occasion of our earlier visit some 15 months ago, he seemed tense and gravely concerned about the problems facing Viet-Nam. This time he was reposed, poised, and appeared confident of the future of his country.

Among the factors that explain the remarkable rise of Free Viet-Nam from the shambles created by 8 years of murderous civil and international war, the division of the country at Geneva and the continuing menace of predatory communism, there is in the first place the dedication, courage, and resourcefulness of President Diem himself. In him, his country has found a truly worthy leader whose integrity and devotion to his country's welfare have become generally recognized among his people. Asia has given us in President Diem another great figure, and the entire free world has become the richer for his example of determination and moral fortitude. There is no more dramatic example of this fortitude than President Diem's decisions during the tense and vital days of the battle against the parasitic politico-religious sects in the city of Saigon in the spring of 1955. These decisions were to resist the multiple pressures to compromise that were building up around him, and to struggle to the

---

[1] Department of State press release No. 289, May 31, 1956 (also printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 11, 1956, pp. 972–974). This address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter S. Robertson, was delivered before the American Friends of Viet-Nam, meeting at the Willard Hotel in Washington.

victorious end for the sake of a just cause. The free world owes him a debt of gratitude for his determined stand at that fateful hour.

Consider Viet-Nam at three stages in its recent history:

First, in mid-1954, partitioned by fiat of the great powers against the will of the Vietnamese people, devoid of governmental machinery or military strength, drifting without leadership and without hope in the backwash of the defeat administered by the combined weight of Communist-impressed infantry and of Chinese and Russian arms.

Secondly, in early 1955, faced with the military and subversive threat of the Communists north of the 17th parallel, confronted with internal strife, its government challenged by the armed, self-seeking politico-religious sects, its army barely reformed and of uncertain loyalty, assailed from within by the most difficult problems, including that of having to absorb the sudden influx of three-quarters of a million refugees who would rather leave their ancestral lands and homes than suffer life under Communist tyranny:

And finally Viet-Nam today, in mid-1956, progressing rapidly to the establishment of democratic institutions by elective processes, its people resuming peaceful pursuits, its army growing in effectiveness, sense of mission, and morale, the puppet Vietnamese politicians discredited, the refugees well on the way to permanent resettlement, the countryside generally orderly and calm, the predatory sects eliminated and their venal leaders exiled or destroyed.

Perhaps no more eloquent testimony to the new state of affairs in Viet-Nam could be cited than the voice of the people themselves as expressed in their free election of last March. At that time the last possible question as to the feeling of the people was erased by an overwhelming majority for President Diem's leadership. The fact that the Viet Minh was unable to carry out its open threats to sabotage these elections is impressive evidence of the stability and prestige of the government.

The United States is proud to be on the side of the effort of the Vietnamese people under President Diem to establish freedom, peace, and the good life. The United States wishes to continue to assist and to be a loyal and trusted friend of Viet-Nam.

Our policies in Viet-Nam may be simply stated as follows:

To support a friendly non-Communist government in Viet-Nam and to help it diminish and eventually eradicate Communist subversion and influence.

To help the Government of Viet-Nam establish the forces necessary for internal security.

To encourage support for Free Viet-Nam by the non-Communist world.

To aid in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of a country and people ravaged by 8 ruinous years of civil and international war.

Our efforts are directed first of all toward helping to sustain the internal security forces consisting of a regular army of about 150,000 men, a mobile civil guard of some 45,000, and local defense units which are being formed to give protection against subversion on the village level. We are providing budgetary support and equipment for these forces and have a mission assisting the training of

the army. We are also helping to organize, train, and equip the Vietnamese police force. The refugees who have fled to South Viet-Nam to escape the Viet Minh are being resettled on productive lands with the assistance of funds made available by our aid program. In various ways our aid program also provides assistance to the Vietnamese Government designed to strengthen the economy and provide a better future for the common people of the country. The Vietnamese are increasingly giving attention to the basic development of the Vietnamese economy and to projects that may contribute directly to that goal. We give our aid and counsel to this program only as freely invited.

I do not wish to minimize the magnitude of the task that still remains and of the problems that still confront this staunch and valiant member of the free world fighting for its independence on the threshold of the Communist heartland of Asia.

The Communist conspiracy continues to threaten Free Viet-Nam. With monstrous effrontery, the Communist conspirators at Hanoi accuse Free Viet-Nam and its friends of violating the armistice provisions which the Vietnamese, and their friends, including ourselves, have scrupulously respected despite the fact that neither the Vietnamese nor ourselves signed the Geneva Accords while they, the Communists who have solemnly undertaken to be bound by these provisions, have violated them in the most blatant fashion.

The facts are that while on the one hand the military potential of Free Viet-Nam has been drastically reduced by the withdrawal of nearly 200,000 members of the French Expeditionary Corps and by the reduction of the Vietnamese Army by more than 50,000 from the time of the armistice to the present as well as by the outshipment from Viet-Nam since the cessation of hostilities of over $200 million worth of war equipment, we have on the other hand reports of steady constant growth of the warmaking potential of the Communists north of the 17th parallel.

Our reports reveal that in complete disregard of its obligations, the Viet Minh have imported voluminous quantities of arms across the Sino-Viet Minh border and have imported a constant stream of Chinese Communist military personnel to work on railroads, to rebuild roads, to establish airports, and to work on other projects contributing to the growth of the military potential of the zone under Communist occupation.

As so eloquently stated by the British Government in a diplomatic note released to the press and sent to Moscow in April of this year, and I quote:

> **The Viet Minh army has been so greatly strengthened by the embodiment and re-equipment of irregular forces that instead of the 7 Viet Minh divisions in existence in July 1954 there are now no less than 20. This striking contrast between massive military expansion in the North and the withdrawal and reduction of military forces in the South speaks for itself.**

By lies, propaganda, force, and deceit, the Communists in Hanoi would undermine Free Viet-nam, whose fall they have been unable to secure by their maneuverings on the diplomatic front. These people, whose crimes against suffering humanity are so vividly described in the book by Lt. Dooley who addressed you this morn-

ing, have sold their country to Peiping. They have shamelessly followed all the devious zigzags of the Communist-bloc line so that their alliance with Communist China and the Soviet Union is firmly consolidated. These are the people who are now inviting President Diem to join them in a coalition government to be set up through so-called "free elections."

President Diem and the Government of Free Viet-Nam reaffirmed on April 6 of this year and on other occasions their desire to seek the reunification of Viet-Nam by peaceful means. In this goal, we support them fully. We hope and pray that the partition of Viet-Nam, imposed against the will of the Vietnamese people, will speedily come to an end. For our part we believe in free elections, and we support President Diem fully in his position that if elections are to be held, there first must be conditions which preclude intimidation or coercion of the electorate. Unless such conditions exist there can be no free choice.

May those leaders of the north in whom the spirit of true patriotism still survives realize the futility of the Communist efforts to subvert Free Viet-Nam by force or guile. May they force the abandonment of these efforts and bring about the peaceful demobilization of the large standing armies of the Viet Minh. May they, above all, return to the just cause of all those who want to reunify their country in peace and independence and for the good of all the people of Viet-Nam.

* * * * * * *

(Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem visited Washington, D.C., from May 8 to 11, at which time this communique was issued. Viet Cong activity then was still at minor level.)

VIETNAMESE-UNITED STATES RELATIONS; Joint Statement Issued at Washington by the President of the United States and the President of Viet-Nam, May 11, 1957[1]

His Excellency Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of Viet-Nam, and President Eisenhower have held discussions during President Ngo Dinh Diem's state visit as the guest of President Eisenhower during May 8-10.

Their discussions have been supplemented by meetings between President Ngo Dinh Diem and his advisers and Secretary of State Dulles and other American officials. These meetings afforded the occasion for reaffirming close mutual friendship and support between the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States. The two Presidents exchanged views on the promotion of peace and stability and the development and consolidation of freedom in Viet-Nam and in the Far East as a whole.

President Eisenhower complimented President Ngo Dinh Diem on the remarkable achievements of the Republic of Viet-Nam under the

[1] White House press release (text as printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 27, 1957, pp. 851-852).

leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem since he took office in July 1954. It was noted that in less than three years a chaotic situation resulting from years of war had been changed into one of progress and stability.

Nearly one million refugees who had fled from Communist tyranny in North Viet-Nam had been cared for and resettled in Free Viet-Nam.

Internal security had been effectively established.

A constitution had been promulgated and a national assembly elected.

Plans for agrarian reform have been launched, and a constructive program developed to meet long-range economic and social problems to promote higher living standards for the Vietnamese people.

President Ngo Dinh Diem reviewed with President Eisenhower the efforts and means of the Vietnamese Government to promote political stability and economic welfare in the Republic of Vietnam. President Eisenhower assured President Ngo Dinh Diem of the willingness of the United States to continue to offer effective assistance within the constitutional processes of the United States to meet these objectives.

President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem looked forward to an end of the unhappy division of the Vietnamese people and confirmed the determination of the two Governments to work together to seek suitable means to bring about the peaceful unification of Vietnam in freedom in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. It was noted with pleasure that the General Assembly of the United Nations by a large majority had found the Republic of Vietnam qualified for membership in the United Nations, which has been prevented by Soviet opposition.

President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem noted in contrast the large buildup of Vietnamese Communist military forces in North Vietnam during the past 2½ years, the harsh suppression of the revolts of the people of North Vietnam in seeking liberty, and their increasing hardships. While noting the apparent diminution during the last 3 years of Communist-inspired hostilities in southeast Asia except in the Kingdom of Laos, President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem expressed concern over continuing Communist subversive capabilities in this area and elsewhere. In particular, they agreed that the continued military buildup of the Chinese Communists, their refusal to renounce the use of force, and their unwillingness to subscribe to standards of conduct of civilized nations constitute a continuing threat to the safety of all free nations in Asia. To counter this threat, President Ngo Dinh Diem indicated his strong desire and his efforts to seek closer cooperation with the free countries of Asia.

Nothing that the Republic of Vietnam is covered by Article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem agreed that aggression or subversion threatening the political independence of the Republic of Vietnam would be considered as endangering peace and stability. The just settlement of problems of the area by peaceful and legitimate means

within the framework of the United Nations Charter will continue to be the mutual concern of both Governments. Finally, President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem expressed the desire and determination of the two Governments to cooperate closely together for freedom and independence in the world.

(Viet Cong activity began to increase by late 1957, obviously at the direction of North Vietnam, and reached serious proportions by 1959.)

THE IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF THE SECURITY AND PROGRESS OF VIET-NAM: Address by the President (Eisenhower), Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, April 4, 1959 (Excerpt)[1]

* * * * * * *

Let us consider briefly the country of Viet-Nam and the importance to us of the security and progress of that country. It is located, as you know, in the southeastern corner of Asia, exactly halfway round the world from Gettysburg College.

Viet-Nam is a country divided into two parts, like Korea and Germany. The southern half, with its 12 million people, is free but poor. It is an underdeveloped country; its economy is weak, average individual income being less than $200 a year. The northern half has been turned over to communism. A line of demarcation running along the 17th parallel separates the two. To the north of this line stand several Communist divisions. These facts pose to south Viet-Nam two great tasks: self-defense and economic growth.

Understandably the people of Viet-Nam want to make their country a thriving, self-sufficient member of the family of nations. This means economic expansion.

For Viet-Nam's economic growth, the acquisition of capital is vitally necessary. Now, the nation could create the capital needed for growth by stealing from the already meager rice bowls of its people and regimenting them into work battalions. This enslavement is the commune system, adopted by the new overlords of Red China. It would mean, of course, the loss of freedom within the country without any hostile outside action whatsoever.

Another way for Viet-Nam to get the necessary capital is through private investments from the outside and through governmental loans and, where necessary, grants from other and more fortunately situated nations.

In either of these ways the economic problem of Viet-Nam could be solved. But only the second way can preserve freedom.

And there is still the other of Viet-Nam's great problems—how to support the military forces it needs without crushing its economy.

Because of the proximity of large Communist military formations in the north, Free Viet-Nam must maintain substantial numbers of

[1] White House press release dated Apr. 4, 1959 (text as printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 27, 1959, pp. 579–583).

men under arms. Moreover, while the Government has shown real progress in cleaning out Communist guerrillas, those remaining continue to be a disruptive influence in the nation's life.

Unassisted, Viet-Nam cannot at this time produce and support the military formations essential to it or, equally important, the morale —the hope, the confidence, the pride—necessary to meet the dual threat of aggression from without and subversion within its borders.

Still another fact! Strategically south Viet-Nam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement. The freedom of 12 million people would be lost immediately and that of 150 million others in adjacent lands would be seriously endangered. The loss of south Viet-Nam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom.

Viet-Nam must have a reasonable degree of safety now—both for her people and for her property. Because of these facts, military as well as economic help is currently needed in Viet-Nam.

We reach the inescapable conclusion that our own national interests demand some help from us in sustaining in Viet-Nam the morale, the economic progress, and the military strength necessary to its continued existence in freedom.

* * * * * * *

(*In view of the worsening situation in South Vietnam, President Kennedy announced on May 5, 1961 that Vice President Johnson would discuss with President Ngo Dinh Diem measures to help the country resist Communist pressures. The joint communique set forth the outcome of these discussions.*)

JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED AT SAIGON BY THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PRESIDENT OF VIET-NAM, MAY 13, 1961 [1]

Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice President of the United States, has just completed a visit to the Republic of Viet-Nam, on behalf of President Kennedy and on invitation of President Ngo Dinh Diem.

The enthusiastic welcome he received in Viet-Nam reflected a deep sense of common cause in the fight for freedom in Southeast Asia and around the world.

This recognition of mutual objectives resulted in concrete understandings between the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States.

It is clear to the Government and the people of Viet-Nam and to the United States that the independence and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam are being brutally and systematically violated by Communist agents and forces from the north.

It is also clear to both Governments that action must be strengthened and accelerated to protect the legitimate rights and aspirations of the people of free Viet-Nam to choose their own way of life.

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, June 19, 1961, pp. 956–957.

The two Governments agreed that this is the basic principle upon which their understandings rest.

The United States, for its part, is conscious of the determination, energy and sacrifices which the Vietnamese people, under the dedicated leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem, have brought to the defense of freedom in their land.

The United States is also conscious of its responsibility and duty, in its own self-interest as well as in the interest of other free peoples, to assist a brave country in the defense of its liberties against unprovoked subversion and Communist terror. It has no other motive than the defense of freedom.

The United States recognizes that the President of the Republic of Viet-Nam, Ngo Dinh Diem, who was recently reelected to office by an overwhelming majority of his countrymen despite bitter Communist opposition, is in the vanguard of those leaders who stand for freedom on the peripbery of the Communist empire in Asia.

Free Viet-Nam cannot alone withstand the pressure which this Communist empire is exerting against it. Under these circumstances —the need of free Viet-Nam for increased and accelerated emergency assistance and the will and determination of the United States to provide such assistance to those willing to fight for their liberties —it is natural that a large measure of agreement on the means to accomplish the joint purpose was found in high-level conversations between the two Governments.

Both Governments recognize that under the circumstances of guerrilla warfare now existing in free Viet-Nam, it is necessary to give high priority to the restoration of a sense of security to the people of free Viet-Nam. This priority, however, in no way diminishes the necessity, in policies and programs of both Governments, to pursue vigorously appropriate measures in other fields to achieve a prosperous and happy society.

The following measures, agreed in principle and subject to prompt finalization and implementation, represent an increase and acceleration of United States assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam. These may be followed by more far-reaching measures if the situation, in the opinion of both Governments, warrants.

First, it was agreed by the two Governments to extend and build upon existing programs of military and economic aid and to infuse into their joint actions a high sense of urgency and dedication.

Second, it was agreed that regular armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam should be increased, and that the United States would extend its military assistance programs to include support for an additional number of regular Vietnamese armed forces.

Third, it was agreed that the United States would provide military assistance program support for the entire Vietnamese civil guard force.

Fourth, it was agreed that the two Governments should collaborate in the use of military specialists to assist and work with Vietnamese armed forces in health, welfare and public works activities in the villages of free Viet-Nam.

Fifth, it was agreed that the assistance of other free governments to the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam in its trouble against Communist guerrilla forces would be welcome.

Sixth, it was agreed that, to achieve the best possible use of available resources, the Vietnamese and the United States, in prosecution of their joint effort against Communist attacks in Viet-Nam, a group of highly qualified economic and fiscal experts would meet in Viet-Nam to work out a financial plan on which joint efforts should be based.

Seventh, it was agreed that the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam would discuss new economic and social measures to be undertaken in rural areas, to accompany the anti-guerrilla effort, in order that the people of Viet-Nam should benefit promptly from the restoration of law and order in their villages and provinces.

Eighth, it was agreed that, in addition to measures to deal with the immediate Viet-Nam guerrilla problem, the two Governments would work together toward a longer range economic development program, including further progress in the fields of agriculture, health, educations, fisheries, highways, public administration, and industrial development.

These longer range plans and programs would be developed in detail after further consideration and discussion.

Their goal would be a Viet-Nam capable of a self-sustained economic growth.

President Ngo Dinh Diem and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, on behalf of President Kennedy, established a sense of mutual confidence and respect which both believe essential to fulfillment of their objectives.

(*In this exchange of messages, President Kennedy pledged increased assistance to Vietnam's defense effort.*)

EXCHANGES OF MESSAGES BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM, DECEMBER 14 AND DECEMBER 7, 1961 [1]

President Kennedy to President Diem

DECEMBER 14, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your recent letter in which you described so cogently the dangerous condition caused by North Viet-Nam's efforts to take over your country. The situation in your embattled country is well known to me and to the American people. We have been deeply disturbed by the assault on your country. Our indignation has mounted as the deliberate savagery of the Communist program of assassination, kidnapping and wanton violence became clear.

Your letter underlines what our own information has convincingly shown—that the campaign of force and terror now being waged against your people and your Government is supported and directed from the outside by the authorities at Hanoi. They have thus vio-

---

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 1, 1962, pp. 13–14.

lated the provisions of the Geneva Accords designed to ensure peace in Viet-Nam and to which they bound themselves in 1954.

At that time, the United States, although not a party to the Accords, declared that it "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security." We continue to maintain that view.

In accordance with that declaration, and in response to your request, we are prepared to help the Republic of Viet-Nam to protect its people and to preserve its independence. We shall promptly increase our assistance to your defense effort as well as help relieve the destruction of the floods which you describe. I have already given the orders to get these programs underway.

The United States, like the Republic of Viet-Nam, remains devoted to the cause of peace and our primary purpose is to help your people maintain their independence. If the Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam will stop their campaign to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam, the measures we are taking to assist your defense efforts will no longer be necessary. We shall seek to persuade the Communists to give up their attempts of force and subversion. In any case, we are confident that the Vietnamese people will preserve their independence and gain the peace and prosperity for which they have sought so hard and so long.

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

President Diem to President Kennedy

DECEMBER 7, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Since its birth, more than six years ago, the Republic of Viet-Nam has enjoyed the close friendship and cooperation of the United States of America.

Like the United States, the Republic of Viet-Nam has always been devoted to the preservation of peace. My people know only too well the sorrows of war. We have honored the 1954 Geneva Agreements even though they resulted in the partition of our country and the enslavement of more than half of our people by Communist tyranny. We have never considered the reunification of our nation by force. On the contrary, we have publicly pledged that we will not violate the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone set up by the agreements. We have always been prepared and have on many occasions stated our willingness to reunify Viet-Nam on the basis of democratic and truly free elections.

The record of the Communist authorities in the northern part of our country is quite otherwise. They not only consented to the division of Viet-Nam, but were eager for it. They pledged themselves to observe the Geneva Agreements and during the seven years since have never ceased to violate them. They call for free elections but are ignorant of the very meaning of the words. They talk of "peaceful reunification" and wage war against us.

From the beginning, the Communists resorted to terror in their efforts to subvert our people, destroy our government, and impose a Communist regime upon us. They have attacked defenseless teachers, closed schools, killed members of our anti-malarial program and looted hospitals. This is coldly calculated to destroy our government's humanitarian efforts to serve our people.

We have long sought to check the Communist attack from the North on our people by appeals to the International Control Commission. Over the years, we have repeatedly published to the world the evidence of the Communist plot to overthrow our government and seize control of all of Viet-Nam by illegal intrusions from outside our country. The evidence has mounted until now it is hardly necessary to rehearse it. Most recently, the kidnapping and brutal

murder of our Chief Liaison Officer to the International Control Commission, Colonel Nguang Thuy Nam, compelled us to speak out once more. In our October 24, 1961, letter to the ICC, we called attention again to the publicly stated determination of the Communist authorities in Hanoi to "liberate the South" by the overthrow of my government and the imposition of a Communist regime on our people. We cited the proof of massive infiltration of Communist agents and military elements into our country. We outlined the Communist strategy, which is simply the ruthless use of terror against the whole population, women and children included.

In the course of the last few months, the Communist assault on my people has achieved high ferocity. In October they caused more than 1,800 incidents of violence and more than 2,000 casualties. They have struck occasionally in battalion strength, and they are continually augmenting their forces by infiltration from the North. The level of their attacks is already such that our forces are stretched to the utmost. We are forced to defend every village, every hamlet, indeed every home against a foe whose tactic is always to strike at the defenseless.

A disastrous flood was recently added to the misfortunes of the Vietnamese people. The greater part of three provinces was inundated, with a great loss of property. We are now engaged in a nationwide effort to reconstruct and rehabilitate this area. The Communists are, of course, making this task doubly difficult, for they have seized upon the disruption of normal administration and communications as an opportunity to sow more destruction in the stricken area.

In short, the Vietnamese nation now faces what is perhaps the gravest crisis in its long history. For more than 2,000 years my people have lived and built, fought and died in this land. We have not always been free. Indeed, much of our history and many of its proudest moments have arisen from conquest by foreign powers and our struggle against great odds to regain or defend our precious independence. But it is not only our freedom which is at stake today, it is our national identity. For, if we lose this war, our people will be swallowed by the Communist Bloc, all our proud heritage will be blotted out by the "Socialist society" and Viet-Nam will leave the pages of history. We will lose our national soul.

Mr. President, my people and I are mindful of the great assistance which the United States has given us. Your help has not been lightly received, for the Vietnamese are proud people, and we are determined to do our part in the defense of the free world. It is clear to all of us that the defeat of the Viet Cong demands the total mobilization of our government and our people, and you may be sure that we will devote all of our resources of money, minds, and men to this great task.

But Viet-Nam is not a great power and the forces of International Communism now arrayed against us are more than we can meet with the resources at hand. We must have further assistance from the United States if we are to win the war now being waged against us.

We can certainly assure mankind that our action is purely defensive. Much as we regret the subjugation of more than half of our people in North Viet-Nam, we have no intention, and indeed no means, to free them by use of force.

I have said that Viet-Nam is at war. War means many things, but most of all it means the death of brave people for a cause they believe in. Viet-Nam has suffered many wars, and through the centuries we have always had patriots and heroes who were willing to shed their blood for Viet-Nam. We will keep faith with them.

When Communism has long ebbed away into the past, my people will still be here, a free united nation growing from the deep roots of our Vietnamese heritage. They will remember your help in our time of need. This struggle will then be a part of our common history. And your help, your friendship, and the strong bonds between our two peoples will be a part of Viet-Nam, then as now.

Ngo Dinh Diem

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

(This communique focused on new joint efforts to accelerate and broaden assistance to the countryside and to support a comprehensive and coordinated counterinsurgency program.)

JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES AND VIET-NAM ON THE EXPANSION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, JANUARY 4, 1962[1]

The Government of Viet-Nam and the United States Government announce a broad economic and social program aimed at providing every Vietnamese with the means for improving his standard of living. This program represents an intensification and expansion of efforts already made for the same purpose during the past few years.

Social facilities in the fields of education and health will be established throughout the country. Roads, communications and agricultural facilities will be developed to bring increasing prosperity to the people.

Measures to strengthen South Viet-Nam's defense in the military field are being taken simultaneously pursuant to the recent exchange of letters between President Kennedy and President Diem.

All of these steps—economic, social, military—demonstrate the desire of both the United States and Vietnamese Governments to do their utmost to improve the protection and prosperity of the Vietnamese in the face of Communist guerrilla aggression and depredations directed and supported by the Communist regime in Hanoi.

The Vietnamese and American Governments have worked out a comprehensive program as a follow-up to the study made by a joint group of experts under the leadership of Professor Vu Quoc Thuc of Viet-Nam and Dr. A. Eugene Staley of the United States, as well as later studies. Some measures have already been started. Others are in the advanced planning stage and will soon be underway.

The United States Government is furnishing additional aid to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in maintaining a level of essential imports which the Government of Viet-Nam could not otherwise finance. Priority will be given to imports required to meet the needs of the people, including the means of developing industries of Viet-Nam, and luxury goods will be excluded in accordance with current conditions of austerity. The Vietnamese Government, as recently announced, has taken steps to increase greatly the piaster resources available to it for financing the piaster costs of security, economic and social programs.

With this combination of dollars and piasters, the Government of Viet-Nam, with United States material and advisory support, will carry out the following programs at village and hamlet levels and in cities:

1. Training facilities for village officials will be set up to improve administration where government has the closest contact with the people.

---

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 22, 1962, pp. 141–142.

2. The rural health program will be further developed. Maternity clinics have already been established in over half of the districts and first aid stations in about two-thirds of the villages. The objective is to extend this program to achieve 100 percent coverage. A nation-wide program of inoculations against diptheria, tetanus and whooping cough will be started. These programs will be concentrated in the near future in areas relatively free of Viet Cong domination and will be extended to other areas as Viet Cong are suppressed.

3. The education program will also be expanded. Public-primary schools have increased from 1,191 in 1954 to 4,668 in 1961. Over the same period the number of students has grown from 330,000 to 1,100,000. The goal is to extend primary schools to every village in the country. As with rural health facilities, the immediate aim is to expedite the extension of primary schools to all those villages in areas relatively free of Viet Cong and to extend them to villages in other areas as Communist guerrillas are eliminated.

4. Village communications are being developed, both to enable receipt of radio programs broadcast over the National Radio System (now nearing completion), and to provide the means for village communication with district headquarters. Such a communication system will make it possible to make emergency calls of any nature —for example, for emergency medical assistance.

5. New roads are being built to link rural communities with main highways and, in turn, with provincial and national centers. This program, already underway in many areas, will make it easier to ferret out Viet Cong guerrillas at the same time it lays potential for improving the lot of loyal citizens.

6. Adequate funds will be available to support and expand the agricultural credit system. It has already functioned successfully in many parts of the country, and as security is restored an increasing number of farmers will be able to borrow money cheaply in order to increase their production and income.

7. The program to control pests and insects, especially in central Viet-Nam where they have ravaged rice crops for the past two years, is ready to be launched on an extensive scale. It should materially improve the livelihood of peasants in the areas affected.

8. Special efforts will also be taken to enable the *montagnard* population in the High Plateau to share progress in this region with their Vietnamese compatriots. Resettlement will be accelerated where necessary to remove the population from Viet Cong pressures. Increased resources available to the Government of Viet-Nam will assist in the construction of resettlement villages and will permit helping inhabitants where necessary until they become self-supporting. Many of the Land Development Centers created during the past few years are now flourishing areas producing new crops like kenaf and ramie, and people living in them enjoy a bigger income than before. Similar prospects exist for new resettlement centers for *montagnards*, to which village improvements in health, education and communications will be extended.

9. Special efforts will be directed at reconstruction in flood-stricken regions in the Mekong Delta. These will include regroupment of people into new villages to which health, education and

communications benefits will be extended. Road and canal construction will also be involved.

10. Extensive programs of public works will be undertaken to help relieve unemployment.

11. Industrial development which has been marked in the past two years will continue. In the field of cotton textiles, for example, a further investment of $6 million will go far toward making Viet-Nam nearly self-sufficient in cotton cloth. At the same time it will provide living for thousands of workers.

Increased United States assistance for both immediate economic and social measures and longer range development reflects the confidence of the United States Government in the future of free Viet-Nam. Both the Vietnamese and United States Governments also welcome the support and assistance of other Governments in carrying forward these programs for insuring the freedom of Viet-Nam and increasing the prosperity of the Vietnamese people.

DECLARATION ON THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS, JULY 23, 1962[1]

The Governments of the Union of Burma, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the Republic of France, the Republic of India, the Polish People's Republic, the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, whose representatives took part in the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961–62;

Welcoming the presentation of the statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962, and taking note of this statement, which is, with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos, incorporated in the present Declaration as an integral part thereof, and the text of which is as follows:

THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF LAOS,

Being resolved to follow the path of peace and neutrality in conformity with the interests and aspirations of the Laotian people, as well as the principles of the Joint Communique of Zurich dated June 22, 1961, and of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 in order to build a peaceful, neutral, independent, democratic, unified and prosperous Laos,

Solemnly declares that:

(1) It will resolutely apply the five principles of peaceful co-existence in foreign relations, and will develop friendly relations and establish diplomatic relations with all countries, the neighboring countries first and foremost, on the basis of equality and of respect for the independence and sovereignty of Laos;

(2) It is the will of the Laotian people to protect and ensure respect for the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity, and territorial integrity of Laos;

(3) It will not resort to the use or threat of force in any way which might impair the peace of other countries, and will not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries;

---

[1] Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5410.

(4) It will not enter into any military alliance or into any agreement, whether military or otherwise, which is inconsistent with the neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos; it will not allow the establishment of any foreign military base on Laotian territory, nor allow any country to use Laotian territory for military purposes or for the purposes of interference in the internal affairs of other countries, nor recognise the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO.

(5) It will not allow any foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos in any form whatsoever;

(6) Subject to the provisions of Article 5 of the Protocol, it will require the withdrawal from Laos of all foreign troops and military personnel, and will not allow any foreign troops or military personnel to be introduced into Laos;

(7) It will accept direct and unconditional aid from all countries that wish to help the Kingdom of Laos build up an independent and autonomous national economy on the basis of respect for the sovereignty of Laos;

(8) It will respect the treaties and agreements signed in conformity with the interests of the Laotian people and of the policy of peace and neutrality of the Kingdom, in particular the Geneva Agreements of 1962, and will abrogate all treaties and agreements which are contrary to those principles.

This statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos shall be promulgated constitutionally and shall have the force of law.

The Kingdom of Laos appeals to all the States participating in the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, and to all other States, to recognise the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of Laos, to conform to these principles in all respects, and to refrain from any action inconsistent therewith.

Confirming the principles of respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos and non-interference in its internal affairs which are embodied in the Geneva Agreements of 1954;

Emphasising the principle of respect for the neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos;

Agreeing that the above-mentioned principles constitute a basis for the peaceful settlement of the Laotian question:

Profoundly convinced that the independence and neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos will assist the peaceful democratic development of the Kingdom of Laos and the achievement of national accord and unity in that country, as well as the strengthening of peace and security in South-East Asia;

1. Solemnly declare, in accordance with the will of the Government and people of the Kingdom of Laos, as expressed in the statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962, that they recognise and will respect and observe in every way the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos.

2. Undertake, in particular, that

(*a*) they will not commit or participate in any way in any act which might directly or indirectly impair the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos;

(*b*) they will not resort to the use or threat of force or any other measure which might impair the peace of the Kingdom of Laos;

(*c*) they will refrain from all direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos;

(*d*) they will not attach conditions of a political nature to any assistance which they may offer or which the Kingdom of Laos may seek;

(*e*) they will not bring the Kingdom of Laos in any way into any military alliance or any other agreement, whether military or otherwise, which is inconsistent with her neutrality, nor invite or encourage her to enter into any such alliance or to conclude any such agreement;

(*f*) they will respect the wish of the Kingdom of Laos not to recognise the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO;

(*g*) they will not introduce into the Kingdom of Laos foreign troops or military personnel in any form whatsoever, nor will they in any way facilitate or connive at the introduction of any foreign troops or military personnel;

(*h*) they will not establish nor will they in any way facilitate or connive at the establishment in the Kingdom of Laos of any foreign military base, foreign strong point or other foreign military installation of any kind;

(*i*) they will not use the territory of the Kingdom of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries;

(*j*) they will not use the territory of any country, including their own for interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos.

3. Appeal to all other States to recognise, respect and observe in every way the sovereignty, independence and neutrality, and also the unity and territorial integrity, of the Kingdom of Laos and to refrain from any action inconsistent with these principles or with other provisions of the present Declaration.

4. Undertake, in the event of a violation or threat of violation of the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos, to consult jointly with the Royal Government of Laos and among themselves in order to consider measures which might prove to be necessary to ensure the observance of these principles and the other provisions of the present Declaration.

5. The present Declaration shall enter into force on signature and together with the statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962, shall be regarded as constituting an international agreement. The present Declaration shall be deposited in the archives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall furnish certified copies thereof to the other signatory States and to all the other States of the world.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Declaration.

Done in two copies in Geneva this twenty-third day of July one thousand nine hundred and sixty-two in the English, Chinese, French, Laotian and Russian languages, each text being equally authoritative.

PROTOCOL TO THE DECLARATION ON THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS

The Governments of the Union of Burma, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the Republic of France, the Republic of

India, the Kingdom of Laos, the Polish People's Republic, the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America;

Having regard to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos of July 23, 1962;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

For the purposes of this Protocol

(*a*) the term "foreign military personnel" shall include members of foreign military missions, foreign military advisers, experts, instructors, consultants, technicians, observers and any other foreign military persons, including those serving in any armed forces in Laos, and foreign civilians connected with the supply, maintenance, storing and utilization of war materials;

(*b*) the term "the Commission" shall mean the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos set up by virtue of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and composed of the representatives of Canada, India and Poland, with the representative of India as Chairman;

(*c*) the term "the Co-Chairmen" shall mean the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961–62, and their successors in the offices of Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respectively;

(*d*) the term "the members of the Conference" shall mean the Governments of countries which took part in the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961–1962.

ARTICLE 2

All foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel shall be withdrawn from Laos in the shortest time possible and in any case the withdrawal shall be completed not later than thirty days after the Commission has notified the Royal Government of Laos that in accordance with Articles 3 and 10 of this Protocol its inspection teams are present at all points of withdrawal from Laos. These points shall be determined by the Royal Government of Laos in accordance with Article 3 within thirty days after the entry into force of this Protocol. The inspection teams shall be present at these points and the Commission shall notify the Royal Government of Laos thereof within fifteen days after the points have been determined.

ARTICLE 3

The withdrawal of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel shall take place only along such routes and through such points as shall be determined by the Royal Government of Laos in consultation with the Commission. The Commission shall be notified in advance of the point and time of all such withdrawals.

ARTICLE 4

The introduction of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel into Laos is prohibited.

ARTICLE 5

Note is taken that the French and Laotian Governments will conclude as soon as possible an arrangement to transfer the French military installations in Laos to the Royal Government of Laos.

If the Laotian Government considers it necessary, the French Government may as an exception leave in Laos for a limited period of time a precisely limited number of French military instructors for the purpose of training the armed forces of Laos.

The French and Laotian Governments shall inform the members of the Conference, through the Co-Chairmen, of their agreement on the question of the transfer of the French military installations in Laos and of the employment of French military instructors by the Laotian Government.

ARTICLE 6

The introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and war material generally, except such quantities of conventional armaments as the Royal Government of Laos may consider necessary for the national defence of Laos, is prohibited.

ARTICLE 7

All foreign military persons and civilians captured or interned during the course of hostilities in Laos shall be released within thirty days after the entry into force of this Protocol and handed over by the Royal Government of Laos to the representatives of the Governments of the countries of which they are nationals in order that they may proceed to the destination of their choice.

ARTICLE 8

The Co-Chairmen shall periodically receive reports from the Commission. In addition the Commission shall immediately report to the Co-Chairmen any violations or threats of violations of this Protocol, all significant steps which it takes in pursuance of this Protocol, and also any other important information which may assist the Co-Chairmen in carrying out their functions. The Commission may at any time seek help from the Co-Chairmen in the performance of its duties, and the Co-Chairmen may at any time make recommendations to the Commission exercising general guidance.

The Co-Chairmen shall circulate the reports and any other important information from the Commission to the members of the Conference.

The Co-Chairmen shall exercise supervision over the observance of this Protocol and the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos.

The Co-Chairmen will keep the members of the Conference constantly informed and when appropriate will consult with them.

ARTICLE 9

The Commission shall, with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos, supervise and control the cease-fire in Laos.

The Commission shall exercise these functions in full co-operation with the Royal Government of Laos and within the framework of the Cease-Fire Agreement or cease-fire arrangements made by the three political forces in Laos, or the Royal Government of Laos. It is understood that responsibility for the execution of the cease-fire shall rest with the three parties concerned and with the Royal Government of Laos after its formation.

ARTICLE 10

The Commission shall supervise and control the withdrawal of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel. Inspection teams sent by the Commission for these purposes shall be present for the period of the withdrawal at all points of withdrawal from Laos determined by the Royal Government of Laos in consultation with the Commission in accordance with Article 3 of this Protocol.

ARTICLE 11

The Commission shall investigate cases where there are reasonable grounds for considering that a violation of the provisions of Article 4 of this Protocol has occurred.

It is understood that in the exercise of this function the Commission is acting with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos. It shall carry out its investigations in full co-operation with the Royal Government of Laos and shall immediately inform the Co-Chairmen of any violations or threats of violations of Article 4, and also of all significant steps which it takes in pursuance of this Article in accordance with Article 8.

ARTICLE 12

The Commission shall assist the Royal Government of Laos in cases where the Royal Government of Laos considers that a violation of Article 6 of this Protocol may have taken place. This assistance will be rendered at the request of the Royal Government of Laos and in full co-operation with it.

ARTICLE 13

The Commission shall exercise its functions under this Protocol in close co-operation with the Royal Government of Laos. It is understood that the Royal Government of Laos at all levels will render the Commission all possible assistance in the performance by the Commission of these functions and also will take all necessary measures to ensure the security of the Commission and its inspection teams during their activities in Laos.

82-783 O - 73 - 17

ARTICLE 14

The Commission functions as a single organ of the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961–1962. The members of the Commission will work harmoniously and in co-operation with each other with the aim of solving all questions within the terms of reference of the Commission.

Decisions of the Commission on questions relating to violations of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 6 of this Protocol or of the cease-fire referred to in Article 9, conclusions on major questions sent to the Co-Chairmen and all recommendations by the Commission shall be adopted unanimously. On other questions, including procedural questions, and also questions relating to the initiation and carrying out of investigations (Article 15), decisions of the Commission shall be adopted by majority vote.

ARTICLE 15

In the exercise of its specific functions which are laid down in the relevant articles of this Protocol the Commission shall conduct investigations (directly or by sending inspection teams), when there are reasonable grounds for considering that a violation has occurred. These investigations shall be carried out at the request of the Royal Government of Laos or on the initiative of the Commission, which is acting with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos.

In the latter case decisions on initiating and carrying out such investigations shall be taken in the Commission by majority vote.

The Commission shall submit agreed reports on investigations in which differences which may emerge between members of the Commission on particular questions may be expressed.

The conclusions and recommendations of the Commission resulting from investigations shall be adopted unanimously.

ARTICLE 16

For the exercise of its functions the Commission shall, as necessary, set up inspection teams, on which the three member-States of the Commission shall be equally represented. Each member-State of the Commission shall ensure the presence of its own representatives both on the Commission and on the inspection teams, and shall promptly replace them in the event of their being unable to perform their duties.

It is understood that the dispatch of inspection teams to carry out various specific tasks takes place with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos. The points to which the Commission and its inspection teams go for the purposes of investigation and their length of stay at those points shall be determined in relation to the requirements of the particular investigation.

ARTICLE 17

The Commission shall have at its disposal the means of communication and transport required for the performance of its duties. These as a rule will be provided to the Commission by the Royal

Government of Laos for payment on mutually acceptable terms, and those which the Royal Government of Laos cannot provide will be acquired by the Commission from other sources. It is understood that the means of communication and transport will be under the administrative control of the Commission.

ARTICLE 18

The costs of the operations of the Commission shall be borne by the members of the Conference in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

(*a*) The Governments of Canada, India and Poland shall pay the personal salaries and allowances of their nationals who are members of their delegations to the Commission and its subsidiary organs.

(*b*) The primary responsibility for the provision of accommodation for the Commission and its subsidiary organs shall rest with the Royal Government of Laos, which shall also provide such other local services as may be appropriate. The Commission shall charge to the Fund referred to in sub-paragraph (*c*) below any local expenses not borne by the Royal Government of Laos.

(*c*) All other capital or running expenses incurred by the Commission in the exercise of its functions shall be met from a Fund to which all the members of the Conference shall contribute in the following proportions:

The Government of the People's Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America shall contribute 17.6 per cent each.

The Governments of Burma, Cambodia, and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, Laos, the Republic of Viet Nam and Thailand shall contribute 1.5 per cent each.

The Governments of Canada, India and Poland as members of the Commission shall contribute 1 per cent each.

ARTICLE 19

The Co-Chairmen shall at any time, if the Royal Government of Laos so requests, and in any case not later than three years after the entry into force of this Protocol, present a report with appropriate recommendations on the question of the termination of the Commission to the members of the Conference for their consideration. Before making such a report the Co-Chairmen shall hold consultations with the Royal Government of Laos and the Commission.

ARTICLE 20

This Protocol shall enter into force on signature.

It shall be deposited in the archives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall furnish certified copies thereof to the other signatory States and to all other States and to all other States of the world.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol.

Done in two copies in Geneva this twenty-third day of July one thousand and nine hundred and sixty-two in the English, Chinese, French, Laotian and Russian languages, each text being equally authoritative.

(In May 1963 Buddhist riots in Huế set off disputes between the Vietnamese Government and the Buddhists. In August, martial law was proclaimed after increasing demonstrations, including immolations. Against this background, President Kennedy made the following statements.)

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S TV INTERVIEWS, SEPTEMBER 2 AND 9, 1963 (Excerpts)[1]

(a) CBS Interview, September 2

* * * * * * *

MR. CRONKITE. Mr. President, the only hot war we've got running at the moment is of course the one in Viet-Nam, and we have our difficulties here, quite obviously.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY. I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it—the people of Viet-Nam—against the Communists. We are prepared to continue to assist them, but I don't think that the war can be won unless the people support the effort, and, in my opinion, in the last 2 months the Government has gotten out of touch with the people.

The repressions against the Buddhists, we felt, were very unwise. Now all we can do is to make it very clear that we don't think this is the way to win. It is my hope that this will become increasingly obvious to the Government, that they will take steps to try to bring back popular support for this very essential struggle.

MR. CRONKITE. Do you think this Government has time to regain the support of the people?

PRESIDENT KENNEDY. I do. With changes in policy and perhaps with personnel, I think it can. If it doesn't make those changes, I would think that the chances of winning it would not be very good.

MR. CRONKITE. Hasn't every indication from Saigon been that President Diem has no intention of changing his pattern?

PRESIDENT KENNEDY. If he does not change it, of course, that is his decision. He has been there 10 years, and, as I say, he has carried this burden when he has been counted out on a number of occasions.

Our best judgment is that he can't be successful on this basis. We hope that he comes to see that; but in the final analysis it is the people and the Government itself who have to win or lose this strug-

---

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Sept. 30, 1963, pp. 498–500

gle. All we can do is help, and we are making it very clear. But I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake. That would be a great mistake. I know people don't like Americans to be engaged in this kind of an effort. Forty-seven Americans have been killed in combat with the enemy, but this is a very important struggle even though it is far away.

We took all this—made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate—we may not like it—in the defense of Asia.

* * * * * * *

(b) NBC Interview, September 9

* * * * * * *

MR. HUNTLEY. Mr. President, in respect to our difficulties in South Viet-Nam, could it be that our Government tends ocassionally to get locked into a policy or an attitude and then finds it difficult to alter or shift that policy?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, that is true. I think in the case of South Vietnam we have been dealing with a Government which is in control, has been in control for 10 years. In addition, we have felt for the last 2 years that the struggle against the Communists was going better. Since June, however—the difficulties with the Buddhists—we have been concerned about a deterioration, particularly in the Saigon area, which hasn't been felt greatly in the outlying areas but may spread. So we are faced with the problem of wanting to protect the area against the Communists. On the other hand, we have to deal with the Government there. That produces a kind of ambivalence in our efforts which exposes us to some criticism. We are using our influence to persuade the Government there to take those steps which will win back support. That takes some time, and we must be patient, we must persist.

MR. HUNTLEY. Are we likely to reduce our aid to South Viet-Nam now?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't think we think that would be helpful at this time. If you reduce your aid, it is possible you could have some effect upon the government structure there. On the other hand, you might have a situation which could bring about a collapse. Strongly in our mind is what happened in the case of China at the end of World War II, where China was lost—a weak government became increasingly unable to control events. We don't want that.

MR. BRINKLEY. Mr. President, have you had any reason to doubt this so-called "domino theory," that if South Viet-Nam falls, the rest of Southeast Asia will go behind it?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I believe it. I believe it. I think that the struggle is close enough. China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers, that if South Viet-Nam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic position for a guerrilla assault on Malaya but would also give the impression that the wave of the future in Southeast Asia was China and the Communists. So I believe it.

MR. BRINKLEY. In the last 48 hours there have been a great many conflicting reports from there about what the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] was up to. Can you give us any enlightenment on it?

THE PRESIDENT. No.

MR. HUNTLEY. Does the CIA tend to make its own policy? That seems to be the debate here.

THE PRESIDENT. No, that is the frequent charge, but that isn't so. Mr. [John A.] McCone, head of the CIA, sits in the National Security Council. We have had a number of meetings in the past few days about events in South Viet-Nam. Mr. McCone participated in every one, and the CIA coordinates its efforts with the State Department and the Defense Department.

MR. BRINKLEY. With so much of our prestige, money, so on, committed in South Viet-Nam, why can't we exercise a little more influence there, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT. We have some influence. We have some influence and we are attempting to carry it out. I think we don't—we can't expect these countries to do everything the way we want to do them. They have their own interest, their own personalities, their own tradition. We can't make everyone in our image, and there are a good many people who don't want to go in our image. In addition, we have ancient struggles between countries. In the case of India and Pakistan, we would like to have them settle Kashmir. That is our view of the best way to defend the subcontinent against communism. But that struggle between India and Pakistan is more important to a good many people in that area than the struggle against the Communists. We would like to have Cambodia, Thailand, and South Viet-Nam all in harmony, but there are ancient differences there. We can't make the world over, but we can influence the world. The fact of the matter is that with the assistance of the United States and SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization], Southeast Asia and indeed all of Asia has been maintained independent against a powerful force, the Chinese Communists. What I am concerned about is that Americans will get impatient and say, because they don't like events in Southeast Asia or they don't like the Government in Saigon, that we should withdraw. That only makes it easy for the Communists. I think we should stay. We should use our influence in as effective a way as we can, but we should not withdraw.

* * * * * * *

(As dissension between the Buddhists and the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem increased, the U.S. reexamined its policy toward South Viet-Nam, as noted in the following three statements.)

U.S. POLICY ON VIET-NAM: WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, OCTOBER 2, 1963[1]

Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara and General [Maxwell D.] Taylor reported to the President this morning and to the National Security Council this afternoon. Their report included a number of classified findings and recommendations which will be the subject of further review and action. Their basic presentation was endorsed by all members of the Security Council and the fol-

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 21, 1963, p. 623.

lowing statement of United States policy was approved by the President on the basis of recommendations received from them and from Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge.

1. The security of South Viet-Nam is a major interest of the United States as other free nations. We will adhere to our policy of working with the people and Government of South Viet-Nam to deny this country to communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central objective of our policy in South Viet-Nam.

2. The military program in South Viet-Nam has made progress and is sound in principle, though improvements are being energetically sought.

3. Major U.S. assistance in support of this military effort is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the Government of South Viet-Nam are capable of suppressing it.

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel. They reported that by the end of this year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Viet-Nam can be withdrawn.

4. The political situation in South Viet-Nam remains deeply serious. The United States has made clear its continuing opposition to any repressive actions in South Viet-Nam. While such actions have not yet significantly affected the military effort, they could do so in the future.

5. It remains the policy of the United States, in South Viet-Nam as in other parts of the world, to support the efforts of the people of that country to defeat aggression and to build a peaceful and free society.

(On November 22, 1963, President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. In December President Lyndon B. Johnson sent Defense Secretary McNamara and CIA Director John A. McCone to Saigon to evaluate the new Government's war effort. This New Year's greeting from President Johnson pledged the energetic support of the United States.)

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO GEN. DUONG VAN MINH, CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM, December 31, 1963 [1]

DEAR GENERAL MINH. As we enter the New Year of 1964, I want to wish you, your Revolutionary Government, and your people full success in the long and arduous war which you are waging so tenaciously and bravely against the Viet Cong forces directed and supported by the Communist regime in Hanoi. Ambassador [Henry

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 27, 1964, pp. 121–122.

Cabot] Lodge and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara have told me about the serious situation which confronts you and of the plans which you are developing to enable your armed forces and your people to redress this situation.

This new year provides a fitting opportunity for me to pledge on behalf of the American Government and people a renewed partnership with your government and people in your brave struggle for freedom. The United States will continue to furnish you and your people with the fullest measure of support in this bitter fight. We shall maintain in Viet-Nam American personnel and material as needed to assist you in achieving victory.

Our aims are, I know, identical with yours: to enable your government to protect its people from the acts of terror perpetrated by Communist insurgents from the north. As the forces of your government become increasingly capable of dealing with this aggression, American military personnel in South Viet-Nam can be progressively withdrawn.

The United States Government shares the view of your government that "neutralization" of South Viet-Nam is unacceptable. As long as the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam persists in its aggressive policy, neutralization of South Viet-Nam would only be another name for a Communist takeover. Peace will return to your country just as soon as the authorities in Hanoi cease and desist from their terrorist aggression.

Thus, your government and mine are in complete agreement on the political aspects of your war against the forces of enslavement, brutality, and material misery. Within this framework of political agreement we can confidently continue and improve our cooperation.

I am pleased to learn from Secretary McNamara about the vigorous operations which you are planning to bring security and an improved standard of living to your people.

I wish to congratulate you particularly on your work for the unity of all your people, including the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai, against the Viet Cong. I know from my own experience in Viet-Nam how warmly the Vietnamese people respond to a direct human approach and how they have hungered for this in their leaders. So again I pledge the energetic support of my country to your government and your people.

We will do our full part to ensure that under your leadership your people may win a victory—a victory for freedom and justice and human welfare in Viet-Nam.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

UNITED STATES TO INCREASE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO VIET-NAM: Statement by the White House, March 17, 1964*

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor, following their initial oral report of Friday, today reported fully to President Johnson

* Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 6, 1964, pp. 522–523.

and the members of the National Security Council. The report covered the situation in South Viet-Nam, the measures being taken by General Khanh and his government, and the need for United States assistance to supplement and support these measures. There was also discussion of the continuing support and direction of the Viet Cong insurgency from North Viet-Nam.

At the close of the meeting the President accepted the report and its principal recommendations, which had the support of the National Security Council and Ambassador Lodge.

Comparing the situation to last October, when Secretary McNamara and General Taylor last reported fully on it, there have unquestionably been setbacks. The Viet Cong have taken maximum advantage of two changes of government, and of more longstanding difficulties, including a serious weakness and overextension which had developed in the basically sound hamlet program. The supply of arms and cadres from the north has continued; careful and sophisticated control of Viet Cong operations has been apparent; and evidence that such control is centered in Hanoi is clear and unmistakable.

To meet the situation, General Khanh and his government are acting vigorously and effectively. They have produced a sound central plan for the prosecution of the war, recognizing to a far greater degree than before the crucial role of economic and social, as well as military, action to insure that areas cleared of the Viet Cong survive and prosper in freedom.

To carry out this plan, General Khanh requires the full enlistment of the people of South Viet-Nam, partly to augment the strength of his antiguerrilla forces, but particularly to provide the administrators, health workers, teachers, and others who must follow up in cleared areas. To meet this need, and to provide a more equitable and common basis of service, General Khanh has informed us that he proposes in the near future to put into effect a National Mobilization Plan that will provide conditions and terms of service in appropriate jobs for all able bodied South Vietnamese between certain ages.

In addition, steps are required to bring up to required levels the pay and status of the paramilitary forces and to create a highly trained guerrilla force that can beat the Viet Cong on its own ground.

Finally, limited but significant additional equipment is proposed for the air forces, the river navy, and the mobile forces.

In short, where the South Vietnamese Government now has the power to clear any part of its territory, General Khanh's new program is designed to clear and to hold, step by step and province by province.

This program will involve substantial increases in cost to the South Vietnamese economy, which in turn depends heavily on United States economic aid. Additional, though less substantial, military assistance funds are also needed, and increased United States training activity both on the civil and military side. The policy should continue of withdrawing United States personnel where their roles can be assumed by South Vietnamese and of sending additional

men if they are needed. It will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance and support to South Viet-Nam for as long as it is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control.

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their overall conclusion that with continued vigorous leadership from General Khanh and his government, and the carrying out of these steps, the situation can be significantly improved in the coming months.

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, AUGUST 5, 1964 [1]

To the Congress of the United States:

Last night I announced to the American people that the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against U.S. naval vessels operating in international waters, and that I had therefore directed air action against gunboats and supporting facilities used in these hostile operations. This air action has now been carried out with substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two U.S. aircraft were lost in the action.

After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a decision to ask the Congress for a resolution expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia.

These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime have given a new and grave turn to the already serious situation in southeast Asia. Our commitments in that area are well known to the Congress. They were first made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the Senate in February 1955.

This treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United States and other members to act in accordance with their constitutional processes to meet Communist aggression against any of the parties or protocol states.

Our policy in southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 1954. I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions:

1. *America keeps her word.* Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments.

2. *The issue is the future of southeast Asia as a whole.* A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us.

3. *Our purpose is peace.* We have no military, political, or territorial ambitions in the area.

4. *This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity.* Our military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 24, 1964, pp. 261–263.

these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence.

The threat to the free nations of southeast Asia has long been clear. The North Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This Communist regime has violated the Geneva accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of subversion, which includes the direction, training, and supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese territory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime has maintained military forces, used Laotian territory for infiltration into South Vietnam, and most recently carried out combat operations—all in direct violation of the Geneva agreements of 1962.

In recent months, the actions of the North Vietnamese regime have become steadily more threatening. In May, following new acts of Communist aggression in Laos, the United States undertook reconnaissance flights over Laotian territory, at the request of the Government of Laos. These flights had the essential mission of determining the situation in territory where Communist forces were preventing inspection by the International Control Commission. When the Communists attacked these aircraft, I responded by furnishing escort fighters with instructions to fire when fired upon. Thus, these latest North Vietnamese attacks on our naval vessels are not the first direct attack on armed forces of the United States.

As President of the United States, I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom.

As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determination to bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression in the area. We seek the full and effective restoration of the international agreements signed in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos.

I recommend a resolution expressing the support of the Congress for all necessary action to protect our Armed Forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO Treaty. At the same time, I assure the Congress that we shall continue readily to explore any avenues of political solution that will effectively guarantee the removal of Communist subversion and the preservation of the independence of the nations of the area.

The resolution could well be based upon similar resolutions enacted by the Congress in the past—to meet the threat to Formosa in 1955, to meet the threat to the Middle East in 1957, and to meet the threat in Cuba in 1962. It could state in the simplest terms the resolve and support of the Congress for action to deal appropriately with attacks against our Armed Forces and to defend freedom and

preserve peace in southeast Asia in accordance with the obligations of the United States under the Southeast Asia Treaty. I urge the Congress to enact such a resolution promptly and thus to give convincing evidence to the aggressive Communist nations, and to the world as a whole, that our policy in southeast Asia will be carried forward—and that the peace and security of the area will be preserved.

The events of this week would in any event have made the passage of a congressional resolution essential. But there is an additional reason for doing so at a time when we are entering on 3 months of political campaigning. Hostile nations must understand that in such a period the United States will continue to protect its national interests, and that in these matters there is no division among us.

SECURITY COUNCIL HEARS U.S. CHARGE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTACKS: Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative in the Security Council, August 5, 1964 [1]

I have asked for this urgent meeting to bring to the attention of the Security Council acts of deliberate aggression by the Hanoi regime against naval units of the United States.

Naval vessels of my Government, on routine operations in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, have been subjected to deliberate and repeated armed attacks. We, therefore, have found it necessary to take defensive measures.

The major facts about these incidents were announced last night by the President of the United States and communicated to other governments at the same time I was instructed to request this meeting. I shall recount these facts for you, Mr. President, in chronological order so that all the members may have all the information available to my Government.

At 8:08 a.m. Greenwich meridian time, August 2, 1964, the United States destroyer *Maddox* was on routine patrol in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, proceeding in a southeasterly direction away from the coast about 30 miles at sea from the mainland of North Viet-Nam. The *Maddox* was approached by three high-speed North Vietnamese torpedo boats in attack formation. When it was evident that these torpedo boats intended to take offensive action, the *Maddox*, in accordance with naval practice, fired three warning shots across the bows of the approaching vessels. At approximately the same time, the aircraft carrier *Ticonderoga*, which was also in international waters and had been alerted to the impending attack, sent out four aircraft to provide cover for the *Maddox*, the pilots being under orders not to fire unless they or the *Maddox* were fired upon first.

---

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 24, 1964, pp. 272–274.

Two of the attacking craft fired torpedoes, which the *Maddox* evaded by changing course. All three attacking vessels directed machinegun fire at the *Maddox*. One of the attacking vessels approached for close attack and was struck by fire from the *Maddox*. After the attack was broken off, the *Maddox* continued on a southerly course in international waters.

Now, Mr. President, clearly this was a deliberate armed attack against a naval unit of the United States Government on patrol in the high seas—almost 30 miles off the mainland. Nevertheless, my Government did its utmost to minimize the explosive potential of this flagrant attack in the hopes that this might be an isolated or uncalculated action. There was local defensive fire. The United States was not drawn into hasty response.

On August 3 the United States took steps to convey to the Hanoi regime a note calling attention to this aggression, stating that United States ships would continue to operate freely on the high seas in accordance with the rights guaranteed by international law, and warning the authorities in Hanoi of the "grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against United States forces." This notification was in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva accords.

Our hopes that this was an isolated incident did not last long. At 2:35 p.m. Greenwich meridian time, August 4, when it was nighttime in the Gulf of Tonkin, the destroyers *Maddox* and *C. Turner Joy* were again subjected to an armed attack by an undetermined number of motor torpedo boats of the North Vietnamese navy. This time the American vessels were 65 miles from shore, twice as far out on the high seas as on the occasion of the previous attack. This time numerous torpedoes were fired. That attack lasted for over 2 hours.

There no longer could be any shadow of doubt that this was a planned, deliberate military aggression against vessels lawfully present in international waters. One could only conclude that this was the work of authorities dedicated to the use of force to achieve their objectives, regardless of the consequences.

My Government therefore determined to take positive but limited and relevant measures to secure its naval units against further aggression. Last night aerial strikes were thus carried out against North Vietnamese torpedo boats and their support facilities. This action was limited in scale, its only targets being the weapons and facilities against which we had been forced to defend ourselves. Our fervent hope is that the point has now been made that acts of armed aggression are not to be tolerated in the Gulf of Tonkin any more than they are to be tolerated anywhere else.

I want to emphasize that the action we have taken is a limited and measured response, fitted precisely to the attack that produced it, and that the deployments of additional U.S. forces to Southeast Asia are designed solely to deter further aggression. This is a single action designed to make unmistakably clear that the United States

cannot be diverted by military attack from its obligations to help its friends establish and protect their independence. Our naval units are continuing their routine patrolling on the high seas with orders to protect themselves with all appropriate means against any further aggression. As President Johnson said last night, "We still seek no wider war."

Mr. President, let me repeat that the United States vessels were in international waters when they were attacked.

Let me repeat that freedom of the seas is guaranteed under long-accepted international law applying to all nations alike.

Let me repeat that these vessels took no belligerent actions of any kind until they were subject to armed attack.

And let me say once more that the action they took in self-defense is the right of all nations and is fully within the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

The acts of aggression by the North Vietnamese in the Gulf of Tonkin make no sense whatsoever standing alone. They defy rational explanation except as part of a larger pattern with a larger purpose. As isolated events, the kidnapping of village officials in the Republic of South Viet-Nam makes no sense either. Neither does the burning of a schoolhouse—or the sabotage of an irrigation project—or the murder of a medical worker—or the random bomb thrown into a crowd of innocent people sitting in a cafe.

All these wanton acts of violence and destruction fit into the larger pattern of what has been going on in Southeast Asia for the past decade and a half. So does the arming of terrorist gangs in South Viet-Nam by the regimes in Hanoi and Peiping. So does the infiltration of armed personnel to make war against the legitimate government of that nation. So does the fighting in Laos—and all the acts of subversion—and all the propaganda—and the sabotage of the international machinery established to keep the peace by the Geneva agreements—and the deliberate, systematic, and flagrant violations of those agreements by two regimes which signed them and which by all tenets of decency, law, and civilized practice are bound by their provisions.

The attempt to sink United States destroyers in international waters is much more spectacular than the attempt to murder the mayor of a village in his bed at night. But they are both part of the pattern, and the pattern is designed to subjugate the people of Southeast Asia to an empire ruled by means of force of arms, of rule by terror, of expansion by violence.

Mr. President, it is only in this larger view that we can discuss intelligently the matter that we have brought to this Council.

In his statement last night, President Johnson concluded by emphasizing that the mission of the United States is peace. Under the explicit instructions of President Johnson, I want to repeat that assurance in the Security Council this afternoon: Our mission is peace.

We hoped that the peace settlement in 1954 would lead to peace in Viet-Nam. We hoped that that settlement, and the supplementary Geneva accords of 1962, would lead to peace in Laos. Communist governments have tried aggression before—and have failed. Each time the lesson has had to be learned anew.

We are dealing here with a regime that has not yet learned the lesson that aggression does not pay, cannot be sustained, and will always be thrown back by people who believe, as we do, that people want freedom and independence, not subjection and the role of satellite in a modern empire.

In Southeast Asia we want nothing more, and nothing less, than the assured and guaranteed independence of the peoples of the area. We are in Southeast Asia to help our friends preserve their own opportunity to be free of imported terror, alien assassination, managed by the North Viet-Nam Communists based in Hanoi and backed by the Chinese Communists from Peiping.

Two months ago, when we were discussing in this Council the problems created on the Cambodia-South Viet-Nam frontier by the Communist Viet Cong, I defined our peace aims in Southeast Asia. I repeat them today:

There is a very easy way to restore order in Southeast Asia. There is a very simple, safe way to bring about the end of United States military aid to the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Let all foreign troops withdraw from Laos. Let all states in that area make and abide by the simple decision to leave their neighbors alone. Stop the secret subversion of other people's independence. Stop the clandestine and illegal transit of national frontiers. Stop the export of revolution and the doctrine of violence. Stop the violations of the political agreements reached at Geneva for the future of Southeast Asia.

The people of Laos want to be left alone.

The people of Viet-Nam want to be left alone.

The people of Cambodia want to be left alone.

When their neighbors decide to leave them alone—as they must—there will be no fighting in Southeast Asia and no need for American advisers to leave their homes to help these people resist aggression. Any time that decision can be put in enforcible terms, my Government will be only too happy to put down the burden that we have been sharing with those determined to preserve their independence. Until such assurances are forthcoming, we shall stand for the independence of free peoples in Southeast Asia as we have elsewhere.

That is what I said to this Council in May. That is what I repeat to this Council in August.

When the political settlements freely negotiated at the conference

tables in Geneva are enforced, the independance of Southeast Asia will be guaranteed. When the peace agreements reached long ago are made effective, peace will return to Southeast Asia and military power can be withdrawn.

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, AUGUST 12, 1964 (Excerpt) [1]

In Viet-Nam, too, we work for world order.

For 10 years, through the Eisenhower administration, the Kennedy administration, and this administration, we have had one consistent aim—observance of the 1954 agreements which guaranteed the independence of South Viet-Nam.

That independence has been the consistent target of aggression and terror. For 10 years our response to these attacks has followed a consistent pattern:

First, that the South Vietnamese have the basic responsibility for the defense of their own freedom.

Second, we would engage our strength and our resources to whatever extent needed to help others repel aggression.

Now, there are those who would have us depart from these tested principles. They have a variety of viewpoints. All of them, I am sure, you have heard in your local community.

Some say that we should withdraw from South Viet-Nam, that we have lost almost 200 lives there in the last 4 years, and we should come home. But the United States cannot and must not and will not turn aside and allow the freedom of a brave people to be handed over to Communist tyranny. This alternative is strategically unwise, we think, and it is morally unthinkable.

Some others are eager to enlarge the conflict. They call upon us to supply American boys to do the job that Asian boys should do. They ask us to take reckless action which might risk the lives of millions and engulf much of Asia and certainly threaten the peace of the entire world. Moreover, such action would offer no solution at all to the real problem of Viet-Nam. America can and America will meet any wider challenge from others, but our aim in Viet-Nam, as in the rest of the world, is to help restore the peace and to reestablish a decent order.

The course that we have chosen will require wisdom and endurance. But let no one doubt for a moment that we have the resources and the will to follow this course as long as it may take. No one should think for a moment that we will be worn down, nor will we be driven out, and we will not be provoked into rashness; but we will continue to meet aggression with firmness and unprovoked attack with measured reply.

That is the meaning of the prompt reaction of our destroyers to unprovoked attack. That is the meaning of the positive reply of our aircraft to a repetition of that attack. That is the meaning of the resolution passed by your Congress with 502 votes in favor and only 2 opposed. That is the meaning of the national unity that we have shown to all the world last week.

There is another consideration. Wherever the forces of freedom are engaged, no one who commands the power of nuclear weapons can escape his responsibility for the life of our people and the life of your children.

---

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 31, 1964, p. 299–300.

It has never been the policy of any American to sympathetically or systematically place in hazard the life of this nation by threatening nuclear war. No American President has ever pursued so irresponsible a course. Our firmness at moments of crisis has always been matched by restraint—our determination by care. It was so under President Truman at Berlin, under President Eisenhower in the Formosa Straits, under President Kennedy in the Cuba missile crisis—and I pledge you that it will be so long as I am your President.

In Viet-Nam, in Cyprus, and in every continent, in a hundred different ways, America's efforts are directed toward world order. Only when all nations are willing to accept peaceful procedures as alternative to forceful settlement will the peace of our world be secure.

(The following two statements were made after further governmental changes in Saigon as a result of which Pham Khac Huu was selected chief of state and Tran Van Huong named Premier of South Vietnam.)

PRESIDENT JOHNSON REAFFIRMS THE BASIC POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES IN VIET-NAM, DECEMBER 1, 1964 [1]

The President today reviewed the situation in South Viet-Nam with Ambassador [Maxwell D.] Taylor, and with the Secretaries of State [Dean Rusk] and Defense [Robert S. McNamara], the Director of Central Intelligence [John A. McCone], and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [Gen. Earle G. Wheeler].

Ambassador Taylor reported that the political situation in Saigon was still difficult but that the new government under Prime Minister [Tran Van] Huong was making a determined effort to strengthen national unity, to maintain law and order, and to press forward with the security program, involving a combination of political, economic, and military actions to defeat the Viet Cong insurgency. The Ambassador also reported that, although the security problems have increased over the past few months in the northern provinces of South Viet-Nam, with uneven progress elsewhere, the strength of the armed forces of the government was being increased by improved recruiting and conscription and by the nearly 100-percent increase in the combat strength of the Vietnamese Air Force. Also, the government forces continue to inflict heavy losses on the Viet Cong.

On the economic front, Ambassador Taylor noted that agricultural output was continuing to increase, with U.S. assistance in fertilizers and pesticides playing an important role. He also noted that the prices of goods and the value of the piaster have remained remarkably stable. On the other hand, the Ambassador reported that increased interdiction of the communication routes by the Viet Cong

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Dec. 21, 1964, pp. 869–870.

is interfering to some extent with commerce within the country, and the recent typhoons and floods in central Viet-Nam have destroyed a large percentage of the crops and livestock in that region. The Vietnamese Government, with U.S. assistance, has moved promptly to organize a program which is bringing relief and rehabilitation to the stricken areas.

The President instructed Ambassador Taylor to consult urgently with the South Vietnamese Government as to measures that should be taken to improve the situation in all its aspects.

The President reaffirmed the basic U.S. policy of providing all possible and useful assistance to the South Vietnamese people and government in their struggle to defeat the externally supported insurgency and aggression being conducted against them. It was noted that this policy accords with the terms of the congressional joint resolution of August 10, 1964, which remains in full force and effect.

The meeting reviewed the accumulating evidence of continuing and increased North Vietnamese support of the Viet Cong and of North Vietnamese forces in, and passing through, the territory of Laos in violation of the Geneva accords of 1962.

COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES AND VIET-NAM REGARDING MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN VIET-NAM, DECEMBER 11, 1964 [1]

The Government of Viet-Nam has just completed a series of discussions with the United States mission with regard to measures which should be taken to improve the situation in South Viet-Nam in all its aspects.

The U.S. Government has offered additional military and economic assistance to improve the execution of the Government's programs and to restrain the mounting infiltration of men and equipment by the Hanoi regime in support of the Viet Cong.

The Government of Viet-Nam has accepted this offer of support, which includes provision for increased numbers of military, paramilitary and police forces, the strengthening of the air defense of South Viet-Nam, and further economic assistance for a variety of forms of industrial, urban and rural development.

For its part, the Government of Viet-Nam is reviewing ways of increasing the scope and effectiveness of its programs related to the development of security and local government in the rural areas.

Together the Government of Viet-Nam and the U.S. mission are making joint plans to achieve greater effectiveness against the infiltration threat.

In the course of the discussions, the U.S. representatives expressed full support for the duly constituted government of Prime Minister [Tran Van] Huong.

---

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Dec. 28, 1964, pp. 904–905.

JOINT U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE RETALIATORY ATTACKS AGAINST NORTH VIET-NAM: White House Statement, February 7, 1965 [1]

On February 7, U.S. and South Vietnamese air elements were directed to launch retaliatory attacks against barracks and staging areas in the southern area of North Viet-Nam which intelligence has shown to be actively used by Hanoi for training and infiltration of Viet Cong personnel into South Viet-Nam.

Results of the attack and further operational details will be announced as soon as they are reported from the field.

Today's action by the U.S. and South Vietnamese Governments was in response to provocations ordered and directed by the Hanoi regime.

Commencing at 2 a.m. on February 7th, Saigon time (1 p.m. yesterday, eastern standard time) two South Vietnamese airfields, two U.S. barracks areas, several villages, and one town in South Viet-Nam were subjected to deliberate surprise attacks. Substantial casualties resulted.

Our intelligence has indicated, and this action confirms, that Hanoi has ordered a more aggressive course of action against both South Vietnamese and American installations.

Moreover, these attacks were only made possible by the continuing infiltration of personnel and equipment from North Viet-Nam. This infiltration markedly increased during 1964 and continues to increase.

To meet these attacks the Government of South Viet-Nam and the U.S. Government agreed to appropriate reprisal action against North Vietnamese targets. The President's approval of this action was given after the action was discussed with and recommended by the National Security Council last night [February 6].

Today's joint response was carefully limited to military areas which are supplying men and arms for attacks in South Viet-Nam. As in the case of the North Vietnamese attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin last August, the response is appropriate and fitting.

As the U.S. Government has frequently stated, we seek no wider war. Whether or not this course can be maintained lies with the North Vietnamese aggressors. The key to the situation remains the cessation of infiltration from North Viet-Nam and the clear indication by the Hanoi regime that it is prepared to cease aggression against its neighbors.

LEGAL BASIS FOR UNITED STATES ACTIONS AGAINST NORTH VIET-NAM: Department of State Memorandum, March 8, 1965 [2]

I—The Issue

This memorandum considers the question whether United States-South Vietnamese actions against military targets in North Vietnam are justified in international law, particularly in light of the

---

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Feb. 22, 1965, pp. 238–239.
[2] Department of State Memorandum, dated March 8, 1965.

United Nations Charter and the 1954 Geneva Accords on Viet-Nam. It concludes that these actions are fully justified.

II—The Facts

On February 27, the Department of State issued "Aggression From the North," a report of North Viet-Nam's campaign to conquer South Viet-Nam. That Report establishes beyond question that North Viet-Nam is carrying out a carefully conceived plan of aggression against the South.

The evidence shows that the hard core of the Communist forces attacking South Viet-Nam were trained in the North and ordered into the South by Hanoi. It shows that the key leadership of the Viet Cong, the officers and much of the cadre, many of the technicians, political organizers, and propagandists have come from the North and operate under Hanoi's direction. It shows that the training of essential military personnel and their infiltration into the South is directed by the Military High Command in Hanoi. It shows that many of the weapons and much of the ammunition and other supplies used by the Viet-Cong have been sent into South Viet-Nam from the North. The evidence plainly indicates that under Hanoi's overall direction the Communists have established an extensive machine, both political and military, for carrying on the war against South Viet-Nam.

The history of Hanoi's campaign to conquer South Viet-Nam is a long one. It was documented earlier in a report entitled "A Threat to the Peace" issued by the Department of State in December 1961. In a special report of June 1962, the International Control Commission in Viet-Nam concluded that there was "sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt" that North Viet-Nam was sending arms and men into South Viet-Nam to carry out subversion with the aim of overthrowing the legal government there, in violation of the 1954 Geneva Accords.

To meet the threat created by these violations of the Geneva Accords, and by North Viet-Nam's aggressive intervention contrary to general international law, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam requested United States assistance. We had been providing Viet-Nam since 1950–51 with both economic and military aid. This assistance was continued after the conclusion of the 1954 Geneva Accords, within the limitations prescribed by those agreements. It had become apparent, however, by 1961 that this limited assistance was not sufficient to meet the growing Communist threat. Consequently, in 1961, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam requested additional aid from the United States. The United States responded with increased supplies and with larger numbers of training and advisory personnel to assist the Vietnamese forces in prosecuting the war against the Viet Cong. This response was proportioned with the design of sustaining Viet-Nam in its defense against aggression without extending the conflict beyond the borders of the country.

The Communists, however, increased their intervention without regard to obligations under international law and international agreements by which they were bound. They stepped up the assist-

ance from the North and increased the use of neighboring Laos as an infiltration route, in violation of the freshly concluded 1962 Geneva Agreement for the Settlement of the Laotian Question.

In more recent months North Viet-Nam has sharply increased the infiltration of men and equipment into the South, and virtually all personnel now coming in are natives of North Viet-Nam. Dramatically illustrative of Hanoi's role is the discovery along the South Vietnamese coast on February 16, 1965 of a huge cargo of arms, ammunition and other supplies, delivered by ship from North Viet-Nam. Major attacks by organized units are being launched against government forces. The North Vietnamese have even attacked United States vessels in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Thus, what began as covert and indirect aggression has become open armed aggression. This aggression has been carried out across the internationally agreed demarcation line of 1954 between North and South Viet-Nam, and across international frontiers between Viet-Nam and Laos.

III. International Law—the UN Charter

As has been seen, North Viet-Nam is engaged in a continuing armed aggression against South Viet-Nam in violation of international agreements and international law.

This being the case, what are the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States entitled to do under international law by way of response?

Under international law, the victim of armed aggression is obviously permitted to defend itself and to organize a collective self-defense effort in which others who are willing may join. This right is recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Article 51 states that—

> Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by the members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such actions as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

As has been shown above, the whole course of conduct of North Viet-Nam, particularly as it has evolved in recent months, adds up to open armed attack within the meaning of Article 51. Indeed it is more than a single armed attack; it is a continuing program of armed aggression carried on across international frontiers and established demarcation lines. In these circumstances, South Viet-Nam has requested and received assistance from the United States and other nations in a collective defense effort.

Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter is also relevant to the Viet-Nam situation. Article 2, paragraph 4, provides that—

> All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

In the first place, it is plain that the use of force against territorial integrity and political independence has been initiated by North Viet-Nam and not by anyone else. Secondly, paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter does not place an absolute prohibition on the use of force. It permits the use of force in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter. Moreover, the Charter itself specifically provides for the use of force in certain circumstances—action through the United Nations itself, action through regional arrangements, and action in self-defense. The actions of the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam, being defensive in character and designed to resist armed aggression are wholly consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter and specifically with Article 2, paragraph 4.

It was as a measure of self-defense under Article 51 that the United States responded in August 1964 to the North Vietnamese attack on our vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin. Those measures were immediately reported to the Security Council in accordance with Article 51. The Security Council did not see fit to take any action to maintain or restore international peace and security in the area. Indeed, North Viet-Nam refused to participate in the deliberations of the Security Council and explicitly denied the right of the Council to examine this question.

The attacks against South Viet-Nam have mounted in intensity since August. In these circumstances, it has been mutually agreed between the Government of Sonth Viet-Nam and the United States Government that further means of providing for the collective defense of South Viet-Nam are required. Prompt defensive action has been decided upon, and airstrikes have been made against military installations and facilities in North Viet-Nam which support the aggression against the South. The actions taken constitute a limited and measured response, fitted to the situation that called for it. Again, these measures have been reported to the Security Council in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. As yet, the Council has taken no action to maintain an effective peace in the area. Until the regime in Hanoi decides to cease its aggressive intervention in South Viet-Nam, or until effective steps are taken to maintain international peace and security in the area, the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam have every right to continue their individual and collective self-defense against the Communist armed aggression coming from North Viet-Nam.

IV—The Geneva Accords

It has been demonstrated that the North Vietnamese have repeatedly violated the 1954 Geneva Accords in a most serious and flagrant manner. In so doing, of course, North Viet-Nam is ignoring an international Agreement which is signed and by which it is bound. In addition, by the continued presence in neighboring Laos of North Vietnamese forces and their use of Laotian territory for infiltration into South Viet-Nam, North Viet-Nam is violating solemn commitments which it undertook in the 1962 Geneva Agreements to refrain from such activities.

In these circumstances, international law recognizes the principle that a material breach of a treaty by one party entitles other parties at least to withhold compliance with an equivalent, corresponding or related provision until the other party is prepared to observe its obligations.

The actions of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States are fully consistent with this principle. North Vietnamese violations of the Geneva Agreements have created an immediate danger to the continued independence and integrity of the Republic of Viet-Nam. The response of South Viet-Nam and the United States is designed to meet this threat created by North Viet-Nam's disregard of the Accords. The extensive North Vietnamese violations certainly justify South Viet-Nam at least to withhold compliance with those provisions of the Accords which limit its ability to protect its very existence. Both South Viet-Nam and the United States have made clear that the actions which they have taken will no longer be necessary if North Viet-Nam would comply with the Accords.

PATTERN FOR PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: Address by President Johnson, Johns Hopkins University, April 7, 1965[1]

Last week 17 nations sent their views to some two dozen countries having an interest in Southeast Asia. We are joining those 17 countries and stating our American policy tonight, which we believe will contribute toward peace in this area of the world.

I have come here to review once again with my own people the views of the American Government.

Tonight Americans and Asians are dying for a world where each people may choose its own path to change. This is the principle for which our ancestors fought in the valleys of Pennsylvania. It is a principle for which our sons fight tonight in the jungles of Viet-Nam.

Viet-Nam is far away from this quiet campus. We have no territory there, nor do we seek any. The war is dirty and brutal and difficult. And some 400 young men, born into an America that is bursting with opportunity and promise, have ended their lives on Viet-Nam's steaming soil.

Why must we take this painful road? Why must this nation hazard its ease, its interest, and its power for the sake of a people so far away?

We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny, and only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure.

This kind of world will never be built by bombs or bullets. Yet the infirmities of man are such that force must often precede reason and the waste of war, the works of peace. We wish that this were not so. But we must deal with the world as it is, if it is ever to be as we wish.

The world as it is in Asia is not a serene or peaceful place.

---

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 26, 1965, pp. 606–610.

The first reality is that North Viet-Nam has attacked the independent nation of South Viet-Nam. Its object is total conquest. Of course, some of the people of South Viet-Nam are participating in attack on their own government. But trained men and supplies, orders and arms, flow in a constant stream from North to South.

This support is the heartbeat of the war.

And it is a war of unparalleled brutality. Simple farmers are the targets of assassination and kidnaping. Women and children are strangled in the night because their men are loyal to their government. And helpless villages are ravaged by sneak attacks. Large-scale raids are conducted on towns, and terror strikes in the heart of cities.

The confused nature of this conflict cannot mask the fact that it is the new face of an old enemy.

Over this war—and all Asia—is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peiping. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent. The contest in Viet-Nam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes.

Why are these realities our concern? Why are we in South Viet-Nam?

We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Viet-Nam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Viet-Nam defend its independence.

And I intend to keep that promise.

To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and to the terror that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong.

We are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are people whose well-being rests in part on the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Viet-Nam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of an American commitment and in the value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war.

We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Viet-Nam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must stay in Southeast Asia —as we did in Europe—in the words of the Bible: "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further."

There are those who say that all our effort there will be futile—that China's power is such that it is bound to dominate all Southeast Asia. But there is no end to that argument until all of the nations of Asia are swallowed up.

There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there. Well, we have it there for the same reason that we have a responsi-

bility for the defense of Europe. World War II was fought in both Europe and Asia, and when it ended we found ourselves with continued responsibility for the defense of freedom.

Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way. We will do everything necessary to reach that objective, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary.

In recent months attacks on South Viet-Nam were stepped up. Thus, it became necessary for us to increase our response and to make attacks by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in what we believe that purpose requires.

We do this in order to slow down aggression.

We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Viet-Nam who have bravely borne this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties.

And we do this to convince the leaders of North Viet-Nam—and all who seek to share their conquest—of a simple fact:

We will not be defeated.

We will not grow tired.

We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement.

We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes. But it is our best and prayerful judgment that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace.

We hope that peace will come swiftly. But that is in the hands of others besides ourselves. And we must be prepared for a long continued conflict. It will require patience as well as bravery—the will to endure as well as the will to resist.

I wish it were possible to convince others with words of what we now find it necessary to say with guns and planes: armed hostility is futile—our resources are equal to any challenge—because we fight for values and we fight for principle, rather than territory or colonies, our patience and our determination are unending.

Once this is clear, then it should also be clear that the only path for reasonable men is the path of peaceful settlement. Such peace demands an independent South Viet-Nam securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others—free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country.

These are the essentials of any final settlement.

We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam.

There may be many ways to this kind of peace: in discussion or negotiation with the governments concerned; in large groups or in small ones; in the reaffirmation of old agreements or their strengthening with new ones.

We have stated this position over and over again 50 times and more to friend and foe alike. And we remain ready with this purpose for unconditional discussions.

And until that bright and necessary day of peace we will try to keep conflict from spreading. We have no desire to see thousands die

in battle—Asians or Americans. We have no desire to devastate that which the people of North Viet-Nam have built with toil and sacrifice. We will use our power with restraint and with all the wisdom that we can command.

But we will use it.

This war, like most wars, is filled with terrible irony. For what do the people of North Viet-Nam want? They want what their neighbors also desire—food for their hunger, health for their bodies, a chance to learn, progress for their country, and an end to the bondage of material misery. And they would find all these things far more readily in peaceful association with others than in the endless course of battle.

These countries of Southeast Asia are homes for millions of impoverished people. Each day these people rise at dawn and struggle through until the night to wrest existence from the soil. They are often wracked by diseases, plagued by hunger, and death comes at the early age of 40.

Stability and peace do not come easily in such a land. Neither independence nor human dignity will ever be won, though, by arms alone. It also requires the works of peace. The American people have helped generously in times past in these works, and now there must be a much more massive effort to improve the life of man in that conflict-torn corner of our world.

The first step is for the countries of Southeast Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development. We would hope that North Viet-Nam would take its place in the common effort just as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible.

The United Nations is already actively engaged in development in this area, and as far back in 1961 I conferred with our authorities in Viet-Nam in connection with their work there. And I would hope tonight that the Secretary-General of the United Nations could use the prestige of his great office and his deep knowledge of Asia to initiate, as soon as possible, with the countries of that area, a plan for cooperation in increased development.

For our part I will ask the Congress to join in a billion-dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway. And I would hope that all other industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union, will join in this effort to replace despair with hope and terror with progress.

The task is nothing less than to enrich the hopes and existence of more than a hundred million people. And there is much to be done.

The vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA. The wonders of modern medicine can be spread through villages where thousands die every year from lack of care. Schools can be established to train people in the skills needed to manage the process of development. And these objectives, and more, are within the reach of a cooperative and determined effort.

I also intend to expand and speed up a program to make available our farm surpluses to assist in feeding and clothing the needy in Asia. We should not allow people to go hungry and wear rags while our own warehouses overflow with an abundance of wheat and corn and rice and cotton.

So I will very shortly name a special team of outstanding patriotic, and distinguished Americans to inaugurate our participation in these programs. This team will be headed by Mr. Eugene Black, the very able former President of the World Bank.

This will be a disorderly planet for a long time. In Asia, and elsewhere, the forces of the modern world are shaking old ways and uprooting ancient civilizations. There will be turbulence and struggle and even violence. Great social change—as we see in our own country—does not always come without conflict.

We must also expect that nations will on occasion be in dispute with us. It may be because we are rich, or powerful, or because we have made some mistakes, or because they honestly fear our intentions. However, no nation need ever fear that we desire their land, or to impose our will, or to dictate their institutions.

But we will always oppose the effort of one nation to conquer another nation.

We will do this because our own security is at stake.

But there is more to it than that. For our generation has a dream. It is a very old dream. But we have the power, and now we have the opportunity to make that dream come true.

For centuries nations have struggled among each other. But we dream of a world where disputes are settled by law and reason. And we will try to make it so.

For most of history men have hated and killed one another in battle. But we dream of an end to war. And we will try to make it so.

For all existence most men have lived in poverty, threatened by hunger. But we dream of a world where all are fed and charged with hope. And we will help to make it so.

The ordinary men and women of North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam, of China and India, of Russia and America, are brave people. They are filled with the same proportions of hate and fear, of love and hope. Most of them want the same things for themselves and their families. Most of them do not want their sons to ever die in battle, or to see their homes, or the homes of others, destroyed.

Well, this can be their world yet. Man now has the knowledge—always before denied—to make this planet serve the real needs of the people who live on it.

I know this will not be easy. I know how difficult it is for reason to guide passion, and love to master hate. The complexities of this world do not bow easily to pure and consistent answers.

But the simple truths are there just the same. We must all try to follow them as best we can.

We often say how impressive power is. But I do not find it impressive at all. The guns and the bombs, the rockets and the warships, are all symbols of human failure. They are necessary symbols. They protect what we cherish. But they are witness to human folly.

A dam built across a great river is impressive.

In the countryside where I was born, and where I live, I have seen the night illuminated, and the kitchen warmed, and the home heated, where once the cheerless night and the ceaseless cold held sway. And all this happened because electricity came to our area

along the humming wires of the REA. Electrification of the countryside—yes, that, too, is impressive.

A rich harvest in a hungry land is impressive.

The sight of healthy children in a classroom is impressive.

These—not mighty arms—are the achievements which the American nation believes to be impressive. And if we are steadfast, the time may come when all other nations will also find it so.

Every night before I turn out the lights to sleep I ask myself this question: Have I done everything that I can do to unite this country? Have I done everything I can to help unite the world, to try to bring peace and hope to all the peoples of the world? Have I done enough?

Ask yourselves that question in your homes—and in this hall tonight. Have we, each of us, all done all we can do? Have we done enough?

We may well be living in the time foretold many years ago when it was said: "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live."

This generation of the world must choose: destroy or build, kill, or aid, hate or understand. We can do all these things on a scale that has never been dreamed of before.

Well, we will choose life. And so doing, we will prevail over the enemies within man, and over the natural enemies of all mankind.

U.S. REPLY TO 17-NATION APPEAL ON VIET-NAM, APRIL 8, 1965[1]

We welcome the concern and interest of the governments participating in the Declaration of March 15; just as we welcome any initiative aimed at bringing peace to any part of the world. The Declaration is a constructive contribution to the effort for peace.

We fully agree with the general principles expressed in that Declaration. The fulfillment of those principles, which are an essential part of American policy everywhere, is the purpose of our presence in Vietnam.

The Declaration reaffirms the right of all people to self-determination. And so do we. We seek self-determination for the people of South Vietnam.

The Declaration reaffirms the belief that recourse to force is contrary to the rights of the people of Vietnam to peace, freedom and independence. And so do we. We seek to bring peace and help restore those rights.

The signatory nations point out that they are "deeply concerned" at the aggravation of the situation in Vietnam. And so are we. We should end the war by ensuring the independence of South Vietnam.

The basic cause of the conflict in Vietnam is the attack by North Vietnam on the independent nation of South Vietnam. The object of that attack is total conquest.

---

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 26, 1965, pp. 610–612.

The regime in North Vietnam has sent trained military personnel and weapons of war on an increasing scale into South Vietnam. It has directed and supported a mounting campaign of terror, assassination, and military action against the Government and people of the Republic of South Vietnam.

The Government of South Vietnam has requested the help of the United States in its defense against attack. In fulfillment of our long-standing commitments we have given such help. We will continue as long as we are needed, and until the aggression is halted. In these actions we seek only the security and peace of South Vietnam, and we threaten no regime.

The war against South Vietnam is a war of great brutality. Simple farmers are the target of assassination and kidnapping. Women and children are strangled in the night because their men are loyal to the government. Small and helpless villages are ravaged by sneak attacks. Large scale raids are conducted on towns; and terror strikes in the heart of cities.

We hope that the anger of people in every country will extend to those who commit these daily acts of violence in the South. We hope that the sympathy and compassion of every land will be held out to these victims of unprovoked attack. These are men and women, and even children, who die because they are attacked—not because they are attackers.

Peace in Southeast Asia demands an independent South Vietnam—security guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others—free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country.

These are the essentials of any final settlement.

We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

There may be many ways to this kind of peace: in discussion or negotiation with the governments concerned, in large groups or in small ones, in the reaffirmation of old agreements or their strengthening with new ones.

We have stated this position over and over again, to friend and foe alike. And we remain ready—with this purpose—for unconditional discussions.

We believe that peace can be achieved in Southeast Asia the moment that aggression from North Vietnam is eliminated. That aggression has many elements. It has meant the training and infiltration of agents and armed forces—the procurement and supply of munitions—the bombing of compounds by night and Embassies by day—murdering secretaries and soldiers alike—in short, a whole campaign of terror and military action that is externally supported and directed. When these things stop and the obstacles to security and stability are removed, the need for American supporting military action will also come to an end.

And when conditions have been created in which the people of South Vietnam can determine their own future free from external interference, the United States will be ready and eager to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam. At the same time, it should become possible to work out the future relationships between North and

South Vietnam on the basis of mutual respect and determination to resolve their problems by peaceful means.

Because the aggressor has made great efforts to hide his actions, it will also be important to have new ways and means of assurance that aggression has in fact been stopped. The problems of such control and assurance are not easy. But these difficulties are not at the center of the problem. The center of the problem is in the realities of behavior. Those realities are known and felt in South Vietnam. They are known and understood by those who are responsible for them. It is by their ending in fact that the actions of the United States Government will be governed.

We also hope that the nations of the world can join in helping the countries of Southeast Asia in their own effort to improve the life of their people.

We have offered our help for a large-scale program of economic development embracing all of Southeast Asia. We hope that other industrialized nations will join.

We are glad of this Declaration. We believe that the nations which signed it are motivated by a deep and sincere purpose of peace. That is our purpose too. We hope it is shared by all others who are affected by this Declaration.

17-Nation Appeal[1]

The Appeal of the Heads of State and Government of Seventeen Non-Aligned Countries Concerning Crisis in Vietnam

Pursuant to the final Declaration of the Declaration of the Conference of Heads of States or Governments of Non-aligned Countries held in Cairo in October 1964,

we, the undersigned Heads of state or government, have noted with great concern the aggravation of existing tensions and conflicts in South-East Asia and in certain regions of Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, arising from oppression and foreign intervention, and regret the present deadlock in the United Nations which prevents it from exercising fully its responsibility in maintaining and safeguarding peace;

we solemnly reaffirm the right of peoples to self-determination and the principle that all states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force;

we reaffirm our dedication to the principle of the inviolability of, and respect for, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states;

we express our conviction that recourse to force and pressure in various forms is contrary to the rights of the people of Vietnam to peace, freedom, and independence and can only lead to the aggravation of the conflict in that area and to its transformation into a more generalized war with catastrophic consequences;

we are deeply concerned at the aggravation of the situation in Vietnam and are convinced that it is the consequence of foreign intervention in various forms, including military intervention, which impedes the implementation of the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam;

we are firmly convinced that, irrespective of possible differences in appraising various elements in the existing situation in Vietnam, the only way leading to the termination of the conflict consists in seeking a peaceful solution

---

[1] Handed to Secretary Rusk for President Johnson on Apr. 1 by a delegation composed of Ambassadors Dinke, Majid, and Micunovic and Ambassador Miguel A. Ribeiro of Ghana. The appeal was also delivered on Apr. 1 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Governments of Canada, Communist China, France, Poland, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, the Republic of Viet-Nam, and North Viet-Nam, as well as to the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam."

through negotiations. We therefore make an urgent appeal to the parties concerned to start such negotiations, as soon as possible, without posing any preconditions, so that a political solution to the problem of Vietnam may be found in accordance with the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people and in the spirit of the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam and of the Declaration of the Conference of Non-aligned Countries held in Cairo.

We invite the governments of all countries interested in maintenance of world peace to associate themselves, as soon as possible, with this appeal.

MARCH 15, 1965

MOHAMMAD YOUSUF, *Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Afghanistan*
AHMED BEN BELLA, *President of the Democratic People's Republic of Algeria*
ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS, *President of the Republic of Cyprus*
DUDLEY SENANAYAKE, *Prime Minister of Ceylon*
HAILE SELASSIE, I, *Emperor of Ethiopia*
DR. KWAME NKRUMAH, *President of the Republic of Ghana*
SEKOU TOURE, *President of the Republic of Guinea*
LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI, *Prime Minister of India*
MARSHAL ABDUL SALAM MOHAMED AREF, *President of the Republic of Iraq*
JOMO KENYATTA, *President of the Republic of Kenya*
MAHENDRA BIR BIKRAM, SHAH DEVA, *King of Nepal*
GENERAL MOHAMAD AMIN EL-HAFEZ, *President of the Syrian Arab Republic*
HABIB BOURGUIBA, *President of Tunisia*
GAMAL ABDEL NASSER, *President of the United Arab Republic*
JOSIP BROZ TITO, *President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*
KENNETH KAUNDA, *President of Zambia*
MILTON OBOTE, *Prime Minister of Uganda*

LETTER FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY MacARTHUR TO SENATOR FULBRIGHT, AUGUST 2, 1965, TRANSMITTING A PAPER ENTITLED: THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO ASSIST SOUTH VIETNAM

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During the course of Ambassador Lodge's testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee July 27 you asked if the Department could supply a statement for the record on our commitment to assist South Vietnam.

Since this commitment was developed, restated, and redefined on several occasions during the last 15 years, I am enclosing a listing of the various agreements, public statements, communiques, and letters that together constitute the U.S. commitment to help South Vietnam defend itself against Communist aggression.

If I can be of any further assistance to you or the committee in this matter, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR II,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO ASSIST SOUTH VIETNAM

1. December 23, 1950: Realizing that the Communist-led Vietminh drive against the French in Indochina was part of the general Communist offensive in the Far East whose northern front was in Korea,

the United States, under the Truman administration, signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (Pentalateral Agreement) with France, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. This agreement, authorized by Public Law 329, 81st Congress, provided for indirect U.S. military aid through France to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

2. September 7, 1951: The United States signed an agreement authorized by Public Law 535, 81st Congress, with Premier Tran Van Huu's government providing for direct U.S. economic aid to Vietnam.

3. July 21, 1954: During the concluding plenary session of the Geneva conference, the head of the U.S. delegation, Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, made a unilateral U.S. declaration. The main points of this declaration were as follows:

(*a*) The United States "will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb" the Geneva agreements.

(*b*) The United States "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."

(*c*) The United States "shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections, supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly" (p. 61).[1]

4. October 23, 1954: President Eisenhower sent a letter to Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem pledging U.S. aid and support to South Vietnam (p. 67).

5. January 1, 1955: On the basis of the existing Pentalateral Agreement the United States began sending direct supporting assistance to the Vietnamese armed forces.

6. February 19, 1955: The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO Treaty) came into force. In a protocol to the treaty, the "SEATO umbrella" was extended to cover Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos should these countries request SEATO assistance in resisting Communist aggression. The U.S. Senate ratified the treaty on February 1, 1955, by a vote of 82 to 1 (p. 62).

7. March 7, 1955: The United States, under the Eisenhower administration, and the government of Premier Ngo Dinh Diem signed an agreement which supplemented the agreement mentioned in (2) above.

8. July 6, 1956: Vice President Richard Nixon visited Vietnam and delivered a letter from President Eisenhower to President Diem stating that President Eisenhower looked forward to many years of cooperation between the two countries.

9. May 11, 1957: A joint communique of President Eisenhower and President Diem was issued in Washington. President Eisenhower assured President Diem of the willingness of the United States to continue to offer effective assistance within the constitutional processes of the United States to promote political stability and economic welfare in the Republic of Vietnam (p. 73).

10. October 26, 1960: In a letter of good wishes on South Vietnam's fifth anniversary, President Eisenhower assured President

[1] Page references are to the committee print date June 16, 1965, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee entitled "Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam."

Diem that "for so long as our strength can be useful, the United States will continue to assist Vietnam in the difficult yet hopeful struggle ahead."

11. May 13, 1961: At the close of Vice President Johnson's visit to Vietnam, a joint Vietnamese-United States communique was issued stating that:

(*a*) Both Governments will extend and build upon existing programs of military and economic aid.

(*b*) Vietnam's regular armed forces will be increased with U.S. assistance.

(*c*) The United States will provide assistance for the entire Vietnamese Civil Guard.

(*d*) U.S. military experts will be used to assist Vietnam's armed forces in health, welfare, and public works activities at the village level.

(*e*) A special group of U.S. economic and fiscal experts will be sent to Vietnam to work out a financial plan as the basis for joint efforts (p. 77).

12. August 2, 1961: President Kennedy declared that the United States would do all it could to save South Vietnam from communism.

13. October 26, 1961: In a letter to President Diem, President Kennedy reaffirmed U.S. determination "to help Vietnam preserve its independence, protect its people against Communist assassins, and build a better life through economic growth."

14. December 7 and 14, 1961: An exchange of messages between President Diem and President Kennedy resulted in President Kennedy's stating that the United States, in response to the Vietnamese Government's request, was prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect its people and preserve its independence. President Kennedy went on to promise that the United States would promptly increase its assistance to Vietnam's defense efforts against Communist aggression (p. 84).

15. January 4, 1962: The United States and Vietnamese Governments issued a joint communique on the expansion of economic development programs which called for both Governments to do "their utmost to improve the protection and prosperity of the Vietnamese in the face of Communist guerrilla aggression and depredations directed and supported by the Communist regime in Hanoi" (p. 86).

16. November 24, 1963: President Johnson affirmed the U.S. intention to continue its military and economic support of South Vietnam's struggle against the Communist Vietcong.

17. December 31, 1963: In a New Year message to Gen. Duong Van Minh, President Johnson pledged that the "United States will continue to furnish you and your people with the fullest measure of support in this bitter fight. We shall maintain in Vietnam American personnel and material as needed to assist you in achieving victory" (p. 106).

18. April 20, 1964: President Johnson stated that no one should "doubt that we are in this battle as long as South Vietnam wants our support and needs our assistance to protect its freedom."

19. August 7, 1964: The Congress approved the southeast Asia resolution by a vote of 88 to 2 in the Senate and 416 to 0 in the House of Representatives. The resolution stated that "the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." It also declared that the United States was prepared "as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom" (p. 128).

20. April 7, 1965: In his speech at Johns Hopkins University, President Johnson stated that he intended to keep the promise repeated since 1954 to help South Vietnam. "To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and to the terror that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong" (p. 197).

21. May 4, 1965: In his message to the Congress accompanying a request for an additional $700 million to meet mounting military requirements in Vietnam, President Johnson stated: "This is not a routine appropriation. For each Member of Congress who supports this request is also voting to persist in our efforts to halt Communist aggression in South Vietnam. Each is saying that the Congress and the President stand united before the world in joint determination that the independence of South Vietnam shall be preserved and Communist attack will not succeed." The House approved the appropriation by a vote of 408 to 7 and the Senate by a vote of 88 to 3 (p. 219).

22. July 28, 1965: President Johnson told his press conference that "We are in Vietnam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges of the American Nation. Three Presidents—President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President—over 11 years, have committed themselves and have promised to help defend this small and valiant nation."

THE QUESTION OF A FORMAL DECLARATION OF WAR IN VIETNAM: State Department Position Paper, Dated November 19, 1965 [1]

The question has been raised whether it would be desirable for the President to seek a formal declaration of war against North Vietnam. This question should be considered with respect to both international and domestic considerations.

INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

From the international standpoint it seems undesirable to request a declaration of war for the following reasons:

1. The policy of the United States in Vietnam is to assist the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, at the latter's request, in thwarting an armed aggression from North Vietnam and to achieve

[1] Prepared by the Department of State at the request of the committee.

a workable settlement of the dispute among the principal parties involved. This policy is pursued with limited aims, seeking to end the aggression against South Vietnam without threatening the destruction of North Vietnam, allowing a miscalculation by the enemy as to our intentions, or unnecessarily enlarging the scope of the conflict. The United States believes that the struggle must be won primarily in South Vietnam and is in that context a defensive military effort.

2. To declare war would add a new psychological element to the international situation since in this century declarations of war have come to imply dedication to the total destruction of the enemy. It would increase the danger of misunderstanding of our true objectives in the conflict by the various Communist states, and increase the chances of their expanded involvement in it. Such a declaration would question the sincerity of the President's claims concerning his desire for a peaceful settlement allowing the various nations of the area, including North Vietnam, to live together in economic cooperation, and his reiteration that we do not threaten the existence of North Vietnam.

3. On balance, a declaration of war—which would be the first and only since the signing of the United Nations Charter—would significantly reduce the flexibility of the United States to seek a solution among extremely complex factors and reduce our adversary's own reasoned approach to a solution, when U.S. policy from the beginning has attempted to avoid closing off any possible avenue of resolution and to make the North Vietnamese more rather than less rational in the situation.

4. There is nothing in modern international law which requires a state to declare war before engaging in hostilities against another state; nor would a formal declaration of war impose any obligations on an enemy by which he would not otherwise be bound.

5. Absence of a formal declaration of war is not a factor which makes an international use of force unlawful. The only relevant legal question is whether the use of force is justified. Examples of hostilities begun without prior declarations of war abound in recent history. The fighting in Korea from 1950 to 1953, that in Indochina from 1947 to 1954, that in and around the Suez Canal in 1956, and that in west New Guinea between the Dutch and Indonesians in the spring and summer of 1962 all took place without benefit of declarations of war. We are not aware that the absence of declarations of war in these cases has been alleged to constitute a violation of international law.

6. The legal rules of international law concerning the conduct of armed conflicts apply to all armed conflicts without regard to the presence or absence of declarations of war. All that is required is armed conflict between two or more international entities. The 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims were specifically made applicable to any "armed conflict of an international character" between two or more of the parties. The rules of war embodied in the Hague conventions formulated in the early years of this century are considered, in general, to be part of customary international law binding on all states, and their applicability is unrelated to declarations of war.

DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS

From the point of view of U.S. law it would be undesirable for the President to seek a declaration of war for the following reasons:

1. A declaration of war is not necessary either to authorize the actions that have been taken by the United States in Vietnam or to provide an expression of congressional intent on the Vietnamese situation. The President has power under article II, section 2, of the Constitution as Commander in Chief to deploy U.S. military forces to Vietnam for the purpose of assisting South Vietnam to defend itself from armed aggression by North Vietnam. Since the Constitution was adopted, there have been at least 125 instances in which the President, without congressional authority and in the absence of a declaration of war, has ordered the Armed Forces to take actions or to maintain positions abroad. Some of these historical instances have involved the use of U.S. forces in combat. Congressional intent is expressed by the joint resolution of Congress of August 10, 1964, passed by a combined vote of 504 to 2, explicitly approving all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, in the defense of freedom in southeast Asia. A much fuller presentation of the views of the executive branch on the question of the President's constitutional authority was published in February 1951, as a joint committee print of the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services.

2. A declaration of war does not seem necessary in order to provide emergency authority to the executive branch. Many laws become operative in time of national emergency or in time of war. Most of these are operative today by virtue of the state of emergency proclaimed by President Truman in December 1950. These laws give the executive branch increased power to deal with the problems in Vietnam as well as other areas of the world. For example, they include special authority with respect to the movement of aliens in and out of the United States; the Armed Forces, Reserves, and the National Guard; procurement of material for the services; transactions in foreign exchange; Government contracts; security and the protection of defense information; and defense transportation. A few emergency laws would not come into effect unless there were a declaration of national emergency or of war subsequent to the 1950 declaration of national emergency. However, there are only a few laws which can become operative only in time of war, and they have not been found necessary for the conduct of hostilities in Vietnam.

LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, TO SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT, JANUARY 5, 1966[1]

His Excellency U THANT,
Secretary General, United Nations.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: My Government has during the past 2 weeks been taking a number of steps in pursuit of peace

[1] U.S. mission to the United Nations press release No. 4781, dated Jan. 5, 1966.

which flow in part from our obligations under the United Nations Charter, of which we are most mindful, and in part from the appeals which His Holiness the Pope and you addressed just before Christmas to us and to others. I believe it would be of interest to you, in addition to what we have already communicated to you privately, and to all States members of the United Nations to know more precisely what we have done, and what we have in mind.

You will observe that we have already responded in terms which go somewhat beyond the appeals earlier addressed to us. President Johnson dispatched messages, and in several cases personal representatives, to His Holiness the Pope, to the Secretary General of the United Nations and to a considerable number of chiefs of state or heads of government, reaffirming our desire promptly to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Vietnam and to do all in our power to move that conflict from the battlefield to the conference table. In this connection, our bombing of North Vietnam has not been resumed since the Christmas truce.

Among the points made in our messages conveyed to a number of governments are the following: That the United States is prepared for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a cease-fire might be the first order of business in any discussion or negotiations, that the United States remains prepared to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference, that the United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in Vietnam, that the future political structure in South Vietnam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through democratic processes, and that the question of the reunification of the two Vietnams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples.

I should appreciate it if this letter could be communicated to all members of the United Nations as a Security Council document.

I would urge them in examining it to recall President Johnson's letter of July 28, 1965, to the Secretary General in which the President invited all members of the United Nations, individually and collectively, to use their influence to bring about unconditional discussions, and my letter of July 31, 1965 (document S/6575) to the President of the Security Council in which I said, inter alia, that the United States stands ready as it has in the past, to collaborate unconditionally with members of the Security Council in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security to that area of the world. I should hope that on the present occasion also organs of the United Nations and all States would give even more earnest thought to what they might do to help to achieve these ends.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG.

U.S. OFFICIAL POSITION ON VIETNAM: State Department Press Release, January 3 and 7, 1966[1]

The following statements are on the public record about elements which the United States believes can go into peace in Southeast Asia:

I. The Fact of Aggression

The simple fact is that tens of thousands of trained and armed men, including units of the North Vietnamese regular army, have been sent by Hanoi into South Vietnam for the purpose of imposing Hanoi's will on South Vietnam by force. It is this external aggression which is responsible for the presence of U.S. combat forces. Indeed, it was not until the early summer of 1965 that the number of U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam reached the number of those which have been infiltrated by Hanoi. If this aggression from the outside were removed, U.S. combat forces would not be needed.

II. The U.S. Commitment

The United States has a clear and direct commitment to the security of South Vietnam against external attack. This commitment is based upon bilateral agreements between the United States and South Vietnam, upon the SEATO Treaty (whose obligations are both joint and several), upon annual actions by the Congress in providing aid to South Vietnam, upon the policy expressed in such Congressional action as the August 1964 resolution, and upon the solemn declarations of three U.S. Presidents. At stake is not just South Vietnam, nor even Southeast Asia: there is also at stake the integrity of a U.S. commitment and the importance of that commitment to the peace right around the globe.

III. Initiatives for Peace

A. We are not aware of any initiative which has been taken by Hanoi during the past five years to seek peace in Southeast Asia. Reports of "peace feelers" have to do with initiatives by third parties. Hanoi has denied that it has ever made any "peace feelers." We ourselves know of none. During 1965 Hanoi has consistently insisted that its four points must be accepted as the sole basis for peace in Vietnam. The third of these four points would require the imposition of the program of the liberation front upon South Vietnam, whether the South Vietnamese wanted it or not.

B. The initiatives for peace undertaken by our side, and by many other governments, would be hard to count. They began with President Kennedy's talk with Premier Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961 and have not ceased. The publicly known initiatives have been

[1] Department of State press release dated Jan. 3 and 7, 1966.

multiplied many times by private initiatives not yet disclosed. On the public record, however, are the following instances:

1. Kennedy-Khrushchev talks in June 1961.
2. Geneva Conference on Laos.
3. U.S. reference of Gulf of Tonkin matter to the UN Security Council in August 1964.
4. The Polish proposal to convene the two Co-Chairmen and the three members of the ICC (India, Canada and Poland) to take up the question of Laos.
5. The call of 17 non-aligned nations for negotiations without preconditions.
6. Attempts by U Thant to visit Hanoi and Peiping.
7. President Johnson's call for unconditional discussions.
8. The British Commonwealth Committee on Vietnam.
9. Attempted or actual visits by Patrick Gordon Walker, Mr. Davies (MP), and Ghanian Delegation.

IV. U.S. Contributions to the Basket of Peace

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia.
2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof.
3. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it.
4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it.
5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions.
6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose.
7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia.
8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured.
9. We support free elections in South Vietnam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice.
10. The question of reunification of Vietnam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision.
11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be nonalined or neutral if that be their option.
12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars.
13. The President has said: "The Vietcong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem."
14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.

LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTING AN URGENT MEETING OF THE COUNCIL TO CONSIDER THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM, JANUARY 31, 1966[1]

His Excellency Roger Seydoux,
President of the Security Council.

Dear Mr. President: I have the honor to request that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be called promptly to consider the situation in Vietnam.

As you know, the U.S. Government has, time and time again, patiently and tirelessly sought a peaceful settlement of this conflict on the basis of unconditional negotiations and the Geneva Accords, of 1954. We have done so both inside and outside the United Nations.

In President Johnson's letter of July 28, 1965, to the Secretary General, in my letter of July 30, 1965, to the President of the Security Council, and in my letter of January 4, 1966, to the Secretary General, we appealed for whatever help in ending the conflict the Security Council and its members or any other organ of the United Nations might be able to give. We have also been in constant touch with the Secretary General in order to keep him fully informed and to seek his counsel and assistance. A great number of United Nations members, acting jointly or separately, have with our earnest encouragement sought to find a means of moving the conflict from the battlefield to the conference table.

As you are also aware, because my Government was advised by many others that a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam might contribute to the acceptance by its Government of our offer of unconditional negotiations, we did suspend bombing on December 24 and continued that suspension for some 37 days. At the same time, President Johnson dispatched several high-ranking representatives to explain to His Holiness the Pope and to the chiefs of state or heads of government of a number of states our most earnest desire to end the conflict peacefully and promptly. Our views were set forth in 14 points which were communicated to a very large number of governments and later published and which were summarized in the third paragraph of my letter of January 4, 1966, to the Secretary General.

I should like to repeat that summary to you as follows:

"That the United States is prepared for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962, that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a cease-fire might be the first order of business in any discussions of negotiation, that the United States remains prepared to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference, that the United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in Vietnam, that the future political structure in South Vietnam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people them-

[1] U.S. Mission to the United Nations press release No. 4798 dated Jan. 31, 1966.

selves through democratic processes, and that the question of the reunification of the two Vietnams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples.

Subsequently, the President in his state of the Union address on January 12 reiterated once again our willingness to consider at a conference or in other negotiations any proposals which might be put forward by others. I am authorized to inform the Council that these U.S. views were transmitted both directly and indirectly to the Government of North Vietnam and were received by that Government.

Unhappily, there has been no affirmative response whatsoever from Hanoi to our efforts to bring the conflict to the negotiating table, to which so many governments lent their sympathy and assistance. Instead, there have been from Hanoi, and of course from Peiping as well, merely the familiar charges that our peace offensive, despite the prolonged bombing pause, was merely a "fraud" and a "swindle" deserving no serious consideration. The most recent response seemed to be that set forth in President Ho Chi Minh's letter to certain heads of state which was broadcast from Hanoi on January 28. In this letter President Ho Chi Minh made quite clear his unwillingness at this time to proceed with unconditional negotiations: on the contrary, he insisted upon a number of preconditions which would in effect require the United States to accept Hanoi's solution before negotiations had even begun. This is obviously unacceptable.

Therefore, Mr. President, my Government has concluded that it should now bring this problem with all its implications for peace formally before the Security Council. We are mindful of the discussions over the past months among the members of the Council as to whether a formal meeting could usefully be held in the context of other efforts then in train. We are also aware that it may not be easy for the Council itself, in view of all the obstacles, to take constructive action on this question. We are firmly convinced, however, that in light of its obligations under the Charter to maintain international peace and security and the failure so far of all efforts outside the United Nations to restore peace, the Council should address itself urgently and positively to this situation and exert its most vigorous endeavors and its immense prestige to finding a prompt solution to it.

We hope that the members of the Security Council will agree that our common dedication to peace and our common responsibility for the future of mankind require no less. In this connection, we are mindful of the renewed appeal of His Holiness the Pope only 2 days ago in which he suggested that "an arbitration of the United Nations confided to neutral nations might tomorrow—we would like to hope even today—resolve this terrible question."

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG.

LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, TO AMBASSADOR ROGER SEYDOUX, PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, JANUARY 31, 1966[1]

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As a supplement to my letter to you of this date, requesting that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be called promptly to consider the situation in Vietnam, I submit herewith a draft resolution which I request be circulated as a Security Council document.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG.

The Security Council,

Deeply concerned at the continuation of hostilities in Vietnam,

Mindful of its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Noting that the provisions of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 have not been implemented,

Desirous of contributing to a peaceful and honorable settlement of the conflict in Vietnam,

Recognizing the right of all peoples, including those in Vietnam, to self-determination,

1. *Calls for* immediate discussions without preconditions at _____ on _____ date, among the appropriate interested governments to arrange a conference looking toward the application of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 and the establishment of a durable peace in Southeast Asia,

2. *Recommends* that the first order of business of such a conference be arrangements for a cessation of hostilities under effective supervision,

3. *Offers* to assist in achieving the purposes of this resolution by all appropriate means, including the provision of arbitrators or mediators,

4. *Calls on* all concerned to cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution,

5. *Requests* the Secretary General to assist as appropriate in the implementation of this resolution.

DECLARATION OF HONOLULU, FEBRUARY 8, 1966[2]

PART I

The Republic of Vietnam and the United States of America jointly declare—

their determination in defense against aggression,

their dedication to the hopes of all the people of South Vietnam,

and their commitment to the search for just and stable peace.

---

[1] U.S. Mission to the United Nations press release No. 4709 dated Jan. 31, 1966.

[2] White House press release dated Feb. 8, 1966.

In pursuit of these objectives the leaders of their governments have agreed upon this declaration, which sets forth—

the purposes of the Government of Vietnam,

the purposes of the Government of the United States,

and the common commitment of both Governments.

PART II

THE PURPOSES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

Here in the mid-Pacific, halfway between Asia and North America, we take the opportunity to state again the aims of our government.

We are a government—indeed a generation—of revolutionary transformation. Our people are caught up in a mortal struggle.

This struggle has four sides.

1. *We must defeat the Vietcong and those illegally fighting with them on our soil.*—We are the victims of an aggression directed and supported from Hanoi. That aggression—that so-called "War of National Liberation"—is part of the communist plan for the conquest of all of Southeast Asia. The defeat of that aggression is vital for the future of our people of South Vietnam.

2. *We are dedicated to the eradication of social injustice among our people.*—We must bring about a true social revolution and construct a modern society in which every man can know that he has a future; that he has respect and dignity; that he has the opportunity for himself and for his children to live in an environment where all is not disappointment, despair and dejection; that the opportunities exist for the full expression of his talents and his hopes.

3. *We must establish and maintain a stable, viable economy and build a better material life for our people.*—In spite of the war, which creates many unusual and unpredictable economic situations, we are determined to continue with a policy of austerity; to make the best possible use of the assistance granted us from abroad; and to help our people achieve regular economic growth and improved material welfare.

4. *We must build true democracy for our land and for our people.*—In this effort we shall continue to imbue the people with a sense of national unity, a stronger commitment to civic responsibility. We shall encourage a widened and more active participation in and contribution to the building of a free, independent, strong and peaceful Vietnam. In particular, we pledge again—

to formulate a democratic constitution in the months ahead, including an electoral law;

to take that constitution to our people for discussion and modification;

to seek its ratification by secret ballot;

to create, on the basis of elections rooted in that constitution, an elected government.

These things shall be accomplished mainly with the blood, intelligence, and dedication of the Vietnamese people themselves. But in this interdependent world we shall need the help of others—to win

the war of independence; to build while we fight; to reconstruct and develop our nation when terror ceases.

To those future citizens of a free, democratic South Vietnam now fighting with the Vietcong, we take this occasion to say come and join in this national revolutionary adventure:

Come safely to join us through the open arms program;

Stop killing your brothers, sisters, their elders and their children;

Come and work through constitutional democracy to build together that life of dignity, freedom, and peace those in the north would deny the people of Vietnam.

Thus, we are fighting this war. It is a military war, a war for the hearts of our people. We cannot win one without winning the other. But the war for the hearts of the people is more than a military tactic. It is a moral principle. For this we shall strive as we fight to bring about a true social revolution.

Part III

The Purpose of the Government of the United States

(1) The United States of America is joined with the people and Government of Vietnam to prevent aggression. This is the purpose of the determined effort of the American Armed Forces now engaged in Vietnam. The United States seeks no bases. It seeks no colonial presence. It seeks to impose no alliance or alinement. It seeks only to prevent aggression, and its pledge to that purpose is firm. It aims simply to help a people and government who are determined to help themselves.

(2) The United States is pledged to the principles of the self-determination of peoples and of government by the consent of the governed. It, therefore, gives its full support to the purpose of free elections proclaimed by the Government of South Vietnam and to the principle of open arms and amnesty for all who turn from terror toward peace and rural construction. The United States will give its full support to measures of social revolution including land reform based upon the principle of building upward from the hopes and purposes of all the people of Vietnam.

(3) Just as the United States is pledged to play its full part in the worldwide attack upon hunger, ignorance, and disease, so in Vietnam it will give special support to the work of the people of that country to build even while they fight. We have helped and we will help them—to stabilize the economy—to increase the production of food—to spread the light of education—to stamp out disease.

(4) The purpose of the United States remains a purpose of peace. The U.S. Government and the Government of Vietnam will continue in the future, as they have in the past, to press the quest for a peaceful settlement in every forum. The world knows the harsh and negative response these efforts have thus far received. But the world should know, too, that the U.S Government and the Government of Vietnam remain determined that no path to peace shall be unexplored. Within the framework of their international commitments, the United States and Vietnam aim to create with others a stable

peace in Southeast Asia which will permit the governments and peoples of the region to devote themselves to lifting the condition of man. With the understanding the support of the Government of Vietnam the peace offensive of the U.S. Government and the Government of South Vietnam will continue until peace is secured.

PART IV

THE COMMON COMMITMENT

The President of the United States and the Chief of State and Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam are thus pledged again—

To defense against aggression;
To the work of social revolution;
To the goal of free self-government;
To the attack on hunger, ignorance, and disease; and
To the unending quest for peace.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND LT. GEN. NGUYEN VAN THIEU, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE, REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM, FOLLOWING TALKS IN HONOLULU, HAWAII, AT THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY 7 to 8, 1966[1]

1. The President of the United States and the Chief of State and Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam have concluded 3 days of the most intense and friendly discussion, and their fundamental concord of purpose and policy is stated in the Declaration of Honolulu which they are issuing together today. In addition, there has been opportunity for extended review of many urgent specific questions, both at the level of the Chiefs of Government and at the level of Cabinet Ministers. The results of this immediate discussion are reported in the remaining paragraphs on this communique.

2. The leaders of the two Governments, with their advisers, reviewed the intense efforts for peace undertaken by the Government of the United States between Christmas and the end of January. Both Governments noted with regret the total absence of a present interest in peace on the part of the Government of North Vietnam. They reviewed the present diplomatic situation in the United Nations and elsewhere, and they agreed upon continued diplomatic efforts for peace.

3. The economic advisers of the two Governments had a thorough discussion of their cooperative programs for maintaining economic stability and controlling the cost of living in a war-torn country. On the basis of their reports, the President and the Chief of State and Prime Minister have agreed that their two Governments will take further concrete steps to combat inflation in Vietnam.

4. The leaders of the two Governments received comprehensive reports on the intensified program of rural construction. The Gov-

[1] White House press release dated Feb. 8, 1966.

ernment of Vietnam set forth a plan for efforts of particular strength and intensity in areas of high priority, and the President gave directions to insure full and prompt support by all agencies of the U.S. Government.

5. In the construction program three particular points were agreed on as essential for rapid progress:

(1) Continued emphasis by both Vietnamese and allied forces on the effort to build democracy in the rural areas—an effort as important as the military battle itself.

(2) Continued emphasis on the design of rural construction work to meet the people's needs for larger output, more efficient production, improved credit, handicrafts and light industry, and rural electrification.

(3) Concentration of resources—both Vietnamese and American—in selected priority areas which are properly related to military plans so that the work of rural construction can be protected against disruption by the enemy.

6. Cabinet members of both Governments had thorough discussions of special needs of the people of South Vietnam in the fields of agriculture, health, and education. In agriculture it was agreed that special effort would be made to move agriculture know-how—particularly new species of highly productive rice and corn and vegetable seed—from the experimental station to the farmer in the fields. Steps for more rapid land reform were carefully reviewed. It was agreed that Secretary of Agriculture Freeman and a team of agricultural experts would proceed at once to Vietnam for the purpose of developing enlarged programs of agricultural cooperation.

7. It was also agreed that programs in health and education would be intensified. The President pledged that he would soon dispatch teams of experts in those fields to Vietnam under the direction of Secretary Gardner. Both Governments agreed to make increased efforts in the training of health personnel, in providing teams for medical care, and creating a stronger medical logistics system. They also agreed to strengthen their cooperation in building elementary schools, in training teachers, in reinforcing vocational and technical education, and in supplying textbooks.

8. It was agreed that the refugees who have of their own free will come over from the enemy side must be adequately cared for and prepared to resume a useful role in society. The Government of Vietnam described its plans to meet this problem and the President assured them of full American support. It was agreed that a special effort will be made to provide good schools for refugee children.

9. There was a full discussion of the military situation and of military plans and programs. The leaders of the two Governments reached full agreement upon a policy of growing military effectiveness and of still closer cooperation between the military forces of Vietnam and those of the United States. They reaffirmed their determination to act with all possible regard for the rights of innocent civilians, to adhere to the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the treatment of prisoners of war, and to act with full respect for the independence and territorial integrity of neighboring countries which wish to live in peace.

10. Finally, it was agreed that the leaders of the two Governments will have further meetings like this one in the future for the continued execution of the policies and purposes of the Declaration of Honolulu.

THE U.S. COMMITMENT IN VIET-NAM: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES: Statements by Secretary Rusk and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations[1]

SECRETARY RUSK, FEBRUARY 18, 1966

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: The immediate occasion for these hearings is a request by the President for a supplemental appropriation to the AID administration of $415 million, of which $275 million are intended for South Viet-Nam. Mr. David Bell, the Administrator of AID, and I have both already testified on this particular request. These hearings, as the chairman has pointed out, have also entered into the largest and most far-reaching aspects of our interests and involvements in Southeast Asia. For my part, I welcome this opportunity to appear again before the committee to discuss with you these larger issues.

Since World War II, which projected the United States into the role of major world power, we Americans have had to face a series of difficult tasks and trials. On the whole, we have faced them very well. Today we are facing another ordeal in Southeast Asia, which again is costing us both lives and treasure.

South Viet-Nam is a long way from the United States, and the issues posed may seem remote from our daily experience and our immediate interests. It is essential, therefore, that we clearly understand—and so far as possible agree on—our mission and purpose in that faraway land.

Why are we in Viet-Nam? Certainly we are not there merely because we have power and like to use it. We do not regard ourselves as the policeman of the universe. We do not go around the world looking for quarrels in which we can intervene. Quite the contrary. We have recognized that, just as we are not gendarmes of the universe, neither are we the magistrate of the universe. If other governments, other institutions, or other regional organizations can find solutions to the quarrels which disturb the present scene, we are anxious to have this occur. But we are in Viet-Nam because the issues posed there are deeply intertwined with our own security and because the outcome of the struggle can profoundly affect the nature of the world in which we and our children will live.

The situation we face in Southeast Asia is obviously complex but, in my view, the underlying issues are relatively simple and are utterly fundamental. I am confident that Americans, who have a deep and mature understanding of world responsibility, are fully capable of cutting through the underbrush of complexity and finding the simple issues which involve our largest interests and deepest purposes. I regard it, therefore, as a privilege to be able to

[1] Department of State Bulletin, vol. LIV, No. 1393, Mar. 7, 1966, pp. 1–17.

discuss these problems with the committee this morning—to consult with you—and at the same time to try to clarify for the American people the issues we must squarely face.

I do not approach this task on the assumption that anyone, anywhere, has all the answers or that all wisdom belongs to the executive branch of the Government, or even to the Government itself. The questions at issue affect the well-being of all Americans, and I am confident that all Americans will make up their own minds in the tradition of a free and independent people. Yet those of us who have special responsibilities for the conduct of our foreign policy have had to think hard and deeply about these problems for a very long time. The President, his Cabinet colleagues, and the Congress, who share the weightiest responsibilities under our constitutional system, have come to certain conclusions that form the basis for the policies we are now pursuing.

Perhaps it is worth pointing out that those who are officially responsible for the conduct of our public affairs must make decisions—and must make decisions among existing alternatives. None of us in the executive or the legislative branch has fulfilled our responsibilities merely by formulating an opinion—we are required to decide what this nation shall do and shall not do and are required to accept the consequences of our determinations.

What are our world security interests involved in the struggle in Viet-Nam?

They cannot be seen clearly in terms of Southeast Asia only or merely in terms of the events of the past few months. We must view the problem in perspective. We must recognize that what we are seeking to achieve in South Viet-Nam is part of a process that has continued for a long time—a process of preventing the expansion and extension of Communist domination by the use of force against the weaker nations on the perimeter of Communist power.

This is the problem as it looks to us. Nor do the Communists themselves see the problem in isolation. They see the struggle in South Viet-Nam as part of a larger design for the steady extension of Communist power through force and threat.

I have observed in the course of your hearings that some objection has been raised to the use of the term "Communist aggression." It seems to me that we should not confuse ourselves or our people by turning our eyes away from what that phrase means. The underlying crisis of this postwar period turns about a major struggle over the very nature of the political structure of the world. Before the guns were silent in World War II, many governments sat down and thought long and hard about the structure of international life, the kind of world which we ought to try to build, and wrote those ideas into the United Nations Charter. That charter establishes an international society of independent states, large and small, entitled to their own national existence, entitled to be free from aggression, cooperating freely across national frontiers in their common interests, and resolving disputes by peaceful means.

But the Communist world has returned to its demand for what it calls a "world revolution," a world of coercion in direct contradiction to the Charter of the United Nations. There may be differences

93-991 O - 65 - 20

within the Communist world about methods, and techniques, and leadership within the Communist world itself, but they share a common attachment to their "world revolution" and to its support through what they call "wars of liberation."

So what we face in Viet-Nam is what we have faced on many occasions before—the need to check the extension of Communist power in order to maintain a reasonable stability in a precarious world. That stability was achieved in the years after the war by the valor of free nations in defending the integrity of postwar territorial arrangements. And we have achieved a certain stability for the last decade and a half. It must not be overthrown now.

Like so many of our problems today, the struggle in South Viet-Nam stems from the disruption of two world wars. The Second World War completed a process begun by the first. It ripped apart a structure of power that had existed for 100 years. It set in train new forces and energies that have remade the map of the world. Not only did it weaken the nations actively engaged in the fighting, but it had far-reaching secondary effects. It undermined the foundations of the colonial structures through which a handful of powers controlled one-third of the world's population. And the winds of change and progress that have blown fiercely during the last 20 years have toppled those structures almost completely.

Meanwhile the Communist nations have exploited the turmoil of a time of transition in an effort to extend Communist control into other areas of the world.

The United States first faced the menace of Communist ambition in Europe, when one after another of the nations on the boundaries of the Soviet Union fell under the dominion of Moscow through the presence of the Red army.

To check this tidal wave the United States provided the Marshall Plan to strengthen the nations of Western Europe and then moved to organize with those nations a collective security system through NATO. As a result, the advance of Soviet Communist power was stopped and the Soviet Union gradually adjusted its policies to this situation.

But within a year after the establishment of NATO, the Communists took over China. This posed a new and serious threat, particularly to those weak new nations of the Far East that had been formed out of colonial empires.

The problems in Asia were, of course, different from those in Europe. But the result was much the same—instability, uncertainty, and vulnerability to both the bully and the aggressor. Western Europe, with its established governmental and traditional social institutions, recovered quickly. But certain of the new nations of Asia—particularly those that had not known self-government for a century or more—continued to face a far more formidable problem, which they still face.

The first test of Asia came in Korea, when the United Nations Forces—predominantly American—stopped the drive of Communist North Korea supported by material aid from the Soviet Union. It stopped the Chinese Army that followed. It brought to a halt the Communist effort to push out the line that had been drawn and to establish Communist control over the Korean Peninsula.

We fought the Korean war, which like the struggle in Viet-Nam occurred in a remote area thousands of miles away, to sustain a principle vital to the freedom and security of America—the principle that the Communist world should not be permitted to expand by overrunning one after another of the arrangements built during and since the war to mark the outer limits of Communist expansion by force.

Before the Korean war had ended, the United States, under President Truman, moved to settle and consolidate the situation in the Pacific through a peace treaty with Japan, and through bilateral security treaties with Japan and the Philippines, and through the ANZUS treaty with Australia and New Zealand.

Hardly had the Korean war been finished when France, which had been fighting a protracted struggle in Indochina, decided to relinquish its political presence in Southeast Asia. After a brief negotiation it came to terms with the Communist forces that had captured the nationalist movement. The result was the division of Indochina into four parts: a Kingdom of Cambodia, a Kingdom of Laos, and Viet-Nam divided at the 17th parallel between the Communist forces in the North and a non-Communist Vietnamese government in the South.

Recognizing that the Communists had not abandoned their ambitions, the United States Government, under President Eisenhower, took steps to secure the situation by further alliances. Bilateral treaties were concluded with the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China on Formosa. In the Middle East the so-called "northern tier" of countries lying to the south of the Soviet Union entered into the Baghdad Pact, which established what is now known as CENTO—the Central Treaty Organization. The United States did not become a formal member of this alliance, which is composed of Great Britain, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. But we are closely associated with CENTO and have bilateral military assistance agreements with its regional members, concluded by the Eisenhower administration.

In order to give support to the nations of Southeast Asia, the United States took the lead in the creation of an alliance embodies in a treaty and reinforced by a collective security system known as SEATO—the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. In this alliance the United States joined with Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines to guarantee the security not only of the member nations but also to come to the aid of certain protocol states and territories if they so requested.

South Viet-Nam was included in this protocol. The United States had not been a party to the agreements made in Geneva in 1954, which France had concluded with the Communist Vietnamese forces known as the Viet Minh. But the Under Secretary of State, Walter Bedell Smith, stated under instructions that the United States would not disturb the agreements and "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the * * * agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."

Under Secretary Smith's statement was only a unilateral declaration, but in joining SEATO the United States took a solemn treaty

engagement of far-reaching effect. Article IV, paragraph 1, provides that "each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack * * * would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

It is this fundamental SEATO obligation that has from the outset guided our actions in South Viet-Nam.

The language of this treaty is worth careful attention. The obligation it imposes is not only joint but several. The finding that an armed attack has occurred does not have to be made by a collective determination before the obligation of each members becomes operative. Nor does the treaty require a collective decision on actions to be taken to meet the common danger. If the United States determines that an armed attack has occurred against any nation to whom the protection of the treaty applies, then it is obligated to "act to meet the common danger" without regard to the news or actions of any other treaty member.

The far-reaching implications of this commitment were well understood by this committee when it recommended, with only the late Senator [William] Langer dissenting, that the Senate consent to the ratification of the treaty. The committee's report states:

> The committee is not impervious to the risks which this treaty entails. It fully appreciates that acceptance of these additional obligations commits the United States to a course of action over a vast expanse of the Pacific. Yet these risks are consistent with our own highest interests. There are greater hazards in not advising a potential enemy of what he can expect of us, and in failing to disabuse him of assumptions which might lead to a miscalculation of our intentions.

Following this committee's recommendation, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the treaty by a vote of 82 to 1, the late Senator Langer dissenting. All members of this distinguished committee who were then Senators voted for that treaty.

Our multilateral engagement under the SEATO treaty has been reinforced and amplified by a series of bilateral commitments and assurances directly to the Government of South Viet-Nam. On October 1, 1954, President Eisenhower wrote to President Diem offering "to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means." In 1957 President Eisenhower and President Diem issued a joint statement which called attention to "the large build-up of Vietnamese Communist military forces in North Viet-Nam" and stated:

> Noting that the Republic of Viet-Nam is covered by Article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem agreed that aggression or subversion threatening the political independence of the Republic of Viet-Nam would be considered as endangering peace and stability.

On August 2, 1961, President Kennedy declared that "the United States is determined that the Republic of Viet-Nam shall not be lost to the Communists for lack of any support which the United States can render."

On December 14, 1961, President Kennedy wrote to President Diem, recalling the United States declaration made at the end of the

Geneva conference in 1954. The President once again stated that the United States was "prepared to help the Republic of Viet-Nam to protect its people and to preserve its independence." This commitment has been reaffirmed many times since.

These, then, are the commitments we have taken to protect South Viet-Nam as a part of protecting our own "peace and security." We have sent American forces to fight in the jungles of that beleaguered country because South Viet-Nam has, under the language of the SEATO treaty, been the victim of "aggression by means of armed attack."

There can be no serious question as to the existence and nature of this aggression. The war is clearly an "armed attack," cynically and systematically mounted by the Hanoi regime against the people of South Viet-Nam.

The North Vietnamese regime has sought deliberately to confuse the issue by seeking to make its aggression appear as an indigenous revolt. But we should not be deceived by this subterfuge. It is a familiar Communist practice. Impeded in their efforts to extend their power by the use of classical forms of force such as the invasion of Korea, the Communist have, over many years, developed an elaborate doctrine for so-called "wars of national liberation" to cloak their aggressions in ambiguity.

A "war of national liberation," in the Communist lexicon, depends on the tactics of terror and sabotage, of stealth and subversion. It has a particular utility for them since it gives an advantage to a disciplined and ruthless minority, particularly in countries where the physical terrain makes clandestine infiltration relatively easy.

At the same time the Communists have a more subtle reason for favoring this type of aggression. It creates in any situation a sense of ambiguity that they can exploit to their own advantage.

Yet, in spite of Communist efforts to confuse the issue, the nature of the conflict in South Viet-Nam is very clear.

Let me review the facts.

With the benefit of hindsight no one can doubt that, in agreeing to the 1954 accords, the regime in Hanoi fully expected that within a relatively short period the South Vietnamese would fall under their control. The South seemed overburdened with troubles. Its formidable economic problems were complicated by the need to absorb almost 1 million North Vietnamese, who—having seen the true face of communism—fled South after the 1954 accords. The North, moreover, had concealed resources in the South. At the time of the accords in 1954, many Communists fighting with the Viet Minh had been directed by the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi to stay in the South, to hide their arms, and to devote their efforts to undermining the South Vietnamese Government. These efforts of subversion were in the initial years quite unsuccessful.

Much to the dismay of the Hanoi regime, South Viet-Nam made substantial progress in spite of the extraordinary problems it faced, while North Viet-Nam lagged far behind. As a consequence the Communist leaders in North Viet-Nam were forced to conclude that more active measures were necessary if the subversion in South Viet-Nam were to succeed.

During the 5 years following the Geneva conference the Hanoi regime developed a secret political-military organization in South Viet-Nam based on the cadres who had been ordered to stay in the South. Many of the activities of this organization were directed toward the assassination of selected South Vietnamese civilians. More than 1,000 civilians were murdered or kidnaped from 1957 to 1959. In 1960 alone, terrorists assassinated 1,400 local government officials and kidnapped 700 others, while armed guerrillas killed 2,200 military and security personnel.

In September 1960, the Lao Dong Party—the Communist Party in North Viet-Nam—held its Third Party Congress in Hanoi. That Congress called for the creation of a front organization to undertake the subversion of South Viet-Nam. Three months thereafter, the National Liberation Front was established to provide a political facade for the conduct of an active guerrilla war. Beginning in 1960 the Hanoi regime began to infiltrate into South Viet-Nam the disciplined adherents whom the party had ordered North at the time of the settlement. In the intervening period since 1954, these men had been trained in the arts of sabotage and subversion. Now they were ordered to conscript young men from the villages by force or persuasion and to form cadres around which guerrilla units could be built.

All of this was documented by the Legal Committee of the International Commission for Supervision and Control. That body, established to supervise the performance of the Viet-Nam cease-fire, is composed of Indian, Polish, and Canadian members. The Legal Committee, with Poland objecting, reported in 1962:

> There is evidence to show that arms, munitions, and other supplies have been sent from the zone in the North to the zone in the South with the objective supporting, organising and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, against the armed forces and administration of the zone in the South.
>
> There is evidence that the PAVN [i.e., the North Vietnamese Army] has allowed the zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the administration in the South.

In the 3-year period from 1959 to 1961, the North Viet-Nam regime infiltrated 10,000 men into the South. In 1962, 13,000 additional personnel were infiltrated. And by the end of 1964, North Viet-Nam may well have moved over 40,000 armed and unarmed guerrillas into South Viet-Nam.

Beginning over a year ago, the Communists apparently exhausted their reservoir of Southerners who had gone North. Since then, the greater number of men infiltrated into the South have been native-born North Vietnamese. Most recently, Hanoi has begun to infiltrate elements of the North Vietnamese army in increasingly larger numbers. Today there is evidence that nine regiments of regular North Vietnamese forces are fighting in organized units in the South.

I have reviewed these facts—which are familiar enough to most of you—because, it seems to me, they demonstrate beyond question that the war in Viet-Nam is as much an act of outside aggression as though the Hanoi regime had sent an army across the 17th parallel rather than infiltrating armed forces by stealth. This point is important since it goes to the heart of our own involvement. Much of the confusion about the struggle in South Viet-Nam has arisen over a failure to understand the nature of the conflict.

For if the war in South Viet-Nam were—as the Communists try to make it appear—merely an indigenous revolt, then the United States would not have its own combat troops in South Viet-Nam. But the evidence is overwhelming that is, in fact, something quite different—a systematic aggression by Hanoi against the people of South Viet-Nam. It is one further effort by a Communist regime in one-half of a divided country to take over the people of the other half at the point of a gun and against their will.

Up to this point I have tried to describe the nature of our commitments in South Viet-Nam and why we have made them. I have sought to put those commitments within the framework of our larger effort to prevent the Communists from upsetting the arrangements which have been the basis for our security. These policies have sometimes been attacked as static and sterile. It has been argued that they do not take account of the vast changes which have occurred in the world and are still in train.

These contentions seems to me to miss the point. The line of policy we are following involves far more than a defense of the *status quo*. It seeks rather to insure that degree of security which is necessary if change and progress are to take place through consent and not through coercion. Certainly, as has been frequently pointed out, the world of the mid-20th century is not standing still. Movement is occurring on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Communism today is no longer monolithic; it no longer wears one face but many, and the deep schism between the two great power centers of the Communist world—Moscow and Peking—is clearly one of the major political facts of our time.

There has been substantial change and movement within the Soviet Union as well—and perhaps even more among the countries of Eastern Europe. These changes have not been inhibited because of our efforts to maintain our postwar arrangements by organizing the Western alliance. They have taken place because of internal developments as well as because the Communist regime in Moscow has recognized that the Western alliance cannot permit it to extend its dominion by force.

Over time the same processes hopefully will work in the Far East. Peking—and the Communist states living under its shadow—must learn that they cannot redraw the boundaries of the world by force.

What we are pursuing, therefore, is not a static concept. For, unlike the Communists, we really believe in social revolution and not merely in power cloaked as revolution. We believe in constructive change and encourage it. That was the meaning of President Johnson's initiatives at the Honolulu conference—to encourage the efforts of the South Vietnamese Government to transform the country in a way that will correct ancient injustices and bring about a better life for all the people.

In meeting our commitments in South Viet-Nam we are using substantial military forces. At the same time, we are making it quite clear to North Viet-Nam and to the world that our forces are being employed for a limited and well-defined objective.

What we seek in South Viet-Nam is to bring about a restoration of the conditions contemplated by the accords of 1954. We seek, in

other words, to restore the integrity of the settlement made between the French Government and the Communist forces under Ho Chi Minh—a settlement which was joined in by the United Kingdom, Communist China, the Soviet Union, Laos, and Cambodia. This settlement forms a party of the structure of arrangements that are the key to stability in the present-day world.

Unfortunately, the limited nature of our purpose is foreign to the philosophy of the Communist world. It may be hard, therefore, for them to realize that the United States seeks no territorial aggrandizement in South Viet-Nam or anywhere in Southeast Asia. We do not wish to maintain our troops in that area any longer than is necessary to secure the freedom of the South Vietnamese people. We want no permanent military bases, no trade advantages. We are not asking that the Government of South Viet-Nam ally itself with us or be in any way beholden to us. We wish only that the people of South Viet-Nam should have the right and the opportunity to determine their future in freedom without coercion or threat.

For months now we have done everything possible to make clear to the regime in Hanoi that a political solution is the proper course. If that regime were prepared to call off the aggression in the South, peace would come in almost a matter of hours. When that occurred, the people of North Viet-Nam could safely go about their business. For we do not seek to destroy the Hanoi regime or to force the people of North Viet-Nam to accept any other form of government. And—under conditions of peace—we would be quite prepared for the North Vietnamese people to share with the other peoples of Southeast Asia in the economic and technical help that we and other nations are extending to that area.

This is the simple message that we have tried to convey to Hanoi through many channels. We have sought in every way to impress upon the Communist world the ease with which peace could be attained if only Hanoi were willing.

We have used every resource of diplomacy. I know of no occasion in history where so much effort has been devoted—not only on the part of the United States but of many other nations—in an effort to bring about a political solution to a costly and dangerous war. I know you are generally familiar with the record.

But to this point the sounds from the other side have been harsh and negative. The regime in Hanoi has been unwilling to accept any of the possibilities open to it for discussion. All we have heard is the constant insistence that they will not negotiate unless we accept in advance their four points. Yet the effect of those four points, as propounded by Hanoi, would be to give away the very purposes for which we are fighting and to deliver the people of South Viet-Nam against their will to the domination of a Communist regime.

To understand the situation realistically, we should not underestimate the harshness of the Communist side or overestimate the ease of a political solution.

From time to time we have heard it suggested that we should seek a Geneva conference, or enlist the good offices of the conference cochairmen, or take the problem to the United Nations, or invite the mediation efforts of neutral nations. Well, we have done all of these

things, and in most cases we have done them repeatedly—with no result.

We heard it suggested also, by governments and individuals on both sides of the Iron Curtain, that no peace was possible so long as American planes were flying bombing missions over North Viet-Nam but that negotiations might be possible if the bombing were discontinued. We did that also—not once but twice. The last pause, as this committee will recall, lasted more than 37 days. And again with no response.

Certainly we shall do everything consistent with our national objectives to seek a solution through diplomacy. There is no doubt as to the elements for an honorable peace as we see it. We have made them clear again and again. Most recently we have summarized them in the form of "14 points."

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia;

2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof;

3. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it;

4. We would welcome unconditional discussion as President Johnson put it;

5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions;

6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose;

7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia;

8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Viet-Nam after peace is assured:

9. We support free elections in South Viet-Nam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice;

10. The question of reunification of Viet-Nam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision;

11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be nonaligned or neutral if that be their option;

12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Viet-Nam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars;

13. The President has said "The Viet-Cong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem."

14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.

These 14 points are on the public record. Our Government has made quite clear what kind of peace we are prepared to accept—a peace that will guarantee the security of South Viet-Nam, a peace that will stop armed aggression in violation of international agreements and international law.

This is the position that we have made known to the other side both directly and through intermediaries. How does this compare with the position of the Hanoi regime?

Both Hanoi and Peking have repeatedly rejected our proposal for unconditional discussions. They have insisted instead that before any discussions can take place our side must agree in advance to the four points of Hanoi's program. The words that they have used have differed from formulation to formulation. Sometimes they have said their points are the "sole basis" for negotiations, sometimes the "most correct basis." But the effect is the same. What they are insisting upon is that we accept in advance their substantive position and then discuss only the ways in which it shall be given effect. The technique of demanding such substantive agreement in advance is a familiar Communist negotiating tactic. It does not mean that the basic points are open for discussion or that they can be loosely interpreted. It means just what it says.

We have subjected these four points to the most careful scrutiny. What do they reveal?

The first point calls for "recognition of the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people: sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity." This point also calls for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, dismantling of our military bases, and abolition of our military alliance with the Government of South Viet-Nam "in strict conformity with the Geneva Agreements."

The United States has made clear that we, too, are prepared to support a restoration of the provisions of the Geneva agreements and that we are prepared to withdraw our troops and dismantle military bases once there is compliance with the accords by all parties. We have said also that we would not expect or require a military alliance with a free South Viet-Nam.

The second point relates to the military clauses of the Geneva agreements, and these, too, we could agree to under the conditions I have indicated.

The fourth point provides that the issue of peaceful reunification should be settled by the Vietnamese people without foreign intervention. This also we could accept if it be clearly understood that conditions must first be created both in the North and South that will make it possible for truly free elections to be held.

It is in the third point that the core of the Communist position is disclosed. That point provides that "The internal affairs of South Viet-Nam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front."

To understand the significance of this point, it is necessary not only to examine what is meant by the "program of the National Liberation Front" but to explore somewhat further the character of the Front itself and the purposes it serves in the tactics of the North Vietnamese regime.

Let us turn first to the Front itself. Both Hanoi and Peking have made clear again and again—and they have been joined in this by other Communist powers—that negotiations will be possible only when the United States recognizes the National Liberation Front as

the "sole genuine representative of the entire South Vietnamese people."

What are the implications of this proposal, and why are the Communists urging it so insistently?

The evidence is overwhelming that the National Liberation Front is exactly what its name implies—a Communist front organization intended to give support to the deliberate fiction that the war in Viet-Nam is an indigenous revolt. The Front is, as the facts make clear, an invention of the Communist Party of North Viet-Nam, to serve as a political cloak for its activities in the South.

As I have noted earlier, the Front was created by the North Vietnamese Communist Party—the Lao Dong Party—in 1960, soon after North Viet-Nam's military leader, General [Vo Nguyen] Giap, announced: "The North is the revolutionary base for the whole country." The individuals proclaimed as leaders of the Front are not personalities widely known to the Vietnamese people, either in the North or in the South. To suggest that they represent the aspirations of the Vietnamese people is absurd. The significant fact is that at no time has any single individual of political significance in South Viet-Nam adhered to the Front or to its policies. While some Vietnamese leaders and groups may differ among themselves on how the country is to be led, none of them differs on the fact that the Front does not speak for them.

In 1961 Hanoi sought to strengthen the fiction of the Front's indigenous origins by creating a seemingly independent Communist Party as the principal element of the Front. It therefore established the People's Revolutionary Party. A secret Lao Dong circular dated December 7, 1961, advised party members that "The People's Revolutionary Party has only the appearance of an independent existence. Actually our Party is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam unified from North to South under the Central Executive Committee of the Party, the chief of which is President Ho. * * * during these explanations, take care to keep this strictly secret, especially in South Viet-Nam, so that the enemy does not perceive our purpose."

The People's Revolutionary Party has not concealed its role in the Front. It has frankly stated that it is the dominant element. On February 15, 1961, the Viet Cong Committee for the South went even farther, stating that in time the Communist Party would "act overtly to lead the revolution in South Viet-Nam." In other words, the Communists have told their followers that, at the proper moment, they would emerge from cover and cast off the disguise of the National Liberation Front.

And so the Communists have a clear purpose in insisting that we recognize the National Liberation Front as the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people. For them this is not a procedural question but a major question of substance. They insist on our recognition of the Front as the sole spokesman for the people of South Viet-Nam since our acceptance of the Front in that capacity would in effect mean our acceptance of the Communist position as to the indigenous nature of the conflict and thus our acceptance of a settle-

ment on Hanoi's terms—which would mean delivering South Viet-Nam into the control of the Communist North.

In spite of these clear realities, we have not asserted nor do we assert an unreasoning attitude with regard to the Front. The President said in his state of the Union message, "We will meet at any conference table, we will discuss any proposals—4 points or 14 or 40—and we will consider the views of any group"—and that, of course, includes the Front along with other groups.

To the extent then that the Front has any validity as a representative of a group, the views of that group can be heard and the issue of the Liberation Front should, as the President has said, not prove "an insurmountable problem."

It remains a problem only because Hanoi insists on using it to establish its own substantive position—that the Front represents the hopes and aspirations of the South Vietnamese people—and hence should control them.

The significance of this issue is clearly seen when one examines the so-called "Program of the National Liberation Front" as it was announced from Hanoi on January 29, 1961, and revised and amplified in a second publication on February 11 that same year. The first point of this program discloses the full Communist intention. It calls for the overthrow of the South Vietnamese Government in Saigon and the establishment of a coalition government from which the government in Saigon would be totally excluded.

In other words, the Hanoi regime is demanding the following preconditions to which the United States must agree before the Communists will even condescend to negotiate:

First, that the South Vietnamese Government be overthrown;

Second, that the Liberation Front, the creature and agent of Hanoi, be accepted as the sole bargaining representative for the South Vietnamese people;

Third, that South Viet-Nam be put under the control of a coalition government formed by the Communists and from which the South Vietnamese Government would be excluded.

May I conclude, therefore, Mr. Chairman, with certain simple points which are at the heart of the problem and at the heart of United States policy in South Viet-Nam.

1. The elementary fact is that there is an aggression in the form of an armed attack by North Viet-Nam against South Viet-Nam.

2. The United States has commitments to assist South Viet-Nam to repel this aggression.

3. Our commitments to South Viet-Nam were not taken in isolation but are a party of a systematic effort in the postwar period to assure a stable peace.

4. The issue in Southeast Asia becomes worldwide because we must make clear that the United States keeps its word wherever it is pledged.

5. No nation is more interested in peace in Southeast Asia or elsewhere than is the United States. If the armed attack against South Viet-Nam is brought to an end, peace can come very quickly. Every channel or forum for contact, discussion, or negotiation will remain active in order that no possibility for peace will be overlooked.

GENERAL TAYLOR, FEBRUARY 17, 1966

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen: I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of the committee for your willingness to hear my views on the situation in South Viet-Nam. I am afraid that they will not be new to many of you since you have often heard me express them in the days when I was an official of the Government. I agree thoroughly with the motivating purpose of these hearings, namely, to analyze the reasons why we are involved in South Viet-Nam, the importance of this involvement, and the effectiveness with which we are dealing with the resultant problems. If my personal views can assist in clarifying these points, I am most happy to present them.

For the purpose of providing a basis for our subsequent discussion, with your permission I would like to make a continuous statement which will undertake to answer three basic questions. First, what are we doing in South Viet-Nam? Secondly, how are we doing it? Finally, can we improve upon what we are doing?

A simple statement of what we are doing in South Viet-Nam is to say that we are engaged in a clash of purpose and interest with the militant wing of the Communist movement represented by Hanoi, the Viet Cong, and Peking. Opposing these Communist forces, in the front rank stand the Government and people of South Viet-Nam, supported primarily by the United States but assisted in varying degree by some 30 other nations.

The purpose of the Hanoi camp is perfectly clear and has been since 1954. It is to absorb the 15 million people of South Viet-Nam into a single Communist state under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh and his associates in Hanoi. In the course of accomplishing this basic purpose, the Communist leaders expect to undermine the position of the United States in Asia and to demonstrate the efficacy of the so-called "war of liberation" as a cheap, safe, and disavowable technique for the future expansion of militant communism.

Our purpose is equally clear and easily defined. In his Baltimore speech of April 7, 1965, President Johnson did so in the following terms:

> Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way.

This has been our basic objective since 1954. It has been pursued by three successive administrations and remains our basic objective today.

Like the Communists, we have secondary objectives derived from the basic one. We intend to show that the "war of liberation," far from being cheap, safe, and disavowable, is costly, dangerous, and doomed to failure. We must destroy the myth of its invincibility in order to protect the independence of many weak nations which are vulnerable targets for subversive aggression—to use the proper term for the "war of liberation." We cannot leave while force and violence threaten them.

The question has been raised as to whether this clash of interests is really important to us. An easy and incomplete answer would be

that it must be important to us since it is considered so important by the other side. Their leadership has made it quite clear that they regard South Viet-Nam as the testing ground for the "war of liberation" and that, after its anticipated success there, it will be used widely about the world. Kosygin told Mr. Reston in his interview of last December:

> We believe that national liberation wars are just wars and they will continue as long as there is national oppression by imperialist powers.

Before him, Khrushchev, in January 1961, had the following to say:

> Now a word about national liberation wars. The armed struggle by the Vietnamese people or the war of the Algerian people serve as the latest example of such wars. These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only admissible but inevitable. Can such wars flare up in the future? They can. The Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank of peoples waging liberation struggles.

General Giap, the Commander in Chief of the North Vietnamese forces, has made the following comment:

> South Viet-Nam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time. If the special warfare that the United States imperialists are testing in South Viet-Nam is overcome, then it can be defeated anywhere in the world.

The Minister of Defense of Communist China, Marshal Lin Piao, in a long statement of policy in September 1965, described in detail how Mao Tse-tung expects to utilize the "war of liberation" to expand communism in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

These testimonials show that, apart from the goal of imposing communism on 15 million South Vietnamese, the success of the "war of liberation" is in itself an important objective of the Communist leadership. On our side, we can understand the grave consequences of such a success for us. President Eisenhower in 1959 stressed the military importance of defending Southeast Asia in the following terms. He said:

> Strategically, South Viet-Nam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries of Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement. * * * The loss of South Viet-Nam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom.

This view has often been referred to as the "domino theory." I personally do not believe in such a theory if it means belief in a law of nature which requires the collapse of each neighboring state in an inevitable sequence, following a Communist victory in South Viet-Nam. However, I am deeply impressed with the probable effects worldwide, not necessarily in areas contiguous to South Viet-Nam, if the "war of liberation" scores a significant victory there. President Kennedy commented on this danger with moving eloquence: "The great battleground for the defense and expansion of freedom today is the southern half of the globe—Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East—the lands of the people who harbor the greatest hopes. The enemies of freedom think they can destroy the hopes of the newer nations and they aim to do it before the end of this decade. This is a struggle of will and determination as much as one of force and violence. It is a battle for the conquest of the minds

and souls as much as for the conquest of lives and territory. In such a struggle, we cannot fail to take sides."

Gentlemen, I think a simple answer to the question, what are we doing in South Viet-Nam, is to say that for more than a decade we have been taking sides in a cause in which we have a vital stake.

My second question was, how are we doing in the pursuit of our objectives in South Viet-Nam? Both sides in the struggle have over the years developed the current strategies which are now in confrontation. During 1964 and 1965, the Hanoi leadership attempted to exploit the political turbulence which followed the fall of President Diem in November 1963. Greatly encouraged by the disorder which marked the political scene in Saigon, the Communist leadership made a massive effort to press on to victory. To meet the growing needs in military manpower, they began the infiltration of personnel of the North Vietnamese army, first as individual replacements, later as formed tactical units. Utilizing this new strength, they intended to make the monsoon offensive of 1965 a major drive for significant military victories. Concurrently they increased the sabotage directed at the land communication system in South Viet-Nam for the purpose of hampering the distribution of commodities and thus adding to the economic stresses in the South. Terrorism was stepped up and directed with added frequency at United States personnel and installations. They apparently hoped to be able to seize and hold politically important localities such as district and provincial capitals, to demoralize the Vietnamese people and Government, and to demonstrate to the United States that we were backing a cause which must inevitably fail.

Faced with this growing threat, the Vietnamese Government and our American officials were obliged to develop a counterstrategy to blunt and defeat the intensified efforts of our adversaries. It evolved out of the experience of the preceding months and years and assumed its full form with the critical decisions in 1965 to introduce United States ground forces and to initiate the bombing campaign against military targets in the North.

Both of these courses of action had been under consideration at least since November 1961, when I presented my report to President Kennedy following a visit to Saigon to appraise the growing criticality of the situation there. We did not take either action at that time, but my report contained the following comment with regard to the possible necessity of using airpower against the source of the Viet Cong support in North Viet-Nam:

> **While we feel that the program recommended represents those measures which should be taken now, I would not suggest that it is the final word, guidance, training and support of a guerrilla war declared on South Viet-Nam in 1959 with continued infiltration and covert support of guerrilla bands in the territory of our ally, we will then have to decide whether to accept as legitimate the continued guidance, training and support of a guerrilla war across an international boundary. Can we admit the establishment of the common law that the party attacked and his friends are denied the right to strike the source of the aggression after the fact that external aggression is clearly established?**

By February 1965, it became clear that we could no longer tolerate this clandestine support from the immune sanctuary in North

Viet-Nam which served as the external base for the Viet Cong insurgency.

In brief, the strategy which we have been and are pursuing consists of four components. The first includes the many activities directed at increasing the effectiveness of our ground combat against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units in South Viet-Nam. For this purpose, we have made the utmost efforts to increase the indigenous forces of South Viet-Nam, always mindful that this is a Vietnamese war in which we should do only those things which the Vietnamese cannot do for themselves or cannot do in time to avert defeat. From July 1954 to July 1955 the armed forces and police of South Viet-Nam were increased by some 140,000 trained men, a very creditable effort on the part of this small country, where military leadership and administrative experience are inevitably in short supply. As of today, the overall military strength in South Viet-Nam is approaching 700,000 the largest military force in being among all of our allies worldwide.

Encouraging though the results have been in increasing the Vietnamese strength, during the year cited our intelligence authorities believed that the Viet Cong increased their total strength by some 60,000. In other words, we were advancing at a rate only a little better than 2 to 1 in our favor. Since history has shown that the government forces successfully opposing a guerrilla insurgency in the past have required a much greater preponderance of strength—10 to 1 or 12 to 1, for example—it was quite clear that the Vietnamese could not raise forces fast enough to keep pace with the growing threat of the Viet Cong in time. It was this sobering conclusion that led to the decision to introduce American ground forces with their unique mobility and massive firepower to compensate for the deficiency in Vietnamese strength. With such forces available, it was felt that the ratios of required strength cited above would lose much of their validity.

I am thoroughly aware of the concern of this committee over the growing requirement for American troops in South Viet-Nam. Is this an endless requirement in an open-ended war? I do not believe that anyone can give a completely satisfactory reply to this question, but I can suggest the consideration of certain limiting factors which have a bearing on the matter.

First, on our side, we are not setting as an objective for our ground forces the occupation of all South Viet-Nam or the hunting down of the last armed guerrilla. We are in Viet-Nam to safeguard the people who are the real target of the enemy. Terrain has little meaning except insofar as it supports people. Thus the extent of control and protection of population is the true measure of progress rather than control of territory. By the former indicator we are not doing too badly. Senator [Mike] Mansfield estimates in his recent report that the government controls about 60 percent of the population, the Viet Cong about 22 percent, leaving 18 percent contested. When I left Saigon last July, those figures were 53 percent, 25 percent, 22 percent.

The point I wish to make is that, when one expresses our military objective in terms of securing a high proportion of the population, the troop requirement loses some of its impression of open-endness.

Under this concept, the prime target of our United States forces becomes the main-line enemy units which constitute the greatest threat to population—not the entire guerrilla force wherever found.

Another limiting factor is the logistic difficulty of the Viet Cong in supporting increased numbers of troops in combat. The combination of air attacks on their lines of supply and of increasing ground attacks on their units, which must then consume supplies at an increased rate, places some kind of ceiling on the forces they can maintain in South Viet-Nam. I wish I knew exactly where that ceiling is, but our basic data on Viet Cong logistics are too uncertain to permit precision. But the point is that there are factors which tend to keep our troop requirement finite and limit the capability of Hanoi to support large numbers of additional forces in the South.

The second component of our strategy relates to the use of airpower against military targets in North Viet-Nam. It is well to remind ourselves of the reasons which impelled us to his decision. There were three which we recognized perfectly at the time of the decision and which remain valid today. The first was to give the people of South Viet-Nam the assurance for the first time of imposing a direct penalty on the source of the aggression. For 11 years they had suffered the depredations of the Viet Cong without exacting any price from the country which provided the direction and support. The morale of the people and that of the armed forces in Viet-Nam received an inestimable lift from the decision to use the air forces of both our countries against military targets in the homeland of the enemy—a lift which has certainly contributed to sustaining their will to continue the fight.

The second reason for the decision was to use airpower, insofar as it could be effective, to limit and render more difficult the infiltration of men and supplies from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam. It was perfectly clear from the start, as it is clear today, that airpower would not be able to stop infiltration. We were quite sure, however, that it could impose a ceiling on the forces which could be sustained in combat in South Viet-Nam. I do not believe that anyone who has reflected on the effect of the destruction of bridges, ports, rail yards, and similar facilities, and on the effect of the limitation of daylight movement on the roads throughout a large part of North Viet-Nam can avoid the conclusion that the air campaign has had an important effect in slowing down infiltration and in raising its price. A testimonial to its effectiveness was the feverish activity in North Viet-Nam during the bombing pause to repair bomb damage and to move transport in daylight.

The third reason for the decision to use our airpower was to provide a sobering reminder to the leaders in Hanoi that progressively they must pay a mounting price for the continuation of their support of the Viet Cong insurgency. In spite of their defiant statements of determination to endure these attacks forever, I for one know from experience that no one derives any enjoyment from receiving incoming shells and bombs day after day, and I have no doubt that the warning message is getting through to the leadership of Hanoi. In a very real sense, the objective of our air campaign is to change the will of the enemy leadership. We hope that, in due

32-991 O - 75 - 21

course, the combination of the Viet Cong failure to win victory on the ground in South Viet-Nam and the effect of continued air attacks will present to the Hanoi leadership a situation so disadvantageous that they will decide that it is in their interest to halt their aggression, redefine their aims, and join with us in discussing ways and means of improving the lot of all Viet-Nam.

The third component of our current strategy includes all of those nonmilitary activities which are so important but which receive too little public attention. It is not that our leaders have been unaware of the importance of better government, better living conditions, and the promise of a better future for the people of this country. Unfortunately lack of security and governmental instability were for a long time factors limiting the effectiveness of the many programs for development and reconstruction. But now, with the growing military effectiveness of our forces on the ground and the slowly developing maturity of the civil leadership in Saigon and in the provinces, I hope that conditions will permit much greater progress than in the past in bringing the benefits of a comparatively normal life to this war-weary people. As you know, the recent Honolulu conference devoted most of its time to a consideration of these nonmilitary activities. If we are to leave a viable country after the end of the Viet Cong insurgency, it is essential that we make progress even under the conditions of war in stabilizing the government, the society, and the economy.

The fourth component of our strategy is that which relates to our political and diplomatic efforts to initiate the discussion of a peaceful settlement of this conflict. The so-called "peace offensive" is so well known as to require no discussion at this time, as is also the discouraging lack of response from the other side. I am obliged to feel that the Hanoi leadership is not yet convinced that it must mend its ways. Perhaps they still hope for some kind of military victory in the South. Certainly they are not convinced that in some way the United States cannot be detached from the support of South Viet-Nam. They hope against hope that through international or domestic pressures our Government can be forced off course. They have not forgotten that the Viet Minh won more in Paris than in Dien Bien Phu and believe that the Viet Cong may be as fortunate in Washington. They doubt the will of the American public to continue the conflict indefinitely. In a contest of patience, they expect to win even though North Viet-Nam, like the South, has been constantly at war for over 20 years. Until it becomes perfectly clear to them that we are going to stay on course regardless of anything they do, I am afraid we are not likely to see them at a conference table. Or if they come unconvinced of the inevitability of the failure of their present course, we can expect them to stall, delay, and maneuver just as they did at Panmunjom in Korea for over 2 years.

In summary, then, our four-point strategy consists of a complex but coherent package of measures designed to improve the effectiveness of our forces on the ground in South Viet-Nam, to exploit our air superiority by attacking military targets in North Viet-Nam, to

stabilize the political, social, and economic systems in South Viet-Nam, and to seek an honorable negotiated settlement of the conflict. It is limited as to objective, as to geographical scope, as to weapons and forces employed, and as to targets attacked. All parts of it are interrelated; all parts are indispensable; we must be successful on all fronts. The key, I believe, is inexorable pressure at all points, directed at the will, the ability, and the means of the Communist aggressors.

It is a fair question to ask whether this is the best strategy to attain our basic objective. I am the first to concede that we can and must do better in all four categories of our efforts, but, unhappily, progress toward peaceful negotiations is a bilateral affair which can progress only with some cooperation from Hanoi. As you know, thus far that cooperation has been withheld.

Having conceded the need and possibility for improvement within the components of our current strategy, I must add in honesty that I know of no new strategic proposal which would serve as a better alternative to the one which I have described—that is, provided we do not sacrifice our basic objective. There are, of course, the two old alternatives which we have always rejected and I hope will continue to reject—to withdraw and give up our basic objective or to widen the war by massive air attacks on the North Vietnamese and even on Chinese targets. These two courses of action appear so to contravene our national and international interests that I shall not take the time of the committee to discuss them here.

The only new proposal of which I am aware is the so-called "holding strategy" which, in its least extreme form, calls for a cessation of United States reinforcements and a limitation of military operations to those necessary for the security of our forces and for the maintenance of our military presence. On several occasions I have expressed myself in opposition to such a course of action. To button up our troops in defensive positions and thus to sacrifice their unique attributes of mobility and firepower would constitute the abandonment of our allies on the battlefield and would assign a most inglorious mission to our troops who, for the present, have high morale and complete confidence in their ability to cope with the Viet Cong in the field. The effect of such behavior on our Vietnamese allies could be disastrous. At a minimum, it would destroy all confidence in Viet-Nam in ultimate success and would encourage the timid and the wavering to turn to the Viet Cong for protection and to the Liberation Front for political accommodation.

Another serious result of such passivity would be the impossibility of obtaining honorable terms at any peace table. The Communists are tough enough to deal with when one has the upper hand. They would never give us acceptable terms of the military situation reflected weakness on our part and a readiness to withdraw. Our only alternative would be to accept dishonorable terms or to continue to sit out the war indefinitely on a supine defensive. I can hardly see the American public or this Congress long supporting such a course of action. Thus I am obliged to conclude that the so-

called "holding strategy" is really not an alternative way of reaching our objective of an independent South Viet-Nam free from attack. We could never reach it on such a course. Rather than being a true alternative, it amounts to the modification and erosion of our basic objective and hence appears to me to be unacceptable.

In conclusion, I feel that our present strategy is the best that has been suggested and that it is important that we adhere to it, always striving to improve our performance within the confines of its general concept. Certainly it is not without risks—but little of value in this world is accomplished without risk. It seems to me that the risks entailed are warranted by the importance of our stake in Southeast Asia.

Congress recognized this importance in the wording of the joint resolution of August 1964: "The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia." I subscribe to those words and believe we should live by them and by the words of President Johnson when he said in regard to our commitment in South Viet-Nam: "We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement."

TEXT OF THE DECLARATION ON PEACE AND PROGRESS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ISSUED AT THE MANILA CONFERENCE OCTOBER 24, 1966 [1]

We, the leaders of the Seven Nations gathered in Manila;

Desiring peace and progress in the Asian-Pacific region;

Having faith in the purposes and principles of the United Nations which call for the suppression of acts of aggression and respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

Determined that aggression should not be rewarded;

Respecting the right of all peoples to choose and maintain their own forms of government;

Seeking a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam; and

Being greatly encouraged by the growing regional understanding and regional cooperation among the free nations of Asia and the Pacific

Hereby proclaim this declaration of principles on which we base our hopes for future peace and progress in the Asian and Pacific region;

I. Aggression Must Not Succeed

The peace and security of Asia and the Pacific and, indeed, of the entire world, are indivisible. The nations of the Asian and Pacific region shall enjoy their independence and sovereignty free from aggression, outside interference, or the domination of any nation. Accepting the hard-won lessons of history that successful aggression

[1] White House press release dated Oct. 25, 1966.

anywhere endangers the peace, we are determined to fulfill our several commitments under the United Nations Charter and various mutual security treaties so that aggression in the region of Asia and the Pacific shall not succeed.

II. We Must Break the Bonds of Poverty, Illiteracy, and Disease

In the region of Asia and the Pacific, where there is a rich heritage of the intrinsic worth and dignity of every man, we recognize the responsibility of every nation to join in an expanding offensive against poverty, illiteracy and disease. For these bind men to lives of hopelessness and despair; these are the roots of violence and war. It is when men know that progress is possible and is being achieved, when they are convinced that their children will lead better, fuller, richer lives, that men lift up their heads in hope and pride. Only thus can there be lasting national stability and international order.

III. We Must Strengthen Economic, Social, and Cultural Cooperation Within the Asian and Pacific Region

Together with our other partners of Asia and the Pacific, we will develop the institutions and practice of regional cooperation. Through sustained effort we aim to build in this vast area, where almost two-thirds of humanity live, a region of security and order and progress, realizing its common destiny in the light of its own traditions and aspirations. The peoples of this region have the right as well as the primary responsibility to deal with their own problems and to shape their own future in terms of their own wisdom and experience. Economic and cultural cooperation for regional development should be open to all countries in the region, irrespective of creed or ideology, which genuinely follow a policy of peace and harmony among all nations. Nations outside the region will be welcomed as partners working for the common benefit and their cooperation will be sought in forms consonant with the independence and dignity of the Asian and Pacific nations.

A peaceful and progressive Asia, in which nations are able to work together for the common good, will be a major factor in establishing peace and prosperity throughout the world and improving the prospects of international cooperation and a better life for all mankind.

IV. We Must Seek Reconciliation and Peace Throughout Asia

We do not threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of our neighbors, whatever their ideological alignment. We ask only that this be reciprocated. The quarrels and ambitions of ideology and the painful frictions arising from national fears and grievances should belong to the past. Aggression rooted in them must not succeed. We shall play our full part in creating an environment in which reconciliation becomes possible, for in the modern world men and nations have no choice but to learn to live together as brothers.

TEXT OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE MANILA SUMMIT CONFERENCE, MANILA, THE PHILIPPINES OCTOBER 24, 1966 [1]

INTRODUCTION

1. In response to an invitation from the President of the Republic of the Philippines, after consultations with the President of the Republic of Korea and the Prime Ministers of Thailand and the Republic of Vietnam, the leaders of seven nations in the Asian and Pacific region held a summit conference in Manila on October 24 and 25, 1966, to consider the conflict in South Vietnam and to review their wider purposes in Asia and the Pacific. The participants were Prime Minister Harold Holt of Australia, President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake of New Zealand, President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines, Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn of Thailand, President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United States of America, and Chairman Nguyen Van Thieu and Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky of the Republic of Vietnam.

BASIC POLICY

2. The nations represented at this conference are united in their determination that the freedom of South Vietnam be secured, in their resolve for peace, and in their deep concern for the future of Asia and the Pacific. Some of us are now close to the actual danger, while others have learned to know its significance through bitter past experience. This conference symbolizes our common purposes and high hopes.

3. We are united in our determination that the South Vietnamese people shall not be conquered by aggressive force and shall enjoy the inherent right to choose their own way of life and their own form of government. We shall continue our military and all other efforts, as firmly and as long as may be necessary, in close consultation among ourselves until the aggression is ended.

4. At the same time our united purpose is peace—peace in South Vietnam and in the rest of Asia and the Pacific. Our common commitment is to the defense of the South Vietnamese people. Our sole demand on the leaders of North Vietnam is that they abandon their aggression. We are prepared to pursue any avenue which could lead to a secure and just peace, whether through discussion and negotiation or through reciprocal actions by both sides to reduce the violence.

5. We are united in looking to a peaceful and prosperous future for all of Asia and the Pacific. We have therefore set forth in a separate declaration a statement of the principles that guide our common actions in this wider sphere.

6. Actions taken in pursuance of the policies herein stated shall be in accordance with our respective constitutional processes.

---

[1] White House press release dated Oct. 25, 1966.

PROGRESS AND PROGRAMS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, THE MILITARY EFFORT

7. The Government of Vietnam described the significant military progress being made against aggression. It noted with particular gratitude the substantial contribution being made by free world forces.

8. Nonetheless, the leaders noted that the movement of forces from North Vietnam continues at a high rate and that firm military action and free world support continue to be required to meet the threat. The necessity for such military action and support must depend for its size and duration on the intensity and duration of the Communist aggression itself.

9. In their discussion, the leaders reviewed the problem of prisoners of war. The participants observed that Hanoi has consistently refused to cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in the application of the Geneva Conventions, and called on Hanoi to do so. They reaffirmed their determination to comply fully with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and welcomed the resolution adopted by the Executive Committee of the League of Red Cross Societies on October 8, 1966, calling for compliance with the Geneva Conventions in the Vietnam conflict, full support for the International Committee of the Red Cross, and immediate action to repatriate seriously sick and wounded prisoners of war. They agreed to work toward the fulfillment of this resolution, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, and indicated their willingness to meet under the auspices of the ICRC or in any appropriate forum to discuss the immediate exchange of prisoners.

PACIFICATION AND REVOLUTION DEVELOPMENT

10. The participating governments concentrated particular attention on the accelerating efforts of the Government of Vietnam to forge a social revolution of hope and progress. Even as the conflict continues, the effort goes forward to overcome the tyranny of poverty, disease, illiteracy and social injustice.

11. The Vietnamese leaders stated their intent to train and assign a substantial share of the armed forces to clear-and-hold actions in order to provide a shield behind which a new society can be built.

12. In the field of Revolutionary Development, measures along the lines developed in the past year and a half will be expanded and intensified. The training of Revolutionary Development cadres will be improved. More electricity and good water will be provided. More and better schools will be built and staffed. Refugees will be taught new skills. Health and medical facilities will be expanded.

13. The Vietnamese Government declared that it is working out a series of measures to modernize agriculture and to assure the cultivator the fruits of his labors. Land reform and tenure provisions will be granted top priority. Agricultural credit will be expanded. Crops will be improved and diversified.

14. The Vietnamese leaders emphasized that underlying these measures to build confidence and cooperation among the people there

must be popular conviction that honesty, efficiency and social justice form solid cornerstones of the Vietnamese Government's programs.

15. This is a program each of the conferring governments has reason to applaud recognizing that it opens a brighter hope for the people of Vietnam. Each pledged its continuing assistance according to its means, whether in funds or skilled technicians or equipment. They noted also the help in non-military fields being given by other countries and expressed the hope that this help will be substantially increased.

ECONOMIC STABILITY AND PROGRESS

16. The Conference was told of the success of the Government of Vietnam in controlling the inflation which, if unchecked, could undercut all efforts to bring a more fulfilling life to the Vietnamese people. However, the Vietnamese leaders reaffirmed that only by constant effort could inflation be kept under control. They described their intention to enforce a vigorous stabilization program, to control spending, increase revenues, and seek to promote savings in order to hold the 1967 inflationary gap to the minimum practicable level. They also plan to take further measures to insure maximum utilization of the Port of Saigon, so that imports urgently needed to fuel the military effort and buttress the civil economy can flow rapidly into Vietnam.

17. Looking to the long-term future of their richly endowed country, the Vietnamese representatives described their views and plans for the building of an expanded postwar economy.

18. Military installations where appropriate will be converted to this purpose, and plans for this will be included.

19. The conferring nations reaffirmed their continuing support for Vietnamese efforts to achieve economic stability and progress. Thailand specifically noted its readiness to extend substantial new credit assistance for the purchase of rice and the other nations present reported a number of plans for the supply of food or other actions related to the economic situation. At the same time the participants agreed to appeal to other nations and to international organizations committed to the full and free development of every nation, for further assistance to the Republic of Vietnam.

POLITICAL EVOLUTION

20. The representatives of Vietnam noted that, even as the Conference met, steps were being taken to establish a new constitutional system for the Republic of Vietnam through the work of the Constituent Assembly, chosen by so large a proportion of the electorate last month.

21. The Vietnamese representatives stated their expectation that work on the Constitution would go forward rapidly and could be completed before the deadline of March 1967. The Constitution will then be promulgated and elections will be held within six months to select a representative government.

22. The Vietnamese Government believes that the democratic process must be strengthened at the local as well as the national

level. The Government of Vietnam announced that to this end it will begin holding village and hamlet elections at the beginning of 1967.

23. The Government of Vietnam announced that it is preparing a program of National Reconciliation. It declared its determination to open all doors to those Vietnamese who have been mislead or coerced into casting their lot with the Viet Cong. The Government seeks to bring them back to participate as free men in national life under amnesty and other measures. Former enemies are asked only to lay down their weapons and bring their skills to the service of the South Vietnamese people.

24. The other participating nations welcomed the stated expectation of the Vietnamese representatives that work on the Constitution will proceed on schedule, and concurred in the conviction of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam that building representative, constitutional government and opening the way for national reconciliation are indispensable to the future of a free Vietnam.

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

25. The participants devoted a major share of their deliberations to peace objectives and the search for a peaceful settlement in South Vietnam. They reviewed in detail the many efforts for peace that have been undertaken, by themselves and other nations, and the actions of the United Nations and of His Holiness the Pope. It was clearly understood that the settlement of the war in Vietnam depends on the readiness and willingness of the parties concerned to explore and work out together a just and resonable solution. They noted that Hanoi still showed no sign of taking any step toward peace, either by action or by entering into discussions or negotiations. Nevertheless, the participants agreed that the search for peace must continue.

26. The Government of the Republic of Vietnam declared that the Vietnamese people, having suffered the ravages of war for more than two decades, were second to none in their desire for peace. It welcomes any initiative that will lead to an end to hostilities, preserves the independence of South Vietnam and protects the right to choose their own way of life.

27. So that their aspirations and position would be clear to their allies at Manila and friends everywhere, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam solemnly stated its views as to the essential elements of peace in Vietnam:

(*1*) *Cessation of aggression.*—At issue in Vietnam is a struggle for the preservation of values which people everywhere have cherished since the dawn of history: the independence of peoples and the freedom of individuals. The people of South Vietnam ask only that the aggression that threatens their independence and the externally supported terror that threatens their freedom be halted. No self-respecting people can ask for less. No peace-loving nation should ask for more.

(*2*) *Preservation of the territorial integrity of South Vietnam.*—The people of South Vietnam are defending their own territory against those seeking to obtain by force and terror what they have been unable to accomplish by peaceful means.

While sympathizing with the plight of their brothers in the North and while disdaining the regime in the North, the South Vietnamese people have no desire to threaten or harm the people of the North or invade their country.

(3) *Reunification of Vietnam.*—The Government and people of South Vietnam deplore the partition of Vietnam into North and South. But this partition brought about by the Geneva Agreements of 1954 however unfortunate and regrettable, will be respected until, by the free choice of all Vietnamese, reunification is achieved.

(4) *Resolution of internal problems.*—The people of South Vietnam seek to resolve their own internal differences and to this end are prepared to engage in a program of national reconciliation. When the aggression has stopped, the people of South Vietnam will move more rapidly toward reconciliation of all elements in the society and will move forward, through the democratic process, toward human dignity, prosperity and lasting peace.

(5) *Removal of allied military forces.*—The people of South Vietnam will ask their allies to remove their forces and evacuate their installations as the military and subversive forces of North Vietnam are withdrawn, infiltration ceases, and the level of violence thus subsides.

(6) *Effective guarantees.*—The people of South Vietnam, mindful of their experience since 1954 insist that any negotiations leading to the end of hostilities incorporate effective international guarantees. They are openminded as such guarantees can be applied and made effective.

28. The other participating governments reviewed and endorsed these as essential elements of peace and agreed they would act on this basis in close consultation among themselves in regard to settlement of the conflict.

29. In particular, they declared that Allied forces are in the Republic of Vietnam because that country is the object of aggression and its government requested support in the resistance of its people to aggression. They shall be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled.

30. All the participants agreed that the value of a meeting among the seven nations had been abundantly demonstrated by the candid and thorough discussions held. It was further agreed that, in addition to the close consultation already maintained through diplomatic channels, there should be regular meetings among their Ambassadors in Saigon in association with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. Meetings of their Foreign Ministers and Heads of Government will also be held as required.

31. At the close of the meeting, all the visiting participants expressed their deep gratitude to President Marcos and to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for offering Manila as the conference site, and expressed their appreciation for the highly efficient arrangements.

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN PRESIDENTS JOHNSON AND HO CHI MINH[1]

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO HO CHI MINH

His Excellency Ho Chi Minh,
President, Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Dear Mr. President: I am writing to you in the hope that the conflict in Vietnam can be brought to an end. That conflict has already taken a heavy toll—in lives lost, in wounds inflicted, in property destroyed, and in simple human misery. If we fail to find a just and peaceful solution, history will judge us harshly.

Therefore, I believe that we both have a heavy obligation to seek earnestly the path to peace. It is in response to that obligation that I am writing directly to you.

We have tried over the past several years, in a variety of ways and through a number of channels, to convey to you and your colleagues our desire to achieve a peaceful settlement. For whatever reasons, these efforts have not achieved any results.

It may be that our thoughts and yours, our attitudes and yours, have been distorted or misinterpreted as they passed through these various channels. Certainly that is always a danger in indirect communication.

There is one good way to overcome this problem and to move forward in the search for a peaceful settlement. That is for us to arrange for direct talks between trusted representatives in a secure setting and away from the glare of publicity. Such talks should not be used as a propaganda exercise but should be a serious effort to find a workable and mutually acceptable solution.

In the past two weeks, I have noted public statements by representatives of your Government suggesting that you would be prepared to enter into direct bilateral talks with representatives of the U.S. Government, provided that we ceased "unconditionally" and permanently our bombing operations against your country and all military actions against it. In the last day, serious and responsible parties have assured us indirectly that this is in fact your proposal.

Let me frankly state that I see two great difficulties with this proposal. In view of your public position, such action on our part would inevitably produce worldwide speculation that discussions were under way and would impair the privacy and secrecy of those discussions. Secondly, there would inevitably be grave concern on our part whether your Government would make use of such action by us to improve its military position.

With these problems in mind, I am prepared to move even further towards an ending of hostilities than your Government has proposed in either public statements or through private diplomatic channels. I am prepared to order a cessation of bombing against your country and the stopping of further augmentation of U.S. forces in South Vietnam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Vietnam by land and by sea has stopped. These acts of restraint on both sides would, I believe, make it possible for us to conduct serious and private discussions leading toward an early peace.

---

[1] "Vietnam: Search for Peace," Department of State, 1967.

I make this proposal to you now with a specific sense of urgency arising from the imminent New Year holidays in Vietnam. If you are able to accept this proposal I see no reason why it could not take effect at the end of the New Year, or Tet, holidays. The proposal I have made would be greatly strengthened if your military authorities and those of the Government of South Vietnam could promptly negotiate an extension of the Tet truce.

As to the site of the bilateral discussions I propose, there are several possibilities. We could, for example, have our representatives meet in Moscow where contacts have already occurred. They could meet in some other country such as Burma. You may have other arrangements or sites in mind, and I would try to meet your suggestions.

The important thing is to end a conflict that has brought burdens to both our peoples, and above all to the people of South Vietnam. If you have any thoughts about the actions I propose, it would be most important that I receive them as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

FEBRUARY 8, 1967.

LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON FROM HO CHI MINH

To His Excellency MR. LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
President, United States of America

YOUR EXCELLENCY: On February 10, 1967, I received your message. This is my reply.

Vietnam is thousands of miles away from the United States. The Vietnamese people have never done any harm to the United States. But contrary to the pledges made by its representative at the 1954 Geneva conference, the U.S. Government has ceaselessly intervened in Vietnam, it has unleashed and intensified the war of aggression in South Vietnam with a view to prolonging the partition of Vietnam and turning South Vietnam into a neo-colony and a military base of the United States. For over two years now, the U.S. Government has, with its air and naval forces, carried the war to the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam, an independent and sovereign country.

The U.S. Government has committed war crimes, crimes against peace and against mankind. In South Vietnam, half a million U.S. and satellite troops have resorted to the most inhuman weapons and the most barbarous methods of warfare, such as napalm, toxic chemicals and gases, to massacre our compatriots, destroy crops, and raze villages to the ground. In North Vietnam, thousands of U.S. aircraft have dropped hundreds of thousands of tons of bombs, destroying towns, villages, factories, schools. In your message, you apparently deplore the sufferings and destruction in Vietnam. May I ask you: Who has perpetrated these monstrous crimes? It is the United States and satellite troops. The U.S. Government is entirely responsible for the extremely serious situation in Vietnam.

The U.S. war of aggression against the Vietnamese people constitutes a challenge to the countries of the socialist camp, a threat to

the national independence movement, and a serious danger to peace in Asia and the world.

The Vietnamese people deeply love independence, freedom and peace. But in the face of the U.S. aggression, they have risen up, united as one man, fearless of sacrifices and hardships. They are determined to carry on their resistance until they have won genuine independence and freedom and true peace. Our just cause enjoys strong sympathy and support from the peoples of the whole world, including broad sections of the American people.

The U.S. Government has unleashed the war of aggression in Vietnam. It must cease this aggression. That is the only way to the restoration of peace. The U.S. Government must stop definitively and unconditionally its bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. and satellite troops, recognize the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs. Such is the basis (sic) content of the five-point stand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which embodies the essential principles and provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, it is the basic (sic) of a correct political solution of the Vietnam problem.

In your message, you suggested direct talks between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States. If the U.S. Government really wants these talks, it must first of all stop unconditionally its bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It is only after the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States could enter into talks and discuss questions concerning the two sides.

The Vietnamese people will never submit to force, they will never accept talks under the threat of bombs.

Our cause is absolutely just. It is to be hoped that the U.S. Government will act in accordance with reason.

Sincerely,

HO CHI MINH.

FEBRUARY 15, 1967.

THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM: The President's Letter to Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington, March 1, 1967 [1]

DEAR SENATOR JACKSON: In further reference to our discussions at dinner on the evening of the 18th concerning the reasons for and effects of bombing, I wish to review for you the following.

We are bombing North Viet-Nam because it is violating two solemn international agreements. In 1954 Hanoi agreed that North Viet-Nam would not be "used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy."

---

[1] Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Public Information Series, released Mar. 2, 1967.

In 1962 Hanoi agreed to withdraw all its military forces from Laos; to refrain from reintroducing such forces; and not to use the territory of Laos to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON GUAM CONFERENCE, MARCH 21, 1967 [1]

The President of the United States and the Chief of State and the Prime Minister of Viet-Nam completed their discussions in Guam.

[1] White House press release dated Mar. 21, 1967.

These talks have demonstrated again their joint determination with their allies, to defend freedom in South Viet-Nam and at the same time to continue the earnest search for an honorable peace.

President Johnson took this occasion to present to Chairman Thieu, Prime Minister Ky and their party the new leadership of the US Mission in Saigon. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker will take up from Ambassador Lodge the maintenance and strengthening of close relations with the Government of Viet-Nam. He will be working with that Government in its struggle to preserve the nation's freedom, in its steady progress toward economic and social development, and in the new political chapter now opening of constitutional and representative government under elected leaders. President Johnson introduced Ambassador Eugene Locke, who will take Ambassador Porter's place as Deputy Chief of the US Mission, and he also explained that his Special Assistant, Mr. Robert Komer, would be in Saigon giving his attention to Pacification/RD matters.

Meeting with their advisors, President Johnson and Chairman Thieu and Prime Minister Ky reviewed the encouraging progress on the various programs of the Vietnamese Government which had been discussed at Honolulu early in 1966 and were outlined in the Communique of the Seven Allied Nations meeting in Manila last October.

Discussion covered the military front, where the initiative lies increasingly with the allied forces and where the leaders of North Viet-Nam must recognize the futility of their effort to seize control of South Viet-Nam by force.

The meeting also reviewed those programs of the Vietnamese Government to which the United States is providing assistance. They found that, a solid foundation having been laid, the pacification and revolutionary development program was now beginning to show encouraging results, despite Viet Cong efforts to disrupt it by terror and intimidation. They noted the successful maintenance of financial stability while recognizing the need for continued vigilance on this front. They heard from Dr. Vu Quoc Thuc and Mr. David Lilienthal of the long-range economic planning now getting underway. Plans for continued efforts in the fields of national reconciliation and reform of land policies and tenure provisions were described by the Vietnamese leaders.

They also outlined the provisions of the Constitution drafted by the Constituent Assembly elected last September 11 and agreed by the Assembly and approved by the Directorate in the last few days. This instrument provides for the principal organs of a representative government and assures to the people civil and economic rights and social justice. The Constitution offers full civil rights to those who respect its provisions and the world looks forward to the day when the Viet Cong will take advantage of this offer, abandon the course of terror and violence and join in making a free, modern society in South Viet-Nam.

It was also announced that elections for a president will be held under the constitution within 4 to 5 months and the elections for a legislature shortly thereafter. Meanwhile a major forward step will be made toward the restoration of democratic local government when village hamlet elections take place, starting in April.

The numerous and varied efforts made in recent months to bring about a peaceful settlement were reviewed by the heads of both delegations. Thus far, they noted regretfully, North Viet-Nam has failed to respond to all such efforts. However, Chairman Thieu, Prime Minister Ky and President Johnson reaffirmed their undertakings at Manila and Honolulu and pledged themselves anew to the diligent pursuit of peace. Continuing consultations about the search for peace will be maintained among the nations whose forces are now fighting against aggression in South Viet-Nam.

The Vietnamese and American leaders also took note of the forthcoming meetings in Washington of SEATO on April 18–20 and of the Foreign Ministers of Nations having troops in Viet-Nam on April 20–21. The latter will bring together again the Governments which met at Manila last October and provide an opportunity for them to review progress and programs in Viet-Nam and consult on future courses of action.

The Vietnamese leaders are leaving Guam for Saigon this morning and President Johnson is expected to depart at the end of the day.

TEXT OF THE JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENT THIEU IN CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA, DECEMBER 20, 1967 [1]

President Nguyen Van Thieu of the Republic of Vietnam and President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United States held an informal working dinner this evening, both being present in Canberra for the memorial service for the late Prime Minister Harold Holt.

---

[1] Senate Resolution 189, agreed to Nov. 20, 1967.
[2] Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 15, 1968, pp. 72–73.

There was a full exchange of views on all aspects of South Vietnam's struggle to defend its freedom from external force.

The military situation was reviewed and found to show good progress.

Progress was also noted in the work of pacification and of economic reconstruction with the intention that this could be speeded up in the coming months.

President Johnson congratulated President Thieu on the completion of a constitution, the holding of successful national elections and the installation of a constitutional government.

It was recognized that many problems remained to be overcome, and President Thieu outlined the plans of his Government to deal with these problems, along the lines of his inaugural speech and the later program presented to the people of South Vietnam by Prime Minister [Nguyen Van] Loc.

Both presidents agreed that their objective remained an honorable and secure peace in accordance with the basic statement of the South Vietnamese position contained in the Manila communique of October 1966 and supported by the other participants.

They regretted that there was no sign that North Vietnam was prepared to take any of the many avenues to peace that had been opened.

They agreed that in these circumstances there was no alternative to continuing appropriate military actions.

President Thieu once again explained his Government's policy of reconciliation enunciated at Honolulu in February 1966.

In the light of the elections which subsequently have taken place, he noted that the Government of Vietnam is now prepared to grant full rights of citizenship to those now fighting against the Government who are prepared to accept constitutional processes and to live at peace under the constitutionally elected government.

President Thieu likewise reaffirmed a willingness to discuss relevant matters with any individuals now associated with the so-called National Liberation Front, while making clear that his Government could not regard the Front as an independent organization in any sense. He noted that it was not useful to attempt constructive discussions with any elements in South Vietnam committed to violent methods to obtain their political ends.

Noting press comment on President Johnson's five points as stated in his television broadcast December 20, President Thieu affirmed that they were fully consistent with a policy on which the Government of Vietnam and the Government of the United States have long agreed.

President Johnson stated the intent of the United States to continue its support for this policy of national reconciliation.

Both presidents agreed that the basic principle involved was the right of the South Vietnamese people to determine their own future through democratic and constitutional processes noted in the principle of one-man one-vote.

They further agreed that the removal of external interference and the acceptance of this principle by all the citizens of South Vietnam were fundamental elements in any enduring and honorable peace in

South Vietnam. They agreed that these elements were totally consistent with the spirit and essential terms of the Geneva agreements of 1954 and the Geneva agreements of 1962 respecting Laos.

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, MARCH 31, 1968[1]

Good evening, my fellow Americans. Tonight I want to speak to you of peace in Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

No other question so preoccupies our people. No other dream so absorbs the 250 million human beings who live in that part of the world. No other goal motivates American policy in Southeast Asia.

For years, representatives of our Government and others have traveled the world seeking to find a basis for peace talks.

Since last September, they have carried the offer that I made public at San Antonio.

That offer was this: that the United States would stop its bombardment of North Vietnam when that would lead promptly to productive discussions—and that we would assume that North Vietnam would not take military advantage of our restraint.

Hanoi denounced this offer, both privately and publicly. Even while the search for peace was going on, North Vietnam rushed their preparations for a savage assault on the people, the Government, and the allies of South Vietnam.

Their attack—during the Tet holidays—failed to achieve its principal objectives.

It did not collapse the elected government of South Vietnam or shatter its army, as the Communists had hoped.

It did not produce a "general uprising" among the people of the cities as they had predicted.

The Communists were unable to maintain control of any of the more than 30 cities that they attacked. And they took very heavy casualties.

But they did compel the South Vietnamese and their allies to move certain forces from the countryside into the cities. They caused widespread disruption and suffering. Their attacks, and the battles that followed, made refugees of half a million human beings.

The Communists may renew their attack any day. They are, it appears, trying to make 1968 the year of decision in South Vietnam—the year that brings, if not final victory or defeat, at least a turning point in the struggle.

This much is clear: If they do mount another round of heavy attacks, they will not succeed in destroying the fighting power of South Vietnam and its allies.

But tragically, this is also clear: Many men—on both sides of the struggle—will be lost. A nation that has already suffered 20 years of warfare will suffer once again. Armies on both sides will take new casualties. And the war will go on.

There is no need for this to be so.

There is no need to delay the talks that could bring an end to this long and this bloody war.

---

[1] Department of State Publication 8376, Apr. 5, 1968.

Tonight I renew the offer I made last August—to stop the bombardment of North Vietnam. We ask that talks begin promptly, that they be serious talks on the substance of peace. We assume that during those talks Hanoi will not take advantage of our restraint.

We are prepared to move immediately toward peace through negotiations.

So tonight, in the hope that this action will lead to early talks, I am taking the first step to deescalate the conflict. We are reducing —substantially reducing—the present level of hostilities. And we are doing so unilaterally and at once.

Tonight I have ordered our aircraft and our naval vessels to make no attacks on North Vietnam, except in the area north of the demilitarized zone where the continuing enemy buildup directly threatens Allied forward positions and where the movements to their troops and supplies are clearly related to that threat.

The area in which we are stopping our attacks includes almost 90 percent of North Vietnam's population and most of its territory. Thus there will be no attacks around the principal populated areas or in the food-producing areas of North Vietnam.

Even this very limited bombing of the North could come to an early end if our restraint is matched by restraint in Hanoi. But I cannot in good conscience stop all bombing so long as to do so would immediately and directly endanger the lives of our men and our allies. Whether a complete bombing halt becomes possible in the future will be determined by events.

Our purpose in this action is to bring about a reduction in the level of violence that now exists.

It is to save the lives of brave men and to save the lives of innocent women and children. It is to permit the contending forces to move closer to a political settlement.

And tonight I call upon the United Kingdom and I call upon the Soviet Union, as cochairmen of the Geneva conferences and as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, to do all they can to move from the unilateral act of deescalation that I have just announced toward genuine peace in southeast Asia.

Now, as in the past, the United States is ready to send its representatives to any forum, at any time, to discuss the means of bringing this ugly war to an end.

I am designating one of our most distinguished Americans, Ambassador Averell Harriman, as my personal representative for such talks. In addition, I have asked Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, who returned from Moscow for consultation, to be available to join Ambassador Harriman at Geneva or any other suitable place just as soon as Hanoi agrees to a conference.

I call upon President Ho Chi Minh to respond positively and favorably to this new step toward peace.

But if peace does not come now through negotiations, it will come when Hanoi understands that our common resolve is unshakable and our common strength is invincible.

Tonight, we and the other allied nations are contributing 600,000 fighting men to assist 700,000 South Vietnamese troops in defending their little country.

Our presence there has always rested on this basic belief: The main burden of preserving their freedom must be carried out by them—by the South Vietnamese themselves.

We and our allies can only help to provide a shield—behind which the people of South Vietnam can survive and can grow and develop. On their efforts—on their determinations and resourcefulness—the outcome will ultimately depend.

That small, beleagured nation has suffered terrible punishment for more than 20 years.

I pay tribute once again tonight to the great courage and endurance of its people. South Vietnam supports armed forces tonight of almost 700,000 men—and I call your attention to the fact that that is the equivalent of more than 10 million in our own population. Its people maintain their firm determination to be free of domination by the North.

There has been substantial progress, I think, in building a durable government during these last 3 years. The South Vietnam of 1965 could not have survived the enemy's Tet offensive of 1968. The elected government of South Vietnam survived that attack and is rapidly repairing the devastation that it wrought.

The South Vietnamese know that further efforts are going to be required:

—to expand their own armed forces,

—to move back into the countryside as quickly as possible,

—to increase their taxes,

—to select the very best men that they have for civil and military responsibility,

—to achieve a new unity within their constitutional government, and

—to include in the national effort all those groups who wish to preserve South Vietnam's control over its own destiny.

Last week President Thieu ordered the mobilization of 135,000 additional South Vietnamese. He plans to reach, as soon as possible, a total military strength of more than 800,000 men.

To achieve this, the Government of South Vietnam started the drafting of 19-year-olds on March 1. On May 1, the Government will begin the drafting of 18-year-olds.

Last month, 10,000 men volunteered for military service; that was 2½ times the number of volunteers during the same month last year. Since the middle of January, more than 48,000 South Vietnamese have joined the armed forces—and nearly half of them volunteered to do so.

All men in the South Vietnamese armed forces have had their tours of duty extended for the duration of the war, and reserves are now being called up for immediate active duty.

President Thieu told his people last week: "We must make greater efforts and accept more sacrifices because, as I have said many times, this is our country. The existence of our nation is at stake, and this is mainly a Vietnamese responsibility."

He warned his people that a major national effort is required to root out corruption and incompetence at all levels of government.

We applaud this evidence of determination on the part of South Vietnam. Our first priority will be to support their effort.

We shall accelerate the reequipment of South Vietnam's armed forces in order to meet the enemy's increased firepower. This will enable them progressively to undertake a larger share of combat operations against the Communist invaders.

On many occasions I have told the American people that we would send to Vietnam those forces that are required to accomplish our mission there. So, with that as our guide, we have previously authorized a force level of approximately 525,000.

Some weeks ago, to help meet the enemy's new offensive, we sent to Vietnam about 11,000 additional marine and airborne troops. They were deployed by air in 48 hours on an emergency basis. But the artillery, tank, aircraft, medical, and other units that were needed to work with and support these infantry troops in combat could not then accompany them by air on that short notice.

In order that these forces may reach maximum combat effectiveness, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended to me that we should prepare to send during the next 5 months support troops totaling approximately 13,500 men.

A portion of these men will be made available from our Active Forces. The balance will come from Reserve component units which will be called up for service.

The actions that we have taken since the beginning of the year to reequip the South Vietnamese forces; to meet our responsibilities in Korea, as well as our responsibilities in Vietnam; to meet price increase and the cost of activating and deploying Reserve Forces; to replace helicopters and provide the other military supplies we need—all of these actions are going to require additional expenditures.

The tentative estimate of those additional expenditures is $2.5 billion in this fiscal year and $2.6 billion in the next fiscal year.

These projected increases in expenditures for our national security will bring into sharper focus the Nation's need for immediate action, action to protect the prosperity of the American people and to protect the strength and the stability of our American dollar.

On many occasions I have pointed that without a tax bill or decreased expenditures next year's deficit would again be around $20 billion. I have emphasized the need to set strict priorities in our spending. I have stressed that failure to act—and to act promptly and decisively—would raise very strong doubts throughout the world about American's willingness to keep its financial house in order.

Yet Congress has not acted. And tonight we face the sharpest financial threat in the postwar era—a threat to the dollar's role as the keystone of international trade and finance in the world.

Last week, at the monetary conference in Stockholm, the major industrial countries decided to take a big step toward creating a new international monetary asset that will strengthen the international monetary system. I am very proud of the very able work done by Secretary [of the Treasury Henry H.] Fowler and Chairman [William McChesney] Martin of the Federal Reserve Board.

But to make this system work the United States just must bring its balance of payments to—or very close to—equilibrium. We must

have a responsible fiscal policy in this country. The passage of a tax bill now, together with expenditure control that the Congress may desire and dictate, is absolutely necessary to protect this Nation's security, to continue our prosperity, and to meet the needs of our people.

What is at stake is 7 years of unparalleled prosperity. In those 7 years, the real income of the average American—after taxes—rose by almost 30 percent, a gain as large as that of the entire preceding 19 years.

So the steps that we must take to convince the world are exactly the steps we must take to sustain our own economic strength here at home. In the past 8 months prices and interest rates have risen because of our inaction.

We must, therefore, now do everything we can to move from debate to action, from talking to voting. There is, I believe—I hope there is—in both Houses of the Congress a growing sense of urgency that this situation just must be acted upon and must be corrected.

My budget in January was, we thought, a tight one. It fully reflected our evaluation of most of the demanding needs of this Nation.

But in these budgetary matters the President does not decide alone. The Congress has the power and the duty to determine appropriations and taxes. The Congress is now considering our proposals, and they are considering reductions in the budget that we submitted.

As part of a program of fiscal restraint that includes the tax surcharge, I shall approve appropriate reductions in the January budget when and if Congress so decides that that should be done.

One thing is unmistakably clear, however: Our deficit just must be reduced. Failure to act could bring on conditions that would strike hardest at those people that all of us are trying so hard to help.

These times call for prudence in this land of plenty. I believe that we have the character to provide it, and tonight I plead with the Congress and with the people to act promptly to serve the national interest, and thereby serve all of our people.

Now let me give you my estimate of the chances for peace:

—the peace that will one day stop the bloodshed in South Vietnam.

—that will—all the Vietnamese people will be permitted to rebuild and develop their land,

—that will permit us to turn more fully to our own tasks here at home.

I cannot promise that the initiative that I have announced tonight will be completely successful in achieving peace any more than the 30 others that we have undertaken and agreed to in recent years.

But it is our fervent hope that North Vietnam, after years of fighting that has left the issue unresolved, will now cease its efforts to achieve military victory and will join with us in moving toward the peace table.

And there may come a time when South Vietnamese—on both sides—are able to work out a way to settle their own differences by free political choice rather than by war.

As Hanoi considers its course, it should be in no doubt of our intentions. It must not miscalculate the pressures within our democracy in this election year.

We have no intention of widening this war.

But the United States will never accept a fake solution to this long and arduous struggle and call it peace.

No one can foretell the precise terms of an eventual settlement.

Our objective in South Vietnam has never been in the annihilation of the enemy. It has been to bring about a recognition in Hanoi that its objective—taking over the South by force—could not be achieved.

We think that peace can be based on the Geneva accords of 1954 under political conditions that permit the South Vietnamese—all the South Vietnamese—to chart their course free of any outside domination or interference, from us or from anyone else.

So tonight I reaffirm the pledge that we made at Manila: that we are prepared to withdraw our forces from South Vietnam as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, stops the infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides.

Our goal of peace and self-determination in Vietnam is directly related to the future of all of Southeast Asia—where much has happened to inspire confidence during the past 10 years. We have done all that we knew how to do to contribute and to help build that confidence.

A number of its nations have shown what can be accomplished under conditions of security. Since 1966 Indonesia, the fifth largest nation in all the world, with a population of more than 100 million people, has had a government that is dedicated to peace with its neighbors and improved conditions for its own people. Political and economic cooperation between nations has grown rapidly.

I think every American can take a great deal of pride in the role that we have played in bringing this about in Southeast Asia. We can rightly judge—as responsible Southeast Asians themselves do—that the progress of the past 3 years would have been far less likely—if not completely impossible—if America's sons and others had not made their stand in Vietnam.

At Johns Hopkins University, about 3 years ago, I announced that the United States would take part in the great work of developing Southeast Asia, including the Mekong Valley, for all the people of that region. Our determination to help build a better land—a better land for men on both sides of the present conflict—has not diminished in the least. Indeed, the ravages of war, I think, have made it more urgent than ever.

So I repeat on behalf of the United States again tonight what I said at Johns Hopkins: that North Vietnam could take its place in this common effort just as soon as peace comes.

Over time, a wider framework of peace and security in Southeast Asia may become possible. The new cooperation of the nations of the area could be a foundation stone. Certainly, friendship with the nations of such a Southeast Asia is what the United States seeks—and that is all that the United States seeks.

One day, my fellow citizens, there will be peace in Southeast Asia.

It will come because the people of Southeast Asia want it—those whose armies are at war tonight and those who, though threatened, have thus far been spared.

Peace will come because Asians were willing to work for it—and to sacrifice for it—and to die by the thousands for it.

But let it never be forgotten: Peace will come also because American sent her sons to help secure it.

It has not been easy—far from it. During the past 4½ years, it has been my fate and my responsibility to be Commander in Chief. I have lived daily and nightly with the cost of this war. I know the pain that it has inflicted. I know perhaps better than anyone the misgivings that it has aroused.

Throughout this entire long period, I have been sustained by a single principle: that what we are doing now in Vietnam is vital not only to the security of Southeast Asia, but it is vital to the security of every American.

Surely we have treaties which we must respect. Surely we have commitments that we are going to keep. Resolutions of the Congress testify to the need to resist aggression in the world and in Southeast Asia.

But the heart of our involvement in South Vietnam under three different Presidents, three separate administrations—has always been America's own security.

And the larger purpose of our involvement has always been to help the nations of Southeast Asia become independent and stand alone, self-sustaining as members of a great world community—at peace with themselves and at peace with all others.

With such an Asia, our country—and the world—will be far more secure than it is tonight.

I believe that a peaceful Asia is far nearer to reality because of what American has done in Vietnam. I believe that the men who endure the dangers of battle—fighting there for us tonight—are helping the entire world avoid far greater conflicts, far wider wars, far more destruction than this one.

The peace that will bring them home some day will come. Tonight I have offered the first in what I hope will be a series of mutual moves toward peace.

I pray that it will not be rejected by the leaders of North Vietnam. I pray that they will accept it as a means by which the sacrifices of their own people may be ended. And I ask your help and your support, my fellow citizens, for this effort to reach across the battlefield toward an early peace.

Finally, my fellow Americans, let me say this:

Of those to whom much is given, much is asked. I cannot say, and no man could say, that no more will be asked of us.

Yet, I believe that now, no less than when the decade began, this generation of Americans is willing to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty." Since those words were spoken by John F. Kennedy, the people of America have kept that compact with mankind's noblest cause.

And we shall continue to keep it.

Yet I believe that we must always be mindful of this one thing, whatever the trials and the tests ahead: The ultimate strength of our country and our cause will lie not in powerful weapons or infinite resources or boundless wealth but will lie in the unity of our people.

This I believe very deeply.

Throughout my entire public career I have followed the personal philosophy that I am a free man, an American, a public servant, and a member of my party, in that order always and only.

For 37 years in the service of our Nation, first as a Congressman, as a Senator, and as Vice President, and now as your President, I have put the unity of the people first. I have put it ahead of any divisive partianship.

And in these times as in times before, it is true that a house divided against itself by the spirit of faction, of party, of region, of religion, of race, is a house that cannot stand.

There is division in the American house now. There is divisiveness among us all tonight. And holding the trust that is mine, as President of all the people, I cannot disregard the peril to the progress of the American people and the hope and the prospect of peace for all peoples.

So I would ask all Americans, whatever their personal interests or concern, to guard against divisiveness and all its ugly consequences.

Fifty-two months and 10 days ago, in a moment of tragedy and trauma, the duties of this office fell upon me. I asked then by your help and God's that we might continue America on it course, binding up our wounds, healing our history, moving forward in new unity, to clear the American agenda and to keep the American commitment for all of our people.

United we have kept that commitment. United we have enlarged that commitment.

Through all time to come, I think America will be a stronger nation, a more just society, and a land of greater opportunity and fulfillment because of what we have all done together in these years of unparalleled achievement.

Our reward will come in the life of freedom, peace, and hope that our children will enjoy through ages ahead.

What we won when all of our people united just must not now be lost in suspicion, distrust, selfishness, and politics among any of our people.

Believing this as I do, I have concluded that I should not permit the Presidency to become involved in the partisan divisions that are developing in this political year.

With America's sons in the fields far away, with America's future under challenge right here at home, with our hopes and the world's hopes for peace in the balance every day, I do not believe that I should devote an hour or a day of my time to any personal partisan causes or to any duties other than the awesome duties of this Office —the Presidency of your country.

Accordingly, I shall not seek, and I will not accept the nomination of my party for another term as your President.

But let men everywhere know, however, that a strong, a confident, and a vigilant America stands ready tonight to seek an honorable peace—and stands ready tonight to defend an honored cause—whatever the price, whatever the burden, whatever the sacrifices that duty may require.

Thank you for listening.

Good night and God bless all of you.

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT ON VIETNAM, OCTOBER 31, 1968[1]

Good evening my fellow Americans:

I speak to you this evening about very important developments in our search for peace in Vietnam. We have been engaged in discussions with the North Vietnamese in Paris since last May. The discussions began after I announced on the evening of March 31 in a television speech to the nation that the United States—in an effort to get talks started on a settlement of the Vietnam war—had stopped the bombing of North Vietnam in the area where 90 percent of the people live.

When our representatives—Ambassador Harriman and Ambassador Vance—were sent to Paris, they were instructed to insist throughout the discussions that the legitimate elected government of South Vietnam must take its place in any serious negotiations affecting the future of South Vietnam. Therefore, our Ambassadors Harriman and Vance made it abundantly clear to the representatives of North Vietnam in the beginning that—as I had indicated on the evening of March 31—we would stop the bombing of North Vietnamese territory entirely when that would lead to prompt and productive talks, meaning by that talks in which the Government of Vietnam was free to participate. Our Ambassadors also stressed that we could not stop the bombing so long as by doing so we would endanger the lives and the safety of our troops.

For a good many weeks, there was no movement in the talks at all. The talks appeared to really be deadlocked. Then a few weeks ago, they entered a new and a very much more hopeful phase. As we moved ahead. I conducted a series of very intensive discussions with our allies, and with the senior military and diplomatic officers of the U.S. Government, on the prospect for peace. The President also briefed our congressional leaders and all of the presidential candidates.

Last Sunday evening, and throughout Monday, we began to get confirmation of the essential understanding that we had been seeking with the North Vietnamese on the critical issues between us for some time. I spent most of all day Tuesday reviewing every single detail of this matter with our field commander, General Abrams, whom I had ordered home, and who arrived here at the White House at 2:30 in the morning and went into immediate conference with the President and the appropriate members of his Cabinet. We received Gen-

[1] Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs release No. 1168, November 1968.

eral Abrams' judgment and we heard his recommendations at some length.

Now, as a result of all of these developments, I have now ordered that all air, naval, and artillery bombardment of North Vietnam cease as of 8 a.m., Washington time, Friday morning. I have reached this decision on the basis of the developments in the Paris talks. And I have reached it in the belief that this action can lead to progress toward a peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese war. I have already informed the three presidential candidates, as well as the congressional leaders of both the Republican and Democratic Parties of the reasons that the Government has made this decision. This decision very closely conforms to the statements that I have made in the past concerning a bombing cessation.

It was on August 19 that the President said:

"This administration does not intend to move further until it has good reasons to believe that the other side intends seriously, seriously, to join us in deescalating the war and moving seriously toward peace."

Then again on September 10, I said:

"The bombing will not stop until we are confident that it will not lead to an increase in American casualties."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, all military men have assured me—and General Abrams firmly asserted to me on Tuesday in that early, 2:30 a.m. meeting—that in their military judgment this action should be taken now, and this action would not result in any increase in American casualties.

A regular session of the Paris talks will take place on Wednesday, November 6, at which the representatives of the Government of South Vietnam are free to participate. We are informed by the representatives of the Hanoi Government that the representatives of the National Liberation Front will also be present. I emphasize that their attendance in no way involves recognition of the National Liberation Front in any form. Yet, it conforms to the statements that we have made many times over the years that the NLF would have no difficulty making its views known.

What we now expect—what we have a right to expect—are prompt, productive, serious and intensive negotiations in an atmosphere that is conducive to progress. We have reached the stage where productive talks can begin. We have made clear to the other side that such talks cannot continue if they take military advantage of them. We cannot have productive talks in an atmosphere where the cities are being shelled and where the demilitarized zone is being abused.

I think I should caution you, my fellow Americans, that arrangements of this kind are never foolproof. For that matter, even formal treaties are never foolproof, as we have learned from our experience. But in the light of the progress that has been made in recent weeks, and after carefully considering and weighing the unanimous military and diplomatic advice and judgment rendered to the Commander in Chief, I have finally decided to take this step now and to really determine the good faith of those who have assured us that progress will result when bombing ceases and to try to ascertain if

an early peace is possible. The overriding consideration that governs us at this hour is the chance and the opportunity that we might have to save human lives, save human lives on both sides of the conflict. Therefore, I have concluded that we should see if they are acting in good faith.

We could be misled—and we are prepared for such a contingency. We pray to God it does not occur. But it should be clear to all of us that the new phase of negotiations which opens on November 6 does not, repeat, does not mean that a stable peace has yet come to Southeast Asia. There may well be very hard fighting ahead. Certainly, there is going to be some very hard negotiating, because many difficult and critically important issues are still facing these negotiators. I hope with good will we can solve them. We know that negotiations can move swiftly if the common intent of the negotiators is peace in the world.

The world should know that the American people bitterly remember the long, agonizing Korean negotiations of 1951 through 1953—and that our people will just not accept deliberate delay and prolonged procrastination again. Well then, how has it come about that now, on November 1, we have agreed to stop the bombardment of North Vietnam? I would have given all I possess if the conditions had permitted me to stop it months ago—if there had just been any movement in the Paris talks that would have justified me in saying to you, "Now it can be safely stopped." But I, the President of the United States, do not control the timing of the events in Hanoi. The decisions in Hanoi really determine when and whether it would be possible for us to stop the bombing.

We could not retract our insistence on the participation of the Government of South Vietnam in serious talks affecting the future of their people—the people of South Vietnam. For though we have allied with South Vietnam for many years in this struggle, we have never assumed and we shall never demand the role of dictating the future of the people of South Vietnam. The very principle for which we are engaged in South Vietnam—the principle of self-determination—requires that the South Vietnamese people themselves be permitted to freely speak for themselves at the Paris talks and that the South Vietnamese delegation play a leading role in accordance with our agreement with President Thieu at Honolulu. It was made just as clear to North Vietnam that a total bombing halt must not risk the lives of our men.

When I spoke last March 31, I said that evening:

"Whether a complete bombing halt becomes possible in the future is going to be determined by events."

I cannot tell you tonight specifically in all detail why there has been progress in Paris. But I can tell you that a series of hopeful events has occurred in South Vietnam:

—the Government of South Vietnam has grown steadily stronger;

—South Vietnamese Armed Forces have been substantially increased to the point where a million men are tonight under arms, and the effectiveness of these men has steadily improved;

—the superb performance of our own men, under the brilliant leadership of General Westmoreland and General Abrams has produced truly remarkable results.

Perhaps some, or all of these factors, played a part in bringing about progress in the talks. And when at last progress did come, I believe that my responsibilities to the brave men, our men, who bear the burden to battle in South Vietnam tonight—and my duty to seek an honorable settlement of the war—required me to recognize and required me to act without delay.

I have acted tonight.

There have been many long days of waiting for new steps toward peace—days that began in hope, only to end at night in disappointment. Constancy to our national purpose—which is to seek the basis for a durable peace in Southeast Asia—has sustained me in all of these hours when there seemed to be no progress whatever in these talks. But now that progress has come, I know that your prayers are joined with mine—and with those of all humanity—that the action I announce tonight will be a major step toward a firm and an honorable peace in Southeast Asia. It can be.

So, what is required of us in these new circumstances is exactly that steady determination and patience which has brought us to this more hopeful prospect. What is required of us is a courage and a steadfastness, and a perseverance here at home, that will match that of our men who fight for us tonight in Vietnam. So, I ask you not only for your prayers—but for the courageous and understanding support that Americans always give their president and their leader in an hour of trial. With that understanding, and with that support, we shall not fail.

Seven months ago I said that I would not permit the Presidency to become involved in the partisan divisions that were then developing in this political year. Accordingly, on the night of March 31, I announced that I would not seek, nor accept, the nomination of my party for another term as President. I have devoted every resource of the Presidency to the search for peace in Southeast Asia. Throughout the entire summer and fall I have kept all of the presidential candidates fully briefed on developments in Paris as well as in Vietnam. I have made it abundantly clear that no one candidate would have the advantage over others—either in information about these developments, or any advance notice of the policy the Government intended to follow. The chief diplomatic and military officers of this Government all were instructed to follow the same course.

Since that night on March 31, each of the candidates has had differing ideas about the Government's policy. But generally speaking, however, throughout the campaign we have been able to present a united voice supporting our Government and supporting our men in Vietnam. I hope, and I believe, that this can continue until January 20 of next year when a new President takes office. Because in this critical hour, we just simply cannot afford more than one voice speaking for our Nation in the search for peace. I do not know who will be inaugurated as the 37th President of the United States next January. But I do know that I shall do all that I can in the next few months to try to lighten his burdens—as the contributions of

the Presidents who preceded me have greatly lightened mine. I shall do everything in my power to move us toward the peace that the new President—as well as this President and, I believe, every other American—so deeply and urgently desires. Thank you for listening and good night. God bless all of you.

STATEMENT BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT[1] NOVEMBER 26, 1968

This statement is designed to answer the questions which have been raised by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam about new meetings in Paris.

Prior to the President's announcement of October 31 of the stopping of bombing against North Vietnam, agreement had been reached in Paris between North Vietnamese and U.S. negotiators that a meeting to discuss a peaceful settlement in Vietnam should be convened in Paris.

During the earlier discussions with the North Vietnamese representatives, U.S. spokesmen made clear that the stopping of bombing and the holding of such a meeting would not be possible without agreed provision for the participation of the Republic of Vietnam as a separate delegation forming with the U.S. delegation one side of the meeting. U.S. negotiators made clear to Hanoi that it might bring on its side of the table any persons it wished.

The North Vietnamese representatives in Paris accepted this proposal and indicated that they would bring to the meeting members of the so-called National Liberation Front.

In the light of these facts the arrangements agreed in Paris provide in essence for a two-sided meeting. Hanoi clearly understands that our side will be constituted as separate delegations of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States.

Whatever others may claim and however they may organize their side, the United States has not agreed and will not agree that the meeting is, or can correctly be described as, a four-sided or four-party conference.

Consistent with our view of the nature of the so-called National Liberation Front, we will regard and treat all the persons on the other side of the table—whatever they might claim for themselves—as members of a single side, that of Hanoi, and for practical purposes as a single delegation.

In the discussions between the United States and North Vietnamese negotiators it was made clear throughout that, whomever Hanoi chose to bring on its side the arrangement involved no element of recognition whatever.

The U.S. Government has repeatedly made clear, publicly and privately, that it does not recognize either the National Liberation Front or the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). Concerning the so-called National Liberation Front in particular, the U.S. Government has at all times regarded it as a creation of

[1] Department of State, press release 264, Nov. 26, 1968.

North Vietnam and an agent of Hanoi's aggression against the Republic of Vietnam. The National Liberation Front is not in any sense a separate entity, much less a government.

Following the stopping of the bombing of North Vietnam, if Hanoi fulfills its repeated undertakings to enter into serious talks—undertakings repeated throughout the contacts between North Vietnamese and American representatives in Paris—the North Vietnamese delegation must talk directly and seriously with the Republic of Vietnam's delegation.

In the Paris meetings, the Republic of Vietnam delegation will play a leading role, as was explicitly affirmed in the Honolulu communique of July. The Republic of Vietnam will take the lead and be the main spokesman on all matters which are of principal concern to South Vietnam.

The new Paris meetings will be expected to explore all avenues to end Communist aggression against the Republic of Vietnam and to reach a peaceful settlement. They will start with a clean slate. The sole agreements that have been reached in the earlier Paris talks between North Vietnamese and U.S. representatives have concerned the stopping of bombing and the convening of a new meeting. The United States considers that there cannot be productive talks in an atmosphere where the cities are being shelled and the DMZ is being abused.

In the new meetings the U.S. Government will operate in the closest cooperation with the Republic of Vietnam, and in continuing consultation with the nations that have contributed military forces to the defense of South Vietnam.

The substantive position of the U.S. Government will be based on respect for the sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam, and on the joint communiques of Manila and Honolulu. In particular, there has been no change whatever, and will be no change, in the position of the U.S. Government toward a so-called coalition in South Vietnam. The United States does not believe aggression should be rewarded and will not recognize any form of government that is not freely chosen through democratic and legal process by the people of South Vietnam. The imposition of any coalition government would be in conflict with this principle.

REPORT BY PRESIDENT NIXON ON PEACE IN VIETNAM, MAY 14, 1969[1]

I have asked for this television time tonight to report to you on our most difficult and urgent problem—the war in Vietnam.

Since I took office 4 months ago nothing has commanded so much of my time and energy as the search for a way to bring lasting peace in Vietnam. I know that some believe I should have ended the war immediately after my inauguration by simply withdrawing our forces from Vietnam.

This would have been the easy thing to do and it might have been a popular move.

---

[1] Department of State Publication 8467. Bureau of Public Affairs, released May 1969.

But I would have betrayed my solemn responsibility as President of the United States had I done so.

I want to end this war. The American people want to end this war. The South Vietnamese people want to end this war. But we want to end it permanently so that the younger brothers of our soldiers in Vietnam will not have to fight in the future in another Vietnam some place in the world.

The fact that there is no easy way to end the war does not mean that we have no choice but to let the war drag on with no end in sight.

For more than 4 years American boys have been fighting and dying in Vietnam. For 12 months our negotiators have been talking with the other side in Paris. Yet the fighting goes on. The destruction continues. Brave men still die.

The time has come for some new initiatives. Repeating the old formulas and the tired rhetoric of the past is not enough. When Americans are risking their lives in war, it is the responsibility of their leaders to take some risks for peace.

I would like to report to you tonight on some of the things we have been doing in the past 4 months to bring true peace, and then I would like to make some concrete proposals to speed that day.

Review and Reassessment

Our first step began before inauguration. This was to launch an intensive review of every aspect of the Nation's Vietnam policy. We accepted nothing on faith; we challenged every assumption and every statistic. We made a systematic, serious examination of all the alternatives open to us. We carefully considered recommendations offered both by critics and by supporters of past policies.

From the review, it became clear at once that the new Administration faced a set of immediate operational problems.

—The other side was preparing for a new offensive.

—There was a wide gulf of distrust between Washington and Saigon, which hindered cooperation.

—In 8 months of talks in Paris, there had been no negotiations directly concerned with a final settlement.

We therefore moved on several fronts at once.

We frustrated the attack which was launched in late February. As a result, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong failed to achieve their military objectives.

We restored a close working relationship with Saigon. In the resulting atmosphere of mutual confidence, President Thieu and his Government have taken important initiatives in the search for a settlement.

We speeded up the strengthening of the South Vietnamese forces. As a result, General Abrams reported to me on Monday that progress in this training program has been excellent, and that apart from what will develop from the negotiations, the time is approaching when South Vietnamese forces will be able to take over some of the fighting fronts now being manned by Americans.

Our deepest concern has been the development of a coherent peace policy, so that our various moves would reinforce each other. As a

result, we have been able to move the Paris talks toward the substantive issues essential to an agreement.

In weighing alternative courses, we have had to recognize that the situation as it exists today is far different from what it was 2 years ago, or 4 years ago, or 10 years ago.

One difference is that we no longer have the choice of not intervening. We have crossed that bridge. There are now more than half a million American troops in Vietnam and 35,000 Americans have lost their lives there.

We can have honest debate about whether we should have entered the war.

We can have honest debate about the past conduct of the war. But whether we should have entered on this course, but what is required of us today.

Against that background, let me discuss first what we have rejected, and second, what we are prepared to accept.

Essential Principles

We have ruled out attempting to impose a purely military solution on the battlefield.

We have also ruled out either a one-sided withdrawal from Vietnam, or the acceptance in Paris of terms that would amount to a disguised defeat.

When we assumed the burden of helping defend South Vietnam, millions of South Vietnamese men, women and children placed their trust in us. To abandon them now would risk a massacre that would shock and dismay everyone in the world who values human life.

Abandoning the South Vietnamese people, however, would jeopardize more than lives in South Vietnam. It would threaten our longer term hopes for peace in the world. A great nation cannot renege on its pledges. A great nation must be worthy of trust.

When it comes to maintaining peace, "prestige" is not an empty word. I am not speaking of false pride or bravado—they should have no place in our policies. I speak rather of the respect that one nation has for another's integrity in defending its principles and meeting its obligations.

If we simply abandoned our effort in Vietnam, the cause of peace might not survive the damage that would be done to other nations' confidence in our reliability.

Another reason stems from debates within the Communist world between those who argue for a policy of confrontation with the United States and those who argue against it. If Hanoi were to succeed in taking over South Vietnam by force—even after the power of the United States had been engaged—it would greatly strengthen those leaders who scorn negotiation, who advocate aggression, who minimize the risks of confrontation. It would bring peace now, but it would enormously increase the danger of a bigger war later.

If we are to move successfully from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation, then we have to demonstrate—at the point at which confrontation is being tested—that confrontation with the United States is costly and unrewarding.

92-891 O - 75 - 23

Almost without exception, the leaders of non-Communist Asia have told me that they would consider a one-sided American withdrawal from Vietnam to be a threat to the security of their own nations.

In determining what choices would be acceptable, we have to understand our essential objective: We seek the opportunity for the South Vietnamese people to determine their own political future without outside interference.

Let me put it plainly: What the United States wants for South Vietnam is not the important thing. What North Vietnam wants for South Vietnam is not the important thing. What is important is what the people of South Vietnam want for themselves.

The United States has suffered over one million casualties in four wars in this century. Whatever faults we may have as a nation, we have asked nothing for ourselves in return for these sacrifices. We have been generous toward those whom we have fought, helping former foes as well as friends in the task of reconstruction. We are proud of this record, and we bring the same attitude to our search for a settlement in Vietnam.

In this spirit, let me be explicit about several points:

—We seek no bases in Vietnam.

—We insist on no military ties.

—We are willing to agree to neutrality if that is what the South Vietnamese people freely choose.

—We believe there should be an opportunity for full participation in the political life of South Vietnam by all political elements that are prepared to do so without the use of force or intimidation.

—We are prepared to accept any government in South Vietnam that results from the free choice of the South Vietnamese people themselves.

—We have no intention of imposing any form of government upon the people of South Vietnam, nor will we be a party to such coercion.

—We have no objection to reunification, if that turns out to be what the people of South Vietnam and the people of North Vietnam want; we ask only that the decision reflect the free choice of the people concerned.

At this point, I would like to add a personal word based on my visits to South Vietnam over the past 5 years. This is the most difficult war in America's history, fought against a ruthless enemy. I am proud of our men who have carried the terrible burden of this war with dignity and courage, despite the division and opposition to the war in the United States. History will record that never have America's fighting men fought more bravely for more unselfish goals than our men in Vietnam. It is our responsibility to see that they will not have fought in vain.

In pursuing our limited objective, we insist on no rigid diplomatic formula. Peace could be achieved by a formal negotiated settlement. Peace could be achieved by an informal understanding, provided that the understanding is clear, and that there were adequate assurances that it would be observed. Peace on paper is not as important as peace in fact.

The Negotiations

This brings us, then, to the matter of negotiations.

We must recognize that peace in Vietnam cannot be achieved overnight. A war which has raged for so many years will require detailed negotiations and cannot be settled at a single stroke.

What kind of a settlement will permit the South Vietnamese people to determine freely their own political future? Such a settlement will require the withdrawal of all non-South Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam and procedures for political choice that give each significant group in South Vietnam a real opportunity to participate in the political life of the nation.

To implement these principles, I reaffirm now our willingness to withdraw our forces on a specified timetable. We ask only that North Vietnam withdraw its forces from South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos into North Vietnam, also in accordance with a timetable.

We include Cambodia and Laos to ensure that these countries would not be used as bases for a renewed war. The Cambodian border is only 35 miles from Saigon; the Laotian border is only 25 miles from Hue.

Our offer provides for a simultaneous start on withdrawal by both sides; agreement on a mutually acceptable timetable; and for the withdrawal to be accomplished quickly.

If North Vietnam wants to insist that it has no forces in South Vietnam, we will no longer debate the point—provided that its forces cease to be there, and that we have reliable assurances that they will not return.

The North Vietnamese delegates have been saying in Paris that political issues should be discussed along with military issues, and that there must be a political settlement in the South. We do not dispute this, but the military withdrawal involves outside forces, and can therefore be properly negotiated by North Vietnam and the United States, with the concurrence of its allies. The political settlement is an internal matter, which ought to be decided among the South Vietnamese themselves and not imposed by outside powers. However, if our presence at these political negotiations would be helpful, and if the South Vietnamese concerned agreed, we would be willing to participate, along with the representatives of Hanoi if that were also desired.

Recent statements by President Thieu have gone far toward opening the way to a political settlement. He has publicly declared his government's willingness to discuss a political solution with the National Liberation Front and has offered free elections. His was a dramatic step forward, a reasonable offer that could lead to a settlement. The South Vietnamese Government has offered to talk without preconditions. I believe that the other side should also be willing to talk without preconditions.

The South Vietnamese Government recognizes, as we do, that a settlement must permit all persons and groups that are prepared to renounce the use of force to participate freely in the political life of South Vietnam. To be effective, such a settlement would require two things: First, a process that would allow the South Vietnamese

people to express their choice; and second, a guarantee that this process would be a fair one.

We do not insist on a particular form of guarantee. The important thing is that the guarantees should have the confidence of the South Vietnamese people, and that they should be broad enough and strong enough to protect the interests of all major South Vietnamese groups.

This, then, is the outline of the settlement that we seek to negotiate in Paris. Its basic terms are very simple: Mutual withdrawal of non-South Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam, and free choice for the people of South Vietnam. I believe that the long-term interests of peace require that we insist on no less, and that the realities of the situation require that we seek no more.

Programs and Alternatives

To make very concrete what I have said, I propose the following measures, which seem to me consistent with the principles of all parties. These proposals are made on the basis of full consultation with President Thieu.

—As soon as agreement can be reached, all non-South Vietnamese forces would begin withdrawals from South Vietnam.

—Over a period of 12 months, by agreed-upon stages, the major portions of all U.S., Allied and other non-South Vietnamese forces would be withdrawn. At the end of this 12-month period, the remaining U.S., Allied and other non-South Vietnamese forces would move into designated base areas and would not engage in combat operations.

—The remaining U.S. and Allied forces would move to complete their withdrawals as the remaining North Vietnam forces were withdrawn and returned to North Vietnam.

—An international supervisory body, acceptable to both sides, would be created for the purpose of verifying withdrawals, and for any other purposes agreed upon between the two sides.

—This international body would begin operating in accordance with an agreed timetable, and would participate in arranging supervised ceasefires.

—As soon as possible after the international body was functioning, elections would be held under agreed procedures and under the supervision of the international body.

—Arrangements would be made for the earliest possible release of prisoners of war on both sides.

—All parties would agree to observe the Geneva Accords of 1954 regarding Vietnam and Cambodia, and the Laos Accords of 1962.

I believe this proposal for peace is realistic, and takes account of the legitimate interests of all concerned. It is consistent with President Thieu's six points. It can accommodate the various programs put forth by the other side. We and the Government of South Vietnam are prepared to discuss its details with the other side. Secretary Rogers is now in Saigon and will be discussing with President

Thieu how, together, we may put forward these proposed measures most usefully in Paris. He will, as well, be consulting with our other Asian allies on these measures while on his Asian trip. However, I would stress that these proposals are not offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We are quite willing to consider other approaches consistent with our principles.

We are willing to talk about anybody's program—Hanoi's four points, the NLF's 10 points—provided it can be made consistent with the few basic principles I have set forth here.

Despite our disagreement with several of its points, we welcome the fact that the NLF has put forward its first comprehensive program. We are continuing to study it carefully. However, we cannot ignore the fact that immediately after the offer, the scale of enemy attacks stepped up and American casualties increased.

Let me make one point very clear. If the enemy wants peace with the United States, that is not the way to get it.

I have set forth a peace program tonight which is generous in its terms. I have indicated our willingness to consider other proposals. No greater mistake could be made than to confuse flexibility with weakness or being reasonable with lack of resolution. I must make clear, in all candor, that if the needless suffering continues, this will affect other decisions. Nobody has anything to gain by delay.

Reports from Hanoi indicate that the enemy has given up hope for a military victory in South Vietnam but is counting on a collapse of American will in the United States. They could make no greater error in judgment.

Let me be quite blunt. Our fighting men are not going to be worn down; our negotiators are not going to be talked down; our allies are not going to be let down.

I have seen the ugly face of war in Vietnam. I have visited the wounded in field hospitals—American boys, South Vietnamese boys, North Vietnamese boys. They were different in many ways—the color of their skins, their religions, their race. Some were enemies, some were friends.

But the differences were small compared with how they were alike. They were brave men and they were so young. Their lives—their dreams for the future had been shattered by a war over which they had no control.

With all of the moral authority of the office which I hold, I say that America could have no greater and prouder role than to help to end this war in a way which will bring nearer that day in which we can have a world order in which young men can grow up in peace and friendship.

I do not criticize those that disagree with me on the conduct of our peace negotiations. I do not ask unlimited patience from a people whose hopes for peace have too often been raised and cruelly dashed over the past 4 years.

I have tried to present the facts about Vietnam with complete honesty and I shall continue to do so in my reports to the American people.

Tonight, all I ask is that you consider these facts and, whatever our differences, that you support a program which can lead to a

peace we can live with and a peace we can be proud of. Nothing could have a greater effect in convincing the enemy that he should negotiate in good faith than to see the American people united behind a generous and reasonable peace offer.

In my campaign for the Presidency, I pledged to end this war in a way that would increase our chances to win true and lasting peace in Vietnam, in the Pacific and in the world. I am determined to keep that pledge. If I fail to do so, I expect the American people to hold me accountable for that failure.

But while I will never raise false expectations, my deepest hope, as I speak to you tonight, is that we shall be able to look back on this day as that critical turning point when American initiative moved us off dead center and forward to the time when this war would be brought to an end and we could devote the unlimited energies and dedication of the American people to the challenges of peace.

MIDWAY ISLAND MEETING, JUNE 8, 1969:[1] Remarks of President Nixon and President Thieu Announcing Decision To Replace 25,000 United States Troops With Vietnamese Forces

PRESIDENT NIXON. Mr. President, I want to take this opportunity officially to welcome you to this meeting at Midway and to tell you how much I have appreciated the opportunity to talk with you again.

We met on two occasions in your country. This is the first time we have had the chance to talk in our present capacities as heads of our Governments and Chiefs of State.

Our meeting this morning has taken approximately 2 hours. We will continue our private discussion through the noon hour, before meeting the larger group, including the Secretary of State, and their opposite numbers, for approximately an hour and a half, later in the afternoon.

The communique at the end of the day, which will be issued at approximately 4, will cover the wide range of subjects that the President and I have discussed. Among those this morning were these: the progress of the talks in Paris; the situation in Vietnam in a number of areas; the pacification program, where I received a very encouraging report from the President; plans for what seems to me a very important land reform program, which will be implemented in South Vietnam by President Thieu and his Government; and the progress insofar as the conduct of the war is concerned.

In addition to these subjects, all of which will be covered in the communique which will be given to you later this afternoon, the President and I had a substantial discussion with regard to the present situation insofar as the training of South Vietnamese Armed Forces is concerned.

As a result of that discussion, we reached a decision which I should like to report to you now, and President Thieu will also express his views with regard to this decision.

---

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, June 16, 1969, pp. 821–826.

President Thieu informed me that the progress of the training program and the equipping program for South Vietnamese forces had been so successful that he could now recommend that the United States begin to replace U.S. combat forces with Vietnamese forces. This same assessment was made by General Abrams when he reported to me last night and this morning.

As a consequence of the recommendation by the President and the assessment of our own commander in the field, I have decided to order the immediate redeployment from Vietnam of a division, equivalent of approximately 25,000 men.

This troop replacement will begin within the next 30 days and will be completed by the end of August. During the month of August and at regular intervals thereafter, we shall review the situation, having in mind the three criteria that I have previously mentioned with regard to troop replacement:

First, the progress insofar as the training and equipping of South Vietnamese forces; second, progress in the Paris peace talks; and third, the level of enemy activity.

I will announce plans for further replacements as decisions are made. As replacement of U.S. forces begins, I want to emphasize two fundamental principles: No actions will be taken which threaten the safety of our troops and the troops of our allies; and second, no action will be taken which endangers the attainment of our objective, the right of self-determination for the people of South Vietnam.

It is significant to note that it was just 27 years ago that the Battle of Midway, which history records as one of the major turning points in World War II, came to a conclusion. I believe that the decision made at Midway today, and which we are announcing at this time, marks a significant step forward in achieving our goal of protecting the right of self-determination for the people of South Vietnam, and in bringing lasting peace to the Pacific.

President Thieu, I know that the members of the press would like to hear your views on our discussions, as well.

PRESIDENT THIEU. Thank you, Mr. President.

Once again I would like to thank you most sincerely for your very kind words and your cordial welcome. It is a great pleasure for me to meet with President Nixon on this island in the middle of the Pacific.

It's our honest hope that the Pacific will become a vast community of free nations living in peace, prosperity, and brotherhood.

Ladies and gentlemen, as everyone knows, this ocean was named after peace because the first navigators were fortunate enough to sail over peaceful waves. But other navigators subsequently found out that this name can be at times only a pious hope. They knew they had to rely on their strength, determination, and perseverance when they ran into stormy weather.

But after the tempest and typhoon, the sun always rises over the immense stretch of the blue waters.

We are, therefore, always confident of the bright and beautiful tomorrow.

So, Mr. President, once again I look forward very much to my exchange of views with you on our common efforts to establish a long-lasting peace and freedom in Vietnam and in Southeast Asia.

Now, I come to a more substantial matter, that is, what President Nixon just said to you.

As you know, ladies and gentlemen, as I have announced many times in the past 12 months, it has been the constant purpose of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to shoulder an increasing share in the struggle to defend freedom in Vietnam and to alleviate the burden nobly assumed by the United States in participating with us in this struggle. We have made continued efforts in that direction.

And in the past months the strengthening of the Vietnamese Armed Forces through general mobilization, and the rapid progress on the pacification and the rural development, have made it possible for me to inform President Nixon that the Armed Forces of Vietnam are now able to start the process of the replacement of the American forces.

And the equivalent of one U.S. combat division will be replaced by Vietnamese troops. That first replacement will start in July and will be completed the end of August. Further replacements of American troops will be considered at regular intervals in the light of the three criteria that President Nixon has decided; that means the progress in training and equipment of Vietnamese Armed Forces; secondly, the level of Communist hostility; and thirdly, the progress which can be made in Paris talks.

Ladies and gentlemen, on this occasion I would like, once again, in the name of the Vietnamese people, to express our deep gratitude for the sacrifice generously accepted by the American people in joining us in the defense of freedom in Vietnam.

Thank you.

Joint Statement by President Nixon and President Thieu, June 8, 1969

President Nguyen Van Thieu of the Republic of Vietnam and President Nixon of the United States met on Midway Island on June 8, 1969. The meeting was at the invitation of President Nixon.

The principal purpose of the meeting was to permit the two Presidents to review a broad range of matters of mutual interest. These included developments in Vietnam—political, economic, and military—the Paris talks, and the general situation in Southeast Asia. Their day-long discussions were chiefly private though they drew on the assistance and counsel of senior members of their respective governments. Though it marked their first meeting as Chiefs of State, the occasion offered President Thieu and President Nixon the opportunity to renew a friendship dating from 1965.

The two Presidents examined in detail the military situation in Vietnam and received a briefing from Vietnamese and American military commanders. They agreed that the failure of the other side to achieve its objectives should convince it of its inability to gain a victory by military means. They expressed the hope that the other side will realize the futility and dangers of its efforts and that it will accept a solution based on the principle of self-determination for the people of South Vietnam. They agreed that application of

the principle of self-determination requires that the people be able to choose without interference or terror. They rejected communist attempts to pre-determine the outcome of future elections before they are held.

The two Presidents confirmed their conviction that the form of government under which the people of South Vietnam will live should be decided by the people themselves. They reiterated their common resolve to reject any attempt to impose upon the Republic of Vietnam any system or program or any particular form of government, such as coalition, without regard to the will of the people of South Vietnam. They declared for their part they will respect any decision by the people of South Vietnam that is arrived at through free elections.

The two Presidents agreed that it would be appropriate to offer guarantees and safeguards for free elections. Provisions for international supervision could be written into the political settlement.

The two Presidents reviewed with particular attention the steps being taken to modernize and improve the Vietnamese armed forces. President Thieu referred to the principle of replacement of American by Vietnamese troops which he had first enunciated in his address to the nation of December 31, 1968, and he expressed pleasure in informing President Nixon that the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam were now reaching the point where they can assume an increasingly large share of the burden of combat.

President Nixon welcomed this development. He and President Thieu thereafter made an announcement regarding the replacement program. Both Presidents agreed that the replacement program should be carried out in consonance with the security situation prevailing at the moment.

President Thieu explained his plans for further strengthening the local forces and asked for additional assistance for that program. President Nixon said he would give this request sympathetic consideration.

The two Presidents then discussed the negotiations taking place in Paris. They reviewed carefully the positions each had recently enunciated—President Thieu on March 25, when he made the offer to talk directly with the "National Liberation Front," the six points he presented on April 7, and President Nixon's May 14 speech. The two Presidents are convinced that the proposals they have put forward represent a reasonable basis for peace. They took note of the 10-point proposal tabled by the other side in Paris on May 8, and observed that despite the fact that it contained certain unacceptable provisions, there were certain points which appear not too far from the positions taken by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States.

The two Presidents expressed their intention to seek a just settlement to the conflict in the spirit of patience and good will. President Thieu reiterated his Government's willingness to talk directly to the NLF about moves relating to a peaceful settlement.

The two Presidents reviewed and reaffirmed the positions taken in concert by the allies at the recent seven-nations conference of ministers in Bangkok. They reiterated in particular the allied position concerning mutual withdrawals of non-South Vietnamese forces,

agreeing that withdrawals could commence simultaneously and proceed expeditiously on the basis of a mutually acceptable timetable; that all externally introduced forces would have to be withdrawn not only from South Vietnam but also from Laos and Cambodia; and that the further introduction of forces into these countries must be prohibited. They agreed that the essential element of any arrangement on withdrawal of non-South Vietnamese forces is that there be adequate assurances and guarantees of compliance with the terms of the arrangement.

President Thieu informed President Nixon that his Government was devoted to the principle of social and political justice for the people of South Vietnam. The policy of national reconciliation had been adopted with this in mind. His offer to negotiate directly with the "National Liberation Front"—without conditions—had been inspired by this principle. If the other side is genuinely interested in finding peace, it should be possible to create an atmosphere in South Vietnam in which all of the people of South Vietnam can participate in the life of a free, viable, and prosperous state.

The two Presidents discussed the progress that has been made in economic and political development in Vietnam despite the present conflict, including the installation of the supreme court and the inspectorate provided for by the Constitution, the wide-spread holding of village and hamlet elections, and the extension of security in rural areas. President Thieu outlined his Government's plans for additional village and hamlet elections, and he laid particular stress on his pursuit of a vigorous land redistribution program that would give the land to those who work it. President Nixon expressed gratification at this progress, expressed special interest in the new concepts of land distribution developed by President Thieu and offered American cooperation to help achieve it.

Finally, the two Presidents reviewed the plans now being formulated by the Republic of Vietnam for the post-war development of the country. They expressed gratification that, despite the continuation of the conflict, plans were going forward. Given the substantial natural and human resources available, the prospects are excellent for conversion to a peace-time economy, job opportunities, increased domestic production in agriculture and industry, as well as exports. President Nixon pledged his country's assistance to this end. Economic self-sufficiency could be achieved in a decade of peace. The two Presidents looked forward, after the termination of hostilities, to an era of peace and the economic and national development of Southeast Asia.

President Thieu asked President Nixon to convey to the American people the deep gratitude of the people of South Vietnam for the sacrifices they have made and the assistance they have given the Republic of Vietnam in its struggle to maintain its freedom. President Nixon assured President Thieu of the determination of the American people to assist their South Vietnamese allies to realize the basic objectives of the two nations. He acknowledged the trust placed in the American people by the people of the Republic of Vietnam and promised that this trust will be honored.

The two Presidents agreed to meet again and review developments in the near future.

Remarks of President Nixon and President Thieu at the Conclusion of Their Meeting, June 8, 1969

PRESIDENT NIXON. Mr. President, as we complete our talks, I wish to express my appreciation to you for your frankness and candor in discussing the problems that we mutually face in Vietnam, and I know that you share with me the sentiments that were expressed in our communique which has already been distributed to members of the press.

I believe that that communique indicates the progress that has been made and the progress we can expect in the future toward a resolution of this struggle which has torn apart the people of North Vietnam, which has cost your people so much in men, in lives, and has cost our people as well.

I would like to say, finally, this one personal word. You have a long journey. You will be back in Saigon tonight because of the time change. You will be speaking to the people of South Vietnam when you arrive.

Would you extend to the people of South Vietnam from the people of the United States our good wishes. We know how they have suffered. We share with them the tragedy of war. We want for them what we have for ourselves, the blessings of peace within our own country and within your own country.

We know—and I speak personally in this respect—that the people of your country are a peaceful people, a hard-working people, that if only you have the opportunity, Vietnam can be one of the most powerful, constructive forces for peace and progress and economic development in all of Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

This is what I feel from having been there many times before. This is what your people are fighting for. It is the goal which we all seek.

We wish you well, personally; more than that, the people of the United States wish your people well. We look forward to the day when they can live in peace together.

PRESIDENT THIEU. Mr. President, I thank you very much for your very comfortable words. I can say that our first meeting here in Midway is very useful. It is not like some speculation before I arrived here that there would be some difference between President Nixon and President Thieu and I had to come here to dissipate or to discuss again those differences. It is not true.

I come here for more understanding and closer cooperation, for more common position between President Nixon and I; not for difference, because we have had no difference before.

You may mention about the eight-point program of President Nixon for peace. I ask you to remember that immediately after President Nixon had his speech, I said it was consistent with the position of Vietnam and very consistent with my six points.

So, we have close consultation before and we have a very close understanding on that. So I come here to discuss with President Nixon, to have better cooperation, and to have a better common position.

I think in the future, when the circumstance demands and when we have an opportunity, we may agree together to meet again, so I think this is the best way to have closer cooperation between two governments and two people.

Now, for you ladies and gentlemen of the press, I think that this morning President Nixon and I, we have announced—and what I consider good news for the American people—that the Vietnamese forces replace the U.S. combat forces to an equivalent of one combat division.

I would like to emphasize again, it is a constant duty of Vietnamese people to take over more responsibility and to alleviate the burden of U.S. people to support us to defend the freedom in Vietnam.

We never forget that the blood and human life are precious to anyone, to any people, at any time.

So I think, once again, we are very grateful and the whole Vietnamese people are very grateful for the sacrifice that the United States people have accepted and continue to accept to join us in defense of freedom and defend the common cause of the free world.

But, once again, I say that we will do our best—our best—from now on to alleviate the burden of the American people. We have to do our best to deserve the noble sacrifice that the American people have accepted for Vietnamese people.

Once again—I hope you understand well my English—I am ready to leave for Saigon and I sincerely thank President Nixon for the useful talks, for the heartfelt welcome, the hospitality of the people in Midway Island. It is the first time I know this island and it is very interesting.

I think you may join us to share the success of this meeting. Thank you.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT NIXON ON PRESIDENT THIEU'S SPEECH OF JULY 11, 1969[1]

President Thieu has put forward a comprehensive, statesmanlike, and eminently fair proposal for a political settlement in South Vietnam. It deserves the support of all who seek peace in that tortured land.

President Thieu's proposal would establish a set of procedures and guarantees to ensure that the political future of South Vietnam would reflect, as accurately and as fairly as possible, the will of the people of South Vietnam—including those whose allegiance is to the other side as well as those whose allegiance is to his own government.

In my television address of May 14, I said: "What the United States wants for South Vietnam is not the important thing. What North Vietnam wants for South Vietnam is not the important thing. What is important is what the people of South Vietnam want for South Vietnam."

---

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, July 14, 1969, pp. 973–974.

I believe President Thieu's proposal is in this spirit, and that it would genuinely give the people of South Vietnam—all of them—the opportunity to determine their own fate for themselves. If the other side is prepared for serious negotiations, and willing to abide by the free choice of the South Vietnamese people, this should open the way at last for a rapid settlement of the conflict.

President Thieu has proposed elections in which all political parties and groups can participate—specifically including the National Liberation Front. He has offered to set up special guarantees to ensure fairness:

—Establishment of an election commission, on which the NLF and all other parties would be represented.

—Empowering this commission to assure all candidates equal opportunity to campaign, and all parties equal opportunity to participate in watching the polls and in supervising the counting of ballots.

—Establishment of an international body to supervise the elections.

Beyond this, President Thieu has indicated his willingness to discuss with the other side the timetable and details of these elections. He has declared that his government will abide by the results of such elections, and has asked that the other side to the same. He also has renewed his offer of private talks with the NLF without preconditions.

President Thieu's offer marks the culmination of a long series of steps by the South Vietnamese and American Governments, all of which together demonstrate clearly the sincere desire of our two governments to negotiate an honorable and rapid settlement of the war.

Let us look at the record:

Prior to January 20, the United States had halted the bombing of North Vietnam and agreed to sit down at the conference table with the NLF, as well as with the governments of Hanoi and Saigon. We have remained at that table and refrained from a resumption of the bombing despite Hanoi's shelling of South Vietnam's major cities, its violation of the Demilitarized Zone, and its refusal to deal with the Saigon Government.

On March 25, President Thieu offered to meet with the NLF for private talks without preconditions on a political settlement. This was refused.

On May 14, with the full support of President Thieu, I put forward an eight-point plan for peace. In this plan, I renounced reliance on a military solution. I offered a withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces within 12 months. I suggested placing the process of mutual withdrawal under international guarantees. I said that we sought no military bases, and no military ties, but only to secure the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future without outside interference.

On June 8, at Midway, with the agreement of President Thieu, I announced the withdrawal of 25,000 American troops. The fact that the troops being withdrawn are actual combat forces, not logistical units, should underscore the fact that our desire is to reduce violence

and achieve a negotiated peace. The program of replacing U.S. forces with South Vietnamese will be reviewed again in August.

At that same Midway meeting, President Thieu and I declared our readiness to accept *any* political outcome which is arrived at through free elections.

President Thieu has now offered a concrete program by which free elections can be held and the will of the South Vietnamese people can be determined. He has challenged the other side to test its claims to popular support at the polls. He has offered means by which the other side can participate in developing election procedures and by which the elections themselves can take place under international supervision.

If the other side genuinely wants peace, it now has a comprehensive set of offers which permit a fair and reasonable settlement. If it approaches us in this spirit, it will find us reasonable. Hanoi has nothing to gain by waiting.

I also want to repeat to the American people what I said in my speech of May 14: "Nothing could have a greater effect in convincing the enemy that he should negotiate in good faith than to see the American people united behind a generous and reasonable peace offer."

We and the South Vietnamese Government have made such an offer.

I call upon the leaders of the other side to respond in a spirit of peace, and let the political issues be resolved by the political process.

EXCERPTS FROM UNOFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S MEETING WITH REPORTERS AT GUAM, JULY 25, 1969 [1]

(NOTE.—Excerpts from an unofficial account of President Nixon's informal news conference today during his stopover on Guam. Mr. Nixon spoke for publication but stipulated that he not be quoted directly.)

MANILA, July 25.—The President said he had seen some speculation about changes in his itinerary and added that he had no present plans to go to Vietnam. But, he said, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker will be coming to Bangkok along with the ambassadors from the other Asian countries that he will not be visiting, and he intends to have a conversation with him there, which will be apart from the conversation he will have with the other ambassadors.

There is also a possibility that Gen. Creighton W. Abrams will be able to go with the Ambassador Bunker to Bangkok for that meeting, Mr. Nixon said.

Now, insofar as this phase of the trip was concerned, and he said he would speak first to the Asian phase and then later and briefly to the Rumanian phase, he though that the backgrounders and the general statements that have been made from the State Department had

[1] Congressional Record, July 28, 1969, pp. S. 8637–8640.

covered it pretty well. He thought what would be of greatest interest before questions is to give the perspective that he has with regard to Asia and America's role in Asia.

Visit of 1953 Noted

He said his background here goes back a few years. It was in 1953 that he first visited this area. That trip was very, very extensive, with the usual four days in each country, a so-called state visit in each country. It provided an opportunity to meet the leaders, but more than that to know the countries in a very effective way.

In the 16 years that have passed, however, since that time, the changes have been very dramatic. He has returned to Asia on a number of occasions since then, and particularly to the countries that he will be visiting on this trip. Consequently, he has kept up with later developments and also, with the exception of Prent Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan in Pakistan, he knows each of the Asian leaders that he will be meeting and will be able to speak to them from that background.

Insofar as the general purpose of a trip like this is concerned, the President said he can understand some of the speculation to the effect that "why does a President of the United States think he learns anything by spending one day each in an Asian country?" Or, for that matter, as he did earlier, in a European country.

The answer is, and he might indicate what will be his general policy for the balance of his service in the White House, that he thinks a one-day trip is just as valuable as four days. In other words, if you take a one-day trip, and concentrate, as he does, on very little protocol, and a great deal of face-to-face conversation, an individual, in meeting the leader of the other country, will gain as much as if he stretched it out over a period of four days. He has been through both experience and, therefore, is somewhat knowledgeable in that respect, Mr. Nixon said.

Short Period of Time

He feels, too, that when one considers the time that is available to a President in these periods, it is essential in order to cover all the ground that needs to be covered to limit, first, the amount of travel and the amount of time that is taken for each one of the stops. He mentioned that only as some of the reasoning that has gone into his decision with regard to covering a great deal of ground in a very short period of time: In this case, going around the world and, in the space of about eight days, after the moon shot, covering a number of countries.

Now, insofar as the individuals are concerned, having met all of these leaders previously, Mr. Nixon supposed the question could be raised, and with good reason, that once you know a leader, the contact with ambassadors would be sufficient. However, he has found in previous travels in Asia and in Europe as well, that as the situations change, it is vitally important to have a renewed contact with the leader in each of the countries involved, a renewed contact because his attitudes may change and in that way when the President reads,

as he reads day after day, the cables that come in from all over the world, he can have a much better understanding of what those cables mean—the nuances—if he has more recently had a direct contact, face-to-face with the individual involved, the individual leader involved.

That is one of the reasons why he is a great believer in visits of this sort, where they are consistent with and can be taken at a time that will fit in with other very demanding parts of his schedule.

Now, a word about what is a very consuming interest in Asia, the President continued, a consuming interest because it is one he has had for a number of years, and one that now, as he looks at the perspective of history, is even more imperative.

Role in Asia

The United States is going to be facing, he hoped before too long—no one can say how long, but before too long—a major decision. What will be its role in Asia and in the Pacific after the end of the war in Vietnam? We will be facing that decision, but also the Asian nations will be wondering about what that decision is, Mr. Nixon said.

When he talked to Prime Minister John G. Gorton, for example, he indicated that in the conversations he had with a number of Asian leaders, they all wondered whether the United States, because of its frustration over the war in Vietnam, because of its earlier frustration over the war in Korea—whether the United States would continue to play a significant role in Asia or whether the United States, like the French before, and then the British, and, of course, the Dutch—whether it would withdraw from the Pacific and play a minor role.

This is a decision that will have to be made, of course, as the war comes to an end. But the time to develop the thinking that will go into that decision is now. Mr. Nixon said he thinks that one of the weaknesses in American foreign policy is that too often we react rather precipitously to events as they occur. We fail to have the perspective and the long range view that is essential for a policy that will be viable.

As he sees it, even though the war in Vietnam has been, as we all know, a terribly frustrating one, and, as a result of that frustration, even though there would be a tendency for many Americans to say, "After we are through with that, let's not become involved in Asia," he is convinced that the way to avoid becoming involved in another war in Asia is for the United States to continue to play a significant role, the President said.

United States A Pacific Power

He said that whether we like it or not, geography makes us a Pacific power and when we consider, for example, that Indonesia and its closest point is only 14 miles from the Philippines, when we consider that Guam, where he was presently standing, of course, is in the heart of Asia, when we consider the interests of the whole Pacific as they relate to Alaska and Hawaii, we can all realize this.

Also, as we look over the historical perspective, while World War II began in Europe, for the United States it began in the Pacific. It came from Asia. The Korean War came from Asia. The Vietnamese war came from Asia.

So, as we consider our past history, Mr. Nixon said, the United States involvement in war so often has been tied to Pacific policy or lack of Pacific policy, as the case might be.

As we look at Asia today, the President observed, we see that the major world power that adopts a very aggressive attitude and a belligerent attitude in its foreign policy, Communist China, of course, is in Asia, and we find that the two minor world powers—minor, although they do have significant strength as we have learned—that most greatly threaten the peace of the world, that adopt the most belligerent foreign policy, are in Asia—North Korea and, of course, North Vietnam.

When we consider those factors, we realize that if we are thinking down the road, down the long road—not just four years or five years, but 10, 15 or 20—that if we are going to have peace in the world, that potentially the greatest threat to that peace will be in the Pacific, the President said.

Other Threats to Peace

He did not mean to suggest that the Mideast is not a potential threat to the peace of the world and that there are not problems in Latin America that concern us, or in Africa and, of course, over it all, we see the great potential conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, the East-West conflict between the two superpowers.

But as far as those other areas are concerned, he said, the possibility of finding some kind of solution is potentially greater than it was in the Asian area.

Pursuing that line of reasoning a bit further, he said he would like to put it in a more positive sense: When he looked at the problems in Asia, he said the threat to peace presented by the growing power of Communist China, the belligerence of North Korea and North Vietnam, should not obscure the great promise that was here.

Mr. Nixon declared that the fastest rate of growth in the world is occurring in non-Communist Asia, Japan, in the last ten years, had tripled its G.N.P., South Korea had doubled its G.N.P., Taiwan had doubled its G.N.P. Thailand had doubled its G.N.P. The same was true of Singapore and of Malaysia.

The record in some of the other countries was not as impressive. But consider the Philippines, he said. The Philippines in 1953 was a major importer of rice. Today, as a result of miracle rice, it no longer had to import it. Some progress was being made in areas like that.

India and Pakistan Cited

The President mentioned India and Pakistan and the terribly difficult and traumatic experience they have had. Because of their conflict with each other, more than with the problems they have had from the outside that picture tends to be rather black.

But India's rate of growth as a result of two good crop years, and a reasonably good one this year, has been at 6 per cent, he said.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, Mr. Nixon said, they are emphasizing growth in manufacturing. They are growing at the rate of 10 per cent per year in manufacturing and from 1965 to 1970, their agricultural production will go up 21 per cent.

The poverty in these two countries, he said, strikes one with tremendous impact. But having seen what it was in 1953 and seeing what it was again in 1957, the amount of progress that has taken place, even in those countries where the rate has not been as high as others, was a very, very formidable thing to see, he asserted.

Asia's Threat and Hope

So, what he is trying to suggest is this the President said: Look at Asia. It poses in his view, over the long haul, looking down to the end of the century, the greatest threat to peace of the world, and, for that reason, the United States should continue to play a significant role.

It also poses, he said, the greatest hope for progress in the world because of the ability, the resources, the ability of the people, the resources physically that are available in this part of the world, and for these reasons, we need policies that will see that we play a part and a part that is appropriate to the condition that we will find.

One other point he made very briefly was that in terms of this situation we must recognize that there are two great new factors which you will see, incidentally, particularly, when you arrive in the Philippines—something you will see there that we didn't see in 1953, to show you how quickly things change—a very great growth of nationalism, nationalism even in the Philippines, vis-a-vis the United States, as well as other countries in the world. And, also, at the same time that national pride is becoming a major factor, regional pride is becoming a major factor.

The second major factor, he went on, is one that is going to have a major impact on the future of Asia, and it is something that we must take into account, Asians will say in every country that we visit that they do not want to be dictated from the outside. Asia for Asians. And that is what we want and that is the role we should play. We should assist it, but we should not dictate.

At this time, he said, the political and economic plans that they are gradually developing are very hopeful, we will give assistance to those plans. We, of course, will keep the treaty commitments we have.

Visit to Rumania

But as far as our role is concerned, he said we must avoid that kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one that we have in Vietnam.

This is going to be a difficult line to follow. It is one, however, that he thinks, with proper planning, we can develop, he went on.

He said he would just answer some of the speculation about Rumania by pointing out that this trip to Rumania is not directed

toward the Chinese or toward the Russians, but toward the Rumanians, Mr. Nixon said.

He said he did not believe that the President of the United States should be able to accept an invitation to visit a Western European country, but should automatically have to decline an invitation to visit an Eastern European country.

Mr. Nixon said that this was an era of negotiation rather than confrontation. It would be more difficult, of course, to develop the communication with Eastern European Communist countries than with Western European countries, but he though it was time that a beginning be made.

He said he would have discussions of bilateral issues with President Nicolae Ceausescu, the problems of Europe, East-West relations.

But this trip under no circumstances, he said, should be interpreted as an affront to the Soviet Union or as a move toward China.

The President said he hoped that if the trip worked out it would set the stage for more openings of this type with countries in Eastern Europe where it would be mutually beneficial to the United States and the other countries involved.

The President was asked, on the question of United States military relationships in Asia, a hypothetical question: If a leader of one of the countries with which we have had close military relationships, either through SEATO or in Vietnam, should say, "Well, you are pulling out of Vietnam with your troops. We can read the newspapers. How can we know you will remain to play a significant role as you say you wish to do in the security arrangements in Europe? What kind of approach would he take to that question?

The President replied that he had indicated that the answer to that question was not an easy one—not easy because we would be greatly tempted when that question is put to us to indicate that if any nation desires the assistance of the United States militarily in order to meet an internal or external threat we will provide it.

On Commitments, Two Points

However, he said he believed that the time had come when the United States, in its relations with all of its Asian friends, should be quite emphatic on two points: one, that we would keep our treaty commitments; our treaty commitments, for example, with Thailand under SEATO. And, two, that as far as the problems of international security are concerned, as far as the problems of military defense, except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons, that the United States was going to encourage and had a right to expect that this problem would be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.

He said he believed, from his preliminary conversations with several Asian leaders over the last few months, that they were going to be willing to undertake this responsibility. He said it would not be easy. But if the United States just continued down the road of responding to requests for assistance, of assuming the primary responsibility for defending these countries when they have international problems or external problems, they were never going to take care of themselves.

He added that, when he talked about collective security for Asia, he realized that at this time it looks like a weak reed. It actually was. But looking down the road—he said he was speaking now of five years from now, 10 years from now—he thought collective security, insofar as it deals with internal threats to any one of the countries, or insofar as it deals with a threat other than that posed by a nuclear power, was an objective that free Asian nations could see and which the United States should support.

The President was asked whether, when speaking of internal threats, he included threats internally assisted by a country from the outside, such as we have in Vietnam?

Internal Threat in Thailand

The President replied, that generally speaking, it was the kind of internal threat that we do have in the Asian countries. For example, in Thailand the threat was one that was indigenous to a certain extent to the northeast and the north, but that would not be too serious if it were not getting the assistance that it was from the outside. The same was true in several of the other Asian countries, he said.

The President was reminded of his hope that his meeting in Rumania would open the way to other meetings involving Eastern Europe. Was it his hope that he would eventually be invited to Moscow to talk with the Russians, perhaps within the next six months or so?

The President replied that as far as any meeting with the Soviet Union was concerned, summit meeting, he had stated his position previously. He thought it would be well to restate it.

He did not believe that any summit meeting with the Soviet Union was useful unless a subject of major interest to both powers was to be discussed with some promise of finding a solution or at least making progress on that particular problem.

He said he believed, for example, as he looked over the history of summitry with the Soviet Union, that while, in all administrations, we had had the best of intentions, summitry had not been particularly helpful. He said this with regard to the spirit of Geneva, the spirit of Camp David, the spirit of Vienna and the spirit of Glassboro.

Meetings With Soviet Union

He felt that where the Soviet Union was concerned, for example today, there were three major areas where a summit meeting could be useful. If, for example, the time had come when we could make a breakthrough in the Mideast, and a summit meeting with the Soviet Union would play a significant part, he thought that could be considered.

The second area, Mr. Nixon said, is in the field of arms control. He said he had a long discussion with Mr. Smith just few days ago, just before leaving, the day before leaving. As far as arms controls are concerned, at this time, the place and the forum in which the discussion should take place is at the ambassador level. There may come a time when a summit meeting may be the device that will make the breakthrough that we need to make in arms control.

Then at the top of the list he placed the problem of Vietnam where, if a summit meeting would serve a useful purpose insofar as Vietnam is concerned, naturally we would welcome that opportunity. That poses, however, Mr. Nixon said, a very significant problem because, whether the Soviet Union can be of assistance in Vietnam is somewhat dependent on its evaluation of whether such assistance should be so publicy provided as a summit, of course, would indicate.

The President was asked, as a background to his thinking on Vietnam, even though it is not to be a major subject of discussion, whether he could tell what sort of reports he had received from Gen. Earle G. Wheeler about the prospects for additional replacement of American troops, and on the question of whether the fighting had eased to the point where we can make some de-escalation move ourselves.

The President replied that he would rather not comment on that at this time. If, after his conversations with Ambassador Bunker and possibly with General Abrams, he feels that some comment would be appropriate, he will make it then. But he should correct one impression that he should not have left, and that is that Vietnam will not be a major topic for discussion. In each of the Asian countries he is going to raise with the Asian leaders the question of the extent to which they would be willing to participate in the international supervisory bodies for elections in South Vietnam and for the policing of ceasefires, provided we are able to get any kind of acceptance on the part of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong on his proposal of May 14.

He believes, for example, Mr. Nixon said, that the international supervisory bodies, which Mr. Thieu has also agreed to, should primarily be made up of and come from Asian nations and the Asian nations that he visits will all be interested in this subject. He wants to get their views on that.

Issue of Withdrawal

The President was asked whether he anticipates in that connection that during his talks with the Asian leaders he is going to have to spend any significant amount of time perhaps convincing them that his plan for withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam will pose no threat to their security.

The President replied that one of the reasons for this trip is to leave no doubt in the minds of the leaders of non-Communist Asia that the United States is committed to a policy in the Pacific—a policy not of intervention but one that certainly rules out withdrawal, and regardless of what happens in Vietnam that we intend to continue to play a role in Asia to the extent that Asian nations, bilaterally and collectively, desire us to play a role.

He said he thought that some reassurance was needed because Vietnam is on the minds of all the Asian leaders. He believes incidentally, that he will not have difficulty in providing that reassurance because, from the report that he did get from General Wheeler, he was told that the troop withdrawals have been accepted by the

Thieu government and by the military in South Vietnam with not only very good grace, but that they have responded very effectively in meeting their own requirements, in handling their own defense. He thinks that he can give some reassuring comments to those Asian leaders who might raise the question, Mr. Nixon said.

Declines To Speculate

The President was reminded that he mentioned that he felt that perhaps five years or ten years from now the Asian nations could collectively take care of their regional security problems. What is our policy to be in the meantime, he was asked, if a Vietnam type situation does occur?

The President replied that he would rather not speculate about one occurring. Each of these countries poses an entirely different question. He would simply say we are going to handle each country on a case-by-case basis.

But attempting to avoid that creeping involvement that eventually simply submerges you, he knows that we can learn from past experience and we must avoid that kind of involvement in the future.

The President said he could put it this way: he recalled in 1964 some advice that he got from Mohammad Ayub Khan, who was then the President of Pakistan. This was before the United States had any significant troop commitment in Vietnam. Mr. Nixon asked him what his view was as to what our role should be. He said: "Well, the role of the United States in Vietnam or the Philippines, or Thailand or any of these countries which have internal subversion, is to help them fight the war but not fight the war for them." That, of course, is a good general principle, one which we would hope would be our policy generally throughout the world, the President said.

The President was reminded that the last time he met with reporters he mentioned that it was his hope that we might be able to withdraw all our combat troops, ground combat troops, in South Vietnam by the end of next year. In the light of that, he was asked if he had any plans for withdrawing the troops that we now have, or some percentage of them, from Thailand, and could he tell what he is going to tell the Thais about that?

Will Tell Thais First

The President replied that he would tell the Thais first. But it is, of course, a proper question, he said.

He is reviewing not only our civilian personnel abroad, where he announced a cut a few weeks ago, but our military personnel abroad, including Thailand.

This is a matter, however, which will be discussed with the Thais, but it would not be appropriate to make any announcement as to what we were going to do until we have discussed it.

The President was asked whether in looking at the situation in post-Vietnam, and in countries other than Vietnam, it seemed to him that in terms of our military strength, the military men that we put into these other countries to help them, or military assistance or eco-

nomic assistance, that in Asia, generally, we would have more or less of this type of assistance and aid in the years down the road than we have now.

The President replied less, if he got the question correctly, would there be more or less of military type of assistance?

He was asked about both in military and nonmilitary, since there are really two parts to this assistance problem, the economic part and the military part. Did he see us having a greater expenditure and a greater involvement in those respects or a lessened involvement as we look down the road?

The President replied that the military involvement, the military assistance, the military aid program and the rest, and particularly the commitments of military personnel, that that type of program would recede.

Economic Aid Stressed

However, as far as economic programs are concerned and particularly those of a multilateral character—and here he had some new ideas that he will be expanding on in the months ahead—he would say that the level of United States activity would be adequate to meet the challenge as it develops, because it is very much in our interest in terms of economic assistance, economic assistance through loans and other programs, to help build the economies of free Asia, Mr. Nixon said.

For example, the President pointed to what has happened to South Korea, what has happened to Taiwan, what has happened to Thailand, what has happened to Japan. All of them now, or virtually all, are on their own feet, at least from an economic standpoint and are very good customers of ours.

Pact With Thailand

The President was asked about quite a bit of speculation in the papers lately—both here and in Washington and in Thailand—as to whether or not there exists some sort of secret defense arrangement between the United States and Thailand.

Could he shed any light on the existence or nonexistence of such a thing and whether we have any similar arrangements with any other countries that might commit us beyond what his hopes might be?

The President replied that there is no secret defense agreement with Thailand. We, of course, have the SEATO treaty. We will keep our commitments under that treaty. We had the Rusk-Thanat communique, which simply spelled out the treaty.

We will, of course, keep our commitments set forth there as well, Mr. Nixon said.

But as far as any secret commitments are concerned, we not only have none in any of these nations, he will make none—and incidentally, he told Senator J. W. Fulbright that the other day, too.

The President was asked to give an evaluation of Red China's economic-political capability of inspiring further wars of liberation in the Asian nations. Are they able to continue that?

The President replied that Red China's capacity in this respect is much less than it was five years ago, even ten years ago. Because of

its internal problems, Red China is not nearly as effective in exporting revolution as it was then. He thinks a pretty good indication of that is the minimal role that Red China is playing in Vietnam as compared with the Soviet Union, the President remarked.

Three years ago, Red China was furnishing over 50 per cent of the military equipment, the hardware, for the North Vietnamese. Now it is approximately 80–20 the other way around, he said.

Problems Within China

There may be other reasons for that coming about, and part of it is that Red China has enough problems within.

Another point he would make in that respect that bears on this: How things have changed since 1953, in country after country that he visited—and he was in every one that we are visiting here and all the others as well. The ones that Secretary William P. Rogers is going to visit on his trip—among most of the intellectual leaders and among many Government leaders, there was a real question as to what was the best path for progress, a question as to whether Communism, as it was developing in Red China, a Communist system was a better way to progress, or whether a non-Communist system was the better way.

Now, Mr. Nixon said, one of the significant developments that has occurred over these last 16 years, with all the bad things that have occurred, including the war in Vietnam, has been that that situation has reversed itself. The appeal of the Communist philosophy, for example, in Pakistan, in India, in Indonesia, in Japan, in any one of these countries, is less today than it was 16 years ago, 10 years ago, 5 years ago.

On the other hand, he would have to say that the effectiveness of subversive activities in many of these countries has not abated to the same extent. It can be on the upsurge. But as we look at the whole of Asia today, it is significant to note that what we have going for us more than anything else is this enormous rate of growth in non-Communist Asia as compared to Communist Asia. You compare Hong Kong with Communist China, you compare Taiwan with Communist China, you look at Japan with 100 million people, with a greater G.N.P. than China with 700 million people. Looking clear around the perimeter, from Japan through India, we find that free Asia's record of growth is a very significant factor in affecting the thinking of those who have to make the determination as to which path they are going to take, Mr. Nixon said.

No More Vietnams?

The President was asked, when he said that the United States was going to continue to play a major role in Asia and that this was one message that he intended to take with him on this trip, whether another message was that there would be no more Vietnams.

The President replied that certainly the objective of any American administration would be to avoid another war like Vietnam any place in the world. He recalled he had said it and so had his opponent, Mr. Humphrey, during the campaign—that we should develop a policy that would avoid other Vietnams.

Mr. Nixon said it was very easy to say that. But he said that to develop the policies to avoid that was taking an enormous amount of his time and that of his associates.

But what he said he could do was to learn from the mistakes of the past. He believed that we have, if we examine what happened in Vietnam, how we became so deeply involved—that we have a good chance of avoiding that kind of involvement in the future, he said.

Troop Withdrawals Discussed

Mr. Nixon was asked whether he intended to make it clear to the Asian leaders that if the lull in Vietnam continues, he would announce a substantial withdrawal of United States forces in August.

The President replied that he would not make any announcement, and no decision on, troop withdrawals on this trip, and of course, he would not make any disclosures of plans in that respect to Asian leaders prior to the time that he had discussed it with the government of South Vietnam and then made the announcement jointly.

That is one of the matters, he said, that he still had under study, under consideration, that he would be discussing with Ambassador Bunker, that he did discuss with General Wheeler and that he might discuss with General Abrams.

Tactics in Vietnam

The President was asked whether there is also a pending question as to whether his administration will change its policy of maintaining maximum military pressure on the enemy in Vietnam?

The President replied that he had been re-examining, since the time his administration came into office, our military tactics in Vietnam, and one of the subjects that he has discussed at great length with General Wheeler and General Abrams has been the character of our commitment and the tactics that should be used. He defers, naturally, to military men as to the conduct of a war because they are more expert than he is in this field, he said.

However, when we are in the process of negotiations, then military tactics become part of the negotiations and, therefore, we are re-evaluating our tactics in Vietnam, having in mind the fact that we have a parallel action going along in the negotiating field, the President said.

If we have any changes in this respect, he will, of course, announce them, he added.

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT NIXON ON THE WAR IN VIETNAM, NOVEMBER 3, 1969[1]

Good evening, my fellow Americans:

Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world—the war in Vietnam.

---

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, November 10, 1969, pp. 1546–1555.

I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.

Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.

How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place?

How has this administration changed the policy of the previous administration?

What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battlefront in Vietnam?

What choices do we have if we are to end the war?

What are the prospects for peace?

Let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20.

—The war had been going on for 4 years.

—31,000 Americans had been killed in action.

—The training program for the South Vietnamese was behind schedule.

—540,000 Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number.

—No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal.

—The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends as well as our enemies abroad.

In view of these circumstances there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces.

From a political standpoint this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat which would be the result of my action on him and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson's war to become Nixon's war.

But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my administration and the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation and on the future of peace and freedom in America and in the world.

Let us all understand that the question before us in not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson's war becomes Nixon's war.

The great question is: How can we win America's peace?

Let us turn now to the fundamental issue. Why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place?

Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.

In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.

Now, many believe that President Johnson's decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others—I among them—have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.

But the question facing us today is—now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?

In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.

For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before.

—They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps.

—We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.

—With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities of Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation—and particularly for the million and a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.

For the United States, this first defeat in our Nation's history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership, not only in Asia but throughout the world.

Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.

—In 1963, President Kennedy, with his characteristic eloquence and clarity, said, ". . . we want to see a stable government there, carrying on a struggle to maintain its national independence.

"We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there."

President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.

For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude.

—A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends.

—Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.

—This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace—in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.

Ultimately, this would cost more lives.

It would not bring peace; it would bring more war.

For these reasons, I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and battlefront.

In order to end a war fought on many fronts, I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts.

In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, and on a number of other occasions I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.

—We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within 1 year.

—We have proposed a cease-fire under international supervision.

—We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. The Saigon Government has pledged to accept the result of the elections.

We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we are willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future. At the Paris peace conference, Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings.

Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms, which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the Government of South Vietnam as we leave.

We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized, in January, that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement.

Tonight I am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace—initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought that we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed.

I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace.

—Soon after my election through an individual who is directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement. Hanoi's replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations.

—Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger,

Ambassador Lodge, and I, personally, have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. None of these initiatives have to date produced results.

—In mid-July, I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks. I spoke directly in this office, where I am now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh.

I did this outside of the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an end. Let me read from that letter:

"Dear Mr. President:

"I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But precisely because of this gulf, I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one—least of all the people of Vietnam. . . .

"The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture, both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war."

I received Ho Chi Minh's reply on August 30, 3 days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative.

The full text of both letters is being released to the press.

—In addition to the public meetings that I have referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam's chief negotiator in Paris in 11 private sessions.

—We have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communication which may still prove to be productive.

But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago and since this administration came into office on January 20, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreements on the shape of the bargaining table.

Now who is at fault?

It has become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government.

The obstacle is the other side's absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. It will not do so while

it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.

There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi's deciding to negotiate, to negotiate seriously.

I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth—the bad news as well as the good news, where the lives of our young men are involved.

Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front.

At the time we launched our search for peace I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiation. I, therefore, put into effect another plan to bring peace—a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front.

It is in line with a major shift in U.S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine—a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam, but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.

We Americans are a do-it-yourself people. We are an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy.

In Korea and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression.

Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said, "When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them."

Well, in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia:

First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.

The defense of freedom is everybody's business—not just America's business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.

The policy of the previous administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war but even more significantly did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.

The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird's visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces.

In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams' orders so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies. Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam.

Our air operations have been reduced by over 20 percent.

And now we have begun to see the results of this long overdue change in American policy in Vietnam.

—After 5 years of Americans going into Vietnam, we are finally bringing American men home. By December 15, over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam—including 20 percent of all of our combat forces.

—The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result they have been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American troops.

Two other significant developments have occurred since this administration took office.

—Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack, over the last 3 months is less than 20 percent of what it was over the same period last year.

—Most important—United States casualties have declined during the last 2 months to the lowest point in 3 years.

Let me now turn to our program for the future.

We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.

I have not and do not intend to announce the timetable for our program. There are obvious reasons for this decision which I am sure you will understand. As I have indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts.

One of these is the progress which can be or might be made in the Paris talks. An announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to

negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.

The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training program of the South Vietnamese forces. I am glad to be able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in June for withdrawal. As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in June. This clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable.

We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time rather than on estimates that are no longer valid.

Along with this optimistic estimate, I must—in all candor—leave one note of caution.

If the level of enemy activity significantly increases we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly.

However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point.

At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago, there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam they would stop the shelling of cities in South Vietnam. I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program.

We have noted the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of our casualties, and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially on those factors.

If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy.

Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage. If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

This is not a threat. This is a statement of policy which as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces I am making in meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be.

My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war.

—I can order an immediate, precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action.

—Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement if possible, or through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization if necessary—a plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program, as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.

I have chosen this second course.

It is not the easy way.

It is the right way.

It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace—not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the world.

In speaking of the consequences of a precipitate withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America.

Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home, but as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.

We have faced other crises in our history and have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what had to be done when we knew our course was right.

I recognize that some of my fellow citizens disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen. Honest and patriotic Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved.

In San Francisco a few weeks ago, I saw demonstrators carrying signs reading: "Lose in Vietnam, bring the boys home."

Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view. But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this Nation to be dictated by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the Nation by mounting demonstrations in the street.

For almost 200 years, the policy of this Nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and in the White House elected by all of the people. If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority this Nation has no future as a free society.

And now I would like to address a word if I may to the young people of this Nation who are particularly concerned, and I understand why they are concerned, about this war.

I respect your idealism.

I share your concern for peace.

I want peace as much as you do.

There are powerful personal reasons I want to end this war. This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives, and loved ones of men who have given their lives for America in Vietnam. It is very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I signed the first week in office. There is nothing I want more than to see the day come when I do not have to write any of those letters.

—I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young men in Vietnam.

—But I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam someplace in the world.

82-991 O - 75 - 25

—And I want to end the war for another reason. I want to end it so that the energy and dedication of you, our young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred against those responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life for all Americans, a better life for all people on this earth.

I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it will succeed.

If it does succeed, what the critics say now won't matter. If it does not succeed, anything I say then won't matter.

I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism or national destiny these days. But I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion.

Two hundred years ago this Nation was weak and poor. But even then, America was the hope of millions in the world. Today we have become the strongest and richest Nation in the world. The wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined by whether the American people have the moral stamina and the courage to meet the challenge of free world leadership.

Let historians not record that when America was the most powerful nation in the world we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism.

And so tonight—to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans—I ask for your support.

I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge.

The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed; for the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate at Paris.

Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand: North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that.

Fifty years ago, in this room and at this very desk, President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the imagination of a war-weary world. He said, "This is the war to end wars." His dream for peace after World War I was shattered on the hard realities of great power politics and Woodrow Wilson died a broken man.

Tonight I do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is the war to end wars. But I do say this.

I have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated—the goal of a just and lasting peace.

As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path to that goal and then leading the Nation along it.

I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command in accordance with your hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your prayers.

Thank you and good night.

NOTE: The President spoke at 9:22 p.m. in his Oval Office at the White Hous The address was broadcast on radio and television.

The exchange of letters with President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam, t which President Nixon referred in his address, was also released by the Whit House, as follows:

July 15, 1969

Dear Mr. President:

I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf four years of war. But precisely because of this gulf, I wanted to take th opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay bringing it to an end can benefit no one—least of all the people of Vietna My speech on May 14 laid out a proposal which I believe is fair to all parti Other proposals have been made which attempt to give the people of Sou Vietnam an opportunity to choose their own future. These proposals take in account the reasonable conditions of all sides. But we stand ready to discu other programs as well, specifically the 10-point program of the NLF.

As I have said repeatedly, there is nothing to be gained by waiting. Del can only increase the dangers and multiply the suffering.

The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an ear resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vi nam. Let history record that at this critical juncture, both sides turned the face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war.

Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON

[His Excellency Ho Chi Minh, President, Democratic Republic of Vietnar Hanoi]

Hanoi, 25 August 1969
(Received in Paris August 30)

To His Excellency Richard Milhous Nixon
President of the United States
Washington

Mr. President:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter.

The war of aggression of the United States against our people, violating ou fundamental national rights, still continues in South Vietnam. The Unite States continues to intensify military operations, the B-52 bombings and th use of toxic chemical products multiply the crimes against the Vietnames people. The longer the war goes on, the more it accumulates the mourning an burdens of the American people. I am extremely indignant at the losses an destructions caused by the American troops to our people and our country. am also deeply touched at the rising toll of death of young Americans wh have fallen in Vietnam by reason of the policy of American governing circle

Our Vietnamese people are deeply devoted to peace, a real peace with ind pendence and real freedom. They are determined to fight to the end, witho fearing the sacrifices and difficulties on order to defend their country and thei sacred national rights. The overall solution in 10 points of the National Libe ation Front of South Vietnam and of the Provisional Revolutionary Gover ment of the Republic of South Vietnam is a logical and reasonable basis f the settlement of the Vietnamese problem. It has earned the sympathy an support of the peoples of the world.

In your letter you have expressed the desire to act for a just peace. For thi the United States must cease the war of aggression and withdraw their troo from South Vietnam, respect the right of the population of the South and the Vietnamese nation to dispose of themselves, without foreign influence. Thi is the correct manner of solving the Vietnamese problem in conformity wit the national rights of the Vietnamese people, the interests of the United State and the hopes for peace of the peoples of the world. This is the path that wi allow the United States to get out of the war with honor.

With good will on both sides we might arrive at common efforts in view o finding a correct solution of the Vietnamese problem.

Sincerely,

HO CHI MINH

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT NIXON ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PURSUIT OF PEACE,[1] DECEMBER 15, 1969

Good evening, my fellow Americans:

I have asked for this television time tonight to give you a progress report on our plan to bring a just peace in Vietnam, which I described in my television address on November 3.

As you will recall, I said then that we were proceeding in our pursuit for peace on two fronts—a peace settlement through negotiation, or if that fails, ending the war through Vietnamization, a plan we have developed with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal first of all U.S. combat ground forces and eventually of other forces and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable.

I must report to you tonight with regret that there has been no progress whatever on the negotiating front since November 3. The enemy still insists on a unilateral, precipitate withdrawal of American forces and on a political settlement which would mean the imposition of a Communist government on the people of South Vietnam against their will, and defeat and humiliation for the United States.

This we cannot and will not accept.

Typical of their attitude is their absolute refusal to talk about the fate of the American prisoners they hold and their refusal even to supply their names so as to ease the anguish of their loved ones in the United States. This cruel indefensible action is a shocking demonstration of the inflexible attitude they have taken on all issues at the negotiating table in Paris.

But despite their attitude, we shall continue to participate in the Paris talks and to seek a negotiated peace—one which is fair, fair to North Vietnam, fair to the United States, but most important, fair to the people of South Vietnam. Because as I have indicated, anything is negotiable except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own fate.

As you know, Ambassador Lodge has had to leave his assignment in Paris because of personal reasons. I have designated Philip Habib, one of our most experienced Foreign Service officers who has been participating in the negotiations for over 18 months, as the acting head of our delegation with the personal rank of Ambassador. He has been given full authority to discuss any proposal that will contribute to a just peace.

Let me turn now to the progress of our plan for Vietnamization and our troop withdrawal program.

When I announced this program in June, I said that the rate of withdrawal would depend on three criteria—progress in the Paris negotiations, progress in the training of South Vietnamese forces, and the level of enemy activity.

Now, while there has been no progress on the negotiating front, I have a much more favorable report to give to you tonight with regard to the training of South Vietnamese forces.

First, let me share with you how I reached this conclusion. In making decisions, I believe a President should listen not only to

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Dec. 22, 1969, pp. 1752-1754.

those who tell him what he wants to hear, but to those who tell him what he needs to hear. It is most important to get independent judgments from individuals who are expert on the factors to be considered but who are not directly involved in the operations themselves. This is particularly essential when the lives of American men are involved.

Several months ago I read a book by Sir Robert Thompson, a British expert who was one of the major architects of the victory over the Communist guerrillas who attempted to take over Malaya in the 1950's. In his book which was published just as this administration took office, he was very pessimistic about the conduct of the war in Vietnam. He particularly noted the failure to prepare the South Vietnamese to take over the responsibilities for their own defense.

On October 7 I met with Mr. Thompson and asked him to go to Vietnam and to give me a firsthand, candid, and completely independent report on the situation there. After 5 weeks of intensive investigation he gave me his report on December 3.

His full report, which makes several very constructive recommendations, must remain confidential since it bears on the security of our men. But let me read to you from his summary of his findings.

"I was very impressed by the improvement in the military and political situation in Vietnam as compared with all previous visits and especially in the security situation, both in Saigon and the rural areas.

"A winning position in the sense of obtaining a just peace (whether negotiated or not) and of maintaining an independent, non-Communist South Vietnam has been achieved but we are not yet through. We are in a psychological period where the greatest need is confidence, a steady application of the 'do it yourself' concept with continuing U.S. support in the background will increase the confidence already shown by many South Vietnam leaders."

Mr. Thompson's report, which I would describe as cautiously optimistic, is in line with my own attitude and with reports I have received from other observers and from our own civilian and military leaders in Vietnam.

Now, there is one disturbing new development, however, with regard to enemy activity. Enemy infiltration has increased substantially. It has not yet reached the point where our military leaders believe the enemy has developed the capability to mount a major offensive, but we are watching the situation closely to see whether it could develop to that extent.

Now for the decision. Taking all these developments into consideration, I am announcing tonight a reduction in our troop ceiling of 50,000 more U.S. troops by April 15 next year. This means that the ceiling which existed when I took office on January 20 has now been reduced by 115,500 men. This reduction has been made with the approval of the Government of South Vietnam, and in consultation with the other nations which have combat forces in Vietnam.

Now there are some who believe that to continue our withdrawals at a time when enemy infiltration is increasing is a risk we should not take. However, I have consistently said we must take risks for peace.

And in that connection, let me remind the leaders in Hanoi that if their infiltration and the level of enemy activity increases while we are reducing our forces they also will be running a risk. I repeat the statement I made in my speech on November 3.

"Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage. If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation."

This reduction in our forces is another orderly step in our plan for peace in Vietnam.

—It marks further progress toward turning over the defense of South Vietnam to the South Vietnamese.

—And it is another clear sign of our readiness to bring an end to the war and to achieve a just peace.

Before concluding this report, I wish to express my appreciation to the great number of people from all over this Nation who have indicated their support for our program for a just peace since my speech on November 3.

This support was particularly underlined by the action of the House of Representatives and the Congress in which a majority of both Democrats and Republicans voted overwhelmingly 334 to 55 for a resolution supporting the plan for peace which I announced on November 3.

The leaders in Hanoi have declared on a number of occasions that division in the United States would eventually bring them the victory they cannot win over our fighting men in Vietnam. This demonstration of support by the American people for our plan to bring a just peace has dashed those hopes.

Hanoi should abandon its dream of military victory.

It is time for them to join us in serious negotiations.

There is nothing to be gained by delay.

If Hanoi is willing to talk seriously they will find us flexible and forthcoming.

I am glad that I was able to report tonight some progress in reaching our goal of a just peace in Vietnam. After 5 years of increasing the number of Americans in Vietnam, we are bringing American men home.

Our casualties continue to be at the lowest rate in 3 years.

But I want you to know that despite this progress, I shall not be satisfied until we achieve the goal we all want—an end to the war on a just and lasting basis.

This is the fifth Christmas when Americans will be fighting in a war far away from home.

I know that there is nothing the American people want more and there is nothing I want more than to see the day come when the Christmas message of "Peace on Earth, Good Will to Men" will be not just an eloquent ideal but a reality for Americans and for all others who cherish peace and freedom throughout the world.

Your continued support of our plan for peace will greatly strengthen our hopes that we can achieve that great goal.

Thank you, and goodnight.

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S: A NEW STRATEGY FOR PEACE. President Nixon's Report to the Congress, February 18, 1970 (Excerpts)

Introduction

"A nation needs many qualities, but it needs faith and confidence above all. Skeptics do not build societies; the idealists are the builders. Only societies that believe in themselves can rise in their challenges. Let us not, then, pose a false choice between meeting our responsibilities abroad and meeting the needs of our people at home. We shall meet both or we shall meet neither."

The President's Remarks at the Air Force Academy Commencement, June 4, 1969

When I took office, the most immediate problem facing our nation was the war in Vietnam. No question has more occupied our thoughts and energies during this past year.

Yet the fundamental task confronting us was more profound. We could see that the whole pattern of international politics was changing. Our challenge was to understand that change, to define America's goals for the next period, and to set in motion policies to achieve them. For all Americans must understand that because of its strength, its history and its concern for human dignity, this nation occupies a special place in the world. Peace and progress are impossible without a major American role.

This first annual report on U.S. foreign policy is more than a record of one year. It is this Administration's statement of a new approach to foreign policy, to match a new era of international relations.

A New Era

The postwar period in international relations has ended.

Then, we were the only great power whose society and economy had escaped World War II's massive destruction. Today, the ravages of that war have been overcome. Western Europe and Japan have recovered their economic strength, their political vitality, and their national self-confidence. Once the recipients of American aid, they have now begun to share their growing resources with the developing world. Once almost totally dependent on American military power, our European allies now play a greater role in our common policies, commensurate with their growing strength.

Then, new nations were being born, often in turmoil and uncertainty. Today, these nations have a new spirit and a growing strength of independence. Once, many feared that they would become simply a battleground of cold-war rivalry and fertile ground for Communist penetration. But this fear misjudged their pride in their national identities and their determination to preserve their newly won sovereignty.

Then, we were confronted by a monolithic Communist world. Today, the nature of that world has changed—the power of individual Communist nations has grown, but international Communist unity has been shattered. Once a unified bloc, its solidarity has been broken by the powerful forces of nationalism. The Soviet Union and Communist China, once bound by an alliance of friendship, had become bitter adversaries by the mid-1960's. The only times the Soviet Union has used the Red Army since World War II have been against its own allies—in East Germany in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Marxist dream of international Communist unity has disintegrated.

Then, the United States had a monopoly or overwhelming superiority of nuclear weapons. Today, a revolution in the technology of war has altered the nature of the military balance of power. New types of weapons present new dangers. Communist China has acquired thermonuclear weapons. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have acquired the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the other, no matter which strikes first. There can be no gain and certainly no victory for the power that provokes a thermonuclear exchange. Thus, both sides have recognized a vital mutual interest in halting the dangerous momentum of the nuclear arms race.

Then, the slogans formed in the past century were the ideological accessories of the intellectural debate. Today, the "isms" have lost their vitality—indeed the restlessness of youth on both sides of the dividing line testifies to the need for a new idealism and deeper purposes.

This is the challenge and the opportunity before America as it enters the 1970's.

THE FRAMEWORK FOR A DURABLE PEACE

In the first postwar decades, American energies were absorbed in coping with a cycle of recurrent crises, whose fundamental origins lay in the destruction of World War II and the tensions attending the emergence of scores of new nations. Our opportunity today—and challenge—is to get at the causes of crises, to take a longer view, and to help build the international relationships that will provide the framework of a durable peace.

I have often reflected on the meaning of "peace", and have reached one certain conclusion: Peace must be far more than the absence of war. Peace must provide a durable structure of international relationships which inhibits or removes the causes of war. Building a lasting peace requires a foreign policy guided by three basic principles:

—Peace requires *partnership*. Its obligations, like its benefits, must be shared. This concept of partnership guides our relations with all friendly nations.

—Peace, requires *strength*. So long as there are those who would threaten our vital interests and those of our allies with military force, we must be strong. American weakness could tempt would be aggressors to make dangerous miscalculations.

At the same time, our own strength is important only in relation to the strength of others. We—like others—must place high priority on enhancing our security through cooperative arms control.

—Peace requires a *willingness to negotiate.* All nations—and we are no exception—have important national interests to protect. But the most fundamental interest of all nations lies in building the structure of peace. In partnership with our allies, secure in our own strength, we will seek those areas in which we can agree among ourselves and with others to accommodate conflicts and overcome rivalries. We are working toward the day when *all* nations will have a stake in peace, and will therefore be partners in its maintenance.

Within such a structure, international disputes can be settled and clashes contained. The insecurity of nations, out of which so much conflict arises, will be eased, and the habits of moderation and compromise will be nurtured. Most important, a durable peace will give full opportunity to the powerful forces driving toward economic change and social justice.

This vision of a peace built on partnership, strength and willingness to negotiate is the unifying theme of this report. In the sections that follow, the first steps we have taken during this past year—the policies we have devised and the programs we have initiated to realize this vision—are placed in the context of these three principles.

1. *Peace Through Partnership—the Nixon Doctrine*

As I said in my address of November 3, "We Americans are a do-it-yourself people—an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. This trait has been carried over into our foreign policy."

The postwar era of American foreign policy began in this vein in 1947 with the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, offering American economic and military assistance to countries threatened by aggression. Our policy held that democracy and prosperity, buttressed by American military strength and organized in a worldwide network of American-led alliances, would insure stability and peace. In the formative years of the postwar period, this great effort of international political and economic reconstruction was a triumph of American leadership and imagination, especially in Europe.

For two decades after the end of the Second World War, our foreign policy was guided by such a vision and inspired by its success. The vision was based on the fact that the United States was the richest and most stable country, without whose initiative and resources little security or progress was possible.

This impulse carried us through into the 1960's. The United States conceived programs and ran them. We devised strategies, and proposed them to our allies. We discerned dangers, and acted directly to combat them.

The world has dramatically changed since the days of the Marshall Plan. We deal now with a world of stronger allies, a commu-

nity of independent developing nations, and a Communist world still hostile but now divided.

Others now have the ability and responsibility to deal with local disputes which once might have required our intervention. Our contribution and success will depend not on the frequency of our involvement in the affairs of others, but on the stamina of our policies. This is the approach which will best encourage other nations to do their part, and will most genuinely enlist the support of the American people.

This is the message of the doctrine I announced at Guam—the "Nixon Doctrine." Its central thesis is that the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot—and will not—conceive *all* the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest.

America cannot live in isolation if it expects to live in peace. We have no intention of withdrawing from the world. The only issue before us is how we can be most effective in meeting our responsibilities, protecting our interests, and thereby building peace.

A more responsible participation by our foreign friends in their own defense and progress means a more effective common effort toward the goals we all seek. Peace in the world will continue to require us to maintain our commitments—and we will. As I said at the United Nations, "It is not my belief that the way to peace is by giving up our friends or letting down our allies." But a more balanced and realistic American role in the world is essential if American commitments are to be sustained over the long pull. In my State of the Union Address, I affirmed that "to insist that other nations play a role is not a retreat from responsibility; it is a sharing of responsibility." This is not a way for America to withdraw from its indispensable role in the world. It is a way—the only way—we can carry out our responsibilities.

It is misleading, moreover, to pose the fundamental question so largely in terms of commitments. Our objective, in the first instance, is to support our *interests* over the long run with a sound foreign policy. The more that policy is based on a realistic assessment of our and others' interests, the more effective our role in the world can be. We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around.

We will view new commitments in the light of a careful assessment of our own national interests and those of other countries, of the specific threats to those interests, and of our capacity to counter those threats as an acceptable risk and cost.

We have been guided by these concepts during the past year in our dealings with free nations throughout the world.

—In Europe, our policies embody precisely the three principles of a durable peace: partnership, continued strength to defend our common interests when challenged, and willingness to negotiate differences with adversaries.

—Here in the Western Hemisphere we seek to strengthen our special relationship with our sister republics through a new

program of action for progress in which all voices are heard and none predominates.

—In Asia, where the Nixon Doctrine was enunciated, partnership will have special meaning for our policies—as evidenced by our strengthened ties with Japan. Our cooperation with Asian nations will be enhanced as they cooperate with one another and develop regional institutions.

—In Vietnam, we seek a just settlement which all parties to the conflict, and all Americans, can support. We are working closely with the South Vietnamese to strengthen their ability to defend themselves. As South Vietnam grows stronger, the other side will, we hope, soon realize that it becomes ever more in their interest to negotiate a just peace.

—In the Middle East, we shall continue to work with others to establish a possible framework within which the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict can negotiate the complicated and difficult questions at issue. Others must joint us in recognizing that a settlement will require sacrifices and restraints by all concerned.

—Africa, with its historic ties to so many of our own citizens, must always retain a significant place in our partnership with the new nations. Africans will play the major role in fulfilling their just aspirations—an end to racialism, the building of new nations, freedom from outside interference, and cooperative economic development. But we will add our efforts to theirs to help realize Africa's great potential.

—In an ever more interdependent world economy, American foreign policy will emphasize the freer flow of capital and goods between nations. We are proud to have participated in the successful cooperative effort which created Special Drawing Rights, a form of international money which will help insure the stability of the monetary structure on which the continued expansion of trade depends.

—The great effort of economic development must engage the cooperation of all nations. We are carefully studying the specific goals of our economic assistance programs and how most effectively to reach them.

—Unprecedented scientific and technological advances as well as explosions in population, communications, and knowledge require new forms of international cooperation. The United Nations, the symbol of international partnership, will receive our continued strong support as it marks its 25th Anniversary.

2. *America's Strength*

The second element of a durable peace must be America's strength. Peace, we have learned, cannot be gained by good will alone.

In determining the strength of our defenses, we must make precise and crucial judgments. We should spend no more than is necessary. But there is an irreducible minimum of essential military security: for it we are less strong than necessary, and if the worst happens, there will be no domestic society to look after. The magnitude of

such a catastrophe, and the reality of the opposing military power that could threaten it, present a risk which requires of any President the most searching and careful attention to the state of our defenses.

The changes in the world since 1945 have altered the context and requirements of our defense policy. In this area, perhaps more than in any other, the need to re-examine our approaches is urgent and constant.

The last 25 years have seen a revolution in the nature of military power. In fact, there has been a series of transformations—from the atomic to the thermonuclear weapon, from the strategic bomber to the intercontinental ballistic missile, from the surface missile to the hardened silo and the missile-carrying submarine, from the single to the multiple warhead, and from air defense to missile defense. We are now entering an era in which the sophistication and destructiveness of weapons present more formidable and complex issues affecting our strategic posture.

The last 25 years have also seen an important change in the relative balance of strategic power. From 1945 to 1949, we were the only nation in the world possessing an arsenal of atomic weapons. From 1950 to 1966, we possessed an overwhelming superiority in strategic weapons. From 1967 to 1969, we retained a significant superiority. Today, the Soviet Union possesses a powerful and sophisticated strategic force approaching our own. We must consider, too, that Communist China will deploy its own intercontinental missiles during the coming decade, introducing new and complicating factors for our strategic planning and diplomacy.

In the light of these fateful changes, the Administration undertook a comprehensive and far-reaching reconsideration of the premises and procedures for designing our forces. We sought—and I believe we have achieved—a rational and coherent formulation of our defense strategy and requirements for the 1970's.

The importance of comprehensive planning of policy and objective scrutiny of programs is clear:

—Because of the lead-time in building new strategic systems, the decisions we make today substantially determine our military posture—and thus our security—five years from now. This places a premium on foresight and planning.

—Because the allocation of national resources between defense programs and other national programs is itself an issue of policy, it must be considered on a systematic basis at the early stages of the national security planning process.

—Because we are a leader of the Atlantic Alliance, our doctrine and forces are crucial to the policy and planning of NATO. The mutual confidence that holds the allies together depends on understanding, agreement, and coordination among the 15 sovereign nations of the Treaty.

—Because our security depends not only on our own strategic strength, but also on cooperative efforts to provide greater security for everyone through arms control, planning weapons systems and planning for arms control negotiations must be closely integrated.

For these reasons, this Administration has established procedures for the intensive scrutiny of defense issues in the light of overall national priorities. We have re-examined our strategic forces; we have reassessed our general purpose forces; and we have engaged in the most painstaking preparation ever undertaken by the United States Government for arms control negotiations.

3. *Willingness to Negotiate—An Era of Negotiation*

Partnership and strength are two of the pillars of the structure of a durable peace. Negotiation is the third. For our commitment to peace is most convincingly demonstrated in our willingness to negotiate our points of difference in a fair and businesslike manner with the Communist countries.

We are under no illusions. We know that there are enduring ideological differences. We are aware of the difficulty in moderating tensions that arise from the clash of national interests. These differences will not be dissipated by changes of atmosphere or dissolved in cordial personal relations between statesmen. They involve strong convictions and contrary philosophies, necessities of national security, and the deep-seated differences of perspectives formed by geography and history.

The United States, like any other nation, has interests of its own, and will defend those interests. But any nation today must define its interests with special concern for the interests of others. If some nations define their security in a manner that means insecurity for other nations, then peace is threatened and the security of all is diminished. This obligation is particularly great for the nuclear superpowers on whose decisions the survival of mankind may well depend.

The United States is confident that tensions can be eased and the danger of war reduced by patient and precise efforts to reconcile conflicting interests on concrete issues. Coexistence demands more than a spirit of good will. It requires the definition of positive goals which can be sought and achieved cooperatively. It requires real progress toward resolution of specific differences. This is our objective.

As the Secretary of State said on December 6:

"We will continue to probe every available opening that offers a prospect for better East-West relations, for the resolution of problems large or small, for greater security for all."

"In this the United States will continue to play an active role in concert with our allies."

This is the spirit in which the United States ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty and entered into negotiation with the Soviet Union on control of the military use of the seabeds, on the frame work of a settlement in the Middle East, and on limitation of strategic arms. This is the basis on which we and our Atlantic allies have offered to negotiate on concrete issues affecting the security and future of Europe, and on which the United States took steps last year to improve our relations with nations of Eastern Europe. This is also the spirit in which we have resumed formal talks in Warsaw with Communist China. No nation need be our permanent enemy.

AMERICA'S PURPOSE

These policies were conceived as a result of change, and we know they will be tested by the change that lies ahead. The world of 1970 was not predicted a decade ago, and we can be certain that the world of 1980 will render many current views obsolete.

The source of America's historic greatness has been our ability to see what had to be done, and then to do it. I believe America now has the chance to move the world closer to a durable peace. And I know that Americans working with each other and with other nations can make our vision real.

* * * * * * *

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

"What we seek for Asia is a community of free nations able to go their own way and seek their own destiny with whatever cooperation we can provide—a community of independent Asian countries, each maintaining its own traditions and yet each developing through mutual cooperation. In such an arrangement, we stand ready to play a responsible role in accordance with our commitments and basic interests."

Statement by the President
at Bangkok, Thailand
July 28, 1969.

Three times in a single generation, Americans have been called upon to cross the Pacific and fight in Asia. No region of the world has more engaged our energies in the postwar period. No continent has changed more rapidly or with greater complexity since World War II. Nowhere has the failure to create peace been more costly or led to greater sacrifice.

America's Asian policy for the 1970's must be based on the lessons of their sacrifice. Does it mean that the United States should withdraw from Asian affairs? If not, does it mean that we are condemned to a recurring cycle of crisis and war in a changing setting beyond the understanding or influence of outsiders?

Our answers to these questions provide the concepts behind this Administration's approach to Asia.

First, we remain involved in Asia. We are a Pacific power. We have learned that peace for us is much less likely if there is no peace in Asia.

Second, behind the headlines of strife and turmoil, the fact remains that no region contains a greater diversity of vital and gifted peoples, and thus a greater potential for cooperative enterprises. Constructive nationalism and economic progress since World War II have strengthened the new nations of Asia internally. A growing sense of Asian identity and concrete action toward Asian cooperation are creating a new and healthy pattern of international relationships in the region. Our Asian friends, especially Japan, are in a position to shoulder larger responsibilities for the peaceful progress of the area. Thus, despite its troubled past, Asia's future is rich in promise. That promise has been nurtured in part by America's participation.

Third, while we will maintain our interests in Asia and the commitments that flow from them, the changes taking place in that region enable us to change the character of our involvement. The responsibilities once borne by the United States at such great cost can now be shared. America *can* be effective in helping the peoples of Asia harness the forces of change to peaceful progress, and in supporting them as they defend themselves from those who would subvert this process and fling Asia again into conflict.

Our friends in Asia have understood and welcomed our concept of our role in that continent. Those with whom the Vice President, the Secretary of State and I spoke during our visits there agreed that this was the most effective way in which we can work together to meet the military challenges and economic opportunities of the new Asia.

Our new cooperative relationship concerns primarily two areas of challenge—military threats, and the great task of development.

Defense

Our important interest and those of our friends are still threatened by those nations which would exploit change and which proclaim hostility to the United States as one of the fundamental tenets of their policies. We do not assume that these nations will always remain hostile, and will work toward improved relationships wherever possible. But we will not underestimate any threat to us or our allies, nor lightly base our present policies on untested assumptions about the future.

At the beginning of my trip last summer through Asia, I described at Guam the principles that underlie our cooperative approach to the defense of our common interests. In my speech on November 3, I summarized key elements of this approach:

—The United States will keep all its treaty commitments.

—We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole.

—In cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

This approach requires our commitment to helping our partners develop their own strength. In doing so, we must strike a careful balance. If we do too little to help them—and erode their belief in our commitments—they may lose the necessary will to conduct their own self-defense or become disheartened about prospects of development. Yet, if we do too much, and American forces do what local forces can and should be doing, we promote dependence rather than independence.

In providing for a more responsible role for Asian nations in their own defense, the Nixon Doctrine means not only a more effective use of common resources, but also an American policy which can best be sustained over the long run.

Economic and Political Partnership

The partnership we seek involves not only defense. Its ultimate goal must be equally close cooperation over a much broader range of

concerns—economic as well as political and military. For in that close cooperation with our Asian friends lies our mutual commitment to peace in Asia and the world.

Our goal must be particularly close cooperation for economic development. Here, too, our most effective contribution will be to support Asian initiatives in an Asian framework.

Our partnership will rest on the solid basis of Asia's own wealth of human and material resources. Acting jointly, its peoples offer each other a wide range of energy and genius. Their benefits shared, its land and products can overcome the unmet needs which have often sparked conflict. Already, the Republics of Korea and China, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia can show a doubling of their gross national product in the last decade. Korea's annual growth rate of 15 per cent may be the highest in the world; the Republic of China, no longer an economic aid recipient, now conducts a technical assistance program of its own in 27 other countries.

Thus, the potential for cooperation among Asian countries is strong, and progress is already apparent. New multi-national organizations are sharing agricultural and technical skills. When the war in Vietnam is ended, reconstruction can be carried out in a regional context. And we look forward to continued cooperation with a regional effort to harness the power of the Mekong River.

The successful start of the Asian Development Bank, of which we are a member, illustrates the potential of Asian initiatives and regionalism. It is an *Asian* institution, with a requirement that the Bank's president, seven of its ten directors, and 60 per cent of its capital come from Asia.

Our hopes for Asia are thus for a continent of strong nations drawing together for their mutual benefit on their own terms, and creating a new relationship with the rest of the international community.

Japan, as one of the great industrial nations of the world, has a unique and essential role to play in the development of the new Asia. Our policy toward Japan during the past year demonstrates our conception of the creative partnership we seek with all Asian nations.

Upon entering office, I faced a pivotal question concerning the future of our relations with Japan: the status of Okinawa. What did we consider more important—the maintenance of American administration of Okinawa with no adjustments in the conditions under which we operate our bases, or the strengthening of our relationship with Japan over the long term? We chose the second course because our cooperation with Japan will be crucial to our efforts to help other Asian nations develop in peace. Japan's partnership with us will be a key to the success of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia.

In November, I therefore agreed with Prime Minister Sato during his visit to Washington that we would proceed with arrangements for the return of Okinawa in 1972, with our bases remaining after its reversion in the same status as our bases in Japan. This was among the most important decisions I have taken as President.

For his part, Prime Minister Sato expressed the intention of the Japanese Government to expand and improve its aid programs in

Asia in keeping with the economic growth of Japan. He agreed with me that attention to the economic needs of the developing countries was essential to the development of international peace and stability. He stated Japan's intention to accelerate the reduction and removal of its restrictions on trade and capital. He also stated that Japan was exploring what it could do to bring about stability and reconstruction in postwar Southeast Asia. The Prime Minister affirmed that it is in Japan's interest that we carry out fully our defensive commitments in East Asia.

We have thereby laid the foundation for US-Japanese cooperation in the 1970's.

Elsewhere, too, we have seen developments encouraging for the future of Asia. In Indonesia—which is virtually half of Southeast Asia—we have participated in multilateral efforts, aimed at achieving economic stability, which have already contributed much to the building of a prospering and peaceful nation.

The United States has a similar long-run interest in cooperation for progress in South Asia. The one-fifth of mankind who live in India and Pakistan can make the difference for the future of Asia. If their nation-building surmounts the centrifugal forces that have historically divided the subcontinent, if their economic growth keeps pace with popular demands, and if they can avert further costly rivalry between themselves, India and Pakistan can contribute their vast energies to the structure of a stable peace. But these are formidable "ifs." We stand ready to help the subcontinent overcome them. These nations' potential contribution to peace is too great for us to do otherwise.

Like the rest of Asia, India and Pakistan have changed significantly over the past decade. They have registered steady economic progress in many areas, and established a hopeful precedent for mutual cooperation in the Indus development scheme. Yet in the same period, each has felt the strains of continuing tension in their relations and their old bitter dispute flared again in brief warfare in 1965.

They have reordered their international relationships with East and West; each remains staunchly independent.

Over the next decade India, Pakistan, and their friends have an opportunity to build substantially on the constructive elements in this record, and above all, to work together to avert further wasteful and dangerous conflict in the area.

While I was in South Asia, I stated our view of the method and purpose of our economic assistance to Asia. These words were spoken in Pakistan, but they express our goals as well for India and all of Asia:

I wish to communicate my Government's conviction that Asian hands must shape the Asian future. This is true, for example, with respect to economic aid, for it must be related to the total pattern of a nation's life. It must support the unique aspirations of each people. Its purpose is to encourage self-reliance, not dependence.

Issues for the Future

The fostering of self-reliance is the new purpose and direction of American involvement in Asia. But we are only at the beginning of

a new road. However clear our conception of where we wish to go, we must be under no illusion that any policy can provide easy answers to the hard, specific issues which will confront us in Asia in coming years.

—While we have established general guidelines on American responses to Asian conflicts, in practice the specific circumstances of each case require careful study. Even with careful planning, we will always have to consider a basic and delicate choice. If we limit our own involvement in the interest of encouraging local self-reliance, and the threat turns out to have been more serious than we had judged, we will only have created still more dangerous choices. On the other hand, if we become unwisely involved, we risk stifling the local contribution which is the key to our long-run commitment to Asia.

—The success of our Asian policy depends not only on the strength of our partnership with our Asian friends, but also on our relations with Mainland China and the Soviet Union. We have no desire to impose our own prescriptions for relationships in Asia. We have described in the Nixon Doctrine our conception of our relations with Asian nations. We hope that other great powers will act in a similar spirit and not seek hegemony.

—Just as we and our allies have an interest in averting great power dominance over Asia, we believe that peace in the world would be endangered by great power conflict there—whether it involves us or not. This characterizes our attitude towards the Sino-Soviet dispute.

—Asian regional cooperation is at its beginning. We will confront subtle decisions as we seek to help maintain its momentum without supplanting Asian direction of the effort.

—A sound relationship with Japan is crucial in our common effort to secure peace, security, and a rising living standard in the Pacific area. We look forward to extending the cooperative relationship we deepened in 1969. But we shall not ask Japan to assume responsibilities inconsistent with the deeply felt concerns of its people.

—In South Asia, our good relations with India and Pakistan should not obscure the concrete dilemmas we will face. How can we bring home to both, for example, our serious concern over the waste of their limited resources in an arms race, yet recognize their legitimate interests in self-defense?

All these issues will confront this Administration with varying intensity over the coming years. We are planning now to meet challenges and anticipate crises. Our purpose in 1969 has been to make sure none was ignored or underestimated. The task ahead—for Asians and Americans—is to address all these issues with the imagination, realism and boldness their solutions demand if lasting peace is to come to Asia.

VIETNAM

"The people of Vietnam, North and South alike, have demonstrated heroism enough to last a century. And I speak from personal observation. I have been to North Vietnam, to Hanoi, in 1953, and

all over South Vietnam. I have seen the people of the North and the people of the South. The people of Vietnam, North and South, have endured an unspeakable weight of suffering for a generation. And they deserve a better future."

The President's Address to the 24th Session of the UN General Assembly, September 18, 1969.

A just peace in Vietnam has been, and remains, our goal.

The real issues are the nature of that peace and how to achieve it. In addressing these issues at the beginning of my Administration, I had to consider the great consequences of our decisions.

I stated the consequences of a precipitate withdrawal in these terms in my speech of May 14:

"When we assumed the burden of helping defend South Vietnam, millions of South Vietnamese man, women and children placed their trust in us. To abandon them now would risk a massacre that would shock and dismay everyone in the world who values human life.

"Abandoning the South Vietnamese people, however, would jeopardize more than lives in South Vietnam. It would threaten our long-term hopes for peace in the world. A great nation cannot renege on its pledges. A great nation must be worthy of trust.

"When it comes to maintaining peace, 'prestige' is not an empty word. I am not speaking of false pride or bravado—they should have no place in our policies. I speak, rather, of the respect that one nation has for another's integrity in defending its principles and meeting its obligations.

"If we simply abandoned our effort in Vietnam, the cause of peace might not survive the damage that would be done to other nations' confidence in our reliability.

"Another reason for not withdrawing unilaterally stems from debates within the Communist world . . . If Hanoi were to succeed in taking over South Vietnam by force—even after the power of the United States had been engaged—it would greatly strengthen those leaders who scorn negotiation, who advocate aggression, who minimize the risks of confrontation with the United States. It would bring peace now but it would enormously increase the danger of a bigger war later."

My trip through Asia last summer made this fact more vivid to me than ever. I did not meet a single Asian leader who urged a precipitate U.S. withdrawal. The closer their nations were to the battlefield, the greater was their concern that America meet its responsibilities in Vietnam.

Less attention had been given to another important consequence of our decisions—within the United States itself. When the Administration took office, Vietnam had already led to a profound national debate. In considering our objectives there, I could only conclude that the peace must not intensify the bitter recrimination and divisions which the war had already inflicted on American society. Were we to purchase peace in Vietnam at the expense of greater suffering later, the American people would inevitably lose confidence in their leaders—not just in the Presidency or in either political party, but in the whole structure of American leadership.

For all these reason, I resolved to seek a peace which all Americans could support, a peace in which all parties to the conflict would have a stake. I resolved also to be completely candid with the American public and Congress in presenting our policies, except for some details on matters of great sensitivity. I was determined to report the setbacks as well as achievements, the uncertainties as well as the hopeful signs.

To seek a just peace, we pursued two distinct but mutually supporting courses of action: Negotiations and Vietnamization. We want to achieve an early and fair settlement through negotiations. But if the other side refuses, we shall proceed to strengthen the South Vietnamese forces. This will allow us to replace our troops on an orderly timetable. We hope that as Vietnamization proceeds the Government of North Vietnam will realize that it has more to gain in negotiations than in continued fighting.

We do not pretend that our goals in Vietnam have been accomplished, or that the way ahead will be easy.

—In South Vietnam, we have helped the South Vietnamese make progress in increasing their defense capacity, and we have reduced the number of American men and casualties. Yet Vietnamization is still a developing process, and enemy intentions on the battlefield are unclear.

—At the conference table, we have made generous and reasonable proposals for a settlement. Yet the other side still refuses to negotiate seriously.

Despite these uncertainties, I believe that we are on the right road, and that we are moving toward our goals.

Negotiations

In seeking a negotiated settlement of the war, we did not underestimate the difficulties ahead:

—We knew that the basic questions at issue in negotiations—particularly the resolution of political power in such a war—were enormously complex. There could be no rigid formula or strict agenda.

—We were aware that Hanoi's actions and doctrinal statements about "protracted conflict," caused it to view negotiations as a means of pressure, rather than as an avenue to a fair compromise.

—We realized that our opponent had sacrificed heavily; he had demonstrated a tenacious commitment to the war, and obviously harbored a deep mistrust of negotiations as a means of settling disputes. As I wrote to the last President Ho Chi Minh last July in an appeal to him to join us in finding a rapid solution: "It is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war."

These were formidable obstacles. But we were equally convinced that negotiations offered the best hope of a rapid settlement of the war. The specific issues were complex but could be resolved, once both sides made the fundamental decision to negotiate in a spirit of goodwill. Therefore we and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam moved to demonstrate to a mistrustful adversary our willingness to negotiate seriously and flexibly.

On May 14, I made a number of far-reaching proposals for a settlement. They included a mutual withdrawal of all non-South Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam and internationally-supervised free elections.

I also indicated that we seek no bases in Vietnam and no military ties, that we are willing to agree to neutrality or to unification of Vietnam if that is what the South Vietnamese people choose.

In order to encourage the other side, to negotiate, I indicated that our proposals were flexible, and that we were prepared to consider other approaches consistent with our principles. We insisted only on one general proposition for which the Government of North Vietnam itself has claimed to be fighting—that the people of South Vietnam be able to decide their own future free of outside interference.

The proposals I made on May 14 still stand. They offer all parties an opportunity to end the war quickly and on an equitable basis.

In a similar spirit, President Thieu of the Republic of Vietnam on July 11 offered a comprehensive set of proposals. They include free elections in which all the people and parties of South Vietnam can participate, including the National Liberation Front and its adherents, and a mixed Electoral Commission on which all parties can be represented. We have supported those proposals.

At Midway, in early June, President Thieu and I both publicly pledged to accept *any* outcome of free elections, regardless of what changes they might bring.

Throughout the year, we explored every means of engaging the other side in serious negotiations—in the public talks in Paris, in private conversations, and through reliable third parties.

To demonstrate our willingness to wind down the war, I also ordered a reduction in the level of our military operations in Vietnam. Our tactical air and B–52 operations have been reduced by over 25 per cent. Our combat deaths have dropped by two-thirds.

Nor were our proposals put forward on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have repeatedly expressed our willingness to discuss the other side's ten-point program. But Hanoi has adamantly refused even to discuss our proposals. It has refused to negotiate with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, although it had agreed to do so as one of the "understandings" that led to the bombing halt. It has insisted that we must unconditionally and totally accept its demands for unilateral U.S. withdrawal and for the removal of the leaders of the Government of South Vietnam. It has demanded these things as conditions for just *beginning* negotiations. If we were to accept these demands, we could have conceded the fundamental points at issue. There would be nothing left to negotiate.

If the other side is interested in genuine negotiations there are many ways they can let us know and there are many channels open to them.

The key to peace lies in Hanoi—in its decision to end the bloodshed and to negotiate in the true sense of the word.

The United States has taken three major steps which we were told repeatedly would lead to serious negotiations. We stopped the bombing of North Vietnam; we began the withdrawl of U.S. forces from

Vietnam; and we agreed to negotiate with the National Liberation Front as one of the parties to the negotiation. But none of those moves brought about the response or the reaction which their advocates had claimed. It is time for Hanoi to heed the concern of mankind and turn our negotiations into a serious give-and-take. Hanoi will find us forthcoming and flexible.

Vietnamization

The other course of action we are pursuing—Vietnamization—is a program to strengthen the ability of the South Vietnamese Government and people to defend themselves. It emphasizes progress in providing physical security for the Vietnamese people and in extending the authority of the South Vietnamese Government throughout the countryside.

Vietnamization is not a substitute for negotiations, but a spur to negotiations. In strengthening the capability of the Government and people of South Vietnam to defend themselves, we provide Hanoi with an authentic incentive to negotiate seriously now. Confronted by Vietnamization, Hanoi's alternative to a reasonable settlement is to continue its costly sacrifices while its bargaining power diminishes.

Vietnamization has two principal components. The first is the strengthening of the armed forces of the South Vietnamese in numbers, equipment, leadership and combat skills, and overall capability. The second component is the extension of the pacification program in South Vietnam.

Tangible progress has been made toward strengthening the South Vietnamese armed forces. Their number has grown, particularly the local and territorial forces. For example the numerical strength of the South Vietnamese Regional Forces and Popular Forces—important elements in resisting guerrilla attacks—grown by more than 75,000 in the last year. The effectiveness of these forces is improving in most areas. In addition, about 400,000 weapons have been supplied to South Vietnamese villagers who have become part of the Peoples' Self Defense Force, a local militia.

Under the Vietnamization program, we have reversed the trend of American military engagement in Vietnam and the South Vietnamese have assumed a greater role in combat operations. We have cut the authorized strength of American forces by 115,500 as of April 15, 1970. American forces will continue to be withdrawn in accordance with an orderly schedule based on three criteria: the level of enemy activity; progress in the negotiations; and the increasing ability of the South Vietnamese people to assume for themselves the task of their own defense.

During this process, we have kept in close consultations with the allied nations—Australia, Korea, New Zealand, and Thailand—which also contribute troops to assist the Vietnamese. Their forces continue to bear a significant burden in this common struggle.

As the Vietnamese Government bears the growing cost of these augmented forces, and as U.S. military spending in Vietnam is reduced with the continuing reduction of the U.S. military presence there, there will be additional strains on the Vietnamese economy.

The Vietnamese will require assistance in dealing with these economic problems. Although our spending for purely military purposes in Vietnam can be expected to decrease substantially during the process of Vietnamization, some increases in our spending for economic purposes will be required.

Vietnamization also involves expansion of the pacification program. Our understanding of the pacification program and of the criteria for measuring its success needed improvement. I therefore ordered a comprehensive study of conditions in the countryside by a committee charged with analyzing the statistics of Vietnam and keeping the situation under constant review.

The study has concluded that the most meaningful criteria for South Vietnamese Government success in the countryside are the establishment in each hamlet of (1) an adequate defense, and (2) a fully functioning government resident in the hamlet 24 hours a day. If the Government can achieve these two objectives, it can prevent the enemy from subverting and terrorizing the population or mobilizing it for its own purposes. The enemy will be denied any but the most limited and furtive access to the people, and will encounter increasing hostility or indifference as they seek the assistance they formerly enjoyed. The enemy forces will be isolated and forced to fight as a conventional expeditionary force, being dependent on external sources of supply and reinforcement.

This is very important: Enemy main force activities have in the past relied on active assistance from the population in the countryside for intelligence, food, money and manpower. This has enabled the enemy to use the countryside as a springboard from which to strike at key Vietnamese cities and installations. If they are forced to fight as a conventional army, with their support provided from their own resources rather than from the population, the enemy will lose momentum as they move forward because their supply lines will lengthen and they will encounter increasing opposition.

To date, the pacification program is succeeding.

Enemy forces have suffered heavy casualties, many in the course of their own offensives of 1968 and early 1969. The operations of U.S. and South Vietnamese troops against enemy main force units have prevented those units from moving freely through the populated areas and have more and more forced them back into bases in remote areas and along the borders of South Vietnam.

Since 1967, the percentage of the rural population living in areas with adequate defense and a fully functioning local government—the two criteria for Government success mentioned above—has more than doubled. By a similar standard, Viet Cong control over the rural population has drooped sharply to less than ten per cent.

The enemy is facing greater difficulty in recruitment and supply. North Vietnamese fillers are being used to bolster Viet Cong main force and local force units, whose strength appears to be declining in most areas. More of the enemy's time is taken up in gaining strength for new offensives which appear to be progressively less efficient.

* * * * * * *

Claims of progress in Vietnam have been frequent during the course of our involvement there—and have often proved too optimis-

tic. However careful our planning, and however hopeful we are for the progress of these plans, we are conscious of two basic facts:

—We cannot try to fool the enemy, who knows what is actually happening.

—Nor must we fool ourselves. The American people must have the full truth. We cannot afford a loss of confidence in our judgment and in our leadership.

Because the prospects and the progress of Vietnamization demand the most careful study and thoughtful analysis—by ourselves and our critics alike—we have made major efforts to determine the facts.

At my request, Secretary Laird and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, have just traveled to Vietnam to look into the situation. Last fall, I asked Sir Robert Thompson, an objective British expert with long experience in the area, to make his own candid and independent appraisal for me.

We have established a Vietnam Special Studies Group whose membership includes my Assistant for National Security Affairs as Chairman, the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have directed this group to:

—sponsor and direct on a continuous basis systematic analyses of U.S. programs and activities in Vietnam;

—undertake special analytical studies on a priority basis as required to support broad policy and related program decisions; and

—provide a forum for and encourage systematic interagency analysis of U.S. activities in Vietnam.

Essentially the purpose of this group is to direct studies of the factual situation in Vietnam. These studies are undertaken by analysts and individuals with experience in Vietnam drawn from throughout the Government. Their findings are presented to the Vietnam Special Studies Group and the National Security Council.

As described below, the group has helped us identify problems for the future. It has provoked the most searching questions, as well as measured the progress we have achieved.

Prisoners of War

In human terms, no other aspect of conflict in Vietnam more deeply troubles thousands of American families than the refusal of North Vietnam to agree to humane treatment of prisoners of war or to provide information about men missing in action. Over 1400 Americans are now listed as missing or captured, some as long as five years, most with no word ever to their families. In the Paris meetings, we have sought repeatedly to raise this subject—to no avail. Far from agreeing to arrangements for the release of prisoners, the other side has failed even to live up to the humane standards of the 1949 Geneva Convention on prisoners of war: the provision of information about all prisoners, the right of all prisoners to correspond with their families and to receive packages, inspection of POW camps by an impartial organization such as the International Red Cross, and the early release of seriously sick and wounded prisoners.

This is not a political or military issue, but a matter of basic humanity. There may be disagreement about other aspects of this conflict, but there can be no disagreement on humane treatment for prisoners of war. I state again our readiness to proceed at once to arrangements for the release of prisoners of war on both sides.

Tasks for the Future

This Administration is carrying out a concerted and coordinated plan for peace in Vietnam. But the following tasks still remain:

—*Negotiations.* One task is to persuade the North Vietnamese Government to join us in genuine negotiations leading toward a compromise settlement which would assure the self-determination of the South Vietnamese people and would also ensure the continued neutrality of Laos. The fact that it has not yet given any indication of doing so does not necessarily mean that such a decision cannot come at any point. While we harbor no undue optimism, the history of negotiations on Vietnam shows that break-throughs have always come, with little warning after long deadlocks.

Hanoi faces serious and complicated issues in making the fundamental decision to seek a genuine settlement. Allied military pressures, uncertainties in its international support, strains within North Vietnam, the recent display of American public support for a just peace, and the strengthening of the South Vietnamese Government under Vietnamization, all argue for seeking a settlement now. On the other hand, Hanoi's mistrust of our intentions before and after a settlement, its hope that American domestic pressures will force us to withdraw rapidly or make major concessions, its hope for political instability and collapse in South Vietnam, its emotional commitment to the struggle, and its own political weakness in the South must weight heavily against its willingness to negotiate.

We do not know what choice the North Vietnamese Government will make. For our part, we shall continue to try to make clear to that Government that its true long-range interests lie in the direction of negotiations. As we have often said, we shall be flexible and generous when serious negotiations start at last.

—*Enemy Intentions.* Another crucial task is to evaluate Hanoi's intentions on the battlefield. We hope that the level of combat can be further reduced, but we must be prepared for new enemy offensives. The Government of North Vietnam could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence would be to its advantage. As I said on November 3, and have repeated since, if I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I will not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

—*Vietnamization.* A major problem we must face is whether the Vietnamization program will succeed. The enemy is determined and able, and will continue to fight unless he can be

persuaded that negotiation is the best solution. The success of Vietnamization is a basic element in Hanoi's assessment of its policies, just as it is in our own.

—We are now attempting to determine the depth and durability of the progress which has been made in Vietnam. We are studying the extent to which it has been dependent on the presence of American combat and support forces as well as on expanded and improved South Vietnamese army and territorial forces. We are asking searching questions:

- What is the enemy's capability to mount sustained operations? Could they succeed in undoing our gains?
- What is the actual extent of improvement in allied capabilities? In particular, are the Vietnamese developing the leadership, logistics capabilities, tactical know-how, and sensitivity to the needs of their own people which are indispensable to continued success?
- What alternative strategies are open to the enemy in the face of continued allied success? If they choose to conduct a protracted, low-intensity war, could they simply wait out U.S. withdrawals and then, through reinvigorated efforts, seize the initiative again and defeat the South Vietnamese forces?
- Most important, what are the attitudes of the Vietnamese people, whose free choice we are fighting to preserve? Are they truly being disaffected from the Viet Cong, or are they indifferent to both sides? What do their attitudes imply about the likelihood that the pacification gains will stick?

These studies are continuing, as are our studies of the enemy situation and options. I have made it clear that I want the Vietnam Special Studies Group and the other agencies of the U.S. Government to provide the fullest possible presentation of the facts, whatever their policy implications might be.

Our task is to continue to proceed carefully in the policy of Vietnamization, and to find the means which will best support our purpose of helping the South Vietnamese to strengthen themselves.

Even as the fighting continues in Vietnam, we must plan for the transition from war to peace. Much has already been done to bring relief to suffering people, to reconstruct war-torn areas and to promote economic rehabilitation. We have been supporting those efforts. We shall continue to support them and we shall count on other nations to help.

I look forward to the day when I shall not have to on the problems of ending a complex war but rather on the opportunities offered by a stable peace, when the men and nations who have fought so long and so hard will be reconciled.

I expressed my hope for the future of Vietnam when I spoke to the United Nations on September 18:

"When the war ends, the United States will stand ready to help the people of Vietnam—all of them—in their tasks of renewal and reconstruction. And when peace comes at last to Vietnam, it can truly come with healing in its wings."

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT NIXON ON THE SITUATION IN LAOS, MARCH 6, 1970[1]

In light of the increasingly massive presence of North Vietnamese troops and their recent offensives in Laos, I have written letters today to British Prime Minister Wilson and Soviet Premier Kosygin asking their help in restoring the 1962 Geneva Agreements for that country.

As Cochairmen of that Conference, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have particular responsibilities for seeing that its provisions are honored. My letters note the persistent North Vietnamese violations of the Accords and their current offensives; support the Laotian Prime Minister's own current appeal to the Cochairmen for consultations; urge the Cochairmen to work with other signatories of the Geneva Accords; and pledge full United States cooperation.

Hanoi's most recent military build-up in Laos has been particularly escalatory. They have poured over 13,000 additional troops into Laos during the past few months, raising their total in Laos to over 67,000. Thiry North Vietnamese battalions from regular division units participated in the current campaign in the Plain of Jars with tanks, armored cars, and long-range artillery. The indigenous Laotian Communists, the Pathet Lao, are playing an insignificant role.

North Vietnam's military escalation in Laos has intensified public discussion in this country. The purpose of this statement is to set forth the record of what we found in January 1969 and the policy of this administration since that time.

I. What We Found

A. THE 1962 ACCORDS

When we came into office, this administration found a highly precarious situation in Laos. Its basic legal framework had been established by the 1962 Accords entered into by the Kennedy administration.

Laos has been a battleground for most of the past 20 years. In 1949 it became a semi-independent state within the French Union. The Pathlet Lao Communists rebelled against the government in the early 1950's, and fighting continued until the 1954 Geneva settlements ended the Indochina War. Laos at that time became an independent neutral state. The indigenous Communists, the Pathet Lao, nevertheless retained control of the two northern provinces.

Since then, this small country has been the victim of persistent subversion and finally invasion by the North Vietnamese.

By 1961 North Vietnamese involvement became marked, the Communist forces made great advances, and a serious situation confronted the Kennedy administration. In his news conference of March 1961, President Kennedy said, "Laos is far away from America, but the world is small. . . . The security of all Southeast Asia will be endangered if Laos loses its neutral independence."

In May 1961 negotiations for a Laotian settlement opened in Geneva, with Governor Harriman as the chief American negotiator.

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, March 9, 1970, pp. 322–328.

During the course of those long negotiations fighting continued and the Communists made further advances. Faced with a potential threat to Thailand, President Kennedy ordered 5,000 Marines to that country in May 1962.

Finally, in July 1962, after 14 months of negotiations, 14 nations signed the Geneva Accords providing for the neutralization of Laos. Other signatories besides the United States included the Soviet Union, Communist China, North Vietnam, the United Kingdom, France, the Southeast Asian nations most directly involved, and the members of the International Control Commission, Canada, India and Poland.

These Accords came one month after the three contending forces within Laos announced agreement on the details of a coalition government composed of the three major political factions and headed by the neutralist, Prince Souvanna Phouma. North Vietnam claimed that it favored a coalition government. Both North Vietnam and the Soviet Union backed Prince Souvanna for his new post. The present Government of Laos thus has been the one originally proposed by the Communists. In approving the 1962 arrangements, the Kennedy administration in effect accepted the basic formulation which had been advanced by North Vietnam and the Soviet Union for a Laotian political settlement.

B. THE RECORD 1962–1969

Before the ink was dry on the 1962 Geneva documents, and despite the fact that they embodied most of its own proposals, North Vietnam started violating them. In compliance with the Accords, the 666 Americans who had been assisting the Royal Lao Government withdrew under ICC supervision. In contrast, the North Vietnamese passed only a token 40 men through ICC checkpoints and left over 6,000 troops in the country.

A steadily growing number of North Vietnamese troops have remained there ever since, in flagrant violation of the Geneva Accords. They climbed to about 33,000 in mid-1967, 46,000 in mid-1968, and 55,000 in mid-1969. Today they are at an all-time high of some 67,000 men.

These are not advisers or technicians or attaches. They are line units of the North Vietnamese army conducting open aggression against a neighbor that poses no threat to Hanoi.

In addition, since 1964, over a half-million North Vietnamese troops have crossed the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" in Laos to invade South Vietnam. This infiltration route provides the great bulk of men and supplies for the war in South Vietnam.

The political arrangements for a three-way government survived only until April 1963 when the Pathet Lao Communist leaders departed from the capital and left their cabinet posts vacant. Fighting soon resumed and since then, there have been cycles of Communist offensives and Royal Laotian Government counteroffensives. The enemy forces have been led and dominated throughout by the North Vietnamese. In recent years Hanoi has provided the great majority of Communist troops in Laos.

North Vietnam appears to have two aims in Laos. The first is to insure its ability to use Laos as a supply route for North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. The second is to weaken and subvert the Royal Lao Government—originally established at its urging—to hinder it from interfering with North Vietnamese use of Laotian territory, and to pave the way for the eventual establishment of a government more amenable to Communist control.

Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has tried a variety of diplomatic efforts to restore peace in Laos. He has repeatedly appealed to the Cochairmen and others to help arrange for restoration of the 1962 Accords. He and the International Control Commission, hampered by lack of authority, have reported and publicized North Vietnamese violations of the Accords. And Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has made several attempts to achieve political reconciliation with the Pathet Lao and to reconstitute a tripartite government.

None of these efforts has borne fruit. Frustrated in his diplomatic efforts and confronted with continuing outside aggression, Souvanna has called upon three American administrations to assist his government in preserving Laotian neutrality and integrity.

By early 1963 the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao had openly breached the 1962 agreements by attacking the neutralist government forces in north Laos and by occupying and fortifying the area in southeast Laos along what came to be known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In these circumstances, the Laotian Prime Minister requested American aid in the form of supplies and munitions. The Kennedy administration provided this assistance in line with the Laotian government's right under the Geneva Accords to seek help in its self-defense.

In mid-May 1964 the Pathet Lao supported by the North Vietnamese attacked Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's neutralist military forces on the Plain of Jars. North Vietnam also began to increase its use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail to further its aggression against South Vietnam. The Johnson administration responded to Royal Laotian Government requests to meet this escalation by increasing our training and logistic support to the Royal Lao Government. In May 1964, as North Vietnamese presence increased, the United States, at Royal Lao Government request, began flying certain interdictory missions against invaders who were violating Lao neutrality.

Thus, when this administration came into office we faced a chronically serious situation in Laos. There had been 6 years of seasonal Communist attacks and growing U.S. involvement at the request of the Royal Laotian Government. The North Vietnamese had steadily increased both their infiltration through Laos into South Vietnam and their troop presence in Laos itself. Any facade of native Pathet Lao independence had been stripped away. In January 1969, we thus had a military assistance program reaching back over 6 years, and air operations dating over 4 years.

II. THE POLICY OF THIS ADMINISTRATION

Since this administration has been in office, North Vietnamese pressure has continued. Last spring, the North Vietnamese mounted

a campaign which threatened the royal capital and moved beyond the areas previously occupied by Communists. A counterattack by the Lao government forces, intended to relieve this military pressure and cut off supply lines, caught the enemy by surprise and succeeded beyond expectations in pushing them off the strategic central plain in north Laos known as the Plain of Jars.

The North Vietnamese left behind huge stores of arms, ammunition, and other supplies cached on the Plain. During their operations in the Plain of Jars last summer and fall, Lao Government forces captured almost 8,000 tons of Communist equipment, supplies and weapons, including tanks, armored cars, artillery pieces, machine guns, and thousands of individual weapons including about 4,000 tons of ammunition. The size and nature of these supply caches the Communists had emplaced on the Plain by the summer of 1969 show clearly that many months ago the North Vietnamese were preparing for major offensive actions on Laotian territory against the Royal Lao Government.

During the final months of 1969 and January 1970, Hanoi sent over 13,000 additional troops into Laos and rebuilt their stocks and supply lines. They also introduced tanks and long-range artillery.

During January and February, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma proposed to the other side that the Plain of Jars be neutralized. The Communists' response was to launch their current offensive which has recaptured the Plain of Jars and is threatening to go beyond the furthest line of past Communist advances.

The Prime Minister is now once again trying to obtain consultations among all the parties to the Geneva Accords, envisaged under Article IV when there is a violation of Lao sovereignty, independence, neutrality, or territorial integrity.

In this situation, our purposes remain straightforward.

We are trying above all to save American and allied lives in South Vietnam which are threatened. By the continual infiltration of North Vietnamese troops and supplies along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Hanoi has infiltrated over 100,000 men through Laos since this administration took office and over 500,000 altogether. Our airstrikes have destroyed weapons and supplies over the past 4 years which would have taken thousands of American lives.

We are also supporting the independence and neutrality of Laos as set forth in the 1962 Geneva Agreements. Our assistance has always been at the request of the legitimate government of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma which the North Vietnamese helped establish; it is directly related to North Vietnamese violations of the agreement.

We continue to be hopeful of eventual progress in the negotiations in Paris. But serious doubts are raised as to Hanoi's intentions if it is simultaneously violating the Geneva Agreements on Laos which we reached with them largely on the basis of their own proposals. What we do in Laos has thus as its aim to bring about conditions for progress toward peace in the entire Indo-Chinese Peninsula.

I turn now to the precise nature of our aid to Laos.

In response to press conference questions on September 26, December 8 and January 30, I have indicated:

—That the United States has no ground combat forces in Laos.
—That there were 50,000 North Vietnamese troops in Laos and that "more perhaps are coming."
—That, at the request of the Royal Laotian Government which was set up by the Geneva Accords of 1962, we have provided logistical and other assistance to that government for the purpose of helping it to prevent the Communist conquest of Laos.
—That we have used air power for the purpose of interdicting the flow of North Vietnamese troops and supplies on that part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail which runs through Laos.
—That, at the request of the Royal Laotian Government, we have flown reconnaissance missions in Northern Laos in support of the Laotian Government's efforts to defend itself against North Vietnamese aggression and that we were engaged in "some other activities."

It would, of course, have posed no political problem for me to have disclosed in greater detail those military support activities which had been initiated by two previous administrations and which have been continued by this administration.

I have not considered it in the national interest to do so because of our concern that putting emphasis on American activities in Laos might hinder the efforts of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma to bring about adherence to the Geneva Agreements by the Communist signatories.

In recent days, however, there has been intense public speculation to the effect that the United States involvement in Laos has substantially increased in violation of the Geneva Accords, that American ground forces are engaged in combat in Laos and that our air activity has had the effect of escalating the conflict.

Because these reports are grossly inaccurate, I have concluded that our national interest will be served by putting the subject into perspective through a precise description of our current activities in Laos.

These are the facts:

—There are no American ground combat troops in Laos.
—We have no plans for introducing ground combat forces into Laos.
—The total number of Americans directly employed by the U.S. Government in Laos is 616. In addition, there are 424 Americans employed on contract to the government or to government contractors. Of these 1040 Americans, the total number, military and civilian, engaged in a military advisory or military training capacity numbers 320. Logistics personnel number 323.
—No American stationed in Laos has ever been killed in ground combat operations.
—U.S. personnel in Laos during the past year has not increased while during the past few months, North Vietnam has sent over 13,000 additional combat ground troops into Laos.
—When requested by the Royal Laotian Government, we have continued to provide military assistance to regular and irregular Laotian forces in the form of equipment, training and

logistics. The levels of our assistance have risen in response to the growth of North Vietnamese combat activities.

—We have continued to conduct air operations. Our first priority for such operations is to interdict the continued flow of troops and supplies across Laotian territory on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. As Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces, I consider it my responsibility to use our air power to interdict this flow of supplies and men into South Vietnam and thereby avoid a heavy toll of American and allied lives.

—In addition to these air operations on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, we have continued to carry out reconnaissance flights in Northern Laos and to fly combat support missions for Laotian forces when requested to do so by the Royal Laotian Government.

—In every instance our combat air operations have taken place only over those parts of Laos occupied and contested by North Vietnamese and other Communist forces. They have been flown only when requested by the Laotian Government. The level of our air operations has been increased only as the number of North Vietnamese in Laos and the level of their aggression has increased.

Our goal in Laos has been and continues to be to reduce American involvement and not to increase it, to bring peace in accordance with the 1962 Accords and not to prolong the war.

That is the picture of our current aid to Laos. It is limited. It is requested. It is supportive and defensive. It continues the purposes and operations of two previous administrations. It has been necessary to protect American lives in Vietnam and to preserve a precarious but important balance in Laos.

III. THE FUTURE

Peace remains the highest priority of this administration. We will continue our search for it in Vietnam. I hope my appeal today to the Geneva Conference Cochairmen will help in Laos. Our policy for that torn country will continue to rest on some basic principles:

—We will cooperate fully with all diplomatic efforts to restore the 1962 Geneva Agreements.

—We will continue to support the legitimate government of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and his efforts to deescalate the conflict and reach political understandings.

—Our air interdiction efforts are designed to protect American and allied lives in Vietnam. Our support efforts have the one purpose of helping prevent the recognized Laotian government from being overwhelmed by larger Communist forces dominated by the North Vietnamese.

—We will continue to give the American people the fullest possible information on our involvement, consistent with national security.

I hope that a genuine quest for peace in Indochina can now begin. For Laos, this will require the efforts of the Geneva Conference Cochairmen and the signatory countries.

But most of all it will require realism and reasonableness from Hanoi. For it is the North Vietnamese, not we, who have escalated the fighting. Today there are 67,000 North Vietnamese troops in this small country. There are no American troops there. Hanoi is not threatened by Laos; it runs risk only when it moves its forces across borders.

We desire nothing more in Laos than to see a return to the Geneva Agreements and the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops, leaving the Lao people to settle their own differences in a peaceful manner.

In the search for peace we stand ready to cooperate in every way with the other countries involved. That search prompted my letters today to the British Prime Minister and the Soviet Premier. That search will continue to guide our policy.

NOTE: The statement was released at Key Biscayne, Fla.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT NIXON OF AN UPDATE REPORT ON VIETNAM, APRIL 20, 1970 [1]

Good evening, my fellow Americans.

I have requested this television and radio time to give you a progress report on our plan to bring a just peace to Vietnam.

When I first outlined our program last June, I stated that the rate of American withdrawals from Vietnam would depend on three criteria—progress in the training of the South Vietnamese, progress in the Paris negotiations, and the level of enemy activity.

Tonight I am pleased to report that progress in training and equipping South Vietnamese forces has substantially exceeded our original expectations last June.

Very significant advances have also been made in pacification.

Although we recognize that problems remain, these are encouraging trends.

However, I must report with regret that no progress has taken place on the negotiating front. The enemy still demands that we unilaterally and unconditionally withdraw all American forces, that in the process we overthrow the elected government of South Vietnam and that the United States accept a political settlement that would have the practical consequence of the forcible imposition of a Communist government upon the people of South Vietnam.

That would mean humiliation and defeat for the United States. This we cannot and will not accept.

Let me now turn to the third criteria for troop withdrawals—the level of enemy activity. In several areas since December, that level has substantially increased.

In recent months Hanoi has sent thousands more of their soldiers to launch new offensives in neutral Laos in violation of the Geneva Accords of 1962 to which they were signatories.

South of Laos, almost 40,000 Communist troops are now conducting overt aggression against Cambodia, a small neutralist country

[1] Office of the White House Press Secretary (San Clemente, California).

that the Communists have used for years as a base for attacks upon South Vietnam in violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 to which they were also signatories.

This follows the consistent pattern of North Vietnamese aggression in Indochina. During the past eight years they have sent tens of thousands of troops into all three countries of the peninsula and across every single common border.

Men and supplies continue to pour down the Ho Chi Minh Trail; and in the past two weeks, the Communists have stepped up their attacks upon allied forces in South Vietnam.

However, despite this new enemy activity, there has been an overall decline in enemy force levels in South Vietnam since December.

As the enemy force levels have declined and as the South Vietnamese have assumed more of the burden of battle, American casualties have declined.

I am glad to be able to report tonight that in the first three months of 1970 the number of Americans killed in action dropped to the lowest first quarter level in five years.

In June, a year ago, when we began troop withdrawals, we did so on a "cut and try" basis—with no certainty that the program would be successful. In June we announced withdrawal of 25,000 American troops; in September another 35,000 and then in December 50,000 more. These withdrawals have now been completed and as of April 15, a total of 115,500 men have returned home from Vietnam.

We have now reached a point where we can confidently move from a period of "cut and try" to a longer-range program for the replacement of Americans by South Vietnamese troops.

I am, therefore, tonight announcing plans for the withdrawal of an additional 150,000 American troops to be completed during the spring of next year. This will bring a total reduction of 265,500 men in our Armed Forces in Vietnam below the level that existed when we took office fifteen months ago.

The timing and pace of these new withdrawals within the overall schedule will be determined by our best judgment of the current military and diplomatic situation.

This far-reaching decision was made after consultation with our commanders in the field and it has the approval of the Government of South Vietnam.

Now viewed against the enemy's escalation in Laos and Cambodia, and in view of the stepped-up attacks this month in South Vietnam, this decision clearly involves some risks.

But I again remind the leaders of North Vietnam that while we are taking these risks for peace, they will be taking grave risks should they attempt to use the occasion to jeopardize the security of our remaining forces in Vietnam by increased military action in Vietnam, in Cambodia, or in Laos.

I repeat what I said November 3rd and December 15th. If I conclude increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

My responsibility as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces is for the safety of our men, and I shall meet that responsibility. The

decision I have announced tonight to withdraw 150,000 more men over the next year is based entirely on the progress of our Vietnamization program.

There is a better, shorter path to peace—through negotiations. We shall withdraw more than 150,000 over the next year if we make progress on the negotiating front.

Had the other side responded positively at Paris to our offer of May 14 last year, most American and foreign troops would have left South Vietnam by now.

A political settlement is the heart of the matter. That is what the fighting in Indochina has been about for the past 30 years.

We have noted with interest the recent statement by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Malik concerning a possible new Geneva Conference on Indochina.

We do not yet know the full implications of this statement. It is in the spirit of the letters I wrote on April 7, to signatories of the 1962 Geneva Accords urging consultations and observance of the Accords. We have consistently said we were willing to explore any reasonable path to peace. We are in the process of exploring this one.

But whatever the fate of this particular move we are ready for a settlement fair to everyone.

Let me briefly review for you the principles that govern our view of a just political settlement.

First, our overriding objective is a political solution that reflects the will of the South Vietnamese people and allows them to determine their future without outside interference.

I again reaffirm this Government's acceptance of eventual, total withdrawal of American troops. In turn, we must see the permanent withdrawal of all North Vietnamese troops and be given reasonable assurances they will not return.

Second, a fair political solution should reflect the existing relationship of political forces within South Vietnam. We recognize the complexity of shaping machinery that would fairly apportion political power in South Vietnam. We are flexible; we have offered nothing on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

And third, we will abide by the outcome of the political process agreed upon. President Thieu and I have repeatedly stated our willingness to accept the free decision of the South Vietnamese people. But we will not agree to the arrogant demand that the elected leaders of the government of Vietnam be overthrown before real negotiations begin.

Let me briefly review the record of our efforts to end the war in Vietnam through negotiations.

We were told repeatedly in the past that our adversaries would negotiate seriously—

—if only we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam

—if only we began withdrawing our forces from South Vietnam

—if only we dealt with the National Liberation Front as one of the parties to the negotiations

—if only we would agree in principle to remove all our forces from Vietnam.

We have taken all these steps.

The United States, over a year and a half ago, halted all bombing of North Vietnam. Long ago we agreed to negotiate with the National Liberation Front as one of the parties. We have already withdrawn 115,500 American troops. Tonight I have announced a decision to reduce American force levels by a quarter of a million men from what they were fifteen months ago. We have offered repeatedly to withdraw all of our troops if the North Vietnamese would withdraw theirs. We have taken risks for peace that every fair and objective man can readily recognize.

Still there is no progress at the negotiating table.

It is Hanoi and Hanoi alone, that stands today blocking the path to a just peace for all the peoples of Southeast Asia.

When our astronauts returned safely to earth last Friday, the whole world rejoiced with us. We could have had no more eloquent demonstration of a profound truth—that the greatest force working for peace in the world today is the fact that men and women everywhere regardless of differences in race, religion, nationality, or political philosophy, value the life of a human being. We were as one as we thought of those brave men, their wives, their children, their parents.

The death of a single man in war, whether he is an American, a South Vietnamese, Viet Cong, or a North Vietnamese, is a human tragedy. That is why we want to end this war and achieve a just peace. We call upon our adversaries to join us in working at the conference table toward that goal.

No Presidential statement on Vietnam would be complete without an expression of our concern for the fate of the American prisoners of war.

The callous exploitation of the anxieties and anguish of the parents, the wives and the children of these brave men, as negotiating pawns, is an unforgivable breach of the elementary rules of conduct between civilized nations. We shall continue to make every possible effort to get Hanoi to provide information on the whereabouts of all prisoners; to allow them to communicate with their families; to permit inspection of prisoners of war camps; and to provide for the early release of at least the sick and the wounded.

My fellow Americans, five years ago American combat troops were first sent to Vietnam. The war since that time has been the longest and one of the most costly and difficult conflicts in our history.

The decision I have announced tonight means that we finally have in sight the just peace we are seeking. We can now say with confidence that pacification is succeeding. We can now say with confidence that the South Vietnamese can develop the capability for their own defense. And we can say with confidence that all American combat forces can and will be withdrawn.

I could not make these statements tonight had it not been for the dedication, bravery and sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of young men who have served in Vietnam. Nor could I have made it had it not been for the perseverence of millions of Americans at home.

When men write the history of this nation they will record that no people in the annals of time made greater sacrifices in a more

selfless cause than the American people sacrificed for the right of eighteen million people in a faraway land to avoid the imposition of Communist rule against their will and for the right of these people to determine their own future free of any outside interference.

The enemy has failed to win the war in Vietnam because of three basic errors in their strategy.

They thought they could win a military victory. They have failed to do so.

They thought they could win politically in South Vietnam. They have failed to do so.

They thought they could win politically in the United States. This proved to be their most fatal miscalculation.

In this great free country of ours, we debate—we disagree, sometimes violently, but the mistake the totalitarians make over and over again, is to conclude that debate in a free country is proof of weakness. We are not a weak people. We are a strong people. America has never been defeated in the proud 190-year history of this country, and we shall not be defeated in Vietnam.

Tonight I want to thank the American people for the support which you have given so generously to the cause of a just peace in Vietnam.

It is your steadiness and your stamina that the leaders of North Vietnam are watching tonight. It is these qualities, as much as any proposals, that will bring them to negotiate.

It is America's resolve, as well as America's reasonableness, that will achieve our goal of a just peace in Vietnam and strengthen the foundations of a just and lasting peace in the Pacific and throughout the world.

Thank you and good night.

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT NIXON ON THE CAMBODIAN STRIKE, APRIL 30, 1970[1]

Good evening, my fellow Americans. Ten days ago, in my report to the Nation on Viet-Nam, I announced a decision to withdraw an additional 150,000 Americans from Viet-Nam over the next year. I said then that I was making that decision despite our concern over increased enemy activity in Laos, in Cambodia, and in South Viet-Nam.

At that time, I warned that if I concluded that increased enemy activity in any of these areas endangered the lives of Americans remaining in Viet-Nam, I would not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

Despite that warning, North Viet-Nam has increased its military aggression in all these areas, and particularly in Cambodia.

After full consultation with the National Security Council, Ambassador Bunker, General Abrams, and my other advisers, I have concluded that the actions of the enemy in the last 10 days clearly endanger the lives of Americans who are in Viet-Nam now

[1] Department of State Bulletin, pp. 617–621.

and would constitute an unacceptable risk to those who will be there after withdrawal of another 150,000.

To protect our men who are in Viet-Nam and to guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal and Vietnamization programs, I have concluded that the time has come for action.

Tonight I shall describe the actions of the enemy, the actions I have ordered to deal with that situation, and the reasons for my decision.

Cambodia, a small country of 7 million people, has been a neutral nation since the Geneva agreement of 1954—an agreement, incidentally, which was signed by the Government of North Viet-Nam.

American policy since then has been to scrupulously respect the neutrality of the Cambodian people. We have maintained a skeleton diplomatic mission of fewer than 15 in Cambodia's capital, and that only since last August. For the previous 4 years, from 1965 to 1969, we did not have any diplomatic mission whatever in Cambodia. And for the past 5 years, we have provided no military assistance whatever and no economic assistance to Cambodia.

North Viet-Nam, however, has not respected that neutrality.

For the past 5 years, as indicated on this map that you see here, North Viet-Nam has occupied military sanctuaries all along the Cambodian frontier with South Viet-Nam.[1] Some of these extend up to 20 miles into Cambodia. The sanctuaries are in red, and as you note, they are on both sides of the border. They are used for hit-and-run attacks on American and South Vietnamese forces in South Viet-Nam.

These Communist-occupied territories contain major base camps, training sites, logistics facilities, weapons and ammunition factories, airstrips, and prisoner of war compounds.

For 5 years neither the United States nor South Viet-Nam has moved against these enemy sanctuaries, because we did not wish to violate the territory of a neutral nation. Even after the Vietnamese Communists began to expand these sanctuaries 4 weeks ago, we counseled patience to our South Vietnamese allies and imposed restraints on our own commanders.

In contrast to our policy, the enemy in the past 2 weeks has stepped up his guerrilla actions, and he is concentrating his main forces in these sanctuaries that you see on this map, where they are building up to launch massive attacks on our forces and those of South Viet-Nam.

North Viet-Nam in the last 2 weeks has stripped away all pretense of respecting the sovereignty or the neutrality of Cambodia. Thousands of their soldiers are invading the country from the sanctuaries; they are encircling the Capital of Phnom Penh. Coming from these sanctuaries, as you see here, they have moved into Cambodia and are encircling the Capital.

Cambodia, as a result of this, has sent out a call to the United States, to a number of other nations, for assistance. Because if this enemy effort succeeds, Cambodia would become a vast enemy staging area and a springboard for attacks on South Viet-Nam along 600

[1] The map to which the President referred is not printed here.

miles of frontier, a refuge where enemy troops could return from combat without fear of retaliation.

North Vietnamese men and supplies could then be poured into that country, jeopardizing not only the lives of our own men but the people of South Viet-Nam as well.

THREE OPTIONS

Now, confronted with this situation, we have three options.

First, we can do nothing. Well, the ultimate result of that course of action is clear. Unless we indulge in wishful thinking, the lives of Americans remaining in Viet-Nam after our next withdrawal of 150,000 would be gravely threatened.

Let us go to the map again. Here is South Viet-Nam. Here is North Viet-Nam. North Viet-Nam already occupies this part of Laos. If North Viet-Nam also occupied this whole band in Cambodia, or the entire country, it would mean that South Viet-Nam was completely outflanked and the forces of Americans in this area, as well as the South Vietnamese, would be in an untenable military position.

Our second choice is to provide massive military assistance to Cambodia itself. Now, unfortunately, while we deeply sympathize with the plight of 7 million Cambodians, whose country is being invaded, massive amounts of military assistance could not be rapidly and effectively utilized by the small Cambodian Army against the immediate threat.

With other nations, we shall do our best to provide the small arms and other equipment which the Cambodian Army of 40,000 needs and can use for its defense. But the aid we will provide will be limited to the purpose of enabling Cambodia to defend its neutrality and not for the purpose of making it an active belligerent on one side or the other.

Our third choice is to go to the heart of the trouble. That means cleaning out major North Veitnamese and Viet Cong occupied territories—these sanctuaries which serve as bases for attacks on both Cambodia and American and South Vietnamese forces in South Viet-Nam. Some of these, incidentally, are as close to Saigon as Baltimore is to Washington. This one, for example [*indicating*], is called the Parrot's Beak. It is only 33 miles from Saigon.

ATTACKS ON ENEMY SANCTUARIES

Now, faced with these three options, this is the decision I have made.

In cooperation with the armed forces of South Viet-Nam, attacks are being launched this week to clean out major enemy sanctuaries on the Cambodian–Viet-Nam border.

A major responsibility for the ground operations is being assumed by South Vietnamese forces. For example, the attacks in several areas, including the Parrot's Beak that I referred to a moment ago, are exclusively South Vietnamese ground operations under South Vietnamese command, with the United States providing air and logistical support.

There is one area, however, immediately above Parrot's Beak, where I have concluded that a combined American and South Vietnamese operation is necessary.

Tonight American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Viet-Nam. This key control center has been occupied by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong for 5 years in blatant violation of Cambodia's neutrality.

This is not an invasion of Cambodia. The areas in which these attacks will be launched are completely occupied and controlled by North Vietnamese forces. Our purpose is not to occupy the areas. Once enemy forces are driven out of these sanctuaries and once their military supplies are destroyed, we will withdraw.

These actions are in no way directed at the security interests of any nation. Any government that chooses to use these actions as a pretext for harming relations with the United States will be doing so on its own responsibility and on its own initiative, and we will draw the appropriate conclusions.

Now, let me give you the reasons for my decision.

A majority of the American people, a majority of you listening to me, are for the withdrawal of our forces from Viet-Nam. The action I have taken tonight is indispensable for the continuing success of that withdrawal program.

A majority of the American people want to end this war rather than to have it drag on interminably. The action I have taken tonight will serve that purpose.

A majority of the American people want to keep the casualties of our brave men in Viet-Nam at an absolute minimum. The action I take tonight is essential if we are to accomplish that goal.

We take this action not for the purpose of expanding the war into Cambodia, but for the purpose of ending the war in Viet-Nam and winning the just peace we all desire. We have made and we will continue to make every possible effort to end this war through negotiation at the conference table rather than through more fighting on the battlefield.

The Record of North Viet-Nam's Intransigence

Let us look again at the record. We have stopped the bombing of North Viet-Nam. We have cut air operations by over 20 percent. We have announced withdrawal of over 250,000 of our men. We have offered to withdraw all of our men if they will withdraw theirs. We have offered to negotiate all issues with only one condition—and that is that the future of South Viet-Nam be determined not by North Viet-Nam, not by the United States, but by the people of South Viet-Nam themselves.

The answer of the enemy has been intransigence at the conference table, belligerence in Hanoi, massive military aggression in Laos and Cambodia, and stepped-up attacks in South Viet-Nam designed to increase American casualties.

This attitude has become intolerable. We will not react to this threat to American lives merely by plaintive diplomatic protests. If

we did, the credibility of the United States would be destroyed in every area of the world where only the power of the United States deters aggression.

Tonight I again warn the North Vietnamese that if they continue to escalate the fighting when the United States is withdrawing its forces, I shall meet my responsibility as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces to take the action I consider necessary to defend the security of our American men.

The action that I have announced tonight puts the leaders of North Viet-Nam on notice that we will be patient in working for peace, we will be conciliatory at the conference table, but we will not be humiliated. We will not be defeated. We will not allow American men by the thousands to be killed by an enemy from privileged sanctuaries.

The time came long ago to end this war through peaceful negotiations. We stand ready for those negotiations. We have made major efforts, many of which must remain secret. I say tonight that all the offers and approaches made previously remain on the conference table whenever Hanoi is ready to negotiate seriously.

But if the enemy response to our most conciliatory offers for peaceful negotiation continues to be to increase its attacks and humiliate and defeat us, we shall react accordingly.

My fellow Americans, we live in an age of anarchy, both abroad and at home. We see mindless attacks on all the great institutions which have been created by free civilizations in the last 500 years. Even here in the United States, great universities are being systematically destroyed. Small nations all over the world find themselves under attack from within and from without.

If, when the chips are down, the world's most powerful nation, the United States of America, acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world.

It is not our power but our will and character that is being tested tonight. The question all Americans must ask and answer tonight is this: Does the richest and strongest nation in the history of the world have the character to meet a direct challenge by a group which rejects every effort to win a just peace, ignores our warning, tramples on solemn agreements, violates the neutrality of an unarmed people, and uses our prisoners as hostages?

If we fail to meet this challenge, all other nations will be on notice that despite its overwhelming power the United States, when a real crisis comes, will be found wanting.

During my campaign for the Presidency, I pledged to bring Americans home from Viet-Nam. They are coming home.

I promised to end this war. I shall keep that promise.

I promised to win a just peace. I shall keep that promise.

We shall avoid a wider war. But we are also determined to put an end to this war.

In this room Woodrow Wilson made the great decisions which led to victory in World War I. Franklin Roosevelt made the decisions which led to our victory in World War II. Dwight D. Eisenhower made decisions which ended the war in Korea and avoided war in

the Middle East. John F. Kennedy, in his finest hour, made the great decision which removed Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba and the Western Hemisphere.

I have noted that there has been a great deal of discussion with regard to this decision that I have made, and I should point out that I do not contend that it is in the same magnitude as these decisions that I have just mentioned. But between those decision and this decision, there is a difference that is very fundamental. In those decisions the American people were not assailed by counsels of doubt and defeat from some of the most widely known opinion leaders of the Nation.

I have noted, for example, that a Republican Senator has said that this action I have taken means that my party has lost all chance of winning the November elections. And others are saying today that this move against enemy sanctuaries will make me a one-term President.

No one is more aware than I am of the political consequences of the action I have taken. It is tempting to take the easy political path: to blame this war on previous administrations and to bring all of our men home immediately, regardless of the consequences, even though that would mean defeat for the United States; to desert 18 million South Vietnamese people who have put their trust in us and to expose them to the same slaughter and savagery which the leaders of North Viet-Nam inflicted on hundreds of thousands of North Vietnamese who chose freedom when the Communists took over North Viet-Nam in 1954; to get peace at any price now, even though I know that a peace of humiliation for the United States would lead to a bigger war or surrender later.

I have rejected all political considerations in making this decision.

Whether my party gains in November is nothing compared to the lives of 400,000 brave Americans fighting for our country and for the cause of peace and freedom in Viet-Nam. Whether I may be a one-term President is insignificant compared to whether by our failure to act in this crisis the United States proves itself to be unworthy to lead the forces of freedom in this critical period in world history. I would rather be a one-term President and do what I believe is right than to be a two-term President at the cost of seeing America become a second-rate power and to see this nation accept the first defeat in its proud 190-year history.

I realize that in this war there are honest and deep differences in this country about whether we should have become involved, that there are differences as to how the war should have been conducted.

But the decision I announce tonight transcends those differences. For the lives of American men are involved. The opportunity for 150,000 Americans to come home in the next 12 months is involved. The future of 18 million people in South Viet-Nam and 7 million people in Cambodia is involved. The possibility of winning a just peace in Viet-Nam and in the Pacific is at stake.

It is customary to conclude a speech from the White House by asking support for the President of the United States. Tonight I depart from that precedent. What I ask is far more importnat. I ask for your support for our brave men fighting tonight halfway around

the world, not for territory, not for glory, but so that their younger brothers and their sons and your sons can have a chance to grow up in a world of peace and freedom and justice.

Thank you and good night.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWS CONFERENCE, MAY 8, 1970[1]

The President: Would you be seated. Mr. Risher [Eugene V. Risher, United Press International].

Q. Mr. President, have you been surprised by the intensity of the protest against your decison to send troops into Cambodia, and will these protests affect your policy in any way?

The President: No, I have not been surprised by the intensity of the protests. I realize that those who are protesting believe that this decison will expand the war, increase American casualties, and increase American involvement. Those who protest want peace. They want to reduce American casualties, and they want our boys brought home.

I made the decision, however, for the very reasons that they are protesting. As far as affecting my decision is concerned—their protests I am concerned about. I am concerned because I know how deeply they feel. But I know that what I have done will accomplish the goals that they want. It will shorten this war. It will reduce American casualties. It will allow us to go forward with our withdrawal program. The 150,000 Americans that I announced for withdrawal in the next year will come home on schedule. It will in my opinion serve the cause of a just peace in Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. President.

The President: Mr. Cormier [Frank Cormier, Associated Press].

Q. Do you believe that you can open up meaningful communications with this college-age generation, and how?

The President: I would like to try as best I can to do that. It is not easy. Sometimes they, as you know, talk so loudly that it is difficult to be heard, as we have learned during the campaigns and also during the appearances many of the Cabinet officers have made on university campuses. However, on an individual basis, I believe that it is possible to do what I have been doing, to bring representatives of the college and university communities to my office, to talk with them, to have a dialogue. I am very glad that Chancellor Heard, the chancellor of Vanderbilt, has agreed to take 2 months off from his very important responsibilities in that position to work with us in the administration to see if we cannot develop better lines of communication both to school administrators but also to school students.

Mr. Kaplow [Herbert Kaplow, NBC News].

Q. Mr. President, what do you think the students are trying to say in this demonstration?

The President: They are trying to say that they want peace. They are trying to say that they want to stop the killing. They are trying

---

[1] Department of State Bulletin, pp. 641.

to say that they want to end the draft. They are trying to say that we ought to get out of Viet-Nam. I agree with everything that they are trying to accomplish.

I believe, however, that the decisions that I have made, and particularly this last terribly difficult decision of going into the Cambodian sanctuaries which were completely occupied by the enemy—I believe that that decision will serve that purpose, because you can be sure that everything that I stand for is what they want.

I would add this: I think I understand what they want. I would hope they would understand somewhat what I want. When I came to the Presidency—I did not send these men to Viet-Nam—there were 525,000 men there. And since I have been here, I have been working 18 or 20 hours a day, mostly on Viet-Nam, trying to bring these men home.

We brought home 115,000. Our casualties were the lowest in the first quarter of this year in 5 years. We are going to bring home another 150,000. And as a result of the greater accomplishments than we expected in even the first week of the Cambodian campaign, I believe that we will have accomplished our goal of reducing American casualties and, also, of hastening the day that we can have a just peace. But above everything else, to continue the withdrawal program that they are for and that I am for.

Yes, sir?

Q. On April 20, you said Vietnamization was going so well that you could pull 150,000 American troops out of Viet-Nam. Then you turned around only 10 days later and said that Vietnamization was so badly threatened you were sending troops into Cambodia. Would you explain this apparent contradiction for us?

The President: I explained it in my speech of April 20, as you will recall, because then I said that Vietnamization was going so well that we could bring 150,000 out by the spring of next year, regardless of the progress in the Paris peace talks and the other criteria that I mentioned.

But I also warned at that time that increased enemy action in Laos, in Cambodia, as well as in Viet-Nam, was something that we had noted and that if I had indicated, and if I found, that that increased enemy action would jeopardize the remaining forces who would be in Viet-Nam after we had withdrawn 150,000, I would take strong action to deal with it. I found that the action that the enemy had taken in Cambodia would leave the 240,000 Americans who would be there a year from now without many combat troops to help defend them, would leave them in an untenable position. That is why I had to act.

* * * * * * *

Q. One of the consequences of the Cambodian action was the fact that the other side boycotted this week's peace talks in Paris. There is some question as to whether our side will attend next week. Have you made a decision on that?

The President: Our side will attend next week. We expect the talks to go forward. And at the time that we are cleaning out the

enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia, we will pursue the path of peace at the negotiating table there and in a number of other forums that we are presently working on.

Mr. Horner [Garnett D. Horner, Washington Evening Star].

Q. Mr. President, Secretary of Defense Laird said last week that if the North Vietnamese troops should move across the DMZ [demilitarized zone] in force, he would recommend resumption of the bombing. What would be your reaction to such a recommendation in those circumstances?

The President: I am not going to speculate as to what the North Vietnamese may do. I will only say that if the North Vietnamese did what some have suggested they might do—move a massive force of 250,000 to 300,000 across the DMZ against our Marine Corps people who are there—I would certainly not allow those men to be massacred without using more force, and more effective force, against North Viet-Nam.

I think we have warned the leaders of North Viet-Nam on this point several times, and because we have warned them I do not believe they will move across the DMZ.

* * * * * * *

Q. Mr. President, on April 30 you announced that you, as Commander in Chief, were sending in U.S. units and South Vietnamese units into Cambodia. Do the South Vietnamese abide by the same pullout deadline as you have laid down for the American forces?

The President: No, they do not. I would expect that the South Vietnamese would come out approximately at the same time that we do because when we come out our logistical support and air support will also come out with them.

I would like also to say that with response to that deadline I can give the members of the press some news with regard to the developments that have occurred. The action actually is going faster than we had anticipated. The middle of next week the first units, American units, will come out. The end of next week the second group of American units will come out. The great majority of all American units will be out by the second week of June, and all Americans of all kinds, including advisers, will be out of Cambodia by the end of June.

* * * * * * *

Mr. Rather [Dan Rather, CBS News].

Q. Mr. President, you mentioned that you expected the Americans to be out of Cambodia by sometime in June. President Thieu was quoted as saying in an interview that he felt the North Vietnamese could reestablish their sanctuaries in Cambodia within 6 months and possibly, he was quoted as saying, within 2 or 3 months. If that is the case, what have we accomplished in Cambodia? Was it worth the risks, and what do we do when they reestablish those sanctuaries?

The President: I am planning to give a report to the Nation when our own actions are completed, toward the latter part of June. At that time, I will answer that question in full.

At the present time, I will say that it is my belief, based on what we have accomplished to date, that we have bought at least 6 months and probably 8 months of time for the training of the ARVN; that is, the Army of South Viet-Nam. We have also saved, I think, hundreds, if not thousands, of Americans, as Frank Reynolds reported tonight on ABC. Rockets by the thousands and small-arms ammunition by the millions have already been captured, and those rockets and small arms will not be killing Americans in these next few months. And what we have also accomplished is that by buying time, it means that if the enemy does come back into those sanctuaries next time, the South Vietnamese will be strong enough and well trained enough to handle it alone.

I should point out, too, that they are handling a majority of the assignment now in terms of manpower.

* * * * * * *

Q. Mr. President, how do you answer the criticism that the justification that you give for going into the Cambodian sanctuaries is hauntingly similar to the reasons that President Lyndon Johnson gave as he moved step by step up the ladder of escalation? He wanted peace, too, sir.

The President: Mr. Scali [John Scali, ABC News], President Johnson did want peace, and if I may use the vernacular, he has taken a bad rap from those who say that he wanted war.

However, the difference is that he did move step by step. This action is a decisive move; and this action also puts the enemy on warning that if it escalates while we are trying to deescalate, we will move decisively and not step by step.

Mr. Healy [Paul F. Healy, New York Daily News].

Q. Mr. President, this war was well underway before you came in, as you just said. Considering the toll in lives and in everything else that is happening now, do you think it will have proved to be worthwhile?

The President: It is rather a moot question, Mr. Healy, as to whether it will prove to have been worthwhile. As Commander in Chief, I have found for 525,000 Americans it has been my responsibility to do everything I could to protect their lives and to get them home as quickly as I can. And we have succeeded pretty well. We brought 115,000 home. We are going to bring another 150,000, and this action will assure the continued success of that program.

However, looking at the whole of Southeast Asia, looking at the fact that we have lost lives there, I would say that only history will record whether it was worthwhile.

I do know this: Now that America is there, if we do what many of our very sincere critics think we should do, if we withdraw from Viet-Nam and allow the enemy to come into Viet-Nam and massacre the civilians there by the millions, as they would—if we do that, let me say that America is finished insofar as the peace-keeper in the Asian world is concerned.

* * * * * * *

Q. After the American troops are removed from Cambodia, there may still be a question as to the future of Cambodia's ability to exist as a neutralist country. What is your policy toward Cambodia's future?

The President: The United States is, of course, interested in the future of Cambodia and the future of Laos, both of which, of course, as you know, are neutral countries. However, the United States, as I indicated in what is called the Guam or Nixon doctrine, cannot take the responsibility and should not take the responsibility in the future to send American men in to defend the neutrality of countries that are unable to defend them themselves.

In this area, what we have to do is to go down the diplomatic trail, and that is why we are exploring with the Soviet Union—with not too much success to date, but we are going to continue to explore it—with Great Britain, with the Asian countries that are meeting in Djakarta, and through every possible channel, methods through which the neutrality of countries like Cambodia and Laos, who cannot possibly defend themselves, to see that that neutrality is guaranteed without having the intervention of foreign forces.

Q. Mr. President, in your inaugural address, you said that one of your goals was to bring us together in America. You said that you wanted to move us in international terms from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation. You said you wanted to bring peace to Viet-Nam. During the past 2 weeks, it seems that we are farther than ever from those goals. How do you account for this apparent failure?

The President: Don't judge us too quickly. When it comes to negotiation, I would suggest that you recognize the fact that some very important talks are going forward on arms limitation with the Soviet Union. We are still far apart. But I will predict now that there will be an agreement. When that agreement comes, it will have great significance. I say that having in mind the fact that we are far apart from the Soviet Union in our policy toward Southeast Asia, in our policy toward the Mideast; but I say that where the problem of arms is concerned, here is where our interest are together. The Soviet Union has just as great an interest as we have in seeing that there is some limitation on nuclear arms.

Q. Mr. President, have you made any judgment yet on the sale of jets to Israel? And how do you view the situation in the Middle East at the moment?

The President: The situation has become ominous due to the fact that reports have been received with regard to Soviet pilots being interjected into the U.A.R. Air Force, not in combat but in some other role. We are watching these reports very closely. If those reports prove to be true and if that continues to escalate, this will dramatically shift the balance of power and it would make it necessary for the United States to reevaluate its decision with regard to the sale of jets to Israel.

We have made it very clear—and this is in the interest of peace in that area—that the balance of power must not be changed and we will keep that commitment.

Q. Mr. President, is the United States prepared to pursue with equal fervor in Paris negotiations to find a political settlement of this war, including the possibility of discussing with the other side a coalition government?

The President: We are prepared to seek not only in Paris but in any other forum a political settlement of this war. We are not prepared, however, to seek any settlement in which we or anyone else imposes upon the people of South Viet-Nam a government that they do not choose. If the people of South Viet-Nam choose a coalition government, if they choose to change the leaders they presently have, that is a decision we will accept. President Thieu has indicated he will accept it. But we do not intend to impose at the conference table on the people of South Viet-Nam a government they do not choose.

* * * * * * *

Q. Mr. President, did Secretary of State Rogers oppose your decision to go into Cambodia, or did Dr. Kissinger [Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs] oppose it?

The President: Every one of my advisers, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Kissinger, Director Helms [Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence], raised questions about the decision, and, believe me, I raised the most questions, because I knew the stakes that were involved, I knew the division that would be caused in this country. I knew also the problems internationally. I knew the military risks. And then after hearing all of their advice, I made the decision. Decisions, of course, are not made by vote in the National Security Council or in the Cabinet. They are made by the President with the advice of those, and I made this decision. I take the responsibility for it. I believe it was the right decision. I believe it will work out. If it doesn't, then I am to blame. They are not.

* * * * * * *

Q. Mr. President, early in the news conference, in saying that the troop withdrawals would continue, you said that a year from now there would be 240,000 American soldiers in Viet-Nam.

The President: Don't hold me to the exact figure. I haven't—

Q. That is 185,000 less. Are you announcing a larger withdrawal tonight?

The President: No, I wasn't. What I was indicating was a range. But don't get the impression that we might not get that low also, because you understand we are going to go forward on the negotiating track at this time, and I am not among those who has given up on that track. I still think there is a possibility of progress there.

* * * * * * *

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT NIXON ON THE CAMBODIAN SANCTUARY OPERATION, JUNE 3, 1970[1]

Good evening, my fellow Americans.

One month ago, I announced a decision ordering American participation with South Vietnamese forces in a series of operations against Communist-occupied areas in Cambodia which have been used for five years as bases for attacks on our forces in South Vietnam.

This past weekend, in the Western White House in California, I met with Secretary Laird, General Abrams and other senior advisors to receive a firsthand report on the progress of this operation.

Based on General Abrams' report, I can now state that this has been the most successful operation of this long and very difficult war.

Before going into the details which form the basis for this conclusion, I believe it would be helpful to review briefly why I considered it necessary to make this decision, what our objectives were; and the prospects for achieving those objectives.

You will recall that on April 20, I announced the withdrawal of an additional 150,000 American troops from Vietnam within a year —which will bring the total number withdrawn, since I have taken office, to 260,000. I also reaffirmed on that occasion our proposals for a negotiated peace.

At the time of this announcement I warned that if the enemy tried to take advantage of our withdrawal program by increased attacks in Cambodia, Laos, or South Vietnam in a way that endangered the lives of our men remaining in South Vietnam, that I would, in my capacity as Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces, take strong action to deal with that threat.

Between April 20 and April 30, Communist forces launched a series of attacks against a number of key cities in neutral Cambodia. Their objective was unmistakable—to link together bases they had maintained in Cambodia for five years in violation of Cambodian neutrality. The entire six-hundred-mile Cambodian-South Vietnam border would then have become one continuous hostile territory from which to launch assaults upon American and allied forces.

This posed an unacceptable threat to our remaining forces in South Vietnam. It would have meant higher casualties. It would have jeopardized our program for troop withdrawals. It would have meant a longer war. And—carried out in the face of an explicit warning from this Government—failure to deal with the enemy action would have eroded the credibility of the United States before the entire world.

After very intensive consultations with my top advisors, I directed that American troops join the South Vietnamese in destroying these major enemy bases along the Cambodian frontier. I said when I made this announcement: "Our purpose is not to occupy these areas. Once the enemy forces are driven out of the sanctuaries and once their supplies are destroyed, we will withdraw."

[1] Congressional Record, June 4, 1970, pp. S8346–7.

92-091 O - 75 - 28

That pledge is being kept. I said further on that occasion, "We take this action not for the purpose of expanding the war in Cambodia, but for the purpose of ending the war in Vietnam." That purpose is being advanced.

As of today I can report that all of our major military objectives have been achieved. 43,000 South Vietnamese took part in these operations, along with 31,000 Americans. Our combined forces have moved with greater speed and success than we had planned; we have captured and destroyed far more in war material than we anticipated; and American and allied casualties have been far lower than we expected.

In the month of May, in Cambodia alone, we captured a total amount of enemy arms, equipment, ammunition and food nearly equal to what we captured in all of Vietnam in all of last year.

Here is some film of the war material that has been captured.

This is some ammunition you see. We have captured more than 10 million rounds of ammunition. That is equal to the enemy's expenditures for nine months.

Here you also see a few of the over 15,000 rifles and machine guns and other weapons we have captured. They will never be used against American boys in Vietnam.

This reality was brought home directly to me a few days ago. I was talking with a union leader from New York. His son died in Vietnam this past February. He told me that—had we moved earlier in Cambodia—we might have captured the enemy weapon that killed his son.

Now you are looking at some of the heavy mortars, rocket launchers and recoilless rifles that have shelled U.S. base camps and Vietnamese towns. We have seized over 2,000 of these along with 90,000 rounds of ammunition. That is as much as the enemy fires in a whole year. Had this war material made its way into South Vietnam and had it been used against American troops, U.S. casualties would have been vastly increased.

Here you see rice, more than 11 million pounds of rice. This is more than enough rice to feed all the enemy's combat battalions in Vietnam for over three months. This rice will not be feeding enemy troops now, but rather war refugees.

Now with the rainy season now beginning, it will take the enemy months to rebuild its shattered installations and to replace the equipment we have captured or destroyed.

The success of these operations to date has guaranteed that the June 30 deadline I set for withdrawal of all American forces from Cambodia will be met. General Abrams advises me that 17,000 of the 31,000 Americans who entered Cambodia have already returned to Vietnam. The remainder will return by the end of this month. This includes all American air support, logistics and military advisory personnel.

The only remaining American activity in Cambodia after July 1 will be air missions to interdict the movement of enemy troops and material where I find that is necessary to protect the lives and security of our men in South Vietnam.

Our discussions with the South Vietnamese government indicate that their primary objective remains the security of South Vietnam, and that their activity in Cambodia in the future—after their withdrawal from the sanctuaries—will be determined by the actions of the enemy in Cambodia.

When this operation was announced, the critics charged that it would increase American casualties, that it would widen the war, that it would lengthen our involvement, that it might postpone troop withdrawals. But the operation was undertaken for precisely the opposite reasons—and it has had precisely the opposite effect.

Let us examine the long-range impact of this operation.

First, we have eliminated an immediate danger to the security of the remaining Americans in Vietnam, and thereby reduced our future casualties. Seizing these weapons and ammunition will save American lives. Because of this operation, American soldiers who might not otherwise be ever coming home, will now be coming home.

Second, we have won precious time for the South Vietnamese to train and prepare themselves to carry the burden of their national defense, so that our American forces can be withdrawn.

From General Abrams' reports and from our advisors in the field, one of the most dramatic and heartening developments of the operation has been the splendid performance of the South Vietnamese army. Sixty percent of all the troops involved in the Cambodian operations were South Vietnamese. The effectiveness, the skill, the valor with which they fought far exceeded our expectations. Confidence and morale in the South Vietnamese army has been greatly bolstered. This operation has clearly demonstrated that our Vietnamization program is succeeding.

Third, we have insured the continuance and success of our troop withdrawal program. On April 20, I announced an additional 150,000 Americans would be home within a year. As a result of the success of the Cambodian operations, Secretary Laird has resumed the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. Fifty thousand of the 150,000 I announced on April 20 will now be out by October 15.

As long as the war goes on, we can expect setbacks and some reversals. But, following the success of this effort, we can say now with confidence that we will keep our timetable for troop withdrawals.

Secretary Rogers and I have been particularly encouraged by the resolve of 11 Asian countries at the Djkarta Conference to seek a solution to the problem of Cambodia. Cambodia offers an opportunity for these 11 nations, as well as other countries of the area, to cooperate in supporting the Cambodian government's efforts to maintain Cambodian neutrality, independence and territorial integrity. We shall do what we can to make it possible for these Asian initiatives to succeed.

To the North Vietnamese tonight I say again—the door to a negotiated peace remains wide open. Every offer we have made at the conference table, publicly or privately, I herewith reaffirm. We are ready to negotiate, whenever they are ready to negotiate.

However, if their answer to our troop withdrawal program, and to our offer to negotiate, is to increase their attacks in a way that jeopardizes the safety of our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall,

as my action five weeks ago clearly demonstrated, take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

As all of you know, when I first announced the decision on Cambodia, it was subjected to an unprecedented barrage of criticism in this country. I want to express tonight my deep appreciation to the millions of Americans who supported me then and who have supported me since in our efforts to win a just peace.

But I also understand the deep divisions in this country over the war. I realize that many Americans are deeply troubled. They want peace. They want to bring the boys home. Let us understand once and for all that no group has a monopoly on those concerns. Every American shares those desires; I share them very deeply.

Our differences are over the best means to achieve a just peace.

As President I have a responsibility to listen to those in this country who disagree with my policies. But I also have a solemn obligation to make the hard decisions which I find are necessary to protect the lives of 400,000 American men remaining in Vietnam.

When I spoke to you a month ago, a clear threat was emerging in Cambodia to the security of our men in Vietnam.

Ask yourselves this question: If an American President had failed to meet this threat to 400,000 American men in Vietnam, would those nations and peoples who rely on America's power and treaty commitments for their security—in Latin America, Europe, the Middle East or other parts of Asia—retain any confidence in the United States? That is why I deeply believe that a just peace in Vietnam is essential, if there is to be a lasting peace in other parts of the world.

With this announcement tonight, we have kept the pledge I made when I ordered this operation, that we would withdraw from Cambodia on a scheduled timetable—just as this Administration has kept every pledge it has made to the American people regarding the war in Vietnam and the return of American troops.

Let us look at the record.

In June of 1969 I pledged a withdrawal of 25,000 troops. They came home. In September of the same year I said I would bring home an additional 35,000. They came home. In December I said an additional 50,000 Americans were coming out of Vietnam. They, too, have come home.

There is one commitment yet to be fulfilled. I have pledged to end this war. I shall keep that promise. But I am determined to end the war in a way that will promote peace rather than conflict throughout the world. I am determined to end it in a way that will bring an era of reconciliation to our people—and not an era of furious recrimination.

In seeking peace, let us remember that at this time only this Administration can end this war and bring peace. We have a program for peace—and the greater the support the Administration receives in its efforts, the greater the opportunity to win that just peace we all desire.

Peace is the goal that unites us. Peace is the goal toward which we are working. Peace is the goal this government will pursue until the day that we reach it.

Thank you, and good night.

THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON CAMBODIA, June 30, 1970 [1]

All American troops have withdrawn from Cambodia on the schedule announced at the beginning of the operation. Together with our South Vietnamese allies, they have just completed successfully the destruction of enemy base areas along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese frontier.

RESULTS OF THE OPERATIONS

Allied sweeps through enemy occupied sanctuaries in Cambodia will:

1. Save American and allied lives in the future;
2. Assure that the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam can proceed on schedule;
3. Enable the program of Vietnamization to continue on its current timetable;
4. Enhance the prospects for a just peace.

These results will flow from the following:

—the elimination of an immediate threat to our forces and the security of South Vietnam.
—the capture of great amounts of enemy supplies.
—the ending of the concept of immune Cambodian sanctuaries for the enemy.
—the dislocation of enemy supply lines and strategy in the southern part of South Vietnam.
—the bolstering of the morale and self-confidence of the South Vietnamese army.
—the maintenance of U.S. credibility.

UNDERLYING BASIS FOR U.S. ACTION

—It was North Vietnam—not the U.S.—which brought the Vietnam war into Cambodia.
—It was the presence of North Vietnamese troops on Cambodian soil that contributed to the downfall of Prince Sihanouk.
—It was the government appointed by Prince Sihanouk and ratified by the Cambodian National Assembly—not a group of usurpers—which overthrew him, with the approval of the National Assembly.
—It was the major expansion of enemy activity in Cambodia that ultimately caused allied troops to end five years of restraint and attack the Communist base areas.

FUTURE U.S. POLICY FOR CAMBODIA

The following will be the guidelines of U.S. policy for Cambodia:

—There will be no U.S. ground personnel in Cambodia except for the regular staff of the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh.
—There will be no U.S. advisers with Cambodian units.

---

[1] White House press release, June 30, 1970.

—The U.S. will conduct—with the approval of the Cambodian Government—air interdiction missions against the enemy efforts to move supplies and personnel through Cambodia towards South Vietnam and to re-establish base areas relevant to the war in Vietnam.
—The U.S. will turn over material captured in the base areas in Cambodia to the Cambodian Government to help it defend its neutrality and independence.
—The U.S. will provide military assistance to the Cambodian Government in the form of small arms and relatively unsophisticated equipment in types and quantities suitable for their army.
—The U.S. will encourage other countries of the region to give diplomatic support to the independence of neutrality of Cambodia and welcomes efforts of the Djakarta Group of countries to encourage Asian cooperation to this end.
—The U.S. will encourage and support the efforts of third countries who wish to furnish Cambodia with troops or material to help Cambodia preserve its neutrality and independence.

SAIGON'S ROLE

The U.S. understands that Saigon will remain ready:
—To prevent reestablishment of base areas along South Vietnam's frontier.
—To assist in the evacuation of Vietnamese civilians and respond selectively to appeals from the Cambodian Government should North Vietnamese aggression make this necessary.

Most of the South Vietnamese operations will be launched from within South Vietnam and there will be no U.S. air, logistic support or U.S. advisers on these operations. The primary objective of the South Vietnamese remains Vietnamization within their country.

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

The President reaffirms his paramount objective of achieving a negotiated settlement and appeals to Hanoi to join in this effort, emphasizing:
—Hanoi cannot impose its will through military means. The U.S. has no intention of imposing its own will.
—The U.S. has not raised the terms for a settlement as a result of Cambodian successes nor will it lower its minimum terms in response to enemy pressure.
—The U.S. reiterates all previous proposals—public and private—searching for a political solution that reflects the will of the South Vietnamese people and allows them to determine their future without outside interference.
—The U.S. recognizes that a fair political solution should reflect the existing relationship of political forces. The U.S. pledges to abide by the outcome of the political process agreed upon by the South Vietnamese.
—The U.S. pledges renewed efforts to bring about genuine negotiations for a just peace in Southeast Asia.

REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE CAMBODIAN OPERATION

Together with the South Vietnamese, the Armed Forces of the United States have just completed successfully the destruction of enemy base areas along the Cambodian-South Vietnam frontier. All American troops have withdrawn from Cambodian on the schedule announced at the start of the operation.

The allied sweeps into the North Vietnamese and Vietcong base areas along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border:

—will save American and allied lives in the future;

—will assure that the withdrawal of American troops from South vietnam can proceed on schedule;

—will enable our program of Vietnamization to continue on its current timetable;

—should enhance the prospects for a just peace.

At this time, it is important to review the background for the decision, the results of the operation, their larger meaning in terms of the conflict in Indochina—and to look down the road to the future.

It is vital to understand at the outset that Hanoi left the United States no reasonable option but to move militarily against the Cambodian base areas. The purpose and significance of our operations against the Cambodian sanctuaries can only be understood aginst the backdrop of what we are seeking to accomplish in Vietnam—and the threat that the Communist bases in Cambodia posed to our objectives. Nor can that military action of the last two months be divorced from its cause—the threat posed by the constant expansion of North Vietnamese aggression throughout Indochina.

A RECORD OF RESTRAINT

America's purpose in Vietnam and Indochina remains what it has been—a peace in which the peoples of the region can devote themselves to development of their own societies, a peace in which all the peoples of Southeast Asia can determine their own political future without outside interference.

When this Administration took office, the authorized strength of American troops in South Vietnam was 549,500—the high water mark of American military presence in Southeast Asia. The United States had been negotiating at Paris for ten months but nothing had been agreed upon other than the shape of the bargaining table. No comprehensive allied peace proposal existed. There was no approved plan to reduce America's involvement in the war—in the absence of a negotiated settlement.

Since January of 1969, we have taken steps on all fronts to move toward peace. Along with the Government of South Vietnam, we have put forward a number of concrete and reasonable proposals to promote genuine negotiations. These proposals were first outlined by me 13 months ago, on May 14, 1969 and by President Thieu on July 11, 1969. Through both public and private channels, our proposals have been repeated and amplified many times since.

These proposals are designed to secure the removal of all foreign military forces from South Vietnam and to establish conditions in

which all political forces can compete freely and fairly in the future of the country. Our principal goal has been to enable the people of South Vietnam to determine their future free of outside interference.

To indicate our good faith, to improve the climate for negotiations, we changed the orders to our commanders in South Vietnam. This has helped to reduce casualties. We have cut tactical air operations in South Vietnam by more than 20 percent. We initiated a troop withdrawal program which, during the course of next spring, will bring American troop strength 265,000 men below the level authorized when this Administration took office.

These are not the actions of a government pursuing a military solution. They are the decisions of a government seeking a just peace at the conference table.

But Hanoi has ignored our unilateral gestures and rejected every offer of serious negotiations. Instead it has insisted that—as a precondition to talks—we pledge unconditionally to withdraw all American forces from South Vietnam and to overthrow the elected government.

These proposals are not a basis for negotiation; they are a demand for surrender. For the United States to accept these conditions would make the negotiations meaningless. Acceptance of such conditions would assure in advance Communist domination of South Vietnam.

With Hanoi's intransigence on the negotiating front, this Administration was faced with essentially three options.

We could have continued the maximum existing level of American involvment in Vietnam. But this was incompatible with the Nixon Doctrine of increasing responsibilities for the Asian countries; and it was unacceptable to the American people.

We could have begun the immediate withdrawal of all our forces. We rejected this course of capitulation which would have only won temporary respite at the price of graver crises later. We also rejected that course as both incompatible with America's commitments and tradition, and disastrous in terms of its long-range consequences for peace in the Pacific and peace in the world.

We selected instead a third option—that of gradually shifting the total combat burden to the South Vietnamese.

Since the beginning of this Administration 17 months ago, it has been our policy to train and equip the South Vietnamese to take over the burden of their own defense from American troops. Even in the absence of progress at the peace table in Paris, and despite continued enemy pressures in South Vietnam, this policy of "Vietnamization" has permitted us to carry out repeated withdrawals of American troops.

As our policy has been tested, more and more Americans have been brought home. By June of 1969, we could announce the pullout of 25,000 American troops. They came home. In September of 1969, we announced the withdrawal of an additional 35,000 American troops. They came home.

In December of 1969, we announced the withdrawal of 50,000 more American troops. They were home by spring of this year. On April 20, I announced the forthcoming withdrawal of an additional 150,000 Americans to be completed during next spring—50,000 of them will be home or on their way home by the 15th of October.

This transfer of primary responsibility for self-defense from American forces to Asian forces reflects our approach to foreign policy. Increasingly, the United States will look to the countires of the region to assume the primary responsibility for their own security—while America moves gradually from a leading to a supporting role.

To be successful this policy requires the striking of a careful balance—whether in South Vietnam or elsewhere in Asia. While the growing strength of our allies, and the growing measure of their regional cooperation allows for a reduction in American presence—they could not survive a sudden and precipitous American withdrawal from our responsibilities. This would lead to a collapse of local strength in the transition period between the old era of principal U.S. involvement to the new era of partnership and emphasis on local and regional cooperation.

Doing too much for an allied people can delay their political maturity, promote a sense of dependency, and diminish that nation's incentive to stand on its own feet. But doing too little for an ally can induce a sense of despair, endanger their right of self-determination and invite their defeat when confronted by an aggressor.

As we have proceeded with Vietnamization it has been with these principles in mind.

Looking at American policy in Vietnam these seventeen months, this Administration—in the generosity of its negotiating offers, in the limitations on its military actions, and in the consistency of its troop withdrawals—has written a record of restraint. The response from the enemy over those same seventeen months has been intransigence in Paris, belligerence from Hanoi and escalation of the war throughout Indochina.

Enemy attacks in Vietnam increased during April.

This past winter Hanoi launched a major offensive against the legitimate government of Laos which they themselves had helped to establish under the 1962 Geneva Accords. For years, in violation of those accords, North Vietnamese troops have occupied Laotian territory and used its eastern regions as a highway for the export of aggression into South Vietnam.

In March and April of this year, Communist troops used their long held bases in Cambodia to move against the Government of Cambodia in a way which increased the long-term threat to allied forces in South Vietnam as well as to the future of our Vietnamization and withdrawal programs. These new violations, too, took place against a backdrop of years of Communist disregard of the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia—guaranteed in the 1954 Geneva Agreements to which Hanoi was a signatory.

BACKGROUND OF THE APRIL 30 DECISION

In assessing the April 30 decision to move against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong sanctuaries in Cambodia, four basic facts must be remembered.

It was North Vietnam—not we—which brought the Vietnam War into Cambodia.

For five years, North Vietnam has used Cambodian territory as a sanctuary from which to attack allied forces in South Vietnam. For five years, American and allied forces—to preserve the concept of Cambodian neutrality and to confine the conflict in Southeast Asia—refrained from moving against those sanctuaries.

It was the presence of North Vietnamese troops on Cambodian soil that contributed to the downfall of Prince Sihanouk. It was the indignation of the Cambodian people against the presence of Vietnamese Communists in their country that led to riots in Phnom Penh which contributed to Prince Sihanouk's ouster—an ouster that surprised no nation more than the United States. At the end of Sihanouk's rule, the United States was making efforts to improve relations with his government and the Prince was taking steps against the Communist invaders on his national soil.

It was the government appointed by Prince Sihanouk and ratified by the Cambodian National Assembly—not a group of usurpers—which overthrew him with the approval of the National Assembly. The United States had neither connection with, nor knowledge of, these events.

It was the major expansion of enemy activity in Cambodia that ultimately caused allied troops to end five years of restraint and attack the Communist base areas.

The historical record is plain.

Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops have operated in Eastern Cambodia for years. The primary objective of these Communist forces has been the support of Hanoi's aggression against South Vietnam. Just as it has violated the 1962 Geneva Accords on Laos, North Vietnam has consistently ignored its pledge, in signing the 1954 Geneva Accords, to respect Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity.

In a May 1967 Phnom Penh radio broadcast, Prince Sihanouk's following remarks were reported to the Cambodian people:

. "I must tell you that the Vietnamese communists and the Viet Cong negotiated with us three or four times but that absolutely nothing comes out of the negotiations . . . After I expelled the French and after the French troops left Cambodia, Viet Minh remained in our country in order to conquer it. How can we have confidence in the Viet Minh? . . . If we side with the Viet Minh we will lose our independence."

Late in 1969, Prince Sihanouk ordered Cambodia's underequipped and weak armed forces to exercise some measure of control over North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Communist forces occupying Cambodian territory.

At the same time, the Communist forces were actively preparing in their base areas for new combat in South Vietnam. These areas—on the Cambodian side of the Vietnam-Cambodian border—have for years served as supply depots and base camps for enemy troops infiltrated through Laos into South Vietnam. They have also served as sanctuaries for North Vietnamese and Viet Cong headquarters elements and for combat troops to rest, refit and re-supply on their return from South Vietnam.

Our screening of more than six tons of documents captured in the Cambodian operations has provided conclusive proof of Communist

reliance on Cambodia as a logistic and infiltration corridor and as a secure area from which Communist designs on Vietnam as well as in Cambodia itself could be carried out.

On January 6, 1970, Prince Sihanouk departed on vacation in France. His Prime Minister, Lon Nol, and Deputy Prime Minister, Sirik Matak, were left in charge. In early March, with Sihanouk still in power, there were public demonstrations, first in the Eastern provinces of Cambodia and later in Phnom Penh, against flagrant North Vietnamese violation of Cambodia's territorial integrity.

On March 13, Prince Sihanouk left Paris for Moscow and Peking, avowedly to seek Soviet and Chinese assistance in persuading the Vietnamese Communists to reduce the presence of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces in Cambodia.

Then, on March 18, the Cambodian National Assembly by unanimous vote declared that Prince Sihanouk was no longer Chief of State. Cheng Heng was retained as Acting Chief of State. Lon Nol and Sirik Matak kept their positions. Reasons for Sihanouk's ouster included growing objections to his mishandling of the economy and to his by-passing of the Cabinet and National Assembly; but resentment over North Vietnam's flagrant misuse of Cambodian territory certainly contributed. Sihanouk arrived in Peking the same day, and met with the Peking leadership as well as with the North Vietnamese Prime Minister who had hastened to Peking to greet him. Thereafter Sihanouk has increasingly identified himself with the Communist cause in Indochina.

This government had no advance warning of the ouster of Sihanouk, with whom we had been attempting to improve relations. Our initial response was to seek to preserve the status quo with regard to Cambodia and to try to prevent an expansion of Communist influence. The immunity of the Cambodian sanctuaries had been a serious military handicap for us for many years. But we had refrained from moving against them in order to contain the conflict. We recognized both the problems facing Sihanouk and the fact that he had exercised some measure of control over Communist activities, through regulation of the flow of rice and military supplies into the sanctuaries from coastal ports. We considered that a neutral Cambodia outweighed the military benefits of a move against the base area.

This is why diplomatically our first reaction to Sihanouk's overthrow was to encourage some form of accommodation in Cambodia. We spoke in this sense to interested governments. And we made clear through many channels that we had no intention of exploiting the Cambodian upheaval for our own ends.

These attempts ran afoul of Hanoi's designs. North Vietnam and the Viet Cong withdrew their representation from Phnom Penh. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces began to expand their base areas along the border.

By April 3, they were beginning to launch attacks against Cambodian forces in Svay Reing Province. Later these attacks were extended to other outposts in Eastern Cambodia, forcing Cambodian troops to evacuate border positions in the Parrot's Beak area by April 10. Communist attacks were also directed against Mekong River traffic.

By April 16, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops began to launch isolated attacks deep into Cambodia including an attack on the Capital of Takeo Province south of Phnom Penh.

Despite escalating Communist activity in Cambodia, we continued to exercise restraint. Though the implications of the Communist actions for our efforts in Vietnam were becoming increasingly ominous, Communist intentions in Cambodia were still not absolutely clear. The military moves by the North Vientnamese and Viet Cong in Cambodia could still be interpreted as temporary actions to secure their base camps in light of the uncertainties following Sihanouk's removal.

When I made my April 20 speech announcing the withdrawal of 150,000 troops over the next year, I knew that we might be at a crossroads in Cambodia. I nevertheless made the announcement because it would leave no doubt about our intention to deescalate the conflict.

I also used the occasion to restate very forthcoming political principles for a negotiated peace. At the same time I described the pattern of North Vietnamese aggression in Indochina, and acknowledge my withdrawal decision involved some risks when viewed against this enemy escalation. I therefore reiterated my determination to take strong and effective measures if increased enemy action in Laos, Cambodia or South Vietnam jeopardized the security of our remaining forces in Vietnam.

Within days of my April 20 speech, Communist intentions became gainfully and unambiguously clear. In the face of our restraint and our warnings, the North Vietnamese continued to expand their territorial control, threatening to link up their base areas. From a series of isolated enclaves, the base areas were rapidly becoming a solid hand of self-sustaining territory stretching from Laos to the sea from which any pretense of Cambodian sovereignty was rapidly being excluded.

—On April 20, North Vietnamese forces temporarily captured Saang, only eighteen miles south of Phnom Penh.

—On April 22, Communist forces assaulted the town of Snoul east of Phnom Penh.

—On April 23, they attacked the town of Mimot and an important bridge linking the town of Snoul and the capital of Kratie Province on Route 13.

—On April 24, they moved on the resort city of Kep.

—On April 26, they attacked some ships on the Mekong and occupied the town of Angtassom, a few miles west of Takeo.

—They then attacked the city of Chhlong, on the Mekong River north of Phnom Penh, and the port city of Kampot.

—During this same period, they cut almost every major road leading south and east out of Phnom Penh.

The prospect suddenly loomed of Cambodia's becoming virtually one large base area for attack anywhere into South Vietnam along the 600 miles of the Cambodian frontier. The enemy in Cambodia would have enjoyed complete freedom of action to move forces and supplies rapidly across the entire length of South Vietnam's flank to attack our forces in South Vietnam with impunity from well-stocked sanctuaries along the border.

We thus faced a rapidly changing military situation from that which existed on April 20.

The possibility of a grave new threat to our troops in South Vietnam was rapidly becoming an actuality.

This pattern of Communist action prior to our decision of April 30 makes it clear the enemy was intent both on expanding and strengthening its military position along the Cambodian border and overthrowing the Cambodian government. The plans were laid, the orders issued, and already being implemented by Communist forces.

Not only the clear evidence of Communist actions—but supporting data screened from more than six tons of subsequently captured Communist documents—leaves no doubt that the Communists' move against the Cambodian Government preceded the U.S. action against the base areas.

THREE OPTIONS

On April 30, before announcing our response, I outlined the three basic choices we had in the face of the expanding Communist threat.

First, we could do nothing. This would have eroded an important restraint on the loss of American lives. It would have run the risk of Cambodia's becoming one vast enemy staging area, a springboard for attacks on South Vietnam without fear of retaliation. The dangers of having done nothing would not have fully materialized for several months and this government might have been commended for exercising restraint. But, as withdrawals proceeded, our paralysis would have seriously jeopardized our forces in Vietnam and would have led to longer lists of American casualties. The United States could not accept the consequences of inaction in the face of this enemy escalation. The American men remaining in South Vietnam after our withdrawal of 150,000 would have been in severe jeopardy.

Our second choice was to provide massive assistance to Cambodia. This was an unrealistic alternative. The small Cambodian army of 30,000 could not effectively utilize any massive transfusion of military assistance against the immediate enemy threat. We also did not wish to get drawn into the permanent direct defense of Cambodia. This would have been inconsistent with the basic premises of our foreign policy.

After intensive consultations with my top advisers, I chose the third course. With the South Vietnamese we launched joint attacks against the base areas so long occupied by Communist forces.

Our military objectives were to capture or destroy the arms, ammunition and supplies that had been built up in those sanctuaries over a period of years and to disrupt the enemy's communication network. At the least this would frustrate the impact of any Communist success in linking up their base areas if it did not prevent this development altogether.

I concluded that, regardless of the success of Communist assaults on the Cambodian Government, the destruction of the enemy's sanctuaries would:

—remove a grave potential threat to our remaining men in South Vietnam, and so reduce future American casualties.

—give added assurance of the continuance of our troop withdrawal program.

—insure the timetable for our Vietnamization program.

—increase the chances of shortening the war in South Vietnam.
—enhance the prospects of a negotiated peace.
—emphasize to the enemy whether in Southeast Asia or elsewhere that the word of the United States—whether given in a promise or a warning—was still good.

THE MILITARY OPERATIONS

Ten major operations were launched against a dozen of the most significant base areas with 32,000 American troops and 48,000 South Vietnamese participating at various times. As of today, all Americans, including logistics personnel and advisers, have withdrawn, as have a majority of the South Vietnamese forces.

Our military response to the enemy's escalation was measured in every respect. It was a limited operation for a limited period of time with limited objectives.

We have scrupulously observed the 21-mile limit on penetration of our ground combat forces into Cambodian territory. These self-imposed time and geographic restrictions may have cost us some military advantages, but we knew that we could achieve our primary objectives within these restraints. And these restraints underscored the limited nature of our purpose to the American people.

My June 3 interim report pointed up the success of these operations and the massive amounts of supplies we were seizing and destroying. We have since added substantially to these totals. A full inventory is attached as an appendix to the report. Here are some highlights.

According to latest estimates from the field, we have captured:

—22,892 individual weapons—enough to equip about 74 full-strength North Vietnames infantry battalions and 2,509 big crew-served weapons—enough to equip about 25 full-strength North Vietnamese infantry battalions;
—More than 15 million rounds of ammunition or about what the enemy has fired in South Vietnam during the past year;
—14 million pounds of rice, enough to feed all the enemy combat battalions estimated to be in South Vietnam for about four months;
—143,000 rockets, mortars, and recoilless rifle rounds, used against cities and bases. Based on recent experience, the number of mortars, large rockets, and recoilless rifle rounds is equivalent to what the enemy shoots in about 14 months in South Vietnam;
—Over 199,552 anti-aircraft rounds, 5,482 mines, 62,022 grenades, and 83,000 pounds of explosives, including 1,002 satchel charges;
—Over 435 vehicles and destroyed over 11,688 bunkers and other military structures.

And while our objective has been supplies rather than personnel, the enemy has also taken a heavy manpower loss—11,349 men killed and about 2,328 captured and detainees.

These are impressive statistics. But what is the deeper meaning of the piles of enemy supplies and the rubble of enemy installations?

We have eliminated an immediate threat to our forces and to the security of South Vietnam—and produced the prospect of fewer American casualties in the future.

We have inflicted extensive casualties and very heavy losses in material on the enemy—losses which can now be replaced only from the North during a monsoon season and in the face of counteraction by South Vietnamese ground and U.S. air forces.

We have ended the concept of Cambodian sanctuaries, immune from attack, upon which the enemy military had relied for five years.

We have dislocated supply lines and disrupted Hanoi's strategy in the Saigon area and the Mekong Delta. The enemy capacity to mount a major offensive in this vital populated region of the South has been greatly diminished.

We have effectively cut off the enemy from resupply by the sea. In 1969, well over half of the munitions being delivered to the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong in Cambodia came by sea.

We have, for the time being, separated the Communist main force units—regular troops organized in formal units similar to conventional armies—from the guerrillas in the southern part of Vietnam. This should provide a boost to pacification efforts.

We have guaranteed the continuance of our troop withdrawal program. On June 3, I reaffirmed that 150,000 more Americans would return home within a year and announced that 50,000 would leave Vietnam by October 15.

We have bought time for the South Vietnamese to strengthen themselves against the enemy.

We have witnessed visible proof of the success of Vietnamization as the South Vietnamese performed with skill and valor and competence far beyond the expectation of our commanders or American advisers. The morale and self-confidence of the Army of South Vietnam is higher than ever before.

These then are the major accomplishments of the operations against the Cambodian base areas. Americans can take pride in the leadership of General Abrams and in the competence and dedication of our forces.

There is another way to view the success of these operations. What if we had chosen the first option—and done nothing?

The enemy sanctuaries by now would have been expanded and strengthened. The thousands of troops he lost, in killed or captured, would be available to attack American positions and with the enormous resources that we captured or destroyed still in his hands.

Our Vietnamization program would be in serious jeopardy; our withdrawals of troops could only have been carried out in the face of serious threat to our remaining troops in Vietnam.

We would have confronted an adversary emboldened by our timidity, an adversary who had ignored repeated warnings.

The war would be a good deal further from over than it is today.

Had we stood by and let the enemy act with impunity in Cambodia—we would be facing a truly bleak situation.

The allied operations have greatly reduced these risks and enhanced

the prospects for the future. However, many difficulties remain and some setbacks are inevitable. We still face substantial problems, but the Cambodian operations will enable us to pursue our goals with greater confidence.

When the decision to go into Cambodia was announced on April 30, we anticipated broad disagreement and dissent within the society. Given the divisions on this issue among the American people, it could not have been otherwise.

But the majority of the Americans supported that decision—and now that the Cambodian operation is over, I believe there is a wide measure of understanding of the necessity for it.

Although there remains disagreement about its long-term significance, about the cost to our society of having taken this action—there can be little disagreement now over the immediate military success that has been achieved. With American ground operations in Cambodia ended, we shall move forward with our plan to end the war in Vietnam and to secure the just peace on which all Americans are united.

The Future

Now that our ground forces and our logistic and advisory personnel have all been withdrawn, what will be our future policy for Cambodia?

The following will be the guidelines of our policy in Cambodia:

1. There will be no U.S. ground personnel in Cambodia except for the regular staff of our Embassy in Phnom Penh.

2. There will be no U.S. advisers with Cambodian units.

3. We will conduct—with the approval of the Cambodian Government—air interdiction missions against the enemy efforts to move supplies and personnel through Cambodia toward South Vietnam and to re-establish base areas relevant to the war in Vietnam. We do this to protect our forces in South Vietnam.

4. We will turn over material captured in the base areas in Cambodia to the Cambodian Government to help it defend its neutrality and independence.

5. We will provide military assistance to the Cambodian Government in the form of small arms and relatively unsophisticated equipment in types and quantities suitable for their army. To date we have supplied about $5 million of these items principally in the form of small arms, mortars, trucks, aircraft parts, communications equipment and medical supplies.

6. We will encourage other countries of the region to give diplomatic support to the independence and neutrality of Cambodia. We welcome the efforts of the Djakarta group of countries * to mobilize world opinion and encourage Asian cooperation to this end.

7. We will encourage and support the efforts of third countries who wish to furnish Cambodia with troops or material. We applaud the efforts of Asian nations to help Cambodia preserve its neutrality and independence.

---

*Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, The Philippines, Singapore, South Vietnam, Thailand.

I will let the Asian Governments speak for themselves concerning their future policies. I am confident that two basic principles will govern the actions of those nations helping Cambodia:

—They will be at the request of, and in close concert with the Cambodian Government.

—They will not be at the expense of those nations' own defense—indeed they will contribute to their security which they see bound up with events in Cambodia.

The South Vietnamese plan to help. Of all the countries of Southeast Asia, South Vietnam has most at stake in Cambodia. A North Vietnamese takeover would, of course, have profound consequences for its security. At the same time, the leaders of South Vietnam recognize that the primary focus of their attention must be on the security of their own country. President Thieu has reflected these convictions in his major radio and TV address of June 27. Our understanding of Saigon's intentions is as follows:

1. South Vietnamese forces remain ready to prevent reestablishment of base areas along South Vietnam's frontier.

2. South Vietnamese forces will remain ready to assist in the evacuation of Vietnamese civilians and to respond selectively to appeals from the Cambodian Government should North Vietnamese aggression make this necessary.

3. Most of these operations will be launched from within South Vietnam. There will be no U.S. air or logistics support. There will not be U.S. advisers on these operations.

4. The great majority of South Vietnamese forces are to leave Cambodia.

5. The primary objective of the South Vietnamese remains Vietnamization within their country. Whatever actions are taken in Cambodia will be consistent with this objective.

In this June 27 speech President Thieu emphasized that his government will concentrate on efforts within South Vietnam. He pledged that his country will always respect the territory, borders, independence and neutrality of Cambodia and will not interfere in its internal politics. His government does not advocate stationing troops permanently in Cambodia or sending the South Vietnamese army to fight the war for the Cambodian army.

Under the foreign policy guidelines first outlined at Guam a year ago, I stressed that a threatened country should first make maximum efforts in its own self-defense. The Cambodian people and soldiers are doing that against the superior force of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong invaders. The majority of the Cambodian people support the present government against the foreign intruders. Cambodian troops have remained loyal and have stood up well in the face of great pressures from a better-armed and experienced foe.

Secondly, our policy stresses there should be regional cooperation where a country is not strong enough to defend herself. Cambodia's neighbors are providing that cooperation by joining with her in a collective effort. Each of them is a target of Communist aggression; each has a stake in Cambodia's neutrality and independence.

Third, the U.S. will assist such self-help and regional actions where our participation can make a difference. Over the long-term, we expect the countries of Asia to provide increasingly for their own defense. However, we are now in a transitional phase when nations are shouldering greater responsibilities but when U.S. involvement, while declining, still plays an important role.

In this interim period, we must offset our lower direct involvement with increased military and economic assistance. To meet our foreign policy obligations while reducing our presence will require a redirection—both quantitatively and qualitatively—in our assistance programs.

Prince Sihanouk wrote in December 1969 about the Communist threat to his country and the balance presented by American forces in Southeast Asia. In a generally anti-American article in the official Cambodian Government Party newspaper he stated:

"On the diplomatic and political plane, the fact that the U.S. remains in our region and does not yet leave it allows us maneuverings . . . to assure on the one hand our more than honorable presence in the concert of nations . . . this presence (and this is an irony of fate for the anti-imperialists that we are) is an essential condition for the 'respect', the 'friendship' and even for the aid of socialist 'friends.' When the U.S. has left these regions, it is certain that the Cambodia of the Sangkum will be the objective of the shellings of the heavy Communist guns: unfriendliness, subversion, aggressions, infiltrations and even occupations."

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

In our search for a lasting peace in Southeast Asia, we are applying the three basic principles of our foreign policy which are set forth in the Foreign Policy Report to Congress last February: partnership, strength and willingness to negotiate.

—The partnership of our Vietnamization Program and of our support for regional defense efforts.

—The strength of our action against the Communist bases in Cambodia and the steadfastness of the American people to see the war through to an honorable conclusion.

—The willingness to negotiate expressed in our generous proposals for a settlement and in our flexibility once Hanoi agrees to serious negotiations.

All three elements are needed to bring peace in Southeast Asia. The willingness to negotiate will prove empty unless buttressed by the willingness to stand by just demands. Otherwise negotiations will be a subterfuge for capitulation. This would only bring a false and transitory peace abroad and recrimination at home.

While we search for genuine negotiation we must continue to demonstrate resolution both abroad and at home and we must support the common defense efforts of threatened Asian nations.

To the leaders in Hanoi, I say the time has come to negotiate. There is nothing to be gained in waiting. There is never an ideal moment when both sides are in perfect equilibrium.

The lesson of the last two months has reinforced the lessons of the last two years—the time has come to negotiate a just peace.

In Cambodia, the futility of expanded aggression has been demonstrated. By its actions in Cambodia, North Vietnam and the Viet Cong provoked the destruction of their sanctuaries and helped to weld together the independent states of Southeast Asia in a collective defense effort, which will receive American support.

The other side cannot impose its will through military means. We have no intention of imposing ours. We have not raised the terms for a settlement as a result of our recent military successes. We will not lower our minimum terms in response to enemy pressure. Our objective remains a negotiated peace with justice for both sides and which gives the people of South Vietnam the opportunity to shape their own future.

With major efforts the North Vietnamese can perhaps rebuild or readjust Cambodia supply areas over a period of months. They can pursue their war against South Vietnam and her neighbors. But what end would a new round of conflict serve? There is no military solution to this conflict. Sooner or later, peace must come. It can come now, through a negotiated settlement that is fair to both sides and humiliates neither. Or it can come months or years from now, with both sides having paid the further price of protracted struggle.

We would hope that Hanoi would ponder seriously its choice, considering both the promise of an honorable peace and the costs of continued war.

We repeat: all our previous proposals, public and private, remain on the conference table to be explored, including the principles of a just political settlement that I outlined on April 20.

We search for a political solution that reflects the will of the South Vietnamese people, and allows them to determine their future without outside interference.

We recognize that a fair political solution should reflect the existing relationship of political forces.

We pledge to abide by the outcome of the political process agreed upon by the South Vietnamese.

For our part, we shall renew our efforts to bring about genuine negotiations both in Paris and for all of Indochina. As I said in my address last September to the United Nations General Assembly:

"The people of Vietnam, North and South alike, have demonstrated heroism enough to last a century . . . The people of Vietnam, North and South, have endured an unspeakable weight of suffering for a generation. And they deserve a better future."

We call on Hanoi to join us at long last in bringing about that better future.

*Significant enemy losses in Cambodia**

I. Ammunition:**	
Machinegun rounds	4,067,177
Rifle rounds	10,694,990
Total, small arms (machineguns and rifle rounds)	14,762,167
Antiaircraft rounds	199,552
Mortar rounds	68,539
Large rocket rounds	2,123
Small rocket rounds	43,160
Recoilless rifle rounds	29,185
Grenades	62,022
Mines	5,482
II. Weapons:	
Individual	22,892
Crew-served	2,509
III. Food:	
Rice—pounds	14,046,000
Man-months of rice	309,012
Total food—pounds	14,518,000
IV. Facilities:	
Bunkers/structures destroyed	11,688
V. Transportation:	
Vehicles	435
Boats	167
VI. Examples of other equipment:	
Radios	248
Generators	40
Total, communications equipment—pounds	58,600
Miscellaneous explosives (including 1,002 satchel charges) (pounds)	88,000
Medical supplies—pounds	110,900
Documents—pounds	12,400
VII. Personnel:	
Enemy KIA	11,349
POW's (includes detainees)	2,328

*As of June 29, 1970, based on latest available data from the field—subject to change.
**Figures do not include 70 tons of assorted ammunition.

A Conversation With the President on Foreign Policy

(The President's Television Interview With Howard K. Smith of ABC, Eric Sevareid of CBS, and John Chancellor of NBC. July 1, 1970[1] (excerpts))

Appointment of Chief of U.S. Delegation to Paris Talks

The President. Good evening. Before turning to our panel for their questions, I have a brief announcement. After consultation with the Secretary of State and other senior advisers, I decided to name Ambassador David Bruce as Chief of our Delegation to the Paris Talks.

Ambassador Bruce, as all of those who have studied our foreign policy know, is one of America's most distinguished diplomats. He is a Democrat, but he has served five Presidents, Democrat and Republican, with great devotion and great ability. He is the only Ambassador in our history who has been Ambassador to Germany, Ambassador to England, and Ambassador to France.

He will meet me in San Clemente along with Ambassador Habib, who is Chief of our Delegation, acting at this time, and the Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson on Saturday, July 4th.

There along with Dr. Kissinger we will discuss the situation with regard to the talks as they presently exist. Then on July 11th, he will meet with Secretary of State Rogers, in London, as Secretary Rogers completes his Asian trip and will stop briefly in Britain on his way back to the United States.

Ambassador Bruce will have the opportunity then to meet with the National Security Council in the middle of this month, perhaps about the 15th of July, and is arranging his affairs so that he will be able to go to Paris and take over as Chief of the Delegation on the 1st of August or shortly before that time.

We believe that in appointing Ambassador Bruce we have selected a man who is superbly qualified to conduct these negotiations. He will have great flexibility in the conduct of his talks. We hope that this move on our part will be reciprocated by a similar move on the part of the North Vietnamese in attempting to find a peaceful solution to the war in Vietnam.

Now, with the brief announcement we will go to the questions.

Questions

. . . Mr. Smith. Sir, I am not recommending this, but if you don't have a legal authority to wage a war, then presumably you could move troops out. It would be possible to agree with the North Vietnamese. They would be delighted to have us surrender. So you could——

What justification do you have for keeping troops there other than protecting the troops that are there fighting?

The President. A very significant justification. It isn't just a case of seeing that the Americans are moved out in an orderly way. If that were the case, we could move them out more quickly, but it is a case of moving American forces out in a way that we can at the same time win a just peace.

Now, by winning a just peace, what I mean is not victory over North Vietnam—we are not asking for that—but it is simply the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future without having us impose our will upon them, or the North Vietnamese, or anybody else outside impose their will upon them.

When we look at that limited objective, I am sure some would say, "Well, is that really worth it? Is that worth the efforts of all these Americans fighting in Vietnam, the lives that have been lost?"

I suppose it could be said that simply saving 17 million people in South Vietnam from a Communist takeover isn't worth the efforts of the United States. But let's go further. If the United States, after all of this effort, if we were to withdraw immediately, as many Americans would want us to do, and it would

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, July 6, 1970, pp. 861–870.

be very easy for me to do it and simply blame it on the previous administration, but if we were to do that, I would probably survive through my term, but it would have, in my view, a catastrophic effect on this country and the cause of peace in the years ahead.

Now I know there are those who say the domino theory is obsolete. They haven't talked to the dominoes. They should talk to the Thais, to the Malaysians, to the Singaporeans, to the Indonesians, to the Filipinos, to the Japanese, and the rest. And if the United States leaves Vietnam in a way that we are humiliated or defeated, not simply speaking in what is called jingoistic terms, but in very practical terms, this will be immensely discouraging to the 300 million people from Japan clear around to Thailand in free Asia, and even more important it will be ominously encouraging to the leaders of Communist China and the Soviet Union who are supporting the North Vietnamese. It will encourage them in their expansionist policies in other areas.

The world will be much safer in which to live.

. . . Mr. CHANCELLOR. Are you saying that we cannot survive, we cannot allow a regime or a government in South Vietnam to be constructed that would, say, lean toward the Communist bloc? What about a sort of Yugoslavia? Is there any possibility of that kind of settlement?

The PRESIDENT. Mr. Chancellor, it depends upon the people of South Vietnam. If the people of South Vietnam after they see what the Vietcong—the Communist Vietcong have done to the villages they have occupied, the 40,000 people that they have murdered, village chiefs and others, the atrocities of Hué—if the people of South Vietnam of which 850,000 of them are Catholic refugees from North Vietnam after a blood bath there when the North Vietnamese took over in North Vietnam—if the people of South Vietnam under those circumstances should choose to move in the direction of a Communist government, that, of course, is their right. I do not think it will happen. But I do emphasize that the American position and the position also of the present government of South Vietnam, it seems to me, is especially strong because we are confident enough that we say to the enemy, "All right, we'll put our case to the people and we'll accept the result." If it happens to be what you describe, a Yugoslav type of government or a mixed government, we will accept it.

. . . Mr. CHANCELLOR. Sir, you said in your report that you had unambiguous knowledge of enemy intentions in Cambodia just after April 20, April 21, 22, 23. It has been asked, and I think it is valid to raise it here, could you, in those early days in that week, before you decided to move on the 30th of April, have consulted with certain key Members of Congress?

The PRESIDENT. Well, as a matter of fact, when we talk about consultation, you can do it formally or you can do it informally, and I can assure you, Mr. Chancellor, I consulted with a great number of people between April 20th and April 30th, including Members of the Senate and Members of the House.

Now, let's come to perhaps really the thrust of your question, and I think this is perhaps something that many of our viewers and listeners would ask: Well, in ordering American men to join with the South Vietnamese, and incidentally, this was 60 percent South Vietnamese, 40 percent Americans, but we carried a very important part of the load—in ordering that kind of an action, why didn't I go to the Senate, for example, and the House and ask for their approval?

Well, now let us suppose we had done that. It took them 7 weeks for Cooper-Church. Let's suppose it had taken 7 weeks. What would have happened? Well, first, all of this year's supply of ammunition that we have acquired would have been gone out of the sanctuaries, or even worse, what might have happened is that the rather fearsome defensive barricades that they had in these sanctuaries would have been ready for us, and we would have lost not just 330 men—that is too many to lose in two months, and that is all we lost in Cambodia—we would have lost 3,000 or 4,000.

As far as I am concerned, I had to think of what was right, what was necessary, what would save American men, and the element of surprise was important.

Now let me also add this. If this had been what some thought it was, an attempt to expand the war into Cambodia, to launch a war into Cambodia, then of course, I would have gone to the Senate. You can be sure that in my administration we are not going to get involved in any more Vietnams where we do not get the approval of the Congress. I will not do this because I think we need Congressional support for our actions, and I trust we do not have to go to the Congress for that kind of support.

But when we have this limited, very precise action which was limited in terms of the time, limited in terms of 21 miles as far as we were going to go, and which had for its purpose the protecting of American lives, I had to take the action when I did, and I did not think it was wise to give the enemy the advance notice, the strategic warning, which would have taken away the surprise and would have cost us lives.

. . . Mr. CRANSTON. Sir, aren't we at the crux of the argument now that is going now in the country that the Executive Branch, according to the Legislative Branch, or at least one body of it, ought to be limited, they say on the Hill, in what it can do in ordering American troops to be used in many different ways around the world? I think we would all benefit, sir, if we could explore your views in a general way on that.

Do you feel that in the modern world there are situations when the President must respond against the very tight deadline or for reasons of security in using American troops crossing a border with them when he cannot, under reasons you yourself have described, consult with the Legislative Branch?

The Constitution says they declare war and you, sir, run it.

The PRESIDENT. Another good example of course is the Cuban missile crisis. President Kennedy had a very difficult decision there and two hours and a quarter before he ordered—and I thought with great justification and great courage—before he ordered the blockade, the use of American men to blockade Cuba, he told the Senate and the Congressional leaders. Now, why didn't he give them more time? For a very good reason he did not give them more time.

It was imperative to move soon with some surprise and some impact or the possibility of a nuclear confrontation might have been greater. That is one example. I trust we don't have another Cuban missile crisis. I trust we don't have another situation like Cambodia, but I do know that in the modern world, there are times when the Commander-in-Chief, the President of the United States, will have to act quickly. I can assure the American people that this President is going to bend over backwards to consult the Senate and consult the House whenever he feels it can be done without jeopardizing the lives of American men.

But when it is a question of the lives of American men or the attitudes of people in the Senate, I am coming down hard on the side of defending the lives of American men.

THE NEW INITIATIVE FOR PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

(The President's Radio and Television Address to the Nation. October 7, 1970[1] (excerpts))

. . . Tonight I would like to talk to you about a major new initiative for peace.

. . . *First, I propose that all armed forces throughout Indochina cease firing their weapons and remain in the positions they now hold.* This would be a "cease-fire-in-place." It would not in itself be an end to the conflict, but it would accomplish one goal all of us have been working toward: an end to the killing.

I do not minimize the difficulty of maintaining a cease-fire in a guerrilla war where there are no frontlines. But an unconventional war may require an unconventional truce; our side is ready to stand still and cease firing.

. . . This cease-fire proposal is put forth without preconditions. The general principles that should apply are these:

A cease-fire must be effectively supervised by international observers, as well as by the parties themselves. Without effective supervision a cease-fire runs the constant risk of breaking down. All concerned must be confident that the cease-fire will be maintained and that any local breaches of it will be quickly and fairly repaired.

A cease-fire should not be the means by which either side builds up its strength by an increase in outside combat forces in any of the nations of Indochina.

And a cease-fire should cause all kinds of warfare to stop. This covers the full range of actions that have typified this war, including bombing and acts of terror.

A cease-fire should encompass not only the fighting in Vietnam but in all of Indochina. Conflicts in this region are closely related. The United States has never sought to widen the war. What we do seek is to widen the peace.

---

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Oct. 12, 1970, pp. 1349–1352.

Finally, a cease-fire should be part of a general move to end the war in Indochina.

A cease-fire-in-place would undoubtedly create a host of problems in its maintenance. But it's always been easier to make war than to make a truce. To build an honorable peace, we must accept the challenge of long and difficult negotiations.

By agreeing to stop the shooting, we can set the stage for agreements on other matters.

A second point of the new initiative for peace is this:

I propose an Indochina Peace Conference. At the Paris talks today, we are talking about Vietnam. But North Vietnamese troops are not only infiltrating, crossing borders and establishing bases in South Vietnam—they are carrying on their aggression in Laos and Cambodia as well.

An international conference is needed to deal with the conflict in all three states of Indochina. The war in Indochina has been proved to be of one piece; it cannot be cured by treating only one of its areas of outbreak.

The essential elements of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 remain valid as a basis for settlement of problems between states in the Indochina area. And we shall accept the results of agreements reached between these states.

. . . *The third part of our peace initiative has to do with the United States forces in South Vietnam.*

. . . We are ready now to negotiate an agreed timetable for complete withdrawals as part of an overall settlement.

We are prepared to withdraw all our forces as part of a settlement based on the principles I spelled out previously and the proposals I am making tonight.

Fourth, I ask the other side to join us in a search for political settlement that truly meets the aspirations of all South Vietnamese.

Three principles govern our approach:

—We seek a political solution that reflects the will of the South Vietnamese people.

—A fair political solution should reflect the existing relationship of political forces in South Vietnam.

—And we will abide by the outcome of the political process agreed upon.

Let there be no mistake about one essential point: The other side is not merely objecting to a few personalities in the South Vietnamese Government. They want to dismantle the organized non-Communist parties and insure the takeover by their party. They demand the right to exclude whomever they wish from government.

This patently unreasonable demand is totally unacceptable.

As my proposals today indicate, we are prepared to be flexible on many matters. But we stand firm for the right of all the South Vietnamese people to determine for themselves the kind of government they want.

. . . *Finally, I propose the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war held by both sides.*

. . . I propose that all prisoners of war, without exception, without condition, be released now to return to the place of their choice.

. . . And I propose that all journalists and other innocent civilian victims of the conflict be released immediately as well.

THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF DECEMBER 10, 1970[1] (EXCERPTS)

Q. Mr. President, a question about Vietnam. Our recent air strikes have raised speculation that our policy of not bombing North Vietnam may be undergoing a subtle change.

What is our policy? Also, despite the rejection by the Saigon Government and the Vietcong, do you plan to propose a unilateral cease-fire from Christmas through Tet in a bid for peace?

. . . With regard to the second part of your question, the bombing of North Vietnam, you may recall that a few weeks ago there was bombing of installations in North Vietnam after the North Vietnamese had fired on some of our unarmed reconnaissance planes.

Now, there's been, I note, some speculation in the press and also some charges from North Vietnam, that there is no understanding that reconnaissance planes are to fly over North Vietnam since the bombing halt was announced.

---

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Dec. 14, 1970, pp. 1650–1656.

I want to be very sure that that understanding is clear. First, President Johnson said there was such an understanding at the time of the bombing halt. Secretary Clifford did, and Ambassador Vance did.

But if there is any misunderstanding, I want to indicate the understanding of this President with regard to the flying of reconnaissance planes over North Vietnam: I must insist that there be continued reconnaissance over North Vietnam because, as we are withdrawing our forces, I have to see whether or not there is any chance of a strike against those forces that remain, and we have to watch for the buildup.

If our planes are fired upon, I will not only order that they return the fire, but I will order that the missile site be destroyed and that the military complex around that site which supports it also be destroyed by bombing. That is my understanding.

Beyond that, there is another understanding with regard to the bombing of North Vietnam which at a number of these press conferences and in my speech on November 3d and in four televised speeches to the Nation last year, I have stated. I restate it again tonight. At a time when we are withdrawing from South Vietnam, it is vitally important that the President of the United States, as Commander in Chief, take the action that is necessary to protect our remaining forces, because the number of our ground combat forces is going down very, very steadily.

Now if, as a result of my conclusion that the North Vietnamese, by their infiltration, threaten our remaining forces, if they thereby develop a capacity and proceed possibly to use that capacity to increase the level of fighting in South Vietnam, then I will order the bombing of military sites in North Vietnam, the passes that lead from North Vietnam into South Vietnam, the military complexes, the military supply lines. That will be the reaction that I shall take.

I trust that that is not necessary. But let there be no misunderstanding with regard to this President's understanding about either reconnaissance flights or about a step-up of the activities.

A Conversation With the President

(The President's Television Interview With John Chancellor of NBC, Eric Sevareid of CBS, Nancy H. Dickerson of PBS, and Howard K. Smith of ABC. January 4, 1971[1] (excerpts))

. . . The President. Well, Mr. Chancellor, I have no desire to resume the bombing of North Vietnam. We do not want to go back to the bombing of the strategic targets in North Vietnam, and we do not want even to bomb military targets unless it becomes necessary to do so, and this is the key point—to protect American forces.

Now, with regard to the understanding, let's see what it is.

First, there was an understanding. President Johnson said so, Dean Rusk said so, Clark Clifford said so, Mr. Harriman said so. There was an understanding that after the bombing halt, that unarmed reconnaissance planes could fly over North Vietnam with impunity. We had to insist on that, because otherwise, we would have no intelligence with regard to what they were planning on an attack.

So, when they fire on those planes I have given instructions that we will take out the SAM site or whatever it is that has fired upon them.

We will continue to do so, and if they say there is no understanding in that respect, then there are no restraints whatever on us, and so we must have that in mind.

Now, the other understanding is one that I have laid down. It is a new one. It is a new one which goes along with our Vietnamization program and our withdrawal program.

. . . We must realize, however, as Secretary Rogers pointed out in his news conference at the State Department a few days ago, that in May of this year, most American combat forces, ground combat forces, will have been withdrawn from Vietnam. But there will still be 280,000 there left to withdraw.

Now, the President of the United States, as Commander in Chief, owes a responsibility to those men to see that they are not subjected to an overwhelming attack from the North. That is why we must continue reconnaissance, and that is why also, if the enemy at a time we are trying to deescalate, at a time we are withdrawing, starts to build up its infiltration, starts moving troops and supplies

---

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Jan. 11, 1971, pp. 33–43.

through the Mu Gia Pass and the other passes, then I, as Commander in Chief, will have to order bombing strikes on those key areas.

That was one of the reasons for this strike, and it will be done again if they continue to threaten our remaining forces in Vietnam. But only on those military targets, and only if necessary.

. . . Mr. SMITH. Suppose, say in 1972 our role is virtually eliminated, we are passive, we have few troops there, then the North Vietnamese attack and begin to come into control of the country. What is our policy then? Do we stand aside?

The PRESIDENT. Well, Mr. Smith, our Vietnamization policy has been very carefully drawn up, and we are withdrawing in a measured way on the basis that the South Vietnamese will be able to defend themselves as we withdraw, and it's working. For example, did you realize that—I am sure you do because I think it was reported on your network, all of our naval forces now, combat forces, have been removed?

The South Vietnamese Navy has taken over. And so it will be in these other areas. When the time comes in 1972 that you speak of, it is possible, of course, that at that time North Vietnam might launch an attack, but I am convinced that at that time, based on the training program of the South Vietnamese, based on the watershed that occurred when they jelled and became a fighting, confident unit after the Cambodian intervention, I am convinced that they will be able to hold their own and defend themselves in 1972.

Now, that doesn't answer your hypothetical question, but I am simply not going to borrow trouble by saying that I expect them to fail. I don't think they will.

THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF FEBRUARY 17, 1971[1] (EXCERPTS)

The PRESIDENT. We'll make this on the record today.

The mike is for the purpose of a transcription which will be available, I think, rather soon after we complete the conference because it will be run simultaneously by the stenographers.

Any question which you want to ask?

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Q. Mr. President, the next logical step in Southeast Asia would seem to be South Vietnamese forces moving into the southern part of North Vietnam for the same reasons that they moved into the Laotian panhandle.

Would our policy rule out support for this type of move, air support for it?

The PRESIDENT. Well, I won't speculate on what South Vietnam may decide to do with regard to a possible incursion into North Vietnam in order to defend their national security. However, I will restate our policy. I stated that policy on November 3d [1969] and have restated it at least nine different times publicly since that time.

I stated then that at a time we are withdrawing our forces that if I found that the enemy was stepping up its activity through infiltration in a way that would threaten our remaining forces that I would take strong action to deal with the new situation.

On December 10 [1970], as you recall, I reiterated that statement and said that this action would include the use of airpower against the infiltration routes, military complex supply depots.

That is our policy, the policy of the President taking action if he finds that the North Vietnamese are undertaking actions which threaten our remaining forces in South Vietnam.

Q. Mr. President, under that guide, is there any limit to what we might do to protect our forces in South Vietnam?

The PRESIDENT. We have indicated several limits. For example, we are not going to use ground forces in Laos. We are not going to use advisers in Laos with the South Vietnamese forces. We are not going to use ground forces in Cambodia or advisers in Cambodia as we have previously indicated and we have no intention, of course, of using ground forces in North Vietnam. Those are limitations.

Q. I had reference to our use of airpower.

---

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Feb. 22, 1971, pp. 236–242.

The PRESIDENT. I'm not going to place any limitation upon the use of airpower except, of course, to rule out a rather ridiculous suggestion that is made from time to time—I think the latest by Hans Morgenthau—that our airpower might include the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

As you know, Mr. Lisagor, this has been speculated on for a period of 5 years and I have said for a period of 5 years that this is not an area where the use of nuclear weapons, in any form, is either needed or would be wise.

As far as our airpower is concerned, it will be directed against—and I ought to be as precise as I was on December 10—against those military activities which I determine are directed against and thereby threaten our remaining forces in South Vietnam.

Q. Mr. President, could you discuss with us your evaluation of the possibility of Communist China entering this situation now that it's expanded into Laos or if the South Vietnamese go into North Vietnam?

The PRESIDENT. Let me refer to the situation as it presently exists rather than the hypothesis of whether the South Vietnamese might go into North Vietnam.

As far as the actions in southern Laos are concerned, they present no threat to Communist China and should not be interpreted by the Communist Chinese as being a threat against them.

As you know, the Communist Chinese have been operating in northern Laos for some time. But this action is not directed against Communist China. It is directed against the North Vietnamese who are pointed toward South Vietnam and toward Cambodia.

Consequently, I do not believe that the Communist Chinese have any reason to interpret this as a threat against them or any reason therefore to react to it.

Q. Mr. President, it is reported in both the South Vietnamese and, I think, in our statement the operation will be limited in time and scope. Can you define those terms?

The PRESIDENT. By time, the operation will be limited to the time that is necessary to accomplish the objective. The objective is not to occupy any part of Laos. The South Vietnamese are not there to stay. They are there to disrupt the enemy's lines of communication, their supply lines, their infiltration routes, and then to get out.

Once that is accomplished, if it is accomplished early, they will get out. If it takes a longer time, they will stay in.

There is also another limitation in terms of time. And that is the weather. In the latter part of April or the early part of May, the rains come. And they would have to get out then because then the North Vietnamese also would pose no threat.

In terms of area, space, it is limited to the specific area that you see on the maps here, in terms of cutting across the trails—and it is more than one trail, there are three or four trails—the trails that are the supply lines on which the North Vietnamese operate.

NORTH VIETNAM

Q. Mr. President, may I ask a question, if I could get back to Vietnam for just one moment? There has been quite a bit of speculation about the possibility of the North Vietnamese coming down through the DMZ.

Would this scrap any obligations that you may have under the bombing ban in the North and would you be in a position then of having to retaliate for any crossing of the DMZ?

The PRESIDENT. My action in case that happened—and I do not believe it will happen—but my action will be guided by the same principles that I have laid down before. I would use the power of the United States, and particularly its power in the air, to the extent that I consider it necessary to protect our remaining forces in South Vietnam.

We have a considerable number of forces, as you know, on the DMZ. The blocking forces along Route 9, before you get to the border of Laos, are primarily American. I will not allow those forces to be endangered by a massive North Vietnamese incursion, if one should be undertaken. I think the very fact that the North Vietnamese know that I intend to take strong action to deal with that incursion means that they are not going to take it. If they do, I can assure you that—I don't want to assure you, I simply want to have the record clear that I would not be bound, of course, by any so-called understandings which they have already violated at the time of the bombing halt.

Q. Could I clear up what I think is an important point on Laos? You suggested that the Saigon regime is making the decisions as to what it will do in its own interest, particularly in reference to crossing the DMZ.

Most Americans believe that the decision to go into Laos was made in Washington and decisions like crossing the DMZ would have, necessarily, to be made here as well because of the use of American airpower.

Could you straighten out for us where the line is between the decisions that the Saigon regime will make and that this Government will make?

The PRESIDENT. Any decision, Mr. Lisagor, that called for American participation would have to be approved in Washington. The decision with regard to Laos was one that was approved in Washington.

I approved the operation and I approved the decision to use American airpower. The operation itself was jointly developed, primarily by the South Vietnamese, but with, of course, very close cooperation and consultation with General Abrams and his staff.

But wherever American participation to any extent is required, you can be sure that that decision will be made here.

Now, when you put it in terms of what would happen in the event the South Vietnamese went into North Vietnam, I am not going to speculate on what they will or will not do. I will only say that any American participation has to be approved here.

If South Vietnam's decision with regard to what they do would depend upon American cooperation, then, of course, it could not be undertaken without our approval.

REPORTER. Thank you, Mr. President.

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S: BUILDING FOR PEACE

(President Nixon's report to Congress, Feb. 25, 1971 [1] (excerpts))

. . . There has been one guiding principle, one irreducible objective, for both our negotiations and Vietnamization. I stated it on May 14, 1969 and consistently since: "We seek the opportunity for the South Vietnamese people to determine their own political future without outside interference."

In our search for a negotiated solution we have stretched our positions towards those of the other side. But we have not agreed to their demand that we impose a political future on the South Vietnamese at the conference table.

In Vietnamization we have withdrawn our forces as rapidly as the South Vietnamese could compensate for our presence. But we have not withdrawn them so as to allow the North Vietnamese to impose a political future on the battlefield.

. . . We thus moved to define more precisely the political solution we envisaged. On April 20, 1970, I set forth the principles that we think should govern a fair political settlement in South Vietnam:

—A political solution must reflect the will of the South Vietnamese people and allow them to determine their future without outside interference.

—A fair political solution should reflect the existing relationship of political forces within South Vietnam.

—We will abide by the outcome of the political process agreed upon.

. . . The other side's constant response has been to demand that we unconditionally withdraw all U.S. forces and replace the leaders of the Republic of Vietnam with a coalition government. Their position is unacceptable to us on several counts.

First, the substance of their demands. They say nothing about what they will do about North Vietnamese forces, when we believe the South Vietnamese should be free of all outside intervention. They ask us to impose a future on South Vietnam, when we believe the people should choose that future.

Secondly, their view of the negotiating process. The Communists pose their demands as *preconditions* to negotiations. If we were to pay this price there would be nothing left to negotiate.

Thirdly, the incompatibility of their demands. Even if we were to agree to their first demand and pull out unilaterally, we would have absolutely no in-

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Mar. 1, 1971, pp. 323–334.

centive to agree to their second demand of assuring their political victory in South Vietnam. This would be their problem, not ours. It would be up to them to compete with the growing strength of the South Vietnamese.

Lastly, the Communist definition of a coalition government. Their definition makes a mockery of the concept itself. They prescribe that one-third of the coalition government would be from the NLF, one-third from those people in the "Saigon Administration" who stand for "peace, independence and neutrality," and one-third from other forces who also stand for these principles.

Since the Communists reserve the right to define the principles of "peace, independence and neutrality" and to decide which people support these principles, their proposal for a coalition government boils down to a demand that they nominate one-third of the government without restrictions and have a veto power over the other two-thirds. It is a formula for a guaranteed political takeover.

Thus, the issue is not, as some would have it, a question of a few personalities in the Saigon government standing in the way of a peaceful solution. The Communists seek not only the removal of the elected leaders of the present Government but the disruption of all organized non-Communist forces.

The fundamental question in the negotiations, in short, is the means of allocating political power in South Vietnam. The other side wants to negotiate in Paris an allotment of power that would assure their dominance. Our proposals call for a fair competitive process that would consult the will of the South Vietnamese people and reflect the existing relationship of political forces.

For negotiations were not entirely in our hands. North Vietnamese history and doctrine did not make for encouraging prospects. Their calculus of the situation in South Vietnam, and more particularly in the United States, probably made them believe that time was on their side. And even if a settlement did come through negotiations, it might take a long period.

At home we did not have the option of continuing as we had—and the enemy knew it. So we chose a policy that we believed would gain the sustained support of the American people and thus give us a chance both to fulfill our objectives in Vietnam and to demonstrate to the other side that time was not necessarily with them. Such a policy seemed the only chance of giving the South Vietnamese a fair chance and the best hope of inducing the North Vietnamese to negotiate.

Thus the alternative, and hopefully the spur, to negotiations, is Vietnamization that I have described on several occasions.

This policy fulfills our objective of reducing American involvement. It cannot, except over a long period, end the war altogether. Still, if Vietnamization leads to perpetuating the war, it is not by our design but because the other side refuses to settle for anything less than a guaranteed takeover.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES

Vietnamization has political and economic dimensions in addition to military ones. They will become increasingly important as the war winds down.

Political development in any newly independent country is a challenging task. When that country is under fire from a determined enemy, the difficulties are multiplied. The government sees its first priority as providing security. Military considerations are likely to dominate the time of officials, the content of programs, and the freedom of political life.

Nevertheless, political development in a paramilitary conflict is a crucial ingredient of a government's effort. It is increasingly important in Vietnam as the military struggle subsides. Ultimately, the fate of Vietnam will turn on political factors—the motivation of the people during the conflict; the cohesion of non-Communist political forces in a possible electoral competition with the Communists; the solidity of the political institutions during and after the war.

There has been a steady political evolution in South Vietnam beginning with the election of a Constitutional Assembly in 1966 and of the President and National Assembly in 1967. In 1970 there were continued signs of a growing commitment to the political institutions established by the 1967 Constitution. Elections for hamlet chiefs and for Village, Municipal and Provincial Councils took place throughout the country. There were also elections for half the seats in the Upper House which attracted a wide spectrum of non-Communist political forces.

1970 saw enactment of Land-to-the-Tiller legislation, a sweeping land reform program which will give land to tenant farmers and could have significant political impact. It has our full support.

The Presidential and Lower House elections this year will further test the fabric of the constitutional system, the strengths of the various political factions and the allegiance of the people. 1971 will show the extent of political development in South Vietnam. Vietnamese people of all factions will judge the responsiveness of the political process and register their verdicts. The enemy will seek to exploit the political currents of an election year. But it will also be watching—and perhaps drawing conclusions from—the stability of the system.

The maintenance of a sound South Vietnamese economy is crucial for Vietnamization. This problem was of great concern in 1970 but the Government moved on it with some encouraging results.

PRISONERS OF WAR

We have the deepest concern for the plight of our prisoners of war in Indochina. Some 1,900 Americans, including pilots and soldiers and some 40 civilians, are missing or held in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Some have been held as long as six years, longer than for any other prisoners of war in our history.

The enemy violates specific requirements of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention, by which they are bound. They violate common standards of decency as well.

They have not permitted impartial inspection of prison camps despite constant attempts to arrange such visits. They have refused to repatriate seriously sick and wounded prisoners. They have failed to identify all prisoners and to allow many of them to correspond with their families.

We and the South Vietnamese have made intensive efforts this past year to secure better treatment and the release of allied prisoners—through global diplomacy, through proposals in Paris and through the courageous raid at Son Tay. Congressional expressions have been valuable in underlining American public concern. The world increasingly condemns the other side's practices, and the UN General Assembly passed a resolution this fall which underscored the international obligation to treat prisoners humanely.

I repeat my October 7 proposal for the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war held by both sides. All prisoners, journalists and other civilian captives should be released now to return to the place of their choice. Such action would not only meet humanitarian concerns; it might also lead to progress on other aspect of a peace settlement.

As first steps, the Republic of Vietnam, with our support, has offered to repatriate all sick and wounded prisoners of war. It has unilaterally returned groups of such prisoners, despite North Vietnam's refusal to make orderly arrangements for their repatriation. And it has proposed the release of all North Vietnamese prisoners of war in return for all U.S. and allied prisoners in Indochina and any South Vietnamese prisoners held outside South Vietnam. We profoundly regret the other side's refusal to respond to these initiatives.

The treatment of prisoners of war anywhere is not a political or military issue but a matter of simple humanity. As I said on October 7:

War and imprisonment should be over for all these prisoners. They and their families have already suffered too much.

This government will continue to take all possible measures to secure the end of imprisonment as well as the end of the war.

No discussion of Vietnam would be complete without paying tribute to the brave Americans who have served there. Many have sacrificed years of their lives. Others have sacrificed life itself.

These Americans have fought in a war which differed from our previous experience. We have not sought a traditional military victory. The complex nature of this conflict posed unprecedented difficulties for those involved.

It is to their lasting credit that Americans in Vietnam have overcome these difficulties and conducted themselves in our best tradition.

PROBLEMS FOR THE FUTURE

There are sobering problems still remaining in Vietnam:

—*Enemy Capabilities and Intentions.* Despite heavy losses, the North Vietnamese have the manpower, the logistical network and the dedication to continue fighting if they wish. Although their main force units have been greatly reduced, they still pose a considerable threat, especially in Military Regions I

and II in South Vietnam. Hanoi could instead use its buildup of forces in Southern Laos and Northeastern Cambodia to step up its presures against the Cambodian government or to increase its hold on Cambodian territory. In any event, Communist terrorist activities, assassinations, and kidnappings continue to exact a tragic toll from the Vietnamese people.

—*The Vietnamization Process.* Vietnamization made very encouraging advances during 1970. The fundamental question remains: can the South Vietnamese fully stand on their own against a determined enemy? We—and more importantly the South Vietnamese—are confident that they can. Substantial problems remain, however; improving the leadership of South Vietnamese forces at all levels; enhancing their ability to take on support as well as combat functions; providing assistance to Cambodia and bettering Vietnamese-Cambodian understanding; rooting out the Viet Cong infrastructure in the countryside; assuring political stability in the cities; managing the strains on the Vietnamese economy as we continue to Vietnamize other aspects of the conflict; and moving against corruption which not only poisons the moral atmosphere but also carries potential political impact. This is a formidable agenda, but South Vietnamese accomplishments to date demonstrate their capacity to deal with it.

—*The Negotiating Stalemate.* Our intensive efforts in 1970 failed to yield progress in the Paris negotiations. We frankly expected that our elaboration of political principles, the appointment of Ambassador Bruce, and the October 7 peace initiative would produce some movement from the other side. We will not give up on negotiations, though the past year indicated that it would be extremely difficult to overcome the enemy's mix of doctrine, calculations and suspicion. There is the additional fact that as our forces decline, the role we can play on many aspects of a settlement is also bound to decline.

LAOS AND CAMBODIA

. . . Enduring peace will come for Vietnam only when there is peace for its neighbors.

Hanoi has made the war an Indochina conflict. In South Vietnam there are some 100,000 North Vietnamese troops. In Laos there are about 90,000. In Cambodia there are over 50,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. These troops challenge the legitimate governments of Laos and Cambodia, and they menace South Vietnam from within and without.

. . . North Vietnam's aggression against Laos and Cambodia and its violation of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements are important. We care about the preservation of international agreements and the independence of these nations. But our immediate concern is that North Vietnam uses them as springboards for assaults on a country where we have a firm commitment, have invested lives, treasure, and prestige, and have Americans to protect as we progessively withdraw. Furthermore, if Hanoi were to gain control of Laos and Cambodia, a large portion of the more than 140,000 Communist troops now engaged in these countries would be freed to fight in South Vietnam.

. . . To date, Hanoi has rejected diplomacy and spread the conflict. The Lao government for many years, and the Cambodian government this year, have turned to us and others for assistance.

These developments left us with the choice between military options. After our one-time sweep against the Communist bases in Cambodia, we have ruled out American ground combat troops in either Laos or Cambodia for several reasons. Our fundamental Vietnam-related objectives are served by other means. In any event, we believe that the two governments can survive through their own efforts, our various kinds of assistance, and that of other friends. We look to them to shoulder the primary combat responsibilities for their own defense.

. . . Thus we did not oppose Congressional restrictions this past year on the use of U.S. ground combat forces in those countries, even though we had strong reservations about the principle of circumscribing executive authority.

. . . In the previous chapter on Vietnam I briefly recalled the background and results of the allied sweeps against the Communist sanctuaries which were so vital to Vietnamization. With the operations concluded, our policy for Cambodia took shape as follows:

—No U.S. ground combat personnel in the country, and no U.S. advisors with Cambodian units.

—Air missions against enemy supplies and personnel that pose a potential threat to South Vietnam or seek to establish base areas relevant to Vietnam.

—Military assistance to the Cambodian Government in amounts and types suitable for their army.
—Encourage and support the efforts of third countries who wish to furnish troops or material.
. . . Cambodia is, in short, a concrete illustration of Nixon Doctrine principles:
—assumption of primary responsibility for its own defense.
—help from regional friends.
—our support through military and economic assistance.
The objective of all our activities related to Cambodia remains constant: to bar the reestablishment of secure Communist base areas that could jeopardize allied forces in Vietnam.
. . . Our defensive and supportive policy [toward Laos] was outlined in the March 6 [1970] statement:
—no American ground combat forces.
—minimum American presence.
—military assistance for regular and irregular Lao forces when requested by the Lao government.
—reconnaissance flights and air operations to interdict North Vietnamese troops and supplies on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
—logistic and air support for Lao forces when requested by the government.

THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MARCH 4, 1971[1] (EXCERPTS)

. . . Q. Mr. President, this is a question that you addressed yourself to at your last news conference, but I'd like to ask it again in view of the fact that President Thieu has publicly said several times, has publicly raised the possibility of South Vietnamese forces invading North Vietnam. Would the United States support such an invasion of North Vietnam by the South Vietnamese?

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Risher, I think it is important to restate the answer that I gave at the last news conference, because you will recall that was in the office where only you ladies and gentlemen who regularly cover the White House were present, and the television audience did not hear the answer.

To restate it completely, let me break it down into its component parts. First, the question is, what will President Thieu in South Vietnam do? The second question is, what will the United States do? And, third, what might we do together? Now, on the first question, President Thieu has stated that he would consider the necessity of invading North Vietnam. Let's look at his position. There are no South Vietnamese in North Vietnam. There are 100,000 North Vietnamese in South Vietnam and they've already killed over 200,000 South Vietnamese. Therefore, President Thieu has to take the position that unless the North Vietnamese leave South Vietnam alone, he has to consider the possibility of going against the North. That is his position, and I'm not going to speculate on what position he might take in the future, in order to defend himself, the right of self-defense, in view of the fact that he is being attacked, he is not attacking North Vietnam.

The second part of the question deals with what we will do. And there, as you will recall, I stated that American policy is that we will have no ground forces in North Vietnam, in Cambodia, or in Laos, except, of course, for rescue teams which go in for American fliers or for prisoners of war where we think there is an opportunity in that case.

On the other hand, I have stated on 10 different occasions, usually, and before press conferences in which you ladies and gentlemen have participated, that in two respects we would use airpower against the North. One, that we would attack those missile sites that fired at our planes, and we have been doing that. We will continue to do that.

Second, that if I determined that increased infiltration from North Vietnam endangered our remaining forces in South Vietnam at a time we were withdrawing, that I would order attacks on the supply routes, on the infiltration routes, on the military complexes, and I have done that in the past. And I shall do so again if I determine that such activities by North Vietnam may endanger our remaining forces in South Vietnam, particularly as we are withdrawing.

---

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Mar. 8, 1971, pp. 424–429.

Now, the third question is this one—whether or not the United States, through its airpower, might support a South Vietnamese operation against North Vietnam. And the answer to that is that no such plan is under consideration in this Government.

. . . Q. Mr. President, there is some feeling in this city and perhaps around the country that you are trying to prepare the American people for the possibility that between 50,000 and 100,000 American troops will still have to be in South Vietnam by election time next year.

Is that true?

THE PRESIDENT. I really can't tell you what the feeling is in this city. I can tell you what my own plans are.

We are for a total withdrawal of all American forces on a mutual basis. As far as those forces are concerned, I have stated in this press conference that Gene Risher referred to a moment ago, I have stated, however, that as long as there are American POW's—and there are 1,600 Americans[1] in North Vietnam jails under very difficult circumstances at the present time—as long as there are American POW's in North Vietnam we will have to maintain a residual force in South Vietnam. That is the least that we can negotiate for.

As far as our goal is concerned, our goal is to get all Americans out of Vietnam as soon as we can by negotiation if possible and through our withdrawal program and Vietnamization program if necessary.

REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

(The President's Address to the Nation, April 7, 1971[2] (excerpts))

. . . Did the Laotian operation contribute to the goals we sought? I've just completed my assessment of that operation and here are my conclusions:

First, the South Vietnamese demonstrated that without American advisers they could fight effectively against the very best troops North Vietnam could put in the field.

Second, the South Vietnamese suffered heavy casualties, but by every conservative estimate the casualties suffered by the enemy were far heavier.

Third, and most important, the disruption of enemy supply lines, the consumption of ammunition and arms in the battle has been even more damaging to the capability of the North Vietnamese to sustain major offensives in South Vietnam than were the operations in Cambodia 10 months ago.

Consequently, tonight I can report that Vietnamization has succeeded. Because of the increased strength of the South Vietnamese, because of the success of the Cambodian operation, because of the achievements of the South Vietnamese operation in Laos, I am announcing an increase in the rate of American withdrawals. Between May 1 and December 1 of this year, 100,000 more American troops will be brought home from South Vietnam. This will bring the total number of American troops withdrawn from South Vietnam to 365,000. Now that's over two-thirds of the number who were there when I came into office, as you can see from this chart on my left. The Government of South Vietnam fully supports the decision I've just announced.

Now, let's look at the future:

As you can see from the progress we have made to date and by this announcement tonight, the American involvement in Vietnam is coming to an end. The day the South Vietnamese can take over their own defense is in sight. Our goal is a total American withdrawal from Vietnam. We can and we will reach that goal through our program of Vietnamization if necessary.

. . . The issue very simply is this: Shall we leave Vietnam in a way that—by our own actions—consciously turns the country over to the Communists? Or shall we leave in a way that gives the South Vietnamese a reasonable chance to survive as a free people? My plan will end American involvement in a way that would provide that chance. And the other plan would end it precipitately and give victory to the Communists.

---

[1] The White House Press Secretary later stated that the figure cited by the President referred to those who are prisoners of war or missing in action in Southeast Asia.

[2] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Apr. 12, 1971, pp. 611–616.

Internment of Prisoners of War in a Neutral Country

(Statement by the President on the Proposal by the Republic of Vietnam at the Paris Negotiations, April 14, 1971 [1])

I welcome the Republic of Vietnam's proposal, made on April 8 in the Paris negotiations, for internment of prisoners of war in a neutral country. Although short of the release of prisoners of war which is our goal, this would be a reasonable and responsible way of alleviating the plight of prisoners of war on both sides. I hope the other side will respond positively to this initiative.

Third country internment of prisoners of war is specifically envisaged by the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1949, by which both sides in the Indochina conflict are bound. There can be no constructive purpose in the continued long detention of prisoners of war. They and their families have suffered too much already. Agreement to intern prisoners of war in a third country would mean that the prisoners would no longer serve as hostages for political or military purposes.

American Society of Newspaper Editors

(The President's Remarks at a Question and Answer Session With a Panel of Six Editors and Reporters at the Society's Annual Convention, April 16, 1971 [2] (excerpts))

U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

. . . Emmett Dedmon [Vice President and Editorial Director, Chicago Sun-Times and The Chicago Daily News]. Mr. President, you mentioned ending our involvement in the war in Vietnam and, yet the Secretary of Defense said the other day that our Air Force and naval power would remain in South Vietnam.

How do you reconcile those two statements or is there a conflict there in your option?

The President. No, Mr. Dedmon, there really isn't a conflict between the two statements. I said that we would end our involvement in Vietnam. You will recall my speech last Wednesday. I said that our goal is a total American withdrawal from Vietnam.

On October 7 of last year you may recall I said that we not only propose a total American withdrawal but a cease-fire all over Southeast Asia which would, of course, mean no airpower, no American forces there, no use of power in any way.

As far as Mr. Laird's statement was concerned, what he was referring to was that pending the time that we can have a total withdrawal consistent with the principles that I laid down in my speech last week, it will be necessary for the United States to retain air power and to retain some residual forces.

Our goal, however, is a total withdrawal. We do not have as a goal a permanent residual force such as we have in Korea at the present time.

But it will be necessary for us to maintain forces in South Vietnam until two important objectives are achieved: one, the release of the prisoners of war held by North Vietnam in North Vietnam and other parts of Southeast Asia, and two, the ability of the South Vietnamese to develop the capacity to defend themselves against a Communist takeover, not the sure capacity, but at least the chance.

Once those two objectives are achieved, then the total American withdrawal can be undertaken and will be undertaken.

We can achieve them earlier, provided the enemy will negotiate. As you noticed, on October 7 I indicated we will have a total withdrawal in 12 months if they would be willing to mutually withdraw their forces.

And so, in sum, the goal of American policy in Vietnam is a total withdrawal with no residual force. But, as long as the prisoner issue remains unsettled, and as long as they hold prisoners, and as long as the South Vietnamese have not yet developed the capacity to defend themselves to take over from us the defense of their own country—a capacity that they rapidly are developing—we will have forces there.

---

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Apr. 19, 1971, p. 628.
[2] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Apr. 19, 1971, pp. 631–640.

. . . Again, Mr. Cormier and Mr. Blaker will remember that when I was at Guam, I explained the Nixon Doctrine in brief.

It provides that where we have a situation as we have in South Vietnam, of a country that is threatened by an aggressive force from the outside, that the United States will try to help that country develop the capacity to defend itself, but that we will not do, if we can possibly avoid it, what we did in Korea and then what we again did in Vietnam—go in, in effect, and do the fighting for them—if we can avoid it.

Under our Vietnamization policy, we are getting out. That is one-half of it. But the other very important half of it is that the South Vietnamese are developing and by the time we get out, will have developed the capacity to defend themselves.

And, so, how that fits into our policy to Southeast Asia, it seems to me, is quite clear. Once we leave South Vietnam, South Vietnam will be strong enough, at least for the foreseeable future, to defend itself.

That will mean that in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, with which country, of course, we have a treaty, the Philippines, with which we have a treaty, will also have a greater assurance of stability.

And I think the repercussions will go clear up to Japan, because as we look at the rim-land of Asia, we must remember that in all of the debate at the present time and the great interest understandably, in what has happened with regard to Mainland China this last week, that on the rim-land of Asia live 300 million people. They produce three times as much as Mainland China and whether those people are going to remain free nations, independent nations, depends upon whether they think they have the capability and whether they can develop the capability of self-defense.

The policy of the United States—and this is a very significant change—is to help other nations, to help the Thais, to help the Indonesians, to help the Vietnamese, to help the Japanese, the others, develop the capability of defending themselves except, of course, where a nuclear attack would be involved and then the United States assumes the responsibility.

THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF NOVEMBER 12, 1971[1] (EXCERPTS)

. . . Based on those consultations and consultations with the Government of South Vietnam, I am now able to make this announcement. Over the next 2 months, we will withdraw 45,000 Americans. I will make another announcement before the first of February. As far as that second announcement is concerned, before the first of February, the number to be withdrawn—the rate, that is—as well as the duration of the announcement, will be determined by three factors.

First, by the level of enemy activity and particularly by the infiltration route and its rate because if the level of enemy activity and infiltration substantially increased, it could be very dangerous to our sharply decreased forces in South Vietnam.

Second, the progress of our training program, our Vietnamization program in South Vietnam, and third, any progress that may have been made with regard to two major objectives that we have, obtaining the release of all our POW's wherever they are in Southeast Asia and obtaining a cease-fire for all of Southeast Asia.

Those three criteria will determine the next announcement, both its duration and its rate.

. . . Q. Mr. President, with the conditions that you know now in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, can you foresee in the near future a substantial diminution of American airpower use in support of the Vietnamese?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, airpower of course, as far as our use of it is concerned, will continue to be used longer than our ground forces, due to the fact that training Vietnamese to handle the aircraft takes the longest lead time, as we know, and we will continue to use it in support of the South Vietnamese until there is a negotiated settlement or, looking further down the road, until the South Vietnamese have developed the capability to handle the situation themselves.

---

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Nov. 15, 1971, pp. 1511–1515.

As far as our airpower is concerned, let me also say this: As we reduce the number of our forces, it is particularly important for us to continue our air strikes on the infiltration routes. If we see any substantial step-up in infiltration in the passes, for example, which lead from North Vietnam into Laos and, of course, the Laotian trail which comes down through Cambodia into South Vietnam—if we see that, we will have to not only continue our air strikes; we will have to step them up.

That is why I have been quite categorical with regard to that situation, because as the number of our forces goes down, their danger increases, and we are not going to allow the enemy to pounce on them by reason of our failure to use airpower against increased infiltration, if it occurs.

POSSIBILITY OF RESIDUAL FORCE

Q. Mr. President, we read much speculation that you plan to keep a residual force, 40,000 or 50,000 men, in Vietnam until the prisoner of war issue is settled completely and all prisoners are out. Is that still valid?

The PRESIDENT. Well, first Mrs. Cornell—(*Laughter.*) It had to come![1]

Q. Touché. (*Laughter.*)

. . . THE PRESIDENT. First, if the situation is such that we have a negotiated settlement, naturally that means a total withdrawal of all American forces. It also not only means a total withdrawal of American forces in South Vietnam, it means a discontinuation of our air strikes and also withdrawal of forces stationed in other places in Southeast Asia or in the Asian theater that are directly related to the support of our forces in Vietnam.

That is, in other words, what is involved if we can get a negotiated settlement. If we do not get a negotiated settlement, then it is necessary to maintain a residual force for not only the reason—and this is, of course, a very primary reason—of having something to negotiate with, with regard to our prisoners, but it is also essential to do so in order to continue our role of leaving South Vietnam in a position where it will be able to defend itself from a Communist take-over.

Both objectives can be fulfilled, we believe, through a negotiated settlement. We would prefer that. If they are not fulfilled through a negotiated settlement, then we will have to go the other route and we are prepared to do so.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT UPON SIGNING THE MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1971

(With Comments on the "Mansfield Amendment." November 17, 1971[2])

I have today signed H.R. 8687, the Military Procurement Authorization Act of 1971.

To avoid any possible misconceptions, I wish to emphasize that section 601 of this act—the so-called "Mansfield Amendment"—does not represent the policies of this administration. Section 601 urges that the President establish a "final date" for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Indochina, subject only to the release of U.S. prisoners of war and an accounting for the missing in action.

Section 601 expresses a judgment about the manner in which the American involvement in the war should be ended. However, it is without binding force or effect, and it does not reflect my judgment about the way in which the war should be brought to a conclusion. My signing of the bill that contains this section, therefore, will not change the policies I have pursued and that I shall continue to pursue toward this end.

Let me reiterate what has been and remains United States policy regarding withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina.

Our goal—and my hope—is a negotiated settlement providing for the total withdrawal of all foreign forces, including our own; for the release of all prisoners; and for a cease-fire throughout Indochina. In the absence of such a settlement, or until such a settlement is reached, the rate of withdrawal of U.S.

---

[1] Helen Thomas, United Press International, was married in October to Douglas Cornell, newly retired as White House correspondent for the Associated Press.

[2] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Nov. 22, 1971, p. 1531.

forces will be determined by three factors: by the level of enemy activity, by the progress of our program of Vietnamization, and by progress toward obtaining the release of all of our prisoners wherever they are in Southeast Asia, and toward obtaining a cease-fire for all of Southeast Asia.

It is because section 601 of this bill will not in fact alter this policy that I have signed it into law. I would add, regretfully, that legislative actions such as this hinder rather than assist in the search for a negotiated settlement.

NOTE: As enacted, the bill (H.R. 8687) is Public Law 92–156.

A PLAN FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM

(The President's Address to the Nation, January 25, 1972[1] (excerpts))

. . . We have made a series of public proposals designed to bring an end to the conflict. But early in this administration, after 10 months of no progress in the public Paris talks, I became convinced that it was necessary to explore the possibility of negotiating in private channels, to see whether it would be possible to end the public deadlock.

After consultation with Secretary of State Rogers, our Ambassador in Saigon and our chief negotiator in Paris, and with the full knowledge and approval of President Thieu, I sent Dr. Kissinger to Paris as my personal representative on August 4, 1969, 30 months ago, to begin these secret peace negotiations.

Since that time, Dr. Kissinger has traveled to Paris 12 times on these secret missions. He has met seven times with Le Duc Tho, one of Hanoi's top political leaders, and Minister Xuan Thuy, head of the North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris talks, and he has met with Minister Xuan Thuy five times alone. I would like, incidentally, to take this opportunity to thank President Pompidou of France for his personal assistance in helping to make the arrangements for these secret talks.

This is why I initiated these private negotiations: Privately, both sides can be more flexible in offering new approaches and also private discussions allow both sides to talk frankly, to take positions free from the pressure of public debate.

. . . On May 31, 1971, 8 months ago, at one of the secret meetings in Paris, we offered specifically to agree to a deadline for the withdrawal of all American forces in exchange for the release of all prisoners of war and a cease-fire.

At the next private meeting, on June 26, the North Vietnamese rejected our offer. They privately proposed instead their own 9-point plan which insisted that we overthrow the Government of South Vietnam.

Five days later, on July 1, the enemy publicly presented a different package of proposals—the 7-point Vietcong plan.

That posed a dilemma: Which package should we respond to, the public plan or the secret plan?

On July 12, at another private meeting in Paris, Dr. Kissinger put that question to the North Vietnamese directly. They said we should deal with their 9-point secret plan, because it covered all of Indochina including Laos and Cambodia, while the Vietcong 7-point proposal was limited to Vietnam.

So that is what we did. But we went even beyond that, dealing with some of the points in the public plan that were not covered in the secret plan.

On August 16, at another private meeting, we went further. We offered the complete withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces within 9 months after an agreement on an overall settlement. On September 13, the North Vietnamese rejected that proposal. They continued to insist that we overthrow the South Vietnamese Government.

. . . I decided in October that we should make another attempt to break the deadlock. I consulted with President Thieu, who concurred fully in a new plan. On October 11, I sent a private communication to the North Vietnamese that contained new elements that could move negotiations forward. I urged a meeting on November 1 between Dr. Kissinger and Special Adviser Le Duc Tho, or some other appropriate official from Hanoi.

---

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Jan. 31, 1972, pp. 120–126.

On October 25, the North Vietnamese agreed to meet and suggested November 20 as the time for a meeting. On November 17, just 3 days before the scheduled meeting, they said Le Duc Tho was ill. We offered to meet as soon as he recovered, either with him, or immediately with any other authorized leader who could come from Hanoi.

Two months have passed since they called off that meeting. The only reply to our plan has been an increase in troop infiltration from North Vietnam and Communist military offensives in Laos and Cambodia. Our proposal for peace was answered by a step-up in the war on their part.

That is where matters stand today.

. . . Here is the essence of our peace plan; public disclosure may gain it the attention it deserves in Hanoi.

Within 6 months of an agreement:

—We shall withdraw all U.S. and allied forces from South Vietnam.

—We shall exchange all prisoners of war.

—There shall be a cease-fire throughout Indochina.

—There shall be a new presidential election in South Vietnam.

President Thieu will announce the elements of this election. These include international supervision; and an independent body to organize and run the election, representing all political forces in South Vietnam, including the National Liberation Front.

Furthermore, President Thieu has informed me that within the framework of the agreement outlined above, he makes the following offer: He and Vice President Huong would be ready to resign one month before the new election. The Chairman of the Senate, as caretaker head of the government, would assume administrative responsibilities in South Vietnam, but the election would be the sole responsibility of the independent election body I have just described.

There are several other proposals in our new peace plan; for example, as we offered privately on July 26 of last year, we remain prepared to undertake a major reconstruction program throughout Indochina, including North Vietnam, to help all these peoples recover from the ravages of a generation of war.

We will pursue any approach that will speed negotiations.

We are ready to negotiate the plan I have outlined tonight and conclude a comprehensive agreement on all military and political issues. Because some parts of this agreement could prove more difficult to negotiate than others, we would be willing to begin implementing certain military aspects while negotiations continue on the implementation of other issues, just as we suggested in our private proposal in October.

Or, as we proposed last May, we remain willing to settle only the military issues and leave the political issues to the Vietnamese alone. Under this approach, we would withdraw all U.S. and allied forces within 6 months in exchange for an Indochina cease-fire and the release of all prisoners.

The choice is up to the enemy . . .

Joint Peace Proposal

(Text of Republic of Vietnam and United States Proposal for a Negotiated Settlement of the Indochina Conflict, Jan. 25, 1972)

1. There will be a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of all U.S. forces and other foreign forces allied with the government of South Vietnam within six months of an agreement.

2. The release of all military men and innocent civilians captured throughout Indochina will be carried out in parallel with the troop withdrawals mentioned in point 1. Both sides will present a complete list of military men and innocent civilians held throughout Indochina on the day the agreement is signed. The release will begin on the same day as the troop withdrawals and will be completed when they are completed.

3. The following principles will govern the political future of South Vietnam:

The political future of South Vietnam will be left for the South Vietnamese people to decide for themselves, free from outside interference.

There will be a free and democratic Presidential election in South Vietnam within six months of an agreement. This election will be organized and run by an independent body representing all political forces in South Vietnam which will assume its responsibilities on the date of the agreement. This body will,

among other responsibilities, determine the qualification of candidates. All political forces in South Vietnam can participate in the election and present candidates. There will be international supervision of this election.

One month before the Presidential election takes place, the incumbent President and Vice President of South Vietnam will resign. The Chairman of the Senate, as caretaker head of the government, will assume administrative responsibilities except for those pertaining to the election, which will remain with the independent election body.

The United States, for its part, declares that it:

—will support no candidate and will remain completely neutral in the election,

—will abide by the outcome of this election and any other political processes shaped by the South Vietnamese people themselves.

—is prepared to define its military and economic assistance relationship with any government that exists in South Vietnam.

Both sides agree that:

—South Vietnam, together with the other countries of Indochina, should adopt a foreign policy consistent with the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords.

—Reunification of Vietnam should be decided on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Vietnam without constraint and annexation from either party, and without foreign interference.

4. Both sides will respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina and those of 1962 on Laos. There will be no foreign intervention in the Indochinese countries and the Indochinese peoples will be left to settle their own affairs by themselves.

5. The problems existing among the Indochinese countries will be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's affairs. Among the problems that will be settled is the implementation of the principle that all armed forces of the countries of Indochina must remain within their national frontiers.

6. There will be a general cease-fire throughout Indochina, to begin when the agreement is signed. As part of the cease-fire, there will be no further infiltration of outside forces into any of the countries of Indochina.

7. There will be international supervision of the military aspects of this agreement including the cease-fire and its provisions, the release of prisoners of war and innocent civilians, the withdrawal of outside forces from Indochina, and the implementation of the principle that all armed forces of the countries of Indochina must remain within their national frontiers.

8. There will be an international guarantee for the fundamental national rights of the Indochinese peoples, the status of all the countries in Indochina, and lasting peace in this region.

Both sides express their willingness to participate in an international conference for this and other appropriate purposes.

NOTE: For the President's address to the Nation on the peace proposal, see the preceding item.

U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace

(President Nixon's Report to Congress, February 9, 1972[1] (Excerpts))

Indochina

Vietnam

"To end this war—but to end it in a way that will strengthen trust for America around the world, not undermine it; in a way that will redeem the sacrifices that have been made, not insult them; in a way that will heal this Nation, not tear it apart."—Address to the Nation, April 7, 1971.

The essential international challenge when this Administration took office was to shape a new American role in the world, to share responsibilities in creative partnerships with our friends, and to move from confrontation to negotiation with our opponents. But as we set out on this road in January 1969, we faced the hard realities of a seemingly open ended war in Indochina.

---

[1] Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 13, 1972, pp. 367–379.

—Five years of steadily rising American troop levels in Vietnam had brought our authorized strength there to 549,500.
—American combat deaths during 1968 had averaged 278 weekly.
—Americans were flying about 88,000 tactical air sorties each month in Indochina, including 18,500 in South Vietnam.
—U.S. monthly draft call in 1968 averaged over 30,000.

In mid-1969, roughly 40 percent of South Vietnam's rural population was under government control, with 50 percent contested and ten percent under the control of the other side. As the enemy's general offensives of 1968 demonstrated, the urban population of six million was by no means secure from attack.

—Straining under the burdens of war, the South Vietnamese economy was wracked by inflation running at a rate of 35–40 percent. There was little planning to overcome this problem, let alone to provide for long range economic development.
—The additional costs of the Vietnam War to the United States had reached $22 billion a year.
—There was no comprehensive plan for lowering American involvement and no suggestion that American troop levels could be reduced. Indeed in September 1968, the then Secretary of Defense stated: "We have not yet reached the level of 549,500 in South Vietnam. We intend to continue to build toward that level. We have no intention of lowering that level, either by next June or at any time in the foreseeable future."
—The expanded Paris peace talks were just beginning and had settled only on procedures. There were no negotiating proposals on the conference table to end the conflict.
—Our domestic fabric was severely strained by dissent over the conflict, and increasing numbers of Americans were pressing for the extreme solutions of escalation or immediate disengagement.

How we dealt with this issue would be crucial to our efforts to shape a new role for America in the 1970's and beyond. Obviously we wanted to end the war. But we knew that the way we ended the war, or our involvement in it, would fundamentally affect our broader international effort.

There were no easy choices. Further escalation of our military efforts would deepen the divisions in our society, could not assure success in a conflict which was as much political as military, and could risk a wider war.

Continuing on the same path offered no clear prospect either of ending American involvement or of ending the war. Such a course could not have commended American domestic support.

Precipitate disengagement, without regard to consequences, would have made impossible our efforts to forge a new foreign policy. It might have been domestically popular for a short term, but as its consequences became clear, the agony of recrimination would have replaced the agony of war. Overseas, this course would have shaken the trust of our friends and earned the contempt of our adversaries. We could not begin to build new partnerships by turning our back on people who had come to count on our support. And we could not set out to negotiate with adversaries by abandoning allies.

There were, however, two possible courses of action that would be internationally responsible and responsive to domestic opinion. The fastest and most decisive course was to negotiate a settlement to end the war for all participants. We progressively defined the terms of a settlement publicly and privately to Hanoi. This effort culminated in the comprehensive U.S.-South Vietnamese proposal which I made public on January 25, 1972.

However, we could not afford to rely solely on North Vietnamese willingness to reach a settlement. We needed an alternative. Thus we launched the process of progressively turning over defense responsibilities to the South Vietnamese and thereby reducing U.S. involvement. We also hoped this course would stimulate negotiation.

. . . We have come a long way.

—There has been a steady decline in American forces over the past three years, with over 400,000 of our troops withdrawn. The authorized American troop level on February 1, 1972 was 139,000. On January 13, 1972 I announced a further withdrawal which by May 1, 1972 will bring our forces down to 69,000, or an 87 percent reduction from the authorized level this Administration inherited.
—American combat deaths averaged 278 per week in 1968. In 1971, they were down to an average of 26, and in the last six months of 1971 were 11 per week.

Close to 60 percent of all U.S. casualties during this Administration occurred in 1969, including 40 percent during the first six months—before our programs had a chance to take hold. Despite its vastly greater role in the war, South Vietnam's casualties have also dropped from the 1968 level.

—In 1971 Americans flew a monthly average of 11,000 attack sorties in Indochina, including only 1,500 in South Vietnam, representing declines of about 70 percent and 90 percent respectively of the comparable 1968 figures.

—Average monthly U.S. draft calls declined to 7,500 in 1971, one-fourth the 1968 figure.

—During 1971 the South Vietnamese army, up to 1.1 million from the 1968 level of 800,000, conducted twenty major combat engagements for every one involving U.S. forces. By year's end U.S. forces had shifted essentially to a defensive and base security role.

—In the countryside, at the close of 1971 approximately 73 percent of the rural population was under South Vietnamese government control, with 24 percent contested and 3 percent still in enemy hands. Added to the now secure urban population of 6 million, this represents over 80 percent of the total South Vietnamese population under GVN control.

—South Vietnamese economic reforms have reduced inflation to 15 percent annually, turned over more than 800,000 acres of land to tenant farmers, and laid the grounds for long range economic development.

—The additional costs of the war have steadily dropped and total $8 billion in the current fiscal year, down by almost 65 percent from the costs three years ago.

This is the record of our Vietnamization policy. It has now effectively concluded the U.S. ground combat responsibility. Our other activities are being transferred to the South Vietnamese. We are ending American involvement in the war while making it possible for those who do not wish to be dominated by outside forces to carry on their own defense.

. . . I believe the record of secret negotiations and our new peace proposals make unmistakably clear that we have been and are ready to conclude a fair settlement. The stubborn reality is that the North Vietnamese have blocked all possible openings so far. They have continued to insist not only that we withdraw unconditionally but that as we do we replace the present leadership in South Vietnam. They offer no political process except one that will ensure in advance that the Communists rule the South.

In our view, there is only one fundamental issue left—*will we collude with our enemies to overturn our friends? Will we impose a future on the Vietnamese people that the other side has been unable to gain militarily or politically? This we shall never do.*

So long as the other side insists on a settlement that is a thinly veiled formula for their takeover with our assistance, negotiations cannot succeed. If instead they are willing to compete fairly in the political arena in South Vietnam, they will find our side forthcoming in meeting their concerns.

Prisoners of War

No single issue has received greater attention or been the subject of more intense efforts in this Administration than the plight of our prisoners of war in Indochina.

About 1,500 of our armed forces and some 40 U.S. civilians remain captured or missing in territory held by North Vietnam and its allies. The other side is holding the prisoners of war under circumstances which violate humanitarian principles and the Geneva Conventions on POW's agreed to by North Vietnam. The enemy has refused to allow international inspection of its prisoner camps. It has refused to furnish to the International Red Cross or to other impartial agencies complete lists of the prisoners it holds. Moreover, it has provided no lists at all for the prisoners it holds in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. It has curtailed the regular flow of mail between the men and their families.

At the end of 1971 the other side finally released a large number of letters. They included the first evidence ever received that some of our men held in South Vietnam were still alive. While we welcomed this development, it also underlined the cruel and unnecessary anguish caused to American families by Hanoi's withholding for so long the fact that these men were alive.

Neither identifying all of our men held by the Communists nor providing their total numbers could have any military significance. It is their suffering and the anguish of their families which give them value as hostages for Hanoi and its

allies. The requirements of international law and decency are clear: the Communist side stands in violation of universally accepted standards. Their policy has set a grim precedent.

This Administration has moved on many fronts to deal with this problem. Our basic position is that this issue should be treated on a humanitarian basis and separated from other military and political issues in the conflict. As I said in my peace initiative of October 7, 1970:

"The immediate release of all prisoners of war would be a simple act of humanity. But it could serve even more. It could serve to establish good faith, the intent to make progress, and thus to improve the prospects for negotiation."

The plight of our prisoners has aroused the widest concern. There have been hearings and resolutions in the Congress. The International Red Cross has made known its concern. The United Nations has adopted a strong resolution calling for compliance with the Geneva Convention, and specifically proposing that seriously sick and wounded prisoners, and those held for long periods, be interned in neutral nations. Many governments have publicly offered such neutral internment, subject to the agreement of both sides. We regret North Vietnam's failure to respond constructively to these humanitarian moves.

In addition to our formal initiatives, the South Vietnamese have, with our support, taken a long series of unilateral steps in an attempt to prompt the early release of prisoners. Over the past five years they have released over 4,000 POWs in South Vietnam and some 250 to North Vietnam. Just in the last year and a half alone, South Vietnam initiated the following moves.

—On July 8, 1970 it returned 62 North Vietnamese sick and wounded prisoners to North Vietnam, along with 24 North Vietnamese fishermen who had been rescued in South Vietnamese waters.

—On October 8, 1970 the Government of South Vietnam joined in the U.S. proposal for the total and prompt release of all prisoners of war held by all sides.

—On December 10, 1970 it proposed the release of all North Vietnamese prisoners it holds in return for the release of all U.S. and free world prisoners and all South Vietnamese prisoners of war held outside South Vietnam.

—On January 24, 1971 it released 35 more North Vietnamese prisoners of war.

—On January 26, 1971 it offered to repatriate all sick and wounded POW's and called for similar action by the other side.

—On April 8, 1971 South Vietnam proposed that sick and wounded prisoners as well as prisoners held in captivity for a long period of time be interned in a neutral country, a proposal supported by the U.S. Government on the same date at the Paris Peace Talks.

—On April 29, 1971 South Vietnam offered to return 570 sick and wounded North Vietnamese prisoners to North Vietnam and to intern in a neutral country 1,200 North Vietnamese prisoners held four years or longer.

—On November 1, 1971 on the occasion of President Thieu's inauguration, it announced the freeing of almost 3,000 Viet Cong prisoners of war in South Vietnam.

We have reinforced these initiatives: special envoys, such as Astronaut Frank Borman and Postmaster General Blount, have gone abroad to seek support for proper POW treatment; a dramatic rescue attempt was made at Son Tay in November 1970.

We have explored all possible channels and all responsible means of gaining freedom for the men. I have reaffirmed my personal commitment. In meeting with a group of POW/MIA families on September 28, 1971, I told them:

". . . I have considered the problem of obtaining the release of our POW's and missing in action as being one that has Presidential priority.

"I can assure you that every negotiating channel . . . including many private channels that have not yet been disclosed, have been pursued, are being pursued, and will be pursued. . . ."

Despite the other side's behavior this far, this Administration will continue to use every means to press for proper treatment and prompt release of all Americans held in captivity. I have said that Americans in significant numbers will remain in South Vietnam until we secure the release of our imprisoned men.

At the same time, we will continue to work for a responsible settlement to the Indochina conflict which will give the people of that area the opportunity to determine freely their own future and speed the return of all our men to their families.

South Vietnam's Growing Capacity to Protect Itself

. . . In coming months the enemy can be expected to pose maximum challenges to Vietnamization. At the turn of the year there were many signs that the enemy was preparing for major offensives, especially in the northern half of South Vietnam. As U.S. withdrawals cut our presence down to a minimum level, Hanoi would still like to discredit the record of these past three years and shake the widespread confidence that the South Vietnamese can defend themselves.

Our friends are bound to suffer some isolated setbacks. But these should not distort the overall picture of growing self-sufficiency and security. We and the South Vietnamese are both confident of their ability to handle the North Vietnamese challenge.

By the close of 1971 the U.S. ground combat role was effectively completed. The year saw a constant advance toward the goal I discussed on April 7:

"As you can see from the progress we have made to date and by this announcement tonight, the American involvement in Vietnam is coming to an end. The day the South Vietnamese can take over their own defense is in sight. Our goal is a total American withdrawal from Vietnam. We can and will reach that goal through our program of Vietnamization if necessary."

The Situation in the Countryside

No aspect of the conflict, and no measure of Vietnamization, is more important than the relentless, if unpublicized, struggle for the South Vietnamese living in the countryside, commonly called pacification.

Pacification involves the situation in rural areas in all its dimensions—physical security, popular allegiance, and the military, administrative, and political effectiveness of both sides. A successful pacification effort permits the villager to return to his land and improve his farm, confident that he will be able to harvest and market his crops in security.

During the past year, the South Vietnamese faced a crucial challenge: to keep up the momentum of pacification, while simultaneously taking over an increasing share of combat responsibilities as U.S. and other allied forces rapidly withdrew. In most areas, this challenge was met successfully.

. . . We did not expect pacification to progress at the same rate in 1971. The remaining contested areas are those in which the other side is most firmly rooted, where the Communist infrastructure has been established for as long as two decades, and where enemy bases and infiltration routes are closest to the rural population. Nevertheless, in 1971 the South Vietnamese Government increased its control over the rural population from 65 percent to 73 percent. At year's end the Government's control was under 60 percent in only seven of the 44 provinces, compared with 15 provinces in December 1970. Government control was over 80 percent in 20 provinces compared with nine a year earlier.

Over 80 percent of the total population of South Vietnam, including the six million urban dwellers and eight million in rural areas, is under effective Government control.

Despite the substantial overall progress in pacification, there were also some setbacks. The percentage of the rural population under uncontested Government of Vietnam control declined in five of the seven most northern provinces, closest to the enemy's staging areas in North Vietnam and Laos. We hope that the formation of an additional division in the northern sector and other recent steps by the Government will reverse that trend.

More South Vietnamese now receive government protection and services than at any time in the past decade. A majority of the population has participated in national and local elections. Rice production has risen to the highest level in history. A major land reform program has resulted in distribution of more than 850,000 acres of land to over 275,000 farm families.

And perhaps most significantly of all, the government has the confidence to hand over nearly 600,000 weapons to peasants who serve as a local militia, the People's Self-Defense Forces. A government unpopular with its people would never dare to arm them.

These are the actions of a government that is increasingly sure of allegiance and taking the steps to deserve that allegiance.

Political Development

In last year's Report I pointed out that the political dimension was crucial for South Vietnam's future and would take on increasing importance as the military

efforts wound down. Noting the upcoming Presidential and lower house elections, I said that, "1971 will show the extent of political development in South Vietnam."

The results this past year have been mixed. There are areas in which political freedom and development still need to be advanced in South Vietnam. And the cohesiveness of the non-Communist political forces remains to be tested.

But this should not obscure some fundamental facts. In just a few short years, South Vietnam has made remarkable progress building toward democracy in the midst of a war. The past four years have been characterized by basic political stability in South Vietnam rather than the turbulence of the previous period. The Constitution is proving effective, and participation in the political process is broadening.

A consistent political evolution has taken place in the period since the election of a Constitutional Assembly in 1966 and of the President and a National Assembly in 1967. The numbers of voters and candidates participating has been exceptionally high in the numerous national and local elections held during the last five years, despite the announced Communist intent to disrupt elections and to attack candidates. Over 95 percent of the elections for hamlet chiefs and village councils have been completed. Councils have been elected in all provinces and municipalities.

The trend was furthered in the August 1971 national elections for South Vietnam's lower house. There was lively competition, and 78 percent of the eligible voters turned out. As in the Senate elections a year earlier, where an opposition slate led the returns, groups critical of the Government won significant victories and increased their substantial representation in the Legislature, a fact that attests to the fairness of these contests.

More international attention was devoted to the South Vietnamese presidential election in October 1971. We hoped that this election would be vigorously contested. We have stressed the concept of free choice in South Vietnam. We believed that a contested election would leave the resulting South Vietnamese Government in a stronger position than an unopposed victory. We had an obligation to make our views known, publicly and privately. We emphasized our view that there should be more than one candidate, and we worked diligently to encourage opponents of President Thieu to remain in the race.

But at this stage in South Vietnam's political development, a contested election depends upon the personal motives and calculations of individuals. South Vietnam lacks well established political parties capable of guaranteeing alternative candidates. The interplay of personalities and circumstances in South Vietnam last year simply failed to produce a contest. Some observers believed that President Thieu's use of governmental powers was primarily responsible. Others believed that opponents deliberately chose to embarrass President Thieu rather than contest an election they expected to lose in any case.

We were disappointed that the election was uncontested; but we rejected the view that we should intervene directly or cut off aid to South Vietnam. In the final phases of American involvement, we were determined to avoid the practices which helped produce our involvement in the first place.

We thus preferred the disappointment of an uncontested election to the probably fatal mistake of attempted manipulation of the South Vietnamese political scene. In the final analysis, it is to the credit of the South Vietnamese—opponents as well as supporters of the regime—that they emerged from a trying and uncertain summer with their political stability and constitutional structure intact. Despite its remaining problems, South Vietnam's political development contrasts favorably, indeed, with North Vietnam, where there are no true elections at all.

Economic Development

A sound Vietnamese economy is crucial for political stability and a viable government. Last year I recounted the successful efforts of the South Vietnamese to brake the rampant inflation that had plagued that nation for years. This effort was continued in 1971. Further actions were taken to lay the groundwork for long range economic development.

The achievements in 1971 were especially striking, in view of the need to support a large military establishment and the dislocations resulting from large U.S. troop withdrawals.

—Domestic tax receipts increased 25 percent.

—Prices increased less than 15 percent.

—Production of rice, lumber, fish and textiles rose.
—New plants were built to produce textiles, plywood, electric power, plastic products and flour.

On November 15, in his first address to the legislature after his inauguration, President Thieu made economic development and eventual economic self-sufficiency major national goals. He announced comprehensive economic reforms to increase savings and investment, to raise domestic tax collections, and to encourage exports, industrialization and private foreign investment. The program included a major devaluation of the piaster, a difficult but essential step.

It is a courageous undertaking to move forward rapidly on development when almost half of the country's able-bodied men are needed for the military effort and the costs of security impose a tremendous burden on the economy. The Vietnamese look to their friends to assist them in their development efforts.

We had hoped to respond promptly by diverting some assistance funds in 1972 to support Vietnamese development. The unwise Congressional reduction of foreign assistance funds has hampered this effort. In the current budget, I am requesting funds specifically for economic development in Vietnam.

South Vietnam will continue to need substantial U.S. support to fill the gap between government revenues and defense costs. This form of U.S. assistance can be reduced over the next several years as the program for internal development takes hold and the economic and tax reforms yield larger revenues. We must not expect instantaneous results, however, so long as the South Vietnamese are forced to devote a major portion of their national effort to defending against North Vietnamese aggression.

South Vietnam has been plagued with war for three and a half decades. It remains a poor country with per capita income of less than $150. But it has rich potential and an industrious people. The ending of hostilities would allow the full utilization of these resources. We stand ready to assist all Vietnamese in peaceful development.

Remaining Problems

Each of the past three years has shown accelerating progress in Vietnam. However, we are under no illusions about the stubbornness and gravity of the remaining problems.

—*Breaking the Negotiating Impasse.*—A negotiated settlement remains the quickest and most humane way to end the conflict. It holds out the only real promise that the war will soon cease for Asians as well as for Americans, for Laos and Cambodia as well as for Vietnam. However, three years of unilateral moves, secret talks, negotiating proposals, and Vietnamization progress have failed to induce the other side to join with us in settling the struggle at the conference table. We have reduced the issues to a single crucial question: will the political future of South Vietnam be imposed by outsiders or will it be competitively shaped by the South Vietnamese? The other side has consistently been unyielding on this political issue. We will nevertheless continue our efforts, in any promising forum.

—*Retrieving Our Men.*—Either as part of an overall settlement, or through other means, we shall secure the release of American prisoners held throughout Indochina. The other side continues to exploit this issue and to manipulate the sentiments of the American people. Hanoi has demonstrated that it will try to extract maximum advantages by using our men as bargaining pawns. So long as they hold our men there will be American forces in South Vietnam. We will pursue every honorable path until we succeed in returning these prisoners to their families.

—*Completing the Transfer of Defense Responsibilities.*—Last year brought the effective conclusion of the American ground combat role in South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese assumed that burden, and a steadily increasing share of all other responsibilities in the conflict. The remaining problems include completion of the transfer of air and logistic support to the South Vietnamese; improving the pacification situation in the northern provinces; building more cohesive non-Communist political forces; and setting in train the long term development of South Vietnam.

Major tests can be expected in coming months. Only the sustained will of the South Vietnamese can meet that challenge. As we complete the Vietnamization process, we will need the continued understanding of the American people to finish the process which has brought us so far, to redeem our sacrifices, and to contribute to the building of a more stable peace.

. . . The Lao and Cambodian governments have tried to restore their independence and neutrality through diplomatic means; failing that, they have been forced to turn to their friends for support of their defense. The United States and other nations have responded to their requests for assistance. We have supported both diplomatic efforts to bring peace to Laos and Cambodia, and defensive military efforts in the absence of a settlement.

On the diplomatic front, we have always backed the efforts of Lao Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma—the neutralist leader supported by Hanoi at the time of the 1962 Geneva Accords—to reinstitute those Accords. In Cambodia we long tolerated a difficult military situation and we encouraged negotiations when Prince Sihanouk was first deposed by the National Assembly in March 1970.

Our negotiating proposals on Vietnam have consistently been addressed to the broader Indochina context. In the face of North Vietnam's refusal to address these problems at the conference table, we have continued the policies of previous Administrations in extending military and economic support to the Royal Lao Government. We have provided military assistance for Cambodia since the spring of 1970, when North Vietnamese troops moved out of the border sanctuaries and extended their operation into broader areas of Cambodia.

Our constant objectives in both countries have been to ensure the momentum of Vietnamization and our withdrawals, to protect American and allied lives, and to help maintain the precarious balance within these two countries as they fight to restore their independence and neutrality.

In both countries our activities are limited, requested, supportive, and defensive.

Laos and Cambodia Provide for Their Own Defense. In Laos, government forces continue to offer a tenacious defense despite years of combat against a numerically superior enemy. The struggle there ebbs and flows on a seasonal basis. The Laotian conflict is, in effect, two wars. In the north, North Vietnamese troops maintain pressure on the very government which Hanoi helped to create in 1962. In the south, the enemy concentrates on expanding and protecting the Ho Chi Minh trail complex which is vital to its military strength in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

The Cambodian Government, faced with assault on its independence, has rallied the population to the cause of national survival. From a lightly-equipped and largely ceremonial force of 35,000 men in 1970, the Cambodian army has now grown to approximately 200,000, for the most part volunteers.

The army has fought bravely, but it lacks training, equipment, and experience. And it faces over 60,000 well-equipped North Vietnamese troops, hardened and experienced by years of war.

Despite the measures which they are taking in their own defense, these two countries are clearly no match for a much larger North Vietnam, and they must have external assistance to survive. It would be a grim development indeed if these two small nations, so clearly the victims of external aggression, were overwhelmed because of restrictions placed on American and other allied aid while North Vietnam continued to receive the full backing of its own allies.

Neither country has requested the deployment of U.S. troops. They are manning the front lines. Thus, there are not—and there will not be—any U.S. ground combat troops in either country.

Together With Other Countries, We Provide Military And Economic Assistance. In Laos, this remains as outlined in my comprehensive report of March 1970—military aid for regular and irregular Lao forces when requested by the Lao Government; reconnaissance flights and air operations to interdict North Vietnamese troops and supplies on the Ho Chi Minh Trail; logistic and air support for Lao forces when requested by the Government. We also provide economic assistance to control inflation, support essential Government services, and assist economic development.

In Cambodia, we have given military assistance since April 1970 and economic assistance and PL 480 programs since March 1971. With the approval of the government we are also conducting air interdiction missions against enemy personnel and supplies that are, or can be, used in offensives against American and allied forces in South Vietnam.

South Vietnam Has Mounted Defensive Operations Against North Vietnamese Forces in Their Laotian and Cambodian Base Areas. I have already described the purposes of these operations and noted the increasing South Vietnamese capabilities that they have demonstrated. In Cambodia, operations are at the

request of the Government and serve to relieve enemy pressures against Cambodia as well as South Vietnam. In Laos, the South Vietnamese operations were strictly limited in objective and duration.

It is senseless to claim that these operations against enemy sanctuaries serve to widen the Vietnam war. Not a single South Vietnamese soldier has gone anywhere except where tens of thousands of North Vietnamese troops have been entrenched for years, violating one country's territory to attack another. It is Hanoi which widened the conflict long ago.

As I said in last year's Foreign Policy Report:

"The arguments against South Vietnam's defensive actions suggest that Hanoi has the right—without provocation and with complete immunity—to send its forces into Laos and Cambodia, threaten their governments, and prepare to bring its full strength to bear on South Vietnam itself.

"The choice for South Vietnam is not between limiting and expanding the war. It is between what it is doing in self-defense and passively watching the menace grow along its borders."

The presence and activities of North Vietnamese troops in Laos and Cambodia are indefensible. Nevertheless, we can expect the Lao and Cambodian peoples to be subjected to additional attacks as Hanoi pursues its aims in the region. These countries ask nothing but to be left alone to shape their own destinies. They have demonstrated their courage, and their determination to try to provide for their own defense. Together with others, we shall continue to provide the support that will help to sustain them in their struggle.

* * * * * * *

I once again appeal to the other side to join in the search for peace in Indochina. Proposals now on the negotiating table could end this conflict on a basis that would respect the sacrifices of all participants.

It is long past time to still the sound of war, to return the men of both sides to their families, and to devote the energies of all to the fruitful tasks of peace.

Report on Vietnam

THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION, APRIL 26, 1972[1] (EXCERPTS)

. . . During the past 3 weeks you have been reading and hearing about the massive invasion of South Vietnam by the Communist armies of North Vietnam.

Tonight, I want to give you a first hand report on the military situation in Vietnam, the decisions I have made with regard to the role of the United States in the conflict, and the efforts we are making to bring peace at the negotiating table.

On January 20, 1969, the American troop ceiling in Vietnam was 549,000. Our casualties were running as high as 300 a week. Thirty thousand young Americans were being drafted every month.

Today, 39 months later, through our program of Vietnamization—helping the South Vietnamese develop the capability of defending themselves—the number of Americans in Vietnam by Monday, May 1, will have been reduced to 69,000. Our casualties—even during the present, all-out enemy offensive—have been reduced by 95 percent. And draft calls now average fewer than 5,000 men a month, and we expect to bring them to zero next year.

As I reported in my television address to the Nation on January 25, we have offered the most generous peace terms in both public and private negotiating sessions. Our most recent proposal provided for an immediate cease-fire; the exchange of all prisoners of war; the withdrawal of all of our forces within 6 months; and new elections in Vietnam, which would be internationally supervised, with all political elements including the Communists participating in and helping to run the elections. One month before such elections, President Thieu and Vice President Huong would resign.

Now, Hanoi's answer to this offer was a refusal even to discuss our proposals and, at the same time, a huge escalation of their military activities on the battlefield. Last October, the same month when we made this peace offer to Hanoi, our intelligence reports began to indicate that the enemy was building up for a

---

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, May 1, 1972, pp. 790–794.

major attack. And yet we deliberately refrained from responding militarily. Instead we patiently continued with the Paris talks, because we wanted to give the enemy every chance to reach a negotiated settlement at the bargaining table rather than to seek a military victory on the battlefield—a victory they cannot be allowed to win.

Finally, 3 weeks ago, on Easter weekend, they mounted their massive invasion of South Vietnam. Three North Vietnamese divisions swept across the demilitarized zone into South Vietnam—in violation of the treaties they had signed in 1954 and in violation of the understanding they had reached with President Johnson in 1968, when he stopped the bombing of North Vietnam in return for arrangements which included their pledge not to violate the DMZ. Shortly after the invasion across the DMZ, another three North Vietnamese divisions invaded South Vietnam further south. As the offensive progressed, the enemy indiscriminately shelled civilian population centers in clear violation of the 1968 bombing halt understanding.

. . . So the facts are clear. More than 120,000 North Vietnamese are now fighting in South Vietnam. There are no South Vietnamese troops anywhere in North Vietnam. Twelve of North Vietnam's 13 regular combat divisions have now left their own soil in order to carry aggressive war onto the territory of their neighbors. Whatever pretext there was of a civil war in South Vietnam has now been stripped away.

What we are witnessing here—what is being brutally inflicted upon the people of South Vietnam—is a clear case of naked and unprovoked aggression across an international border. There is only one word for it—invasion.

This attack has been resisted on the ground entirely by South Vietnamese forces, and in one area by South Korean forces. There are no United States ground troops involved. None will be involved. To support this defensive effort by the South Vietnamese, I have ordered attacks on enemy military targets in both North and South Vietnam by the air and naval forces of the United States.

I have here on my desk a report. I received it this morning from General Abrams. He gives the following evaluation of the situation:

The South Vietnamese are fighting courageously and well in their self-defense. They are inflicting very heavy casualties on the invading force, which has not gained the easy victory some predicted for it 3 weeks ago.

Our air strikes have been essential in protecting our own remaining forces and in assisting the South Vietnamese in their efforts to protect their homes and their country from a Communist takeover.

General Abrams predicts in this report that there will be several more weeks of very hard fighting. Some battles will be lost, he says; others will be won by the South Vietnamese. But his conclusion is that if we continue to provide air and sea support, the enemy will fail in its desperate gamble to impose a Communist regime in South Vietnam, and the South Vietnamese will then have demonstrated their ability to defend themselves on the ground against future enemy attacks.

Based on this realistic assessment from General Abrams, and after consultation with President Thieu, Ambassador Bunker, Ambassador Porter, and my senior advisers in Washington, I have three decisions to announce tonight.

First, I have decided that Vietnamization has proved itself sufficiently that we can continue our program of withdrawing American forces without detriment to our overall goal of ensuring South Vietnam's survival as an independent country. Consequently, I am announcing tonight that over the next 2 months 20,000 more Americans will be brought home from Vietnam. This decision has the full approval of President Thieu and of General Abrams. It will bring our troop ceiling down to 49,000 by July 1—a reduction of half a million men since this Administration came into office.

Second, I have directed Ambassador Porter to return to the negotiating table in Paris tomorrow, but with one very specific purpose in mind. We are not resuming the Paris talks simply in order to hear more empty propaganda and bombast from the North Vietnamese and Vietcong delegates, but to get on with the constructive business of making peace. We are resuming the Paris talks with the firm expectation that productive talks leading to rapid progress will follow through all available channels. As far as we are concerned, the first order of business will be to get the enemy to halt his invasion of South Vietnam and to return the American prisoners of war.

Finally, I have ordered that our air and naval attacks on military installations in North Vietnam be continued until the North Vietnamese stop their offensive in South Vietnam.

I have flatly rejected the proposal that we stop the bombing of North Vietnam

as a condition for returning to the negotiating table. They sold that package to the United States once before, in 1968, and we are not going to buy it again in 1972.

. . . As you will recall, I have warned on a number of occasions over the past 3 years that if the enemy responded to our efforts to bring peace by stepping up the war, I would act to meet that attack, for these three very good reasons: first, to protect our remaining American forces; second, to permit continuation of our withdrawal program; and third, to prevent the imposition of a Communist regime on the people of South Vietnam against their will, with the inevitable bloodbath that would follow for hundreds of thousands who have dared to oppose Communist aggression.

. . . Let us look at what the stakes are—not just for South Vietnam, but for the United States and for the cause of peace in the world. If one country, armed with the most modern weapons by major powers, can invade another nation and succeed in conquering it, other countries will be encouraged to do exactly the same thing—in the Mideast, in Europe, and in other international danger spots. If the Communists win militarily in Vietnam, the risk of war in other parts of the world would be enormously increased. But if, on the other hand, Communist aggression falls in Vietnam, it will be discouraged elsewhere and the chance for peace will be increased.

Remarks of the President at the Connally Ranch, April 30, 1972[1] (Excerpts)

Introduction by Secretary Connally

Questions—Vietnam

Q. Mr. President, do you anticipate any developments in Vietnam other than those courageous statements we heard on the television the other night, that you might tell us here?

The President. . . . As General Abrams reported then, and as he has updated his report as of today, the South Vietnamese on the ground are resisting very bravely a massive Communist North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam. That invasion will continue. The offensive will continue in its intensity, and we can expect over the next 4 to 5 weeks that there will be some battles lost by the South Vietnamese and some will be won, but it is his professional judgment—General Abrams' professional judgment—that the South Vietnamese will be able to hold and deny to the North Vietnamese their goal, which, of course, is to impose on the people of South Vietnam a Communist government.

. . . Let me tell you the reasons why I feel that it is vitally important that the United States continue to use its air and naval power against targets in North Vietnam, as well as in South Vietnam, to prevent a Communist takeover and a Communist victory over the people of South Vietnam.

First, because there are 69,000 Americans still in Vietnam—that will be reduced to 49,000 by the first of July—and I, as Commander in Chief have a responsibility to see to it that their lives are adequately protected, and I, of course, will meet that responsibility.

Second, because as we consider the situation in Vietnam, we must remember that if the North Vietnamese were to take over in South Vietnam, as a result of our stopping our support in the air and on the sea—we have no ground support whatever, there are no American ground forces in action in South Vietnam and none will be—but when we consider that situation, if there were such a takeover, we must consider the consequences.

There is, first, the consequence to the people of South Vietnam. We look back to what happened historically. In 1954, when the North Vietnamese took over in North Vietnam, the Catholic Bishop of Danang estimated that at least 500,000 people in North Vietnam who had opposed the Communist takeover in the North were either murdered or starved to death in slave labor camps. I saw something of that when Mrs. Nixon and I were there in 1956, when we visited refugee camps where over a million North Vietnamese fled from the Communist tyranny to come to the South. If, at this particular point, the Communists were to take over in South Vietnam, you can imagine what would happen to the hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese who sided with their own Government and with the United States against the Communists. It would be a bloodbath that would stain the hands of the United States for time immemorial.

---

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, May 8, 1972, pp. 808–816.

Q. Mr. President, may I ask you about strategic targets in North Vietnam? I have been told for years by the pilots that there are dams up there that would be very much defeating to the North Vietnamese, who have defied what you have tried to prove in the way of peace. Is this true or false? Has this crossed your mind?

THE PRESIDENT. The question is with regard to the targets in North Vietnam, and particularly with regard to the dams and the dikes, which many of the pilots believe would be very effective strategic targets.

I would say on that score that we have, as you know, authorized strikes, and we have made them over the past 4 weeks, since the Communist offensive began, in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

I have also indicated, as this offensive continues, if it does continue, that we will continue to make strikes on military targets throughout North Vietnam.

Now, the problem that is raised with regard to dams or dikes is that, while it is a strategic target, and indirectly a military target, it would result in an enormous number of civilian casualties. That is something that we want to avoid. It is also something we believe is not needed.

Just let me say that as far as the targets in North Vietnam are concerned, that we are prepared to use our military and naval strength against military targets throughout North Vietnam, and we believe that the North Vietnamese are taking a very great risk if they continue their offensive in the South.

I will just leave it there, and they can make their own choice.

In other words, I believe that we can limit our strikes to military targets without going to targets that involve civilian casualties. That is what we have done, and we can do that in the future, and do the job.

THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION, MAY 8, 1972[1] (EXCERPTS)

. . . There are only two issues left for us in this war. First, in the face of a massive invasion do we stand by, jeopardize the lives of 60,000 Americans, and leave the South Vietnamese to a long night of terror? This will not happen. We shall do whatever is required to safeguard American lives and American honor.

Second, in the face of complete intransigence at the conference table do we join with our enemy to install a Communist government in South Vietnam? This, too, will not happen. We will not cross the line from generosity to treachery.

We now have a clear, hard choice among three courses of action: immediate withdrawal of all American forces, continued attempts at negotiation, or decisive military action to end the war.

I know that many Americans favor the first course of action, immediate withdrawal. They believe the way to end the war is for the United States to get out and to remove the threat to our remaining forces by simply withdrawing them.

From a political standpoint, this would be a very easy choice for me to accept. After all, I did not send over one-half million Americans to Vietnam. I have brought 500,000 men home from Vietnam since I took office. But, abandoning our commitment in Vietnam here and now would mean turning 17 million South Vietnamese over to Communist tyranny and terror. It would mean leaving hundreds of American prisoners in Communist hands with no bargaining leverage to get them released.

An American defeat in Vietnam would encourage this kind of aggression all over the world, aggression in which smaller nations armed by their major allies, could be tempted to attack neighboring nations at will in the Mid-East, in Europe, and other areas. World peace would be in grave jeopardy.

The second course of action is to keep on trying to negotiate a settlement. Now this is the course we have preferred from the beginning and we shall continue to pursue it. We want to negotiate, but we have made every reasonable offer and tried every possible path for ending this war at the conference table.

The problem is, as you all know, it takes two to negotiate and now, as throughout the past 4 years, the North Vietnamese arrogantly refuse to negotiate anything but an imposition, an ultimatum that the United States impose a Communist regime on 17 million people in South Vietnam who do not want a Communist government.

---

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, May 15, 1972, pp. 838–842.

It is plain then that what appears to be a choice among three courses of action for the United States is really no choice at all. The killing in this tragic war must stop. By simply getting out, we would only worsen the bloodshed. By relying solely on negotiations, we would give an intransigent enemy the time he needs to press his aggression on the battlefield.

There is only one way to stop the killing. That is to keep the weapons of war out of the hands of the international outlaws of North Vietnam.

. . . I therefore concluded that Hanoi must be denied the weapons and supplies it needs to continue the aggression. In full coordination with the Republic of Vietnam, I have ordered the following measures which are being implemented as I am speaking to you.

All entrances to North Vietnamese ports will be mined to prevent access to these ports and North Vietnamese naval operations from these ports. United States forces have been directed to take appropriate measures within the internal and claimed territorial waters of North Vietnam to interdict the delivery of any supplies. Rail and all other communications will be cut off to the maximum extent possible. Air and naval strikes against military targets in North Vietnam will continue.

These actions are not directed against any other nation. Countries with ships presently in North Vietnamese ports have already been notified that their ships will have three daylight periods to leave in safety. After that time, the mines will become active and any ships attempting to leave or enter these ports will do so at their own risk.

These actions I have ordered will cease when the following conditions are met:

First, all American prisoners of war must be returned.

Second, there must be an internationally supervised cease-fire throughout Indochina.

Once prisoners of war are released, once the internationally supervised cease-fire has begun, we will stop all acts of force throughout Indochina, and at that time we will proceed with a complete withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam within 4 months.

Now, these terms are generous terms. They are terms which would not require surrender and humiliation on the part of anybody. They would permit the United States to withdraw with honor. They would end the killing. They would bring our POW's home. They would allow negotiations on a political settlement between the Vietnamese themselves. They would permit all the nations which have suffered in this long war—Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, South Vietnam—to turn at last to the urgent works of healing and of peace. They deserve immediate acceptance by North Vietnam.

It is appropriate to conclude my remarks tonight with some comments directed individually to each of the major parties involved in the continuing tragedy of the Vietnam war.

First, to the leaders of Hanoi, your people have already suffered too much in your pursuit of conquest. Do not compound their agony with continued arrogance; choose instead the path of a peace that redeems your sacrifices, guarantees true independence for your country and ushers in an era of reconciliation.

To the people of South Vietnam, you shall continue to have our firm support in your resistance against aggression. It is your spirit that will determine the outcome of the battle. It is your will that will shape the future of your country.

To other nations, especially those which are allied with North Vietnam, the actions I have announced tonight are not directed against you. Their sole purpose is to protect the lives of 60,000 Americans who would be gravely endangered in the event that the Communist offensive continues to roll forward and to prevent the imposition of a Communist government by brutal aggression upon 17 million people.

I particularly direct my comments tonight to the Soviet Union. We respect the Soviet Union as a great power. We recognize the right of the Soviet Union to defend its interests when they are threatened. The Soviet Union in turn must recognize our right to defend our interests.

No Soviet soldiers are threatened in Vietnam. Sixty thousand Americans are threatened. We expect you to help your allies, and you cannot expect us to do other than to continue to help our allies, but let us, and let all great powers, help our allies only for the purpose of their defense, not for the purpose of launching invasions against their neighbors.

Thank you and good night.

NOTE.—The President spoke at 9 p.m. in his Oval Office at the White House. His address was broadcast live on radio and television.

NEWS CONFERENCE OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, MAY 9, 1972[1] (EXCERPTS)

. . . Now, in order to put into perspective where we are in the peace negotiations, I would like to go through with you the exchanges that have taken place between us and Hanoi since the end of last year, that is to say, since the North Vietnamese canceled the private meeting that was scheduled for November 20, when they canceled it 3 days before.

As you remember, the President in his speech on January 25 pointed out that after Le Duc Tho had been suddenly taken ill, we offered to resume negotiations any time that he recovered, either with him or any other representative of Hanoi's political leadership, in order to bring about a rapid end of the war.

We insisted on a representative of Hanoi's political leadership because our experience had been that the delegation in Paris simply did not have sufficient authority to make these private talks useful. We never received a reply to this message of November 19.

On January 26, or the day after the President's speech revealing the secret talks, we sent a message to Hanoi indicating our readiness to resume private negotiations. On February 14, there was a reply in which Hanoi indicated its willingness to meet any time from March 15 on.

On February 17, that is to say, 3 days after we received the message, we accepted this proposal and suggested the date of March 20. The reason we suggested March 20 is because it is easier to travel on a weekend and we picked the first weekend after March 15.

In this message we said the following, which has characterized our attitude. We said, "The United States believes that (at this meeting) the proposals of both sides should be considered." In other words, we indicated our readiness to discuss their points. "It expects to negotiate on this basis with an attitude of justice and generosity and with a view to bringing about a rapid end of the war."

On February 29, Hanoi accepted the date of March 20. On March 6, Hanoi postponed the March 20 meeting until April 15. We accepted this on March 13, only pointing out that there were other commitments on April 15 and proposing instead April 24. The other commitment was the trip to Japan that had been planned and which we did not wish to cancel.

We did not hear from Hanoi to our acceptance of their own proposal. So after 10 days, Porter interrupted the plenaries. On March 27, 4 days after Porter had interrupted the plenaries, Hanoi accepted the date of April 24, provided the United States returned to the plenaries.

We called Porter back and we sent a message which was delivered on April 2, but which was in fact drafted on March 31, in which we agreed to resume the plenary sessions on April 18 and confirmed the meeting of April 24.

When that message was drafted we were not aware of the fact that a major offensive had in fact started at the demilitarized zone, and therefore, some of the press reports that we were tying the resumption of the plenaries to the end of the offensive are totally wrong. In fact, I will read you from our message to the North Vietnamese which will confirm this. It said as follows:

"In order to demonstrate its positive attitude and explore every possible opportunity for progress in negotiation, Ambassador Porter will propose a plenary session of the Paris Conference on Thursday, April 13, 1972.

"On this basis the United States reaffirms its agreement to a meeting between Dr. Kissinger and Special Adviser Le Duc Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy on April 24 at the usual location.

"The U.S. side points out that the military operations launched by the North Vietnamese in recent days near the demilitarized zone and elsewhere and the firing of missiles from North Vietnamese territories into South Vietnamese air space are inconsistent with the purpose of these meetings. The U.S. side has been showing great restraint in its response in order to give the negotiations every chance to succeed."

At that time, as some of you who called me will know, we were not sure that this was a full scale offensive until Easter Sunday. Maybe we should have been. But we were not certain that this was an offensive across the demilitarized zone.

The purpose of this message was to prevent military pressure from being put by either side.

---

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, May 15, 1972, pp. 842–848.

I would also like to point out that during March, while we knew that a military buildup was going on, we nevertheless, showed very great restraint, in fact, in dealing with it. In fact, we did not authorize any attacks into North Vietnam except the normal protective reaction, but nothing against supply installations or missile sites, because of our concern for our relationships that had been established in Peking and that we were trying to develop with Moscow.

I have mentioned all of this to stress that what has happened was not done lightly, whatever judgments people may make about its wisdom.

Then during April there was an exchange of many messages which revolved around the question of whether there should be a private meeting before a plenary session or a plenary session before a private meeting which did not however add a great deal to the substance that I have already pointed out to you. There were a total of six messages that were going back and forth in April.

This was the situation when I went to Moscow. As has been reported, the problem of Vietnam was discussed at considerable length. We pointed out to the Soviet leaders the extraordinary complexity that was posed for us by a massive invasion of the entire North Vietnamese field army against South Vietnam, an invasion that if it achieved its objective was bound to jeopardize the security of 60,000 Americans, and the impact that such developments had to have on our attempts to move forward on a broad front.

While I do not want to go into the details of the discussions, the Soviet leaders felt that every effort should be made to resume negotiations, and on this basis, and in order not to be hung up on a procedural point, we proposed that we would return to the plenaries, if we received a firm assurance that a private meeting would follow rapidly.

We left no doubt that we were not concerned only or primarily with the fact of a private meeting, but with the results of a private meeting. We made it very clear that we were prepared to consider any reasonable approach that would lead either to a reduction in the violence, to an end of military operations, to a discussion of the military issues alone, or to a discussion of the entire complex of issues with only one proviso: We would not impose a Communist government on Saigon; we wanted a genuine political evolution. But with that one proviso we indicated a readiness to discuss any possible approach.

The meetings took place, as you know. There were two plenary sessions and a private session. We again went through every conceivable approach for ending the military phase and we indicated a readiness to examine any political proposal other than the imposition of a Communist government.

We were confronted by the reading to us of the published Communist statement. It had taken us 6 months to set up the meeting and innumerable exchanges and when we got there, what we heard could have been clipped from a newspaper and sent to us in the mail. This was the situation we confronted last week.

What is it that the other side is asking of us that we have rejected? The other side has asked of us, prior to negotiations, prior to a cease-fire, that the following steps must be taken:

The President of South Vietnam must resign. What is called by the other side "the machinery of oppression of the government" must be disbanded. Pacification must be stopped. Vietnamization must be stopped, which means the end of American military and economic aid. All persons that have been arrested on political grounds should be set free. Then a government should be formed which is composed of all those who favor peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy, presumably, by definition, including the Communists.

In that government, in other words, the Communists would be the only organized force, since all the organized non-Communist forces would have been disbanded by definition.

All of this is prior to a cease-fire. Then this government is supposed to negotiate with the Communists a final solution. In other words, this is only the thinnest veneer; this government, which already contains the Communists, is then supposed to negotiate with the Provisional Revolutionary Government, which at that moment will be the only force in the country that has an army, which is backed by the North Vietnamese army. It will be the only force in the country that has any physical strength, and it is supposed to negotiate with them a final settlement. And all of this, ladies and gentlemen, is before a cease-fire.

That is what we have rejected. That is what we call the imposition, under the thinnest veneer, of a Communist government. That is the ending of American economic and military aid, the disbanding of the government that exists in South Vietnam, as a prelude to negotiations. That is the only issue on which negotiations have broken down.

On the whole complex of military issues, we have indicated total readiness for discussion and our proposals have not been rejected; there has been a total refusal even to discuss them. We have not been told what is wrong with our proposals. There has been an absolute unwillingness to discuss any one of them, or to give us any reason why it was unacceptable so that we could continue the discussions.

This was the background against which the Presidential decision had to be seen. No one can believe that 2 weeks before a summit meeting that it has taken us 2 years to set up the President would lightly engage in the sort of decisions he had taken.

We were confronted with the fact that an opponent was insisting on continuing an all-out military offensive which he would stop only on terms that no American President can be asked to accept. And this is why, with enormous pain and great reluctance, this Administration was forced into those decisions.

For 2 years we have been engaged in negotiations on a broad range of issues with the Soviet Union. We are on the verge not just of success in this or that negotiation, but of what could be a new relationship of benefit to all of mankind, a new relationship in which, on both sides, whenever there is a danger of crisis, there will be enough people who have a commitment to constructive programs so that they could exercise restraining influences. But in order for such a policy to succeed, it cannot be accepted that one country can be oblivious to the impact on another of the actions of its friends, particularly when those friends are armed with the weapons of this country.

I ask you to consider what you would think, if in the months before a summit meeting, an American ally, armed with American weapons, attacked a Soviet ally and put into jeopardy tens of thousands of Soviet troops, and whether you would not ask us whether we should have exercised some restraint.

I am not saying that at the point that I was in Moscow the Soviet ability to exercise restraint was very great. I am saying that the decision was very difficult, but it had to be taken for these reasons:

First, you must not conclude from this decision that we are assuming that the battle in the South cannot be stabilized. What we are trying to prevent by this decision is an endless continuation of this process by which one attack after another takes place over a period of months without serious negotiations, and without any prospect for a settlement. But we also want to be in a position that if our assessment is incorrect, and things should turn out not as well as we hope, that we have some bargaining position left on behalf of the Americans who will then be threatened, and of the Americans who are now prisoners.

What we have done must be seen not in the context of a country which is trying to impose its will. It has to be seen in the context of the proposals which the President made in his speech.

What is it that we are asking of the North Vietnamese? What is it in those proposals that a country cannot honorably accept? We are saying that if our prisoners are returned, and if there is an end to the fighting, that we will withdraw all our forces from South Vietnam in 4 months, and that we will stop all acts of force throughout Indochina. Why is it that these proposals should not be accepted?

They would leave the determination of the political future to the Vietnamese. They would enable us to withdraw with honor and they would at last put an end to the fighting. So it is incorrect to say that we have embarked on a course designed to impose our solution. We have embarked on a course to try to bring an end to this agony and, in a way, to this deception, where there is the constant delusion that there is just one formula that has somehow eluded us, where for months we have attempted in good faith to set up a serious negotiation, where our proposals are not even discussed, and where everything is staked be the other side on a pure military move.

So both we and other major powers are at this moment at a critical decision. It is this decision that is compared by some to the Cuban missile crisis, but there are very important differences:

We do not view this as a confrontation between us and the Soviet Union. We are not attempting by these actions to impose a one-sided solution. We are trying to work out some principles of international conduct and an end to a conflict which threatens, alike, our interests as well as the interests of other countries that have a stake in the preservation of peace.

Those were the reasons, in summary, that led to the President's speech last night, and now I will be delighted to answer questions.

Impressions of Ho Chi Minh in 1946: Statements by Frank M. White, Former Major, Office of Strategic Services; and Abbot Low Moffat, Former Chief, Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (excerpts) [1]

CONVERSATION WITH HO CHI MINH

Mr. White. At the epicenter of all this sat Ho Chi Minh who invited me to call on him shortly after the French landing at Haiphong.

... Ho wondered if Americans knew how strongly the Vietnamese people desired independence. He went back to the history of early Chinese invasions, then reviewed the French occupation and finally the past five years under the Japanese. In great detail he developed his theme, the burden of which was that no matter who the occupier, the Vietnamese people had always been determined to resist. At no juncture in this recital did he refer in any way to himself or even to the Communist Party, although he was to mention the latter later on.

VIETNAM'S NEED FOR INVESTMENTS OF MONEY AND MACHINES

... It was in this context that he asked me if I had seen any of the Vietnamese countryside. I confessed I had seen but little of the south and none of the north. Then he went into a lengthy description of the economy of the country, particularly stressing its dependence on rice. What we really need, he said, is large investments of money and machines, at first to repair and improve our dike system and then later, when we are self-sufficient in food, the means to make us a modern country in the industrial sense. Then he asked me if I thought the Russians at present could make such a contribution. I said I was not in any position to know.

... The United States, Ho said, was probably in the best position to aid Vietnam in the postwar years. He said that we had emerged from the war with enormous power and prestige in the world. He also mentioned that America was a Pacific power and therefore would logically have a particular interest in the area. He also dwelled at some length on the disposition of Americans as a people to be sympathetic to self-determination of nations and generous in making contributions to less fortunate states. But here again he doubted that the United States Government could be counted on to come to the aid of Vietnam—in a massive way.

Mr. White [reading]:

In short, he was saying that he hoped America would interest itself in Vietnam but he didn't believe, in the final analysis, we would.

It was quite dark when I left the palace. He had given me no specific messages or requests to transmit. I returned to the Metropole. We had made no firm plans to meet again.

RECEPTION GIVEN BY HO IN PALACE

Thus it came as a surprise to receive a message from Ho just a few moments after returning to the hotel. The message said that he regretted the short notice, but would I care to come to a reception he was giving that same evening at the Palace? The invitation sounded quite casual and extemporaneous, but I changed uniforms and was back at the palace by 7:00 p.m. It turned out to be an extraordinary evening.

There were three other guests with Ho when I was ushered into the same salon we'd met in that afternoon before.

All three were Vietnamese. Two were elderly men in mandarin robes and headpieces. The third was much younger. He wore white shorts and an open neck white shirt. The latter was introduced to me as "The Provisional Minister of National Defense." He was Nguyen Van Giap—the general. At that time the name held little significance, nor could I engage him in much conversation either in French or English. The two elders turned out to be provisional ministers also—of education and cultural affairs, or some such. At the time I felt that I was simply being given an opportunity to meet some of Ho's official family informally. Rosé wine was served.

Then suddenly other guests began arriving. Through the double doors of the big room burst General LeClerc gripping his white malacon cane, followed by

---

[1] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Causes, Origins, and Lessons of the Vietnam war, Hearings, 92d Congress, 2d session, May 9, 10, and 11, 1972. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973). Both White and Moffat met with Ho Chi Minh during visits to Vietnam in 1946.

Generals Valluy and Salan, Sainteny and finally Colonel Mirmanbeau, LeClerc's Chief of Staff. This was the first team—

As I explained earlier, as I was a liaison officer, I knew all of them well—

Although my association with LeClerc had always been cordial, the French never concealed their irritation and distrust of OSS.

LeClerc was visibly distressed to see me there. He had no idea that Americans were there, and it is not mentioned in this particular dispatch because it wasn't pertinent but General LeClerc had been very unhappy with the activities of the the French OSS unit in the south of the border as well as those in the north.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the Americans?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir; I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. The American OSS?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, our activities.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. WHITE. And indeed the first detachment commander in the south was a young American colonel called Peter Dewey, and the French had succeeded, in ways that were never explained to us, in effecting Colonel Dewey's recall, and indeed it was ironic and rather tragic that Colonel Dewey was assassinated in Saigon the night before he was to have been recalled; and it was rather unclear to all of us there at the time who did the assassination. I personally saw the assassination happen because it happened very close to where we were staying and I could actually see the people shooting the guns at him, so it could be determined whether it was a native Annamite, non-Caucasian, if you will, but who ordered the assassination was never clear; but it was clear that the French were very pleased to have Dewey recalled.

WAS HO REPRESENTATIVE OF RUSSIANS? INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM?

. . . The CHAIRMAN. Your description there of your meeting with Ho was a very moving one. Did you get the impression that he was acting as an agent for the Russians? Did he convey to you an attitude that he was there as a representative of Russia?

Mr. WHITE. No, certainly not.

The CHAIRMAN. How about China, did you get the impression that he was there as an agent of international communism?

Mr. WHITE. No, quite the contrary was the case; obviously the Chinese Communists were 2 years away from taking power in China at the time, or 3, but quite the contrary, he dwelt at really extraordinary length on traditional hostility between his own people and the Chinese people. It was exacerbated by the fact they were there looting his country; he dwelt very much on it.

Mr. MOFFAT. I have never met an American, be he military, OSS, diplomat, or journalist, who had met Ho Chi Minh who did not reach the same belief: that Ho Chi Minh was first and foremost a Vietnamese nationalist. He was also a communist and believed that communism offered the best hope for the Vietnamese people. But his loyalty was to his people. When I was in Indochina it was striking how the top echelon of competent French officials held almost unanimously the same view.

OFFICIAL REACTION TO HO'S STATEMENT OF FRIENDSHIP FOR U.S.

. . . Senator PERCY. But so that we may continue our historical inquiry, I would very much appreciate, Mr. Moffat, your reactions to and knowledge as to what might have been the response, the official response, of the United States Government when we did receive and learn of statements made by Ho as to his professed friendship for the United States—was there an official reaction ever?

Mr. MOFFAT. The position, and we were very sympathetic with Ho Chi Minh who was, in our opinion, perfectly clear—a letter addressed to the President of the United States cannot be answered without, in effect, I mean, other than from the head of another state, without actually involving recognition. We talked with him, we had all communications with him, but there was no answer ever sent to a formal inquiry addressed to the President of the United States, and I think if we had, that would have been taken by the French in that case as a really serious affront and possibly a breach of international etiquette.

Senator PERCY. Were his statements acknowledged to the extent that we possi-

bly could, under international protocol, or were they also ignored simply because he was a Communist?

Mr. MOFFAT. It had nothing to do with his being a Communist. I wrote one of those memos saying we shouldn't answer this.

Senator PERCY. Our lack of official responses was well understood by him, simply because of his understanding of international protocol?

Mr. MOFFAT. I don't know what his reaction would be, but I assume that he would have understood that.

OFFICIAL VIEW OF HO CHI MINH

. . . Senator PERCY. Now, Mr. White, was there any official view taken by the OSS or any other governmental agency that you know of, of Ho Chi Minh?

Mr. WHITE. No, I don't believe we had an official view in that sense; our mission was to try to advise the departments, our headquarters, who was on first base in this particular part of the world, and what he was up to; and in that context it was clear that the party and the particular leader who was on first was certainly Ho Chi Minh.

. . . Senator PERCY. You heard Mr. Moffat's statement as to how he looked on Ho. Was he looked on as a Communist of any particular sort? Was he looked upon strictly as a Communist within the nationalists' particular framework or was he looked upon by the OSS as an agent of Moscow?

Mr. WHITE. Certainly not by those of us who were there, Mr. Percy. We looked at him as a leader of a party, the principal party and the principal leader. I had occasion to recount some conversations I had with him, and he never made any secret or attempted to downplay the fact that he was a Communist and had been a Communist, that he had been to Russia, that he had been interested in working for the Communist cause in many parts of the world and so forth, but when I talked to him he was taking a really quite matter-of-fact who is going to help me get this place running—you know.

DID HO CHI MINH PROVIDE SERVICES FOR U.S.?

Senator PERCY. Did he perform any services that you know of for the United States Government? Was he of any assistance, for instance, in connection with the rescueing of downed American fliers?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, he was. I asked him particularly about this because one of the functions we had in OSS was to attempt to locate people who had been particularly heroic in defense of American interests and people in that area during the Japanese occupation.

We had heard that Ho had indeed helped two American fliers, Navy pilots, reach safety in China, and according to the report we had at the time, which we had not had any way, really, to confirm, but it was that he had walked personally all the way from his mountainous retreat, hideaway, in northern Tonkin to Kunming, to the outskirts of Kunming, and delivered those two pilots over in effect to American authorities in Kunming; and he allowed that that was true, but before I could ask him for any details and get him to explain the length of the trip and so forth, he rather uncomfortably shifted the subject to something he was more particularly anxious to talk about, which was where could he get—

Senator PERCY. Could you give us the benefit of any conversation you might have had with OSS officers who had worked with the Viet Minh before you arrived, as to what Ho was really doing?

Was he fighting the Japanese or was he operating in just harassing operations and stockpiling resources to fight his own battles later; that is, for the postwar use?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, if I understand your question, I didn't have any debriefing from the operation I succeeded. The very limited conversations I had with the departing group was that Ho had in fact been very useful in, and very resistant to the Japanese—harassment was about the limit, harassment and provision of intelligence, was about the limit of his contribution. But there had been no lack of cooperation, or enthusiasm, on his part. The answer to your part whether he was laying some kind of infrastructure, laying some plans for later, I did not get that impression. I didn't get the impression that he was using resistance to the Japanese, as a ploy for bringing in power his own group. But I can't—I am not a terribly reliable witness on that point.

HO CHI MINH'S OUTLOOK ON CHINESE-VIETNAMESE RELATIONSHIPS

Senator PERCY. Did he ever comment to you on the long history of China's attempt to dominate Indochina?

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir. You will find in this dispatch that that was very much on his mind when he discussed this with me. He gave me, in fact, a primer on Indochinese history or the history of the people, which is mainly one of resistance to the Chinese over a course of 800 years, and he gave that to me in great detail.

Senator PERCY. Did he comment to you or describe what his outlook would be on Chinese-Vietnamese relationships?

Mr. WHITE. In the sense, by inference certainly, he would resist all forms of Chinese domination of an independent Vietnam; that was their historical position and it was a very practical feeling he had this day which was exacerbated, as I said a little bit earlier, by the fact that his part of the world, the province of Tonkin and the northern part of Annam, that part north of the 16th parallel, were under Chinese occupation and the Chinese were looting the country very diligently. Here again it is the Chinese problem that was uppermost in his mind.

DESCRIPTION OF HO CHI MINH

. . . The CHAIRMAN. To return to Ho a bit, describe a bit—you said you felt you were in the presence of a great man—just for the record, I am very curious myself—describe a little more about him, your impressions about him. Did you have the same feeling of his great curiosity and his expectations of friendship for the United States? What did he say?

Mr. MOFFAT. He talked about the immediate—his desire for friendship with the United States and for help. It was just not that type of conversation where he talked around or be full of curiosity. He knew that I had come from the State Department. It seemed he was hoping that I would have some message for him and I was miserable not being able to say anything. His quietness was, I think, one of the things and I don't think it was a quietness of just being sick. I had a feeling of a quiet personality that was——

Mr. WHITE. Reflective.

HO'S LETTERS TO U.S. GOVERNMENT NOT ACKNOWLEDGED

The CHAIRMAN. The Pentagon Papers say that he addressed eight letters to the Government of the United States and they were never acknowledged. Do you know anything about that?

Mr. MOFFAT. Yes, sir, I explained to Senator Percy about that.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry.

Mr. MOFFAT. Letters to the President of the United States except from heads of state, certainly from somebody who is in opposition to the head of state of a friendly country, are not acknowledged because as a matter of policy, the President can't begin engaging in correspondence with people around the world; and that is just a matter of international etiquette. They don't get acknowledged. I think if we had, I think there would have been very, very severe repercussions—it would have been almost tantamout to recognition and that would have made—have meant a break with the French.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever seen the letters?

Mr. MOFFAT. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What did they say; Can you summarize the type of things they said;

Mr. MOFFAT. Very much the same. Again, if I remember them, that he wanted American aid; he hoped for American support in their nationalist struggle. They varied, I think, as I recall. The one that is mentioned in the—in your study, in your committee print, is the one where he really wanted us to throw the French off the Far Eastern Commission, which was, of course, far more than just an appeal for help.

THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JUNE 29, 1972[1] (EXCERPTS)

The PRESIDENT. Mr. Cormier has the first question tonight.

Q. Mr. President. I don't want to ask a soft or flabby question because, as you know, your associate John Ehrlichman has suggested that news conferences

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, July 3, 1972, pp. 1111–1118.

really are not all that important because we tend to ask that type of question too often.

So I want to submit one for the Ehrlichman Award this evening.

The PRESIDENT. As long as it is not soft and flabby.

ENDING THE WAR IN VIETNAM

Q. Mindful that ending the war was one of your major campaign themes in 1968, mindful that our bombings in Indochina now are at a 5-year high, according to the Pentagon, mindful that troops are still coming out but even more are going into Thailand and the 7th Fleet, I wonder if you can say with any confidence that you can end the war by January 20 of next year?

. . . The PRESIDENT. Mr. Cormier, we have made great progress in ending the war and particularly in ending American involvement in the war.

. . . As far as the situation on the negotiating front is concerned, instead of being in a position where we did not have a positive offer on the table, we have made what Mr. Brinkley of NBC characterized last night as being a very constructive offer, one in which in return for an all-Indochina cease-fire and the return of POW's and an accounting for all of our missing in action that we would stop all military activities in Indochina and we would withdraw all Americans, all of those that remain, within 4 months.

Now, having reached this position at this time, we believe that that is an excellent record. The only thing that we have not done is to do what the Communists have asked and that is to impose a Communist government on the people of South Vietnam against their will. This we will not do because that would reward aggression, it would encourage that kind of aggression and reduce the chances of peace all over the world in the years to come, and it would dishonor the United States of America.

RESUMPTION OF PARIS TALKS

On the negotiating front, we have informed the North Vietnamese, after consultation with the Government of Vietnam, that we will return to the negotiating table in Paris on April [July] 13, Thursday; we have been informed by the North Vietnamese, the Vietcong, that they, too, will return on that date. We have returned to the negotiating table, or will return to it on the assumption that the North Vietnamese are prepared to negotiate in a constructive and serious way. We will be prepared to negotiate in that way. If those negotiations go forward in a constructive and serious way, this war can be ended and it can be ended well before January 20. If they do not go forward on that basis, the United States will continue to meet its commitments. Our bombing, as far as that is concerned, our mining is for the purpose only of preventing Communist aggression from succeeding, to protect the remaining Americans, 40,000 or so, that are still in Vietnam, and to have some bargaining position in getting our POW's back.

One last point with regard to the POW's: I know that every American is concerned about these men. I have been somewhat concerned about them. I will only say that I have had some experience, and a great deal of experience as a matter of fact in this past year, in dealing with Communist leaders. I find that making a bargain with them is not easy and you get something from them only when you have something they want to get from you. The only way we are going to get our POW's back is to be doing something to them, and that means hitting military targets in North Vietnam, retaining a residual force in South Vietnam, and continuing the mining of the harbors of North Vietnam.

Only by having that kind of activity go forward will they have any incentive to return our POW's rather than not to account for them as was the case when the French got out of Vietnam in 1954 and 15,000 French were never accounted for after that.

. . . The South Vietnamese are now on the offensive. It is not over. We expect, perhaps, some more North Vietnamese offensives, but I believe that now the ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves on the ground, with the support that we give them in the air, has been demonstrated. Their ability to defend themselves in An Loc and Kontum, and now in the area of Hué, is an indication that Vietnamization, as far as their ground activity is concerned, has proved to be a successful action.

THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JULY 27, 1972[1] (EXCERPTS)

Q. Mr. President, you have said that it is against U.S. policy to bomb the dikes and dams in North Vietnam. Yesterday, the State Department acknowledged there had been incidental and inadvertent damage from the bombing nearby.

My question is this: Is it worth the risk of possible flooding or having world opinion turn against us to bomb military targets near the dikes and dams?

The PRESIDENT. I think your question perhaps could be better answered by my discussing the policy toward bombing of civilian installations in North Vietnam generally, and then coming down to the specifics of your question, in giving the general answer.

Some of you who were in Texas with me will recall that that question was raised at the Connally Ranch, and it was raised, actually, by an advocate of bombing dikes as to why we did not bomb dikes. And I said it had not been U.S. policy even before the bombing halt of 1968 to bomb the dikes, that it was not our policy now, that it would not be in the future, because it is the policy of the United States in all of its activities against North Vietnam to direct its attacks against military targets only.

That was the policy in the sixties and it is now the policy since we have had to resume the bombing for the purposes that I mentioned in my speech of May 8.

Now with regard to the situation on the dikes, let us understand what we are confronted with here. This is approximately a 2,700-mile chain of installations, including perhaps a half-dozen major dams which are the heart of the system, and then peripheral areas getting down to mounds, which have, of course, the purpose of controlling the floodwaters in that particular area.

If it were the policy of the United States to bomb the dikes, we could take them out, the significant part of them out in a week. We don't do so for the reasons that I have mentioned, because we are trying to avoid civilian casualties, not cause them.

Now, with regard to the reports, reports that have come from Hanoi that there had been some damage to some parts of the dike system, I think it is important to note two things: One, there has been no report of any flooding; second, there has been no report of any strikes on the major dike areas.

What I am referring to is the big dams which are the heart of the system. There have been reports of incidental damage to some of the peripheral installations in this 2,700-mile system which covers the country of North Vietnam.

Now, under these circumstances, I think that it is well to keep in context first what our policy is, and second, what its effect has been. Our policy is not to bomb civilian installations and second, our restraint, it seems to me, rather than being subject to criticisms, should be subject to objective analysis and, it seems to me, a considerable amount of support.

As far as this matter is concerned, I think, too, it is time to strip away the double standard. I noted with interest that the Secretary General of the U.N., just like his predecessor, seized upon this enemy-inspired propaganda, which has taken in many well-intentioned and naive people, to attack what he called the American bombing of civilian installations and risking civilian lives, and yet not raising one word against deliberate bombing of civilian installations in South Vietnam.

THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF AUGUST 29, 1972[2] (EXCERPTS)

. . . Q. Mr. President, you announced today another reduction in the force levels in Vietnam, and it was unclear from the announcement whether this is your last announcement. Do you see this as the residual force in Vietnam necessary as bargaining leverage?

The PRESIDENT. I can't image that Mr. Ziegler didn't make everything perfectly clear. (*Laughter.*) But I shall try to, under those circumstances. The announcement of 27,500 (27,000) does not indicate that 27,500 (27,000) is the force that is going to remain in South Vietnam indefinitely. We are going to look at the situation again before the first of December, after the election, incidentally, because we are not going to play election politics with the next withdrawal, or this next announcement, I should say, because I am not suggesting that there will be another withdrawal.

---

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, July 31, 1972, pp. 1179–1184.
[2] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Sept. 4, 1972, pp. 1306–1312.

We will look at this situation and the three principles that I have always applied with regard to withdrawals will in this case control it: the status of our POW and MIA situation, the status with regard to negotiations, and the status of enemy activity. At that time we will determine what the American force level should be. It should be noted that the present force level of 39,000, and the level that we will reach of 27,500 (27,000) involves no ground combat personnel. It involves only advisory and training personnel and, of course, air support personnel. It is entirely a volunteer force.

I will add something that perhaps everyone here is quite aware of: that as far as any so-called residual force is concerned, our offer is for a total withdrawal. We want to withdraw all American forces, but that offer is conditioned on what I laid down on May 8, and one of those conditions is the situation with regard to our POWs and MIAs. As long as there is one POW in North Vietnam, or one Missing in Action, not accounted for, there will be an American volunteer force in South Vietnam.

. . . As far as what can happen in the future, I know that there are those who believe—I noted some report out of the Air Force to the effect that we would probably be bombing in North Vietnam 2 or 3 years from now. That, of course, is quite ridiculous. As far as the future is concerned, we believe that our training program for the South Vietnamese not only on the ground but in the air, has gone forward so successfully that if the enemy still refuses to negotiate, as we have asked them to negotiate, then the South Vietnamese will be able to undertake the total defense of their country.

. . . Q. Mr. President, if it is, as you say, "quite ridiculous" that we will be bombing 2 or 3 years from now—by the way, I don't know if you mean North Vietnam or all of Vietnam—then how about a year from now? Is it likely that bombing would no longer be necessary in your present plan or thinking?

The PRESIDENT. No, I would not comment on what the situation will be a year from now because, with the fact that we have had negotiation proposals made—I am not indicating progress; I am simply indicating they have been made—and with also the progress that is being made by the South Vietnamese, the very outstanding progress in their ability to defend themselves, and also to undertake the air effort as well as the ground effort, I am not going to put any limitation on when the U.S. activities in the air would stop.

Also, I am not going to indicate they are going to continue for any length of time. We are going to continue to watch the situation month by month. We will do what is necessary to protect our interests. We will do what is necessary to assure the return of our POW's and accounting for our Missing in Action. We will do what is necessary to prevent the imposition, against their will, of a Communist government on the people of South Vietnam.

All this we will do, but on the other hand, we are not there for the purpose of staying any moment that is longer than is necessary.

THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF OCTOBER 5, 1972[1] (EXCERPTS)

* * * * * * *

VIETNAM

Question. Mr. President, do you see any possibility of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam before the election?

The PRESIDENT. The settlement will come just as soon as we can possibly get a settlement which is right, right for the South Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese, and for us, one that will have in mind our goals of preventing the imposition by force of a Communist Government on South Vietnam and, of course, a goal that is particularly close to our hearts, in a humanitarian sense, the return of our prisoners of war.

I should emphasize, however, that under no circumstances will the timing of a settlement, for example, the possible negotiation of a cease-fire, the possible negotiation of or unilateral action with regard to a bombing halt, under no circumstances will such action be affected by the fact that there is going to be an election November 7.

---

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Oct. 9, 1972, pp. 1486–1491.

If we can make the right kind of a settlement before the election, we will make it. If we cannot, we are not going to make the wrong kind of a settlement before the election. We were around that track in 1968 when well-intentioned men made a very, very great mistake in stopping the bombing without adequate agreements from the other side.

I do not criticize them for that as far as their motives are concerned. I simply say, having seen what happened then, we are not going to make that mistake now.

The election, I repeat, will not in any way influence what we do at the negotiating table.

Summary of Nine Point U.S.-DRV Draft Agreement (As Broadcast by Radio Hanoi, October 26, 1972)

Hanoi VNA October 26.—Following is the full text of the statement issued here today by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the present state of the negotation relating to the Vietnam problem:

Following years of a glorious resistance war of our armed forces and people in both zones, the United States had to stop in October 1968 the bombardments against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and accept the holding of a four-party conference on Vietnam in Paris. That situation opened up prospects for restoring peace in Vietnam.

The Nixon administration chose, however, to embark on the path of "Vietnamization of the war," and negotiation from a position of strength. As a result, the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam dragged on, was intensified and expanded, and the Vietnam peace negotiation could not make any progress.

Over the past four years, the valiant and undaunted Vietnamese people have stepped up their just struggle on the military, political and diplomatic fronts, and have recorded unprecedented victories, especially since spring 1972, thus inflicting a very important setback on the "Vietnamization" policy.

At the same time, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has constantly shown its serious attitude and goodwill in the search for a peaceful solution to the Vietnam problem on a basis guaranteeing the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination.

In full agreement with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has held private meetings with the U.S. Government with a view to a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem. But till September 1972, the negotiations on the Vietnam problem had remained without result.

With a view to making the negotiations progress, at the private meeting on October 8, 1972, the DRV side took a new, extremely important initiative: It put forward a draft "agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam," and proposed that the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, and the Government of the United States of America, with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, immediately agreed upon and signed [as received] this agreement to rapidly restore peace in Vietnam. In that draft agreement, the DRV side proposed a cessation of the war throughout Vietnam, a cease-fire in South Vietnam, an end to all U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of troops of the United States and those of the foreign countries allied with the United States and with the Republic of Vietnam, and the return of all captured and detained personnel of the parties. From the enforcement of the cease-fire to the installation of the government formed after free and democratic general elections, the two present administrations in South Vietnam will remain in existence with their respective domestic and external functions.

These two administrations shall immediately hold consultations with a view to the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, achieving national concord, ensuring the democratic liberties of the South Vietnamese people, and forming an administration of national concord which shall have the task of promoting the South Vietnamese parties' implementation of the signed agreements and organizing general elections in South Vietnam. The two South Vietnamese parties shall settle together the internal matters of South Vietnam

within three months after the cease-fire comes into effect. Thus the Vietnam problem will be settled in two stages in accordance with the oft-expressed desire of the American side: The first stage will include a cessation of the war in Vietnam, a cease-fire in South Vietnam, a cessation of the U.S. military involvement in South Vietnam and an agreement on the principles for the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination in the second stage, the two South Vietnamese parties will settle together the internal matters of South Vietnam. The DRV side proposed that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States sign this agreement by mid-October 1972.

The above initiative of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam brought the negotiations on the Vietnam problem, which had dragged on for four years now, onto the path to a settlement. The American side itself admitted that the draft "agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam" put forward by the DRV side was indeed an important and very fundamental document which opened up the way to an early settlement.

After several days of negotiations, on October 17, 1972, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States reached agreement on almost all problems on the basis of the draft agreement of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, except for only *two unagreed issues*. With its goodwill, the DRV side did its utmost to remove the last obstacles in accepting the American side's proposals on the two remaining questions in the agreement. In his October 10, 1972 message to the premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the President of the United States appreciated the goodwill of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and confirmed that the formulation of the agreement could be considered complete. But in the same message, he raised a number of complex points. Desirous of rapidly ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam clearly explained its views on this subject. In his October 22, 1972 message, the President of the United States expressed satisfaction with the explanations given by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Thus by October 22, 1972, the formulation of the agreement was complete. The main issues of the agreement which have been agreed upon may be summarized as follows:

(1) The United States respects the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva agreements.

(2) Twenty-four hours after the signing of the agrement, *a cease-fire shall be observed throughout South Vietnam*. The United States will stop all its military activities, and end the bombing and mining in North Vietnam. Within 60 days, there will be a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of troops and military personnel of the United States and those of the foreign countries allied with the United States and with the Republic of Vietnam. The two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisors and military personnel, armaments, munitions, and war material into South Vietnam. The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to make periodical replacements of armaments, munitions, and war material that have been worn out or damaged after the cease-fire, on the basis of piece for piece of similar characteristics and properties. The United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam.

(3) The return of all captured and detained personnel of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with the U.S. troops withdrawal.

(4) The principles for the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination are as follows: The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Vietnam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision: the United States is not committed to any political tendency or to any personality in South Vietnam, and it does not seek to impose a pro-American regime in Saigon: national reconciliation and concord will be achieved, the democratic liberties of the people ensured: an administrative structure called the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord of three equal segments will be set up to promote the implementation of the signed agreements by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and to organize the general elections, the two South Vietnamese parties will consult about the formation of councils at lower levels; the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be settled by the South Vietnamese parties in a spirit

of national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance with the post-war situation: among the questions to be discussed by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce the military number on both sides and to demobilize the troops being reduced; the two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Vietnam as soon as possible and will do their utmost to accomplish this within three months after the cease-fire comes into effect.

(5) The *reunification* of Vietnam shall be carried out step by step through peaceful means.

(6) There will be formed a four-party joint military commission, and a joint military commission of the two South Vietnamese parties.

An international commission of control and supervision shall be established.

An international guarantee conference on Vietnam will be convened within 30 days of the signing of this agreement.

(7) The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, the Government of the United States of America, and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam shall strictly respect the Cambodian and Lao peoples' fundamental national rights as recognized by the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina and the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos, i.e., the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of these countries. They shall respect the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam undertake to refrain from using the territory of Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach on the sovereignty and security of other countries. Foreign countries shall put an end to all military activities in Laos and Cambodia, totally withdraw from and refrain from reintroducing into these two countries troops, military advisers and military personnel, armaments, munitions and war material. The internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos shall be settled by the people of each of these countries without foreign interference.

The problems existing between the *three Indochinese countries* shall be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

(8) The ending of the war, the restoration of peace in Vietnam will create conditions for establishing a new, equal, and mutually beneficial relationship between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States. The United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to post-war reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina.

(9) This agreement shall come into force as of its signing. It will be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

The two parties have also agreed on a schedule for the signing of the agreement. On October 9, 1972, at the proposal of the U.S. side, it was agreed that on October 18, 1972, the United States would stop the bombing and mining in North Vietnam; on October 19, 1972, *the two parties* would initial the text of the agreement in Hanoi; on October 26, 1972, the foreign ministers of the two countries would formally sign the agreement in Paris.

On October 11, 1972, the U.S. side proposed the following change to the schedule: On October 21, 1972, the United States would stop the bombing and mining in North Vietnam; on October 22, 1972, *the two parties* would initial the text of the agreement in Hanoi; on October 30, 1972, the foreign ministers of the two countries would formally sign the agreement in Paris. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam agreed to the new U.S. schedule.

On October 20, 1972, under the pretext that there still remained a number of unagreed points, the U.S. side again put forth another schedule: On October 23, 1972, the United States would stop the bombing and mining in North Vietnam; on October 24, 1972, the *two parties* would initial the text of the agreement in Hanoi; on October 31, 1972, the foreign ministers of the two countries would formally sign the agreement in Paris. Despite the fact that the U.S. side had changed many times what had been agreed upon, the DRV side with its goodwill again agreed to the U.S. proposal while stressing that the U.S. side should not under any pretext change the agreed schedule.

Thus, by October 22, 1972, the DRV side and the U.S. side had agreed both on the full text of the "agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam" and on a schedule to be observed for the formal signing of the agreement on October 31, 1972. Obviously, the *two sides had agreed upon an agreement* of extremely important significance, which meets the wishes of the peoples in Vietnam, the United States and the world.

But on October 23, 1972, contrary to its pledges, the U.S. side again referred to difficulties in Saigon, demanded that the negotiations be continued for resolving new problems, and did not say anything about the implementation of its commitments under the agreed schedule. This behaviour of the U.S. side has brought about a very serious situation which risks to jeopardize the signing of the "agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam."

The so-called difficulties in Saigon represent a mere pretext to delay the implementation of the U.S. commitments, because it is public knowledge that the Saigon administration has been rigged up and fostered by the United States. With a mercenary army equipped and paid by the United States, this administration is a tool for carrying out the "Vietnamization" policy and the neo-colonialist policy of the United States in violation of the South Vietnamese people's national rights. It is an instrument for the United States to sabotage all peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem.

NEWS CONFERENCE OF DR. HENRY KISSINGER, OCTOBER 26, 1972[1]

DR. KISSINGER. Ladies and gentlemen: We have now heard from both Viet-Nam's, and it is obvious that as a war that has been raging for 10 years is drawing to a conclusion that this is a traumatic experience for all of the participants. The President thought that it might be helpful if I came out here and spoke to you about what we have been doing, where we stand, and to put the various allegations and charges into perspective.

First, let me talk about the situation in three parts: Where do we stand procedurally, what is the substance of the negotiations, and where do we go from here?

We believe that peace is at hand. We believe that an agreement is within sight based on the May 8 proposals of the President and some adaptations of our January 25 proposal which is just to all parties. It is inevitable that in a war of such complexity that there should be occasional difficulties in reaching a final solution, but we believe that by far the longest part of the road has been traversed and what stands in the way of an agreement now are issues that are relatively less important than those that have already been settled.

Let me first go through the procedural points, the arguments with respect to particular dates for signing the agreement. As you know, we have been negotiating in these private sessions with the North Vietnamese for nearly four years. We resumed the discussions on July 19 of this year. Up to now, the negotiations had always foundered on the North Vietnamese insistence that a political settlement be arrived at before a military solution be discussed and on the companion demand of the North Vietnamese that the political settlement make arrangements which, in our view, would have predetermined the political outcome.

We had taken the view, from the earliest private meetings on, that rapid progress could be made only if the political and military issues were separated: that is to say, if the North Vietnamese and we would negotiate about methods to end the war and if the political solution of the war were left to the Vietnamese parties to discuss among themselves. During the summer, through many long private meetings, these positions remained essentially unchanged.

As Radio Hanoi correctly stated today, on October 8 the North Vietnamese for the first time made a proposal which enabled us to accelerate the negotiations. Indeed, for the first time they made a proposal which made it possible to negotiate concretely at all. This proposal has been correctly summarized in the statements from Hanoi; that is to say, it proposed that the United States and Hanoi, in the first instance, concentrate on bringing an end to the military aspects of the war, that they agree on some very general principles within which

---

[1] Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 13, 1972, pp. 549–558.

the South Vietnamese parties could then determine the political evolution of South Viet-Nam—which was exactly the position which we had always taken.

They dropped their demand for a coalition government which would absorb all existing authority. They dropped their demand for a veto over the personalities and the structure of the existing government.

They agreed for the first time to a formula which permitted a simultaneous discussion of Laos and Cambodia. In short, we had for the first time a framework where, rather than exchange general propositions and measuring our progress by whether dependent clauses of particular sentences had been minutely altered, we could examine concretely and precisely where we stood and what each side was prepared to give.

I want to take this opportunity to point out that from that time on, the North Vietnamese negotiators behaved with good will and with great seriousness. And so did we. We have no complaint with the general description of events as it was given by Radio Hanoi.

However, there grew up the seeds of one particular misunderstanding. The North Vietnamese negotiators made their proposal conditional on the solution of the problem by October 31, and they constantly insisted that we give some commitment that we would settle the war and complete the negotiations by October 31.

I want to stress that these dates were not dates that we invented or proposed. I would like to stress that my instructions from the President were exactly those that were stated by him at a press conference; that is to say, that we should make a settlement that was right, independent of any arbitrary deadlines that were established by our own domestic processes.

In order to avoid an abstract debate on deadlines, which at that time still seemed highly theoretical, we did agree that we would make a major effort to conclude the negotiations by October 31; and it is true that we did, from time to time, give schedules by which this might be accomplished. It was, however, always clear, at least to us—and we thought we made it clear in the records of the meetings—that obviously we could not sign an agreement in which details remained to be worked out simply because in good faith we had said we would make an effort to conclude it by a certain date.

It was always clear that we would have to discuss anything that was negotiated first in Washington and then in Saigon. There has been a great deal of discussion whether Saigon has a veto over our negotiations, and I would like to explain our position with respect to that.

Clearly, the people of South Viet-Nam, who have suffered so much, and the Government of South Viet-Nam, with which we have been allied, who will be remaining in that country after we have departed, have every right to participate in the making of their own peace. They have every right to have their views heard and taken extremely seriously.

We of course preserve our own freedom of judgement, and we will make our own decisions as to how long we believe a war should be continued. But one source of misunderstanding has been that Hanoi seemed to be of the view that we could simply impose any solution on Saigon and that their participation was not required. But I also want to make clear that the issues that remain to be settled have a number of sources, and I will get into them in some detail.

Saigon, as is obvious from the public record, has expressed its views with its customary forcefulness both publicly and privately. We agreed with some of their views. We didn't agree with all of them, and we made clear which we accepted and which we could not join.

In addition, while my colleagues and I were in Saigon, we visited other countries of Southeast Asia and we had extensive conversation with American officials, and it appeared that there were certain concerns and certain ambiguities in the draft agreement that we believed required modification and improvement. But I want to stress that what remains to be done is the smallest part of what has already been accomplished, and as charges and countercharges fill the air, we must remember that, having come this far, we cannot fail and we will not fail over what still remains to be accomplished.

Now, let me first go briefly over the main provisions of the agreement as we understand them, and then let me say what, in our view, still remains to be done. We believe, incidentally, what remains to be done can be settled in one more negotiating session with the North Vietnamese negotiators lasting, I would think, no more than three or four days; so we are not talking of a delay of a very long period of time.

Let me, however, before I go into the issues that still remain, cover those that are contained in the draft agreement, of which, on the whole, a very fair account has been given in the radio broadcast from Hanoi. I don't refer to the last two pages of rhetoric; I am referring to the description of the agreement.

The principal provisions were and are that a cease-fire would be observed in South Viet-Nam at a time to be mutually agreed upon—it would be a cease-fire-in-place; that U.S. forces would be withdrawn within 60 days of the signing of the agreement, that there would be a total prohibition on the reinforcement of troops; that is to say, that infiltration into South Viet-Nam from whatever area, and from whatever country, would be prohibited. Existing military equipment within South Viet-Nam could be replaced on a one-to-one basis by weapons of the same characteristics, and of similar characteristics and properties, under international supervision.

The agreement provides that all captured military personnel and foreign civilians be repatriated within the same time period as the withdrawal; that is to say, there will be a return of all American prisoners, military or civilian, within 60 days after the agreement comes into force.

North Viet-Nam has made itself responsible for an accounting of our prisoners and missing in action throughout Indochina and for the repatriation of American prisoners throughout Indochina.

There is a separate provision that South Vietnamese civilians detained in South Viet-Nam, that their future should be determined through negotiation among the South Vietnamese parties, so that the return of our prisoners is not conditional on the disposition of Vietnamese prisoners in Vietnamese jails on both sides of the conflict.

With respect to the political provisions, there is an affirmation of general principles guaranteeing the right of self-determination of the South Vietnamese people and that the South Vietnamese people should decide their political future through free and democratic elections under international supervision.

As was pointed out by Radio Hanoi, the existing authorities with respect to both internal and external policies would remain in office; the two parties in Viet-Nam would negotiate about the timing of elections, the nature of the elections, and the offices for which these elections were to be held.

There would be created an institution called the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord whose general task would be to help promote the maintenance of the cease-fire and to supervise the elections on which the parties might agree. That Council would be formed by appointment, and it would operate on the basis of unanimity. We view it as an institutionalization of the election commission that we proposed on January 25 in our plan.

There are provisions that the disposition of Vietnamese armed forces in the South should also be settled through negotiation among the South Vietnamese parties.

There are provisions that the unification of Viet-Nam also be achieved by negotiation among the parties, without military pressure and without foreign interference, without coercion and without annexation.

There is a very long and complex section on international supervision, which will no doubt occupy graduate students for many years to come and which, as far as I can tell, only my colleague Ambassador Sullivan [William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] understands completely.

But briefly, it provides for joint commissions of the participants, either two-party or four-party, for those parts of the agreement that are applicable either to two parties or to four parties; it provides for an international supervisory commission to which disagreements of the commissions composed of the parties would be referred, but which also had a right to make independent investigations, and an international conference to meet within 30 days of the signing of the agreement to develop the guarantees and to establish the relationship of the various parties to each other in greater detail.

There is, finally, a section on Cambodia and Laos in which the parties to the agreement agree to respect and recognize the independence and sovereignty of Cambodia and Laos, in which they agree to refrain from using the territory of Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach on the sovereignty and security of other countries. There is an agreement that foreign countries shall withdraw their forces from Laos and Cambodia.

And there is a general section about the future relationship between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in which both sides express their

conviction that this agreement will usher in a new period of reconciliation between the two countries and in which the United States expresses its view that it will in the postwar period contribute to the reconstruction of Indochina and that both countries will develop their relationships on a basis of mutual respect and noninterference in each other's affairs and that they will move from hostility to normalcy.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, in the light of where we are, it is obvious that most of the most difficult problems have been dealt with, that if you consider what many of you might have thought possible some months ago compared to where we are, we have to say that both sides have approached this problem with a long-term point of view with the attitude that we want to have not an armistice, but peace; and it is this attitude which will govern our actions despite occasional ups and downs which are inevitable in a problem of this complexity.

Now, what is it, then, that prevents the completion of the agreement? Why is it that we have asked for one more meeting with the North Vietnamese to work out a final text? The principal reason is that in a negotiation that was stalemated for five years, and which did not really make a breakthrough until October 8, many of the general principles were clearly understood before the breakthrough, but as one elaborated the text, many of the nuances on which the implementation will ultimately depend became more and more apparent.

It was obvious, it was natural, that when we were talking about the abstract desirability of a cease-fire that neither side was perhaps as precise as it had to become later about the timing and staging of a cease-fire in a country in which there are no clear frontlines. And also the acceptance on our part of the North Vietnamese insistence on an accelerated schedule meant that texts could never be conformed, that English and Vietnamese texts tended to lag behind each other, and that ambiguities in formulation arose that require one more meeting to straighten out.

Let me give you a few examples, and I think you will understand that we are talking here of a different problem than what occupied us in the many sessions I have had with you ladies and gentlemen about the problem of peace in Viet-Nam, sessions which concerned abstract theories of what approach might succeed.

We are talking here about six or seven very concrete issues that, with anything like the good will that has already been shown, can easily be settled. For example, it has become apparent to us that there will be great temptation for the cease-fire to be paralled by a last effort to seize as much territory as possible and perhaps to extend operations for long enough to establish political control over a given area.

We would like to avoid the dangers of the loss of life, perhaps in some areas even of the massacre that may be inherent in this, and we therefore want to discuss methods by which the international supervisory body can be put in place at the same time that the cease-fire is promulgated.

The Secretary of State has already had preliminary conversations with some of the countries that are being asked to joint this body in order to speed up this process.

Secondly, because of the different political circumstances in each of the Indochinese countries, the relationship of military operations there to the end of the war in Viet-Nam, or cease-fires there in relation to the end of the war in Viet-Nam, is somewhat complex; and we would like to discuss more concretely how to compress this time as much as possible.

There were certain ambiguities that were raised by the interview that the North Vietnamese Prime Minister, Pham Van Dong, gave to one of the weekly journals in which he seemed to be, with respect to one or two points, under a misapprehension as to what the agreement contained, and at any rate, we would like to have that clarified.

There are linguistic problems. For example, we call the National Council of Reconciliation an administrative structure in order to make clear that we do not see it as anything comparable to a coalition government. We want to make sure that the Vietnamese text conveys the same meaning.

I must add that the words "administrative structure" were given to us in English by the Vietnamese, so this is not a maneuver on our part.

There are some technical problems as to what clauses of the Geneva accords to refer to in certain sections of the document, and there is a problem which was never settled in which the North Vietnamese, as they have pointed out in their broadcast, have proposed that the agreement be signed by the United States

and North Viet-Nam—we on behalf of Saigon, they on behalf of their allies in South Viet-Nam.

We have always held the view that we would leave it up to our allies whether they wanted a two-power document or whether they wanted to sign themselves a document that establishes peace in their country. Now, they prefer to participate in the signing of the peace, and it seems to us not an unreasonable proposal that a country on whose territory a war has been fought and whose population has been uprooted and has suffered so greatly—that it should have the right to sign its own peace treaty. This, again, strikes us as a not insuperable difficulty, but its acceptance will require the redrafting of certain sections of the document, and that, again, is a job that will require several hours of work.

We have asked the North Vietnamese to meet with us on any date of their choice. We have, as has been reported, restricted our bombing, in effect, to the battle area in order to show our good will and to indicate that we are working within the framework of existing agreements.

We remain convinced that the issues that I have mentioned are soluble in a very brief period of time. We have undertaken, and I repeat it here publicly, to settle them at one more meeting and to remain at that meeting for as long as is necessary to complete the agreement.

So this is the situation in which we find ourselves.

With respect to Hanoi, we understand its disappointment that a schedule toward the realization of which it had made serious efforts could not be met for reasons beyond the control of any party, but they know, or they should know and they certainly must know now, that peace is within reach in a matter of weeks, or less, dependent on when the meeting takes place, and that once peace is achieved we will move from hostility to normalcy and from normalcy to cooperation with the same seriousness with which we have conducted our previous less fortunate relationships with them.

As far as Saigon is concerned, it is, of course, entitled to participate in the settlement of a war fought on its territory. Its people have suffered much, and they will remain there after we leave. Their views deserve great respect. In order to accelerate negotiations, we had presented them with conclusions which obviously could not be fully settled in a matter of four days that I spent in Saigon. But we are confident that our consultations with Saigon will produce agreement within the same time frame that I have indicated is required to complete the agreement with Hanoi and that the negotiations can continue on the schedule that I have outlined.

With respect to the American people, we have talked to you ladies and gentlemen here very often about the negotiations with respect to the peace, and we have been very conscious of the division and the anguish that the war has caused in this country. One reason why the President has been so concerned with ending the war by negotiation, and ending it in a manner that is consistent with our principles, is because of the hope that the act of making peace could restore the unity that had sometimes been lost at certain periods during the war and so that the agreement could be an act of healing rather than a source of new division. This remains our policy.

We will not be stampeded into an agreement until its provisions are right. We will not be deflected from an agreement when its provisions are right. And with this attitude, and with some cooperation from the other side, we believe that we can restore both peace and unity to America very soon.

Thank you. I will be glad to answer your questions.

Question. Do you feel that this program could not have been achieved four years ago?

Dr. KISSINGER. There was no possibility of achieving this agreement four years ago because the other side consistently refused to discuss the separation of the political and military issues, because it always insisted that it had to settle the political issues with us and that we had to predetermine the future of South Viet-Nam in a negotiation with North Viet-Nam.

As the statement from Hanoi said, on October 8 Hanoi for the first time made what it called a very significant proposal in which it accepted the principles that the military issues should be settled first and that the political issues should be left essentially to a negotiation among the South Vietnamese parties, with just the most general principles to be settled in the private negotiations.

As they say, "With a view to making the negotiations progress"—this is reading from the Hanoi statement—"at the private meeting on October 8, the DRV

side took a new, extremely important initiative. It put forward a draft agreement and proposed that the government," and so on, "immediately agree upon and sign this agreement to rapidly restore peace in Vietnam." In that draft agreement, the DRV side proposed the cessation of the war throughout Viet-Nam, a cease-fire in South Viet-Nam, and a total withdrawal of U.S. forces.

And then it said, "The two South Vietnamese parties shall settle together the internal matters of South Vietnam within three months after the cease-fire comes into effect." This is not an exact description of what the agreement says. The agreement does not say it must be done within three months. The agreement says that the two parties will do their utmost to get it done within three months. The exact text to which I referred is as follows:

"Therefore, as the U.S. side has many times proposed, the Vietnam problem would be solved in two steps. The first step is to end the war in Vietnam, to have a cease-fire in South Vietnam, to end U.S. military involvement in South Vietnam. In the second step, the South Vietnamese sides will jointly solve South Vietnamese internal problems."

This has been our position since the beginning of these negotiations. It was never accepted four years ago, three years ago, or two months ago. The first time it was accepted was on October 8. As soon as it was accepted, we completed within four days a rough draft of an agreement from which we have since been operating.

Question. What is the recourse if the negotiations for the elections break down? That has been a point at which North Viet-Nam has balked in the past.

Dr. KISSINGER. The agreement provides that the cease-fire is without time limit.

Question. Does President Thieu go along with the whole deal?

Dr. KISSINGER. As I have pointed out, the South Vietnamese agree with many parts of it and disagree with some aspects of it. We agree with some of their disagreements and not with all.

Question. Have the South Vietnamese been informed of the negotiations?

Dr. KISSINGER. The South Vietnamese were informed of the negotiations as they went along. However, the negotiations really were composed of two phases. There was the negotiation between July 19 and October 8. In that negotiation, the other side constantly proposed various formulas for the institution of a coalition government which would replace the existing government in Saigon and which would assume governmental power. And Saigon was informed.

I took a trip to Saigon in the middle of August to have a long discussion with the South Vietnamese Government. My deputy, General [Alexander M.] Haig, took another trip to present to them the various formulations that had been developed.

On October 8, for the first time, Hanoi presented the different approach which they have correctly described in their statement. They then insisted that we, on the basis of this approach, begin to draft the outline of an agreement in order to meet their deadline for October 31.

Now, if we had wanted to protract negotiation, we could easily have said that we have to return to Washington first or return to Saigon for further consultation. We believed that this was such an important step on the part of the North Vietnamese that took into account so many of the proposals that we had made, and such a significant movement in the direction of the position consistently held by this administration, that we had an obligation, despite the risks that were involved, of working with them to complete at least an outline of an agreement; and we spent four days, sometimes working 16 hours a day, in order to complete this draft agreement, or at least the outline of this draft agreement.

I mention this only because if we had wanted to delay we had many much better opportunities than to raise a few objections of the kind that I have described at the very end. But we did insist—and we constantly emphasized it—that we could not conclude this agreement without a full discussion with our allies in Viet-Nam.

I want to make clear another thing: that many of the concerns I have expressed here, while they are also shared by Saigon, are ours as well, and the particular issues that I raised would require resolution if the agreement is to bring a real peace and if it is not to lead immediately to endless disputes as to what its provisions mean.

Question. Why are you waiting for Hanoi to propose the date of the next meeting? Why don't you suggest that you start tomorrow?

Dr. KISSINGER. Because we are not eager to score debating points. Obviously, the North Vietnamese negotiators have to get wherever we are going to meet from where they are. We have told them that any day they are ready to meet we will be there. We have suggested Paris, but we have also told them that we would meet in other locations that might be more convenient for them.

Question. Would you go to Hanoi, Dr. Kissinger?

Dr. KISSINGER. I think we should complete the agreement elsewhere.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, you have, in effect, encouraged the American people that you are on the brink of peace. By coincidence—this happens to come by coincidence, you say at any rate—this happens to come at a time when the American people are about to vote for a President. What assurance can you give the American people that this will not somehow fall down, that it will not come off after the election?

Dr. KISSINGER. We can only give the assurance of our record. We have conducted these negotiations for four years, and we have brought them to this point with considerable difficulty and with considerable anguish. We cannot control if people believe or if people choose to assert that is simply some trick.

We have negotiated seriously and in good faith. We stand by what we have agreed to, and we give the assurance that we will stick by what we have negotiated and what we have achieved so laboriously.

As for the point that this is by a so-called coincidence, I can only repeat that the deadline was established by Hanoi and not by us and that we were prepared to keep this whole agreement secret until it was consummated and we would not have revealed it if it had not been consummated before the election.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, what are the main differences between Saigon and Washington now, and what will happen if agreement is not reached?

Dr. KISSINGER. We are confident that agreement will be reached. No useful purpose would be served by going into the details of consultations that are still in process, but we are confident that we will reach agreement within the time frame that I have described to you.

Question. Is the United States prepared to sign a separate agreement with North Viet-Nam if President Thieu refuses to sign an agreement?

Dr. KISSINGER. I see no point in addressing a hypothetical question which, as I have said, we are confident will not arise; and as I have indicated, the particular objectives which we seek for ourselves in the remainder of the negotiations are all views which we strongly hold as the U.S. Government.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, you haven't said whether President Thieu accepts a cease-fire.

Dr. KISSINGER. I think I have expressed my conviction that President Thieu will accept a crease-fire.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, President Thieu said in his speech that the Communists were demanding a coalition government, and you did not mention one. Could this National Council be turned into a coalition?

Dr. KISSINGER. This settlement is a compromise settlement in which neither side achieves every thing and in which both parties have the necessity of posturing themselves for their constituencies.

We do not consider this a coalition government, and we believe that President Thieu was speaking about previous versions of a Communist plan and not about this version of the Communist plan. I think we all recognize the fact that political leaders speak to many audiences at the same time.

Question. Are you going to make the text available that you had?

Dr. KISSINGER. No.

Question. Do you believe the North Vietnamese will leave on the negotiating table the proposals they have accepted thus far if you don't make the October 31 deadline?

Dr. KISSINGER. I cannot believe that when this major progress has been made that an arbitrary deadline should be the obstacle to peace, and we believe that the negotiations will continue.

Question. On the same point, with respect to the 8th of November deadline, what is to assure them that our side will not harden our negotiating stance once the pressure of the election is off?

Dr. KISSINGER. Our negotiation has not been framed by the election. We have not revealed any of our positions throughout the election; and had not Hanoi revealed the text or the substance of the agreement, we would have had no intention of disclosing it until or unless an agreement had been reached.

We have given a commitment that a text that will be agreed to at the next session will be the final text and that no new changes will be proposed. We will maintain this commitment. We are not engaged in Viet-Nam for the purpose of conducting a war.

I would like to suggest to you ladies and gentlemen that while it is possible to disagree with provisions of an agreement, the implication that this is all a gigantic maneuver which we will revoke as soon as this period is over is unworthy of what we have gone through.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, can you say whether President Thieu himself would insist on signing an agreement or whether somebody else might, for his government?

Dr. KISSINGER. The level at which the agreement will be signed has not been finally determined, but it is almost certainly not the Presidential level.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, does the resupplying and reequipment of the Communist forces apply only to those in South Viet-Nam, and if so, are the North Vietnamese at liberty to take as much from the Soviet Union as they can get?

Dr. KISSINGER. The formal provisions apply only to South Viet-Nam, but there is no question, and there can be no question, that the general conditions in Indochina will govern the actions of many of the countries, but I don't want to go into greater detail.

Question. Does your formal explanation there cover U.S. support, the status of continuing U.S. support?

Dr. KISSINGER. There is no limitation of any kind on economic aid. Military aid is governed by the replacement provisions that I have described. There is no limitation of any kind on economic advisers, and the military presence is governed by the withdrawal provisions.

Question. Is bombing covered within the concept of a withdrawal of U.S. forces?

Dr. KISSINGER. It covers an end to all military activities over the territory of North Viet-Nam from whatever direction.

Question. What effect does it have on Thailand and the 7th Fleet?

Dr. KISSINGER. There are no limitations on American forces in Thailand nor on the fleet.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, do you think that the mining of the harbor and the bombing of North Viet-Nam contributed to the acceleration by the North Vietnamese of negotiations?

Dr. KISSINGER. I don't want to speculate on North Vietnamese motivation.

Question. What concessions did the United States make to get this agreement, in your judgment?

Dr. KISSINGER. The United States made the concessions that are described in the agreement. There are no secret side agreements of any kind.

Question. Did you discuss with Le Duc Tho at any time the deadline of October 31 to sign the agreement, and if he raised this question, what did you reply?

Dr. KISSINGER. We believe that it is quite possible that an honest misunderstanding arose. We always said that we would make a major effort to meet the deadline, and we developed various hypothetical ways by which this deadline could be met. We also said, and that is equally in the record, that all of this depended on a satisfactory completion of various parts of the agreement. But they may have misunderstood honestly the conditional or hypothetical nature of some of the schedules.

But the most significant aspect cannot be whether one signs on one date or another. The significant aspect is when one is so close to an agreement, whether one perfects it and then signs it regardless of the deadline. There is no magic about any one date.

Question. Why did Hanoi want that deadline?

Dr. KISSINGER. You will have to ask Hanoi.

Question. Is it still possible to achieve that deadline of October 31?

Question. What countries would participate in supervising the cease-fire and in the conference?

Dr. KISSINGER. We are committed to achieving an agreement in another session of several days' duration, and it is up to the other side to determine when they want to meet.

Which countries participate? Until all the countries have been approached, it would not be proper for me——

Question. Is the United States one of them?

Dr. KISSINGER. The United States is a party, and it cannot be part of the supervisory mechanism. But the United States is a party to the four-power Joint Military Commission. That is one of the bodies that supervises those provisions that apply to the four parties. It is not part of the international body, but it is part of the international conference.

Question. How broad would the conference be, sir?

Dr. KISSINGER. Again, it would be inappropriate to list the countries until they have been approached.

Question. Would you amplify somewhat on the Cambodian-Laos agreement? Both sides must withdraw forces and cease major supplying, is that what you implied before?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I have given the general outline of the agreement, but it is envisaged that foreign forces are withdrawn from these countries.

Question. When was Hanoi advised one more meeting would be necessary?

Dr. KISSINGER. I believe on Sunday morning our time here, and we also informed them that we would stop military activities north of the 20th parallel.

NEWS CONFERENCE OF DR. HENRY KISSINGER, DEC. 16, 1972[1]

VIETNAM PEACE TALKS: STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS

Text of a press conference held December 16, 1972, at the White House by Dr. Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, as released by the Office of the White House Press Secretary (11:43 A.M., EST).

Mr. ZIEGLER. Dr. Kissinger will be on the record this morning, as he always is.

Dr. KISSINGER. Ladies and gentlemen, as you know, I have been reporting to the President and meeting with the Secretary of State, the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and other senior officials. I am meeting with you today because we wanted to give you an account of the negotiations as they stand today.

I am sure you will appreciate that I cannot go into the details of particular issues, but I will give you as fair and honest a description of the general trend of the negotiations as I can.

First, let me do this in three parts; what led us to believe, at the end of October, that peace was imminent; second, what has happened since; third, where do we go from here?

At the end of October we had just concluded three weeks of negotiations with the North Vietnamese. As you all know, on October 8th the North Vietnamese presented to us a proposal which, as it later became elaborated, appeared to us to reflect the main principles that the President has always enunciated as being part of the American position. These principles were that there had to be an unconditional release of American prisoners throughout Indochina; secondly, that there should be a cease-fire in Indochina brought into being by various means suitable to the conditions of the countries concerned; third, that we were prepared to withdraw our forces under these conditions in a time period to be mutually agreed upon; fourth, that we would not pre-judge the political outcome of the future of South Vietnam, we would not impose a particular solution, we would not insist on our particular solution.

The agreement, as it was developed during October, seemed to us to reflect these principles precisely. Then, toward the end of October, we encountered a number of difficulties. Now, at the time, because we wanted to maintain the atmosphere leading to a rapid settlement, we mentioned them at our briefings, but we did not elaborate on them.

Now let me sum up what the problems were at the end of October.

It became apparent that there was in preparation a massive Communist effort to launch an attack throughout South Vietnam to begin several days before the cease-fire would have been declared, and to continue for some weeks after the cease-fire came into being.

Second, there was an interview by the North Vietnamese Prime Minister which implied that the political solution that we had always insisted was part of our principles, namely, that we would not impose a coalition government, was not as clearcut as our record of the negotiations indicated.

---

[1] Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 8, 1973, pp. 33–41.

Thirdly, as no one could miss, we encountered some specific objections from Saigon.

Under these conditions, we proposed to Hanoi that there should be one other round of negotiations to clear up these difficulties. We were convinced that with good will on both sides, these difficulties could be relatively easily surmounted and that if we conducted ourselves on both sides in the spirit of the October negotiations, a settlement would be very rapid.

It was our conviction that if we were going to bring to an end 10 years of warfare, we should not do so with an armistice, but with a peace that had a chance of lasting. Therefore, we proposed three categories of clarifications in the agreement. First, we wanted the so-called linguistic difficulties cleared up so that they would not provide the seed for unending disputes and another eruption of the war. I will speak about those in a minute.

Secondly, the agreement always had provided that international machinery be put in place immediately after the cease-fire was declared. We wanted to spell out the operational meaning of the word "immediately" by developing the protocols that were required to bring the international machinery into being simultaneously with a cease-fire agreement. This, to us, seemed a largely technical matter.

Thirdly, we wanted some reference in the agreement, however vague, however allusive, however indirect, which would make clear that the two parts of Vietnam would live in peace with each other and that neither side would impose its solution on the other by force. These seemed to us modest requirements, relatively easily achievable.

Let me now tell you the sequence of events since that time. We all know of the disagreements that have existed between Saigon and Washington. These disagreements are, to some extent, understandable. It is inevitable that a people on whose territory the war has been fought and that for 25 years has been exposed to devastation and suffering and assassination, would look at the prospects of a settlement in a more detailed way, in a more anguished way, than we who are 10,000 miles way. Many of the provisions of the agreement inevitably were seen in a different context in Vietnam than in Washington.

I think it is safe to say that we face, with respect to both Vietnamese parties, this problem. The people of Vietnam, North and South, have fought for so long that the risks and perils of war, however difficult, seem sometimes more bearable to them than the uncertainties and the risks and perils of peace.

Now, it is no secret, either, that the United States has not agreed with all the objections that were raised by Saigon. In particular, the United States' position with respect to the cease-fire had been made clear in October, 1970. It had been reiterated in the President's proposal of January 25, 1972. It was repeated again in the President's proposal of May 8, 1972. None of these proposals had asked for a withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces. Therefore, we could not agree with our allies in South Vietnam when they added conditions to the established positions after an agreement had been reached that reflected these established positions.

As was made clear in the press conference here on October 26th, as the President has reiterated in his speeches, the United States will not continue the war one day longer than it believes is necessary to reach an agreement we consider just and fair.

So, we want to leave no doubt about the fact that if an agreement is reached that meets the stated conditions of the President, if an agreement is reached that we consider just, that no other party will have a veto over our actions.

But I am also bound to tell you that today this question is moot because we have not yet reached an agreement that the President considers just and fair. Therefore, I want to explain to you the process of the negotiations since they resumed on November 20th and where we are.

The three objectives that we were seeking in these negotiations were stated in the press conference of October 26th, in many speeches by the President afterwards, and in every communication to Hanoi since. They could not have been a surprise.

Now, let me say a word first about what were called "linguistic difficulties" which were called these in order not to inflame the situation. How did they arise? They arose because the North Vietnamese presented us a document in English which we then discussed with them. In many places throughout this document, the original wording was changed as the negotiations proceeded and

the phrases were frequently weakened compared to the original formulation. It was not until we received the Vietnamese text, after those negotiations were concluded, that we found that while the English terms had been changed, the Vietnamese terms had been left unchanged.

So, we suddenly found ourselves engaged in two negotiations, one about the English text, the other about the Vietnamese text. Having conducted many negotiations, I must say this was a novel procedure. It led to the view that perhaps these were not simply linguistic difficulties, but substantive difficulties.

Now I must say that all of these, except one, have now been eliminated. The second category of problems concerned bringing into being the international machinery so that it could operate simultaneously with the cease-fire and so as to avoid a situation where the cease-fire, rather than bring peace, would unleash another frenzy of warfare.

So to that end we submitted on November 20th, the first day that the negotiations resumed, a list of what are called protocols, technical instruments to bring this machinery into being. These protocols—and I will not go into the details of these protocols—they are normally technical documents and ours were certainly intended to conform to normal practices, despite the fact that this occurred four weeks after we had made clear that this was our intention and three weeks after Hanoi had pressed us to sign a cease-fire agreement. The North Vietnamese refused to discuss our protocols and refused to give us their protocols, so that the question of bringing the international machinery into being could not be addressed.

The first time we saw the North Vietnamese protocols was on the evening of December 12th, the night before I was supposed to leave Paris, six weeks after we had stated what our aim was, five weeks after the cease-fire was supposed to be signed, a cease-fire which called for that machinery to be set up immediately.

These protocols were not technical instruments, but reopened a whole list of issues that had been settled, or we thought had been settled, in the agreement. They contained provisions that were not in the original agreement, and they excluded provisions that were in the original agreement. They are now in the process of being discussed by the technical experts in Paris, but some effort will be needed to remove the political provisions from them and to return them to a technical status.

Secondly, I think it is safe to say that the North Vietnamese perception of international machinery and our perception of international machinery is at drastic variance, and that, ladies and gentlemen, is an understatement.

We had thought that an effective machinery required, in effect, some freedom of movement, and our estimate was that several thousand people were needed to monitor the many provisions of the agreement. The North Vietnamese perception is that the total force should be no more than 250, of which nearly half should be located at headquarters; that it would be dependent for its communications, logistics, and even physical necessities entirely on the party in whose area it was located.

So it would have no jeeps, no telephones, no radios of its own; that it could not move without being accompanied by liaison officers of the party that was to be investigated, if that party decided to give it the jeeps to get to where the violation was taking place and if that party would then let it communicate what it found.

It is our impression that the members of this commission will not exhaust themselves in frenzies of activity if this procedure were adopted.

Now, thirdly, the substance of the agreement. The negotiations since November 20th really have taken place in two phases. The first phase, which lasted for three days, continued the spirit and the attitude of the meetings in October. We presented our proposals. Some were accepted; others were rejected.

But by the end of the third day we had made very substantial progress, and all of us thought that we were within a day or two of completing arrangements. We do not know what decisions were made in Hanoi at that point, but from that point on, the negotiations have had the character where a settlement was always just within our reach, and was always pulled just beyond our reach when we attempted to grasp it.

I do not think it is proper for me to go into the details of the specific issues, but I think I should give you a general atmosphere and a general sense of the procedures that were followed.

When we returned on December 4th, we of the American team, we thought that the meetings could not last more than two or three days because there were only two or three issues left to be resolved. You all know that the meetings lasted nine days. They begin with Hanoi withdrawing every change that had been agreed to two weeks previously.

We then spent the rest of the week getting back to where we had already been two weeks before. By Saturday, we thought we had narrowed the issues sufficiently where, if the other side had accepted again one section they already had agreed to two weeks previously, the agreement could have been completed.

At that point, the President ordered General Haig to return to Washington so that he would be available for the mission, that would then follow, of presenting the agreement to our allies. At that point, we thought we were sufficiently close so that experts could meet to conform the texts so that we would not again encounter the linguistic difficulties which we had experienced previously, and so that we could make sure that the changes that had been negotiated in English would also be reflected in Vietnamese.

When the experts met, they were presented with 17 new changes in the guise of linguistic changes. When I met again with the Special Advisor, the one problem which we thought remained on Saturday had grown to two, and a new demand was presented. When we accepted that, it was withdrawn the next day and sharpened up. So we spent our time going through the 17 linguistic changes and reduced them again to two.

Then, on the last day of the meeting, we asked our experts to meet to compare whether the 15 changes that had been settled, of the 17 that had been proposed, now conformed in the two texts. At that point we were presented with 16 new changes, including four substantive ones, some of which now still remain unsettled.

Now, I will not go into the details or into the merits of these changes. The major difficulty that we now face is that provisions that were settled in the agreement appear again in a different form in the protocols; that matters of technical implementation which were implicit in the agreement from the beginning have not been addressed and were not presented to us until the very last day of a series of sessions that had been specifically designed to discuss them; and that as soon as one issue was settled, a new issue was raised.

It was very tempting for us to continue the process which is so close to everybody's heart, implicit in the many meetings, of indicating great progress, but the President decided that we could not engage in a charade with the American people.

We now are in this curious position: Great progress has been made, even in the talks. The only thing that is lacking is one decision in Hanoi, to settle the remaining issues in terms that two weeks previously they had already agreed to.

So, we are not talking of an issue of principle that is totally unacceptable.

Secondly, to complete the work that is required to bring the international machinery into being in the spirit that both sides have an interest of not ending the war in such a way that it is just the beginning of another round of conflict. So, we are in a position where peace can be near, but peace requires a decision. This is why we wanted to restate once more what our basic attitude is.

With respect to Saigon, we have sympathy and compassion for the anguish of their people and for the concerns of their government. But if we can get an agreement that the President considers just, we will proceed with it.

With respect to Hanoi, our basic objective was stated in the press conference of October 26th. We want an end to the war that is something more than an armistice. We want to move from hostility to normalization and from normalization to cooperation. But we will not make a settlement which is a disguised form of continued warfare and which brings about, by indirection, what we have always said we would not tolerate.

We have always stated that a fair solution cannot possibly give either side everything that it wants. We are not continuing a war in order to give total victory to our allies. We want to give them a reasonable opportunity to participate in a political structure, but we also will not make a settlement which is a disguised form of victory for the other side.

Therefore, we are at a point where we are again perhaps closer to an agreement than we were at the end of October, if the other side is willing to deal with us in good faith and with good will. But it cannot do that if everyday an issue is settled a new one is raised, that when an issue is settled in an agreement, it is raised again as an understanding and if it is settled in an understanding, it

is raised again as a protocol. We will not be blackmailed into an agreement. We will not be stampeded into an agreement, and, if I may say so, we will not be charmed into an agreement until its conditions are right.

For the President and for all of us who have been engaged in these negotiations, nothing that we have done has meant more than attempting to bring an end to the war in Vietnam. Nothing that I have done since I have been in this position has made me feel more the trustee of so many hopes as the negotiations in which I have recently participated. It was painful at times to think of the hopes of millions and, indeed, of the hopes of many of you ladies and gentlemen who were standing outside these various meeting places expecting momentous events to be occurring while inside one frivolous issue after another was surfaced in the last three days.

So, what we are saying to Hanoi is, we are prepared to continue in the spirit of the negotiations that were started in October. We are prepared to maintain an agreement that provides for the unconditional release of all American and allied prisoners, that imposes no political solution on either side, that brings about an internationally supervised cease-fire and the withdrawal of all American forces within 60 days. It is a settlement that is just to both sides and that requires only a decision to maintain provisions that had already been accepted and an end to procedures that can only mock the hopes of humanity.

On that basis, we can have a peace that justifies the hopes of mankind and the sense of justice of all participants.

Now, I will be glad to answer some of your questions.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, could you explain what in your mind you think Hanoi's motivation was in playing what you called a charade?

Dr. KISSINGER. I don't want to speculate on Hanoi's motives. I have no doubt that before too long we will hear a version of events that does not exactly coincide with ours. I have attempted to give you as honest an account as I am capable of. I believe—and this is pure speculation—that for a people that have fought for so long, it is paradoxically perhaps easier to face the risks of war than the uncertainties of peace.

It may be that they are waiting for a further accentuation of the divisions between us and Saigon, for more public pressures on us, or perhaps they simply cannot make up their mind. But I really have no clue to what the policy decisions were.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, from your account one would conclude that the talks are now ended in terms of the series you completed. Is that true? Secondly, if it is not true, on what basis will they be resumed?

Dr. KISSINGER. We do not consider the talks completed. We believe that it would be a relatively simple matter to conclude the agreement, because many of the issues that I mentioned, in the press conference of October 26th, have either been settled or substantial progress toward settling them has been made.

Therefore, if there were a determination to reach an agreement, it could be reached relatively quickly. On the other hand, the possibilities of raising technical objections are endless.

So, as Le Duc Tho said yesterday, we would remain in contact through messages. We can then decide whether or when to meet again. I expect that we will meet again, but we have to meet in an atmosphere that is worthy of the seriousness of the endeavor. On that basis, as far as we are concerned, the settlement will be very rapid.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, you have not discussed at all the proposals that the United States made on behalf of Saigon which required changes in the existing agreement that was negotiated. Can you discuss what those were and what effect they had on stimulating Hanoi, if they did, to making counter-proposals of its own?

Dr. KISSINGER. As I pointed out, there were two categories of objections on the part of Saigon, objections which we agreed with, and objections which we did not agree with. The objections that we agreed with are essentially contained in the list that I presented at the beginning and those were the ones we maintained. All of those, we believe, did not represent changes in the agreement, but either clarifications, removal of ambiguities, or spelling out the implementation of agreed positions.

In the first sequence of meetings between November 20th and November 26th, most of those were, or many of those were taken care of. So that we have literally, as I have pointed out before, been in the position where every day we thought it could and indeed, almost had to be the last day.

The counter-proposals that Hanoi has made were again in two categories. One set of changes that would have totally destroyed the balance of the agreement and which, in effect, withdrew the most significant concessions they had made. I did not mention those in my statement, because in the process of negotiation they tended to disappear. They tended to disappear from the agreement to reappear in understandings and then to disappear from understandings to reappear in protocols. But I suspect that they will, in time, after the nervous exhaustion of our technical experts, disappear from the protocols as well. So, there were major counter-proposals which we believe can be handled.

But then there were a whole series of technical counter-proposals which were absolutely unending and which hinged on such profound questions as whether, if you state an obligation in the future tense, you were therefore leaving open the question of when it would come into operation, and matters that reached the metaphysical at moments and which, as soon as one of them was settled, another one appeared, which made one believe that one was not engaged in an effort to settle fundamental issues but in a delaying action for whatever reason.

Now, those issues can be settled any day that somebody decides to be serious. Now it is clear that the interplay between Saigon and Hanoi is one of the complicating features of this negotiation, but the basic point that we want to make here is this:

We have had our difficulties in Saigon, but the obstacle to an agreement at this moment is not Saigon, because we do not have, as yet, an agreement that we can present to them. When that point is reached, the President has made clear that he will act on the basis of what he considers just; but he has also made clear that he does not want to end such a long war by bringing about a very short peace.

Question. Can a useful agreement be made operative without Saigon's signature?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, this is a question that has not yet had to be faced and which we hope will not have to be faced.

Question. For the agreement to be just, according to the President's terms, must there be substantial withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the South?

Dr. KISSINGER. The question of North Vietnamese forces in the South has three elements: the presence of the forces now there, their future, and the general claim that North Vietnam may make with respect to its right to intervene constantly in the South.

With respect to the last question, we cannot accept the proposition that North Vietnam has a right of constant intervention in the South.

With respect to the first question, of the forces now in the South, the United States has made three cease-fire proposals since October 1970, all of them based on the de facto situation as it existed at the time of the cease-fire, all of them approved by the Government of South Vietnam. Therefore, we did not add that condition of withdrawal to our present proposal, which reflected exactly the positions we had taken on January 25th and on May 8th of this year, both of which had been agreed to by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

We believe, however, that if the agreement that has been negotiated is implemented in good faith, that the problem of the forces will tend to lose its significance, or at least reduce significance, partly because of de facto withdrawals that could occur, and partly because if the provisions with respect to Laos, Cambodia, and no infiltration are maintained, the consequences in attrition will have to be obvious.

Question. Are we back to Square 1 now, Dr. Kissinger, would you say?

Dr. KISSINGER. No. We have an agreement that is 99 percent completed as far as the text of the agreement is concerned. We also have an agreement whose associated implementations are very simple to conclude if one takes the basic provisions of international supervision that are in the text of the agreement, provisions that happened to be spelled out in greater detail in the agreement than any other aspect, and, therefore, we are one decision away from a settlement.

Hanoi can settle this any day by an exchange of messages, after which there would be required a certain amount of work on the agreement, which is not very much, and some work in bringing the implementing instruments into being.

Question. Would you tell what that one percent is?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, you know, I have found I get into trouble when I give figures, so let me not insist on one percent. It is an agreement that is substan-

tially completed, but I cannot go into that. But that alone is not the problem. The problem is as I have described it in my presentation.

Question. I am a little confused, Dr. Kissinger, as to whether what remains you would describe as fundamental or one of these technical problems, because you have ranged between the two and I am a little lost as to what is left.

Dr. KISSINGER. The technical implementing instruments that they have presented are totally unacceptable for the reasons which I gave. On the other hand, I cannot really believe that they are serious. What remains on the agreement itself is a fundamental point. It is, however, a point that had been accepted two weeks previously and later withdrawn. So we are not raising a new, fundamental point. We are raising the acceptance of something that had once been accepted.

Question. Is it a political issue?

Dr. KISSINGER. I really don't want to go into it.

Question. What is the future of the Paris peace talks?

Dr. KISSINGER. I think that the sort of discussions that have been going on in the Paris peace talks are not affected by such temporary ups and downs as the private peace talks, so I am sure that Minister Xuan Thuy and Ambassador Porter will find many subjects for mutual recrimination. (Laughter)

Question. Dr. Kissinger, isn't the fundamental point the one you raised about the right of North Vietnamese forces to intervene in the future in South Vietnam?

Dr. KISSINGER. I will not go into the substance of the negotiations.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, you already mentioned a fundamental disagreement in which you say it is the U.S. insistence that the two parts of Vietnam should live in peace with each other. Is that not the fundamental disagreement here?

Dr. KISSINGER. As I said, I will not go into the details. I cannot consider it an extremely onerous demand to say that the parties of a peace settlement should live in peace with one another, and we cannot make a settlement which brings peace to North Vietnam and maintains the war in South Vietnam.

Question. But isn't their position basically that Vietnam is one country, and that this peace agreement is supposed to ratify that point?

Dr. KISSINGER. As I said, I will not go into the substance of the discussions, and I repeat: The issue that remained when we sent General Haig home is one that had already been agreed upon once, so it could not have been something that happened by oversight.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, was Hanoi messaged ahead of time that you would talk to us?

Dr. KISSINGER. No. But I suspect you will get that message to them very quickly.

Question. Was there any understanding in Paris before you left that each side would be free to express itself without damaging the possibility of future talks?

Dr. KISSINGER. No. Le Duc Tho correctly stated our agreement at the airport: that we would not go into the substance of the talks. Now, I recognize that what I am doing here goes to the edge of that understanding—(Laughter)—but the President felt that we could not permit a situation to continue in which there was daily speculation as to something that was already accomplished, while the record was so clearly contrary; therefore, we owed you an explanation not of the particular issues, but of the progress of negotiations, and exactly where they stood.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, I am not quite clear on a technical point. You talked about agreements, understandings and protocols. Are there in fact three different sets of documents under negotiation? What are these understandings?

Dr. KISSINGER. There are agreements, understandings and protocols. It always happens in a negotiation that there is some discussion which is not part of the agreement which attempts to explain what specific provisions mean and how they are going to be interpreted. This is what I meant by understanding. The protocols are the instruments that bring into being the international machinery and prisoner release. Their function is usually, in fact always, a purely technical implementation of provisions of an agreement.

These protocols do not, as a general rule, raise new issues, but rather they say, for example, with respect to prisoners, if the prisoners are to be released in 60 days, they would spell out the staging, the point at which they are released, who can receive them, and so forth.

Similarly with respect to international machinery, they would say where are the teams located, what are their functions and so forth. Our concern is that the

protocols, as we now have them, raise both political issues, which are inappropriate to implementing protocols, and technical issues, which are inconsistent with international supervision.

We have other protocols that deal with prisoners and withdrawals and mining that also present problems, but which I don't mention here because those are normal technical discussions that you would expect in the course of an agreement.

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT NIXON ON VIETNAM PEACE AGREEMENT, JANUARY 23, 1973 [1]

Good evening. I have asked for this radio and television time tonight for the purpose of announcing that we today have concluded an agreement to end the war and bring peace with honor in Viet-Nam and in Southeast Asia.

The following statement is being issued at this moment in Washington and Hanoi:

"At 12:30 Paris time today, January 23, 1973, the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam was initialed by Dr. Henry Kissinger on behalf of the United States, and Special Advisor Le Duc Tho on behalf of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

"The agreement will be formally signed by the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam on January 27, 1973, at the International Conference Center in Paris.

"The cease-fire will take effect at 2400 Greenwich Mean Time, January 27, 1973. The United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam express the hope that this agreement will insure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the preservation of lasting peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia."

That concludes the formal statement.

Throughout the years of negotiations, we have insisted on peace with honor. In my addresses to the Nation from this room of January 25 and May 8, I set forth the goals that we considered essential for peace with honor.[2]

In the settlement that has now been agreed to, all the conditions that I laid down then have been met. A cease-fire, internationally supervised, will begin at 7 p.m. this Saturday, January 27, Washington time. Within 60 days from this Saturday, all Americans held prisoners of war throughout Indochina will be released. There will be the fullest possible accounting for all of those who are missing in action.

During the same 60-day period, all American forces will be withdrawn from South Viet-Nam.

The people of South Viet-Nam have been guaranteed the right to determine their own future without outside interference.

By joint agreement, the full text of the agreement and the protocols to carry it out will be issued tomorrow.

Throughout these negotiations we have been in the closest consultation with President Thieu and other representatives of the Republic of Viet-Nam. This settlement meets the goals and has the full support of President Thieu and the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, as well as that of our other allies who are affected.

The United States will continue to recognize the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam as the sole legitimate government of South Viet-Nam.

We shall continue to aid South Viet-Nam within the terms of the agreement, and we shall support efforts by the people of South Viet-Nam to settle their problems peacefully among themselves.

We must recognize that ending the war is only the first step toward building the peace. All parties must now see to it that this is a peace that lasts, and also a peace that heals, and a peace that not only ends the war in Southeast Asia but contributes to the prospects of peace in the whole world.

This will mean that the terms of the agreement must be scrupulously adhered to. We shall do everything the agreement requires of us, and we shall expect the other parties to do everything it requires of them. We shall also expect other interested nations to help insure that the agreement is carried out and peace is maintained.

As this long and very difficult war ends, I would like to address a few special words to each of those who have been parties in the conflict.

---

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Jan. 29, 1973, pp. 43–45.

First, to the people and Government of South Viet-Nam: By your courage, by your sacrifice, you have won the precious right to determine your own future, and you have developed the strength to defend that right. We look forward to working with you in the future, friends in peace as we have been allies in war.

To the leaders of North Viet-Nam: As we have ended the war through negotiations, let us now build a peace of reconciliation. For our part, we are prepared to make a major effort to help achieve that goal; but just as reciprocity was needed to end the war, so, too, will it be needed to build and strengthen the peace.

To the other major powers that have been involved, even indirectly: Now is the time for mutual restraint so that the peace we have achieved can last.

And finally, to all of you who are listening, the American people: Your steadfastness in supporting our insistence on peace with honor has made peace with honor possible. I know that you would not have wanted that peace jeopardized. With our secret negotiations at the sensitive stage they were in during this recent period, for me to have discussed publicly our efforts to secure peace would not only have violated our understanding with North Viet-Nam; it would have seriously harmed and possibly destroyed the chances for peace. Therefore, I know that you now can understand why during these past several weeks I have not made any public statements about those efforts.

The important thing was not to talk about peace, but to get peace and to get the right kind of peace. This we have done.

Now that we have achieved an honorable agreement, let us be proud that America did not settle for a peace that would have betrayed our allies, that would have abandoned our prisoners of war, or that would have ended the war for us but would have continued the war for the 50 million people of Indochina. Let us be proud of the 2½ million young Americans who served in Viet-Nam, who served with honor and distinction in one of the most selfless enterprises in the history of nations. And let us be proud of those who sacrificed, who gave their lives so that the people of South Viet-Nam might live in freedom and so that the world might live in peace.

In particular, I would like to say a word to some of the bravest people I have ever met—the wives, the children, the families, of our prisoners of war and the missing in action. When others called on us to settle on any terms, you had the courage to stand for the right kind of peace so that those who died and those who suffered would not have died and suffered in vain and so that where this generation knew war the next generation would know peace. Nothing means more to me at this moment than the fact that your long vigil is coming to an end.

Just yesterday, a great American who once occupied this office died. In his life President Johnson endured the vilification of those who sought to portray him as a man of war. But there was nothing he cared about more deeply than achieving a lasting peace in the world.

I remember the last time I talked with him. It was just the day after New Year's. He spoke then of his concern with bringing peace, with making it the right kind of peace, and I was grateful that he once again expressed his support for my efforts to gain such a peace. No one would have welcomed this peace more than he.

And I know he would join me in asking for those who died and for those who live; Let us consecrate this moment by resolving together to make the peace we have achieved a peace that will last.

Thank you and good evening.

News Conference of Dr. Kissinger, January 24, 1973[1]

Ladies and gentlemen: The President last evening presented the outlines of the agreement, and by common agreement between us and the North Vietnamese we have today released the texts. And I am here to explain, to go over briefly, what these texts contain and how we got there, what we have tried to achieve in recent months, and where we expect to go from here.

Let me begin by going through the agreement, which you have read.

The agreement, as you know, is in nine chapters. The first affirms the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, as recognized by the 1954

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Jan. 29, 1973, pp. 64–74.

92-991 O - 75 - 33

Geneva agreements on Viet-Nam, agreements which established two zones divided by a military demarcation line.

Chapter II deals with the cease-fire. The cease-fire will go into effect at 7 o'clock, Washington time, on Saturday night. The principal provisions of chapter II deal with permitted acts during the cease-fire and with what the obligations of the various parties are with respect to the cease-fire.

Chapter II also deals with the withdrawal of American and all other foreign forces from Viet-Nam within a period of 60 days. And it specifies the forces that have to be withdrawn. These are in effect all military personnel and all civilian personnel dealing with combat operations. We are permitted to retain economic advisers, and civilian technicians serving in certain of the military branches.

Chapter II further deals with the provisions for resupply and for the introduction of outside forces. There is a flat prohibition against the introduction of any military force into South Viet-Nam from outside of South Viet-Nam, which is to say that whatever forces may be in South Viet-Nam from outside South Viet-Nam, specifically North Vietnamese forces, cannot receive reinforcements, replacements, or any other form of augmentation by any means whatsoever. With respect to military equipment, both sides are permitted to replace all existing military equipment on a one-to-one basis under international supervision and control.

There will be established, as I will explain when I discuss the protocols, for each side three legitimate points of entry through which all replacement equipment has to move. These legitimate points of entry will be under international supervision.

Release of prisoners

Chapter III deals with the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians, as well as with the question of civilian detainees within South Viet-Nam.

This, as you know, throughout the negotiations presented enormous difficulties for us. We insisted throughout that the question of American prisoners of war and of American civilians captured throughout Indochina should be separated from the issue of Vietnamese civilian personnel detained, partly because of the enormous difficulty of classifying the Vietnamese civilian personnel by categories of who was detained for reasons of the civil war and who was detained for criminal activities, and secondly, because it was foreseeable that negotiations about the release of civilian detainees would be complex and difficult and because we did not want to have the issue of American personnel mixed up with the issues of civilian personnel in South Viet-Nam.

This turned out to be one of the thorniest issues, that was settled at some point and kept reappearing throughout the negotiations. It was one of the difficulties we had during the December negotiations.

As you can see from the agreement, the return of American military personnel and captured civilians is separated in terms of obligation, and in terms of the time frame, from the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel.

The return of American personnel and the accounting of missing in action is unconditional and will take place within the same time frame as the American withdrawal.

The issue of Vietnamese civilian personnel will be negotiated between the two Vietnamese parties over a period of three months, and as the agreement says, they will do their utmost to resolve this question within the three-month period.

So I repeat, the issue is separated, both in terms of obligation and in terms of the relevant time frame, from the return of American prisoners, which is unconditional.

We expect that American prisoners will be released at intervals of two weeks or 15 days in roughly equal installments. We have been told that no American prisoners are held in Cambodia. American prisoners held in Laos and North Viet-Nam will be returned to us in Hanoi. They will be received by American medical evacuation teams and flown on American airplanes from Hanoi to places of our own choice, probably Vientiane.

There will be international supervision of both this provision and of the provision for the missing in action. And all American prisoners will, of course, be released, within 60 days of the signing of the agreement. The signing will take place on January 27 in two installments, the significance of which I will explain to you when I have run through the provisions of the agreement and the associated protocols.

Self-determination for South Viet-Nam

Chapter IV of the agreement deals with the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination. Its first provision contains a joint statement by the United States and North Viet-Nam in which those two countries jointly recognize the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, in which those two countries jointly affirm that the South Vietnamese people shall decide for themselves the political system that they shall choose and jointly affirm that no foreign country shall impose any political tendency on the South Vietnamese people.

The other principal provisions of the agreement are that in implementing the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, the two South Vietnamese parties will decide, will agree among each other, on free elections, for offices to be decided by the two parties, at a time to be decided by the two parties. These elections will be supervised and organized first by an institution which has the title of National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord, whose members will be equally appointed by the two sides, which will operate on the principle of unanimity, and which will come into being after negotiation between the two parties, who are obligated by this agreement to do their utmost to bring this institution into being within 90 days.

Leaving aside the technical jargon, the significance of this part of the agreement is that the United States has consistently maintained that we would not impose any political solution on the people of South Viet-Nam. The United States has consistently maintained that we would not impose a coalition government or a disguised coalition government on the people of South Viet-Nam.

If you examine the provisions of this chapter, you will see, first, that the existing government in Saigon can remain in office; secondly, that the political future of South Viet-Nam depends on agreement between the South Vietnamese parties, and not on an agreement that the United States has imposed on these parties; thirdly, that the nature of this political evolution, the timing of this political evolution, is left to the South Vietnamese parties, and that the organ that is created to see to it that the elections that are organized will be conducted properly is one in which each of the South Vietnamese parties has a veto.

The other significant provision of this agreement is the requirement that the South Vietnamese parties will bring about a reduction of their armed forces and that the forces being reduced will be demobilized.

The Issue of the Demilitarized Zone

The next chapter deals with the reunification of Viet-Nam and the relationship between North and South Viet-Nam. In the many negotiations that I have conducted over recent weeks, not the least arduous was the negotiation conducted with the ladies and gentlemen of the press, who constantly raised issues with respect to sovereignty, the existence of South Viet-Nam as a political entity, and other matters of this kind.

I will return to this issue at the end when I sum up the agreement, but it is obvious that there is no dispute in the agreement between the parties that there is an entity called South Viet-Nam and that the future unity of Viet-Nam, as it comes about, will be decided by negotiation between North and South Viet-Nam; that it will not be achieved by military force; indeed, that the use of military force with respect to bringing about unification, or any other form of coercion, is impermissible according to the terms of this agreement.

Secondly, there are specific provisions in this chapter with respect to the demilitarized zone (DMZ). There is a repetition of the agreement of 1954 which makes the demarcation line along the 17th parallel provisional, which means pending reunification. There is a specific provision that both North and South Viet-Nam shall respect the demilitarized zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line, and there is another provision that indicates that among the subjects that can be negotiated will be modalities of civilian movement across the demarcation line, which makes it clear that military movement across the demilitarized zone is in all circumstances prohibited.

Now, this may be an appropriate point to explain what our position has been with respect to the DMZ. There has been a great deal of discussion about the issue of sovereignty and about the issue of legitimacy—which is to say, which government is in control of South Viet-Nam—and finally, about why we laid such great stress on the issue of the demilitarized zone.

We had to place stress on the issue of the demilitarized zone because the provisions of the agreement with respect to infiltration, with respect to replacement,

with respect to any of the military provisions, would have made no sense whatsoever if there was not some demarcation line that defined where South Viet-Nam began. If we had accepted the proposition that would have in effect eroded the demilitarized zone, then the provisions of the agreement with respect to restrictions about the introduction of men and material into South Viet-Nam would have been unilateral restrictions applying only to the United States and only to our allies. Therefore, if there was to be any meaning to the separation of military and political issues, if there was to be any permanence to the military provisions that had been negotiated, then it was essential that there was a definition of where the obligations of this agreement began. As you can see from the text of the agreement, the principles that we defended were essentially achieved.

Chapter VI deals with the international machinery, and we will discuss that when I talk about the associated protocols of the agreement.

Laos and Cambodia

Chapter VII deals with Laos and Cambodia. Now, the problem of Laos and Cambodia has two parts. One part concerns those obligations which can be undertaken by the parties signing the agreement—that is to say, the three Vietnamese parties and the United States—those measures that they can take which affect the situation in Laos and Cambodia. A second part of the situation in Laos has to concern the nature of the civil conflict that is taking place within Laos and Cambodia and the solution of which, of course, must involve as well the two Laotian parties and the innumerable Cambodian factions.

Let me talk about the provisions of the agreement with respect to Laos and Cambodia and our firm expectations as to the future in Laos and Cambodia.

The provisions of the agreement with respect to Laos and Cambodia reaffirms as an obligation to all the parties, the provisions of the 1954 agreement on Cambodia and of the 1962 agreement on Laos, which affirm the neutrality and right to self-determination of those two countries. They are therefore consistent with our basic position with respect also to South Viet-Nam.

In terms of the immediate conflict, the provisions of the agreement specifically prohibit the use of Laos and Cambodia for military and any other operations against any of the signatories of the Paris agreement or against any other country. In other words, there is a flat prohibition against the use of base areas in Laos and Cambodia.

There is a flat prohibition against the use of Laos and Cambodia for infiltration into Viet-Nam or, for that matter, into any other country.

Finally, there is a requirement that all foreign troops be withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia, and it is clearly understood that North Vietnamese troops are considered foreign with respect to Laos and Cambodia.

Now, as to the conflict within these countries which could not be formally settled in an agreement which is not signed by the parties of that conflict, let me make this statement, without elaborating it: It is our firm expectation that within a short period of time there will be a formal cease-fire in Laos which in turn will lead to a withdrawal of all foreign forces from Laos and, of course, to the end of the use of Laos as a corridor of infiltration.

Secondly, the situation in Cambodia, as those of you who have studied it will know, is somewhat more complex because there are several parties headquartered in different countries. Therefore, we can say about Cambodia that it is our expectation that a de facto cease-fire will come into being over a period of time relevant to the execution of this agreement.

Our side will take the appropriate measures to indicate that it will not attempt to change the situation by force. We have reason to believe that our position is clearly understood by all concerned parties, and I will not go beyond this in my statement.

Relationship of the U.S. to North Viet-Nam

Chapter VIII deals with the relationship between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

As I have said in my briefings on October 26 and on December 16 and as the President affirmed on many occasions, the last time in his speech last evening, the United States is seeking a peace that heals. We have had many armistices in Indochina. We want a peace that will last.

And therefore it is our firm intention in our relationship to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to move from hostility to normalization, and from normalization to conciliation and cooperation. And we believe that under conditions

of peace we can contribute throughout Indochina to a realization of the humane aspirations of all the people of Indochina. And we will, in that spirit, perform our traditional role of helping people realize these aspirations in peace.

Chapter IX of the agreement is the usual implementing provision.

So much for the agreement.

Provisions of protocols to the agreement

Now let me say a word about the protocols. There are four protocols or implementing instruments to the agreement: on the return of American prisoners, on the implementation and institution of an International Control Commission, on the regulations with respect to the cease-fire and the implementation and institution of a Joint Military Commission among the concerned parties, and a protocol about the deactivation and removal of mines.

I have given you the relevant provisions of the protocol concerning the return of prisoners. They will be returned at periodic intervals in Hanoi to American authorities and not to American private groups. They will be picked up by American airplanes, except for prisoners held in the southern part of South Viet-Nam, which will be released at designated points in the South, again to American authorities.

We will receive on Saturday, the day of the signing of the agreement, a list of all American prisoners held throughout Indochina. And both parties—that is to say, all parties—have an obligation to assist each other in obtaining information about the prisoners, missing in action, and about the location of graves of American personnel throughout Indochina.

The International Commission has the right to visit the last place of detention of the prisoners, as well as the place from which they are released.

Now to the International Control Commission. You will remember that one of the reasons for the impasse in December was the difficulty of agreeing with the North Vietnamese about the size of the International Commission, its function, or the location of its teams.

On this occasion, there is no point in rehashing all the differences. It is, however, useful to point out that at that time the proposal of the North Vietnamese was that the International Control Commission have a membership of 250, no organic logistics or communication, dependent entirely for its authority to move on the party it was supposed to be investigating; and over half of its personnel were supposed to be located in Saigon, which is not the place where most of the infiltration that we were concerned with was likely to take place.

We have distributed to you an outline of the basic structure of this Commission. Briefly stated, its total number is 1,160, drawn from Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, and Poland. It has a headquarters in Saigon. It has seven regional teams, 26 teams based in localities throughout Viet-Nam which were chosen either because forces were in contact there or because we estimated that these were the areas where the violations of the cease-fire were most probable.

There are 12 teams at border-crossing points. There are seven teams that are set aside for points of entry, which have yet to be chosen, for the replacement of military equipment. That is for article 7 of the agreement. There will be three on each side, and there will be no legitimate point of entry into South Viet-Nam other than those three points. The other border and coastal teams are there simply to make certain that no other entry occurs, and any other entry is by definition illegal. There has to be no other demonstration except the fact that it occurred.

This leaves one team free for use, in particular, at the discretion of the Commission. And of course the seven teams that are being used for the return of the prisoners can be used at the discretion of the Commission after the prisoners are returned.

There is one reinforced team located at the demilitarized zone, and its responsibility extends along the entire demilitarized zone. It is in fact a team and a half. It is 50 percent larger than a normal border team and it represents one of the many compromises that were made, between our insistence on two teams and their insistence on one team. By a brilliant stroke, we settled on a team and a half. [Laughter.]

With respect to the operation of the International Commission, it is supposed to operate on the principle of unanimity, which is to say that its reports, if they are Commission reports, have to have the approval of all four members. However,

each member is permitted to submit his own opinion, so that as a practical matter any member of the Commission can make a finding of a violation and submit a report, in the first instance to the parties.

The International Commission will report for the time being to the four parties to the agreement. An international conference will take place, we expect, at the foreign ministers level within a month of signing the agreement.

That international conference will establish a relationship between the International Commission and itself, or any other international body that is mutually agreed upon, so that the International Commission is not only reporting to the parties that it is investigating. But for the time being, until the international conference has met, there was no other practical group to which the International Commission could report.

In addition to this international group, there are two other institutions that are supposed to supervise the cease-fire. There is, first of all, an institution called the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, which is composed of ourselves and the three Vietnamese parties, which is located in the same place as the International Commission, charged with roughly the same functions, but as a practical matter, it is supposed to conduct the preliminary investigations, its disagreements are automatically referred to the International Commission, and moreover, any party can request the International Commission to conduct an investigation regardless of what the Four-Party Commission does and regardless of whether the Four-Party Commission has completed its investigation or not.

After the United States has completed its withdrawal, the Four-Party Military Commission will be transformed into a Two-Party Commission composed of the two South Vietnamese parties. The total number of supervisory personnel, therefore, will be in the neighborhood of 4,600 during the period that the Four-Party Commission is in existence, and in the neighborhood of about 3,000 after the Four-Party Commission ceases operating and the Two-Party Commission comes into being.

Finally, there is a protocol concerning the removal and deactivation of mines, which is self-explanatory and simply explains—discusses the relationship between our efforts and the efforts of the DRV concerning the removal and deactivation of mines, which is one of the obligations we have undertaken in the agreement.

Procedure for signing documents

Now let me point out one other problem. On Saturday, January 27, the Secretary of State, on behalf of the United States, will sign the agreement bringing the cease-fire and all the other provisions of the agreement and the protocols into force. He will sign in the morning a document involving four parties, and in the afternoon a document between us and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. These documents are identical, except that the preamble differs in both cases.

The reason for this somewhat convoluted procedure is that while the agreement provides that the two South Vietnamese parties should settle their disputes in an atmosphere of national reconciliation and concord, I think it is safe to say that they have not yet quite reached that point, indeed, that they have not yet been prepared to recognize each other's existence.

This being the case, it was necessary to devise one document in which neither of the South Vietnamese parties was mentioned by name, and therefore no other party could be mentioned by name, on the principle of equality. So the four-party document, the document that will have four signatures, can be read with great care and you will not know until you get to the signature page whom exactly it applies to. It refers only to the parties participating in the Paris Conference, which are, of course, well known to the parties participating in the Paris Conference. [Laughter.]

It will be signed on two separate pages. The United States and the GVN are signing on one page, and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and its ally are signing on a separate page. And this procedure has aged us all by several years. [Laughter.]

Then there is another document, which will be signed by the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in the afternoon. That document, in its operative provisions, is word for word the same as the document which will be signed in the morning and which contains the obligations to which the two South Vietnamese parties are obligated.

It differs from that document only in the preamble and in its concluding

paragraph. In preamble it says the United States, with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, and the DRV, with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, and the rest is the same, and then the concluding paragraph has the same adaptation. That document, of course, is not signed by either Saigon or its opponent, and therefore their obligations are derived from the four-party document.

I do not want to take any time in going into the abstruse legalisms. I simply wanted to explain to you why there were two different signature ceremonies and why, when we handed out the text of the agreement, we appended to the document which contains the legal obligations which apply to everybody—namely, the four parties—why we appended another section that contained a different preamble and a different implementing paragraph which is going to be signed by the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

This will be true with respect to the agreement and three of the protocols. The fourth protocol, regarding the removal of mines, applies only to the United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and therefore we are in the happy position of having to sign only one document.

Negotiating process and achievements

Now then, let me summarize for you how we got to this point and some of the aspects of the agreement that we consider significant, and then I will answer your questions.

As you know, when I met with this group on December 16, we had to report that the negotiations in Paris seemed to have reached a stalemate. We had not agreed at that time, although we didn't say so, on the—we could not find a formula to take into account the conflicting views with respect to signing. There were disagreements with respect to the DMZ and with the associated aspects of what identity South Viet-Nam was to have in the agreement.

There was a total deadlock with respect to the protocols, which I summed up in the December 16 press conference. The North Vietnamese approach to international control and ours were so totally at variance that it seems impossible at that point to come to any satisfactory conclusion. And there began to be even some concern that the separation which we thought we had achieved in October between the release of our prisoners and the question of civilian prisoners in South Viet-Nam was breaking down.

When we reassembled on January 8, we did not do so in the most cordial atmosphere that I remember. However, by the morning of January 9, it became apparent that both sides were determined to make a serious effort to break the deadlock in negotiations. And we adopted a mode of procedure by which issues in the agreement and issues of principle with respect to the protocols were discussed at meetings between Special Advisor Le Duc Tho and myself while concurrently an American team headed by Ambassador Sullivan [William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] and a Vietnamese team headed by Vice Minister Thach [Nguyen Co Thach, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs] would work on the implementation of the principles as they applied to the protocols.

For example, the Special Advisor and I might agree on the principle of border control posts and their number, but then the problem of how to locate them, according to what criteria, and with what mode of operation presented enormous difficulties.

Let me on this occasion also point out that these negotiations required the closest cooperation throughout our government, between the White House and the State Department, between all the elements of our team, and that therefore the usual speculation of who did what to whom is really extraordinarily misplaced.

Without a cooperative effort by everybody, we could not have achieved what we have presented last night and this morning.

The Special Advisor and I then spent the week first on working out the unresolved issues in the agreement and then the unresolved issues with respect to the protocols and, finally, the surrounding circumstances of schedules and procedures.

Ambassador Sullivan remained behind to draft the implementing provisions of the agreements that had been achieved during the week. The Special Advisor and I remained in close contact.

So by the time we met again yesterday, the issues that remained were very few, indeed, were settled relatively rapidly. And I may on this occasion also point out that while the North Vietnamese are the most difficult people to negotiate with that I have ever encountered when they do not want to settle, they are also the most effective that I have dealt with when they finally decide to settle—so that we have gone through peaks and valleys in these negotiations of extraordinary intensity.

Now then, let me sum up where this agreement has left us—first with respect to what we said we would try to achieve, then with respect to some of its significance, and finally, with respect to the future.

First, when I met this group on October 26 and delivered myself of some epigrammatic phrases, we obviously did not want to give a complete checklist and we did not want to release the agreement as it then stood, because it did not seem to us desirable to provide a checklist against which both sides would then have to measure success and failure in terms of their prestige.

At that time, too, we did not say that it had always been foreseen that there would be another three or four days of negotiation after this tentative agreement had been reached. The reason why we asked for another negotiation was because it seemed to us at that point that for a variety of reasons, which I explained then and again on December 16, those issues could not be settled within the time frame that the North Vietnamese expected.

It is now a matter of history, and it is therefore not essential to go into a debate of on what we based this judgment. But that was the reason why the agreement was not signed on October 31, and not any of the speculations that have been so much in print and on television.

Now, what did we say on October 26 we wanted to achieve? We said, first of all, that we wanted to make sure that the control machinery would be in place at the time of the cease-fire. We did this because we had information that there were plans by the other side to mount a major offensive to coincide with the signing of the cease-fire agreement.

This objective has been achieved by the fact that the protocols will be signed on the same day as the agreement, by the fact that the International Control Commission and the Four-Party Military Commission will meet within 24 hours of the agreement going into effect, or no later than Monday morning, Saigon time, that the regional teams of the International Control Commission will be in place 48 hours thereafter, and that all other teams will be in place within 15 and a maximum of 30 days after that.

Second, we said that we wanted to compress the time interval between the cease-fires we expected in Laos and Cambodia and the cease-fire in Viet-Nam.

For reasons which I have explained to you, we cannot be as specific about the cease-fires in Laos and Cambodia as we can about the agreements that are being signed on Saturday, but we can say with confidence that the formal cease-fire in Laos will go into effect in a considerably shorter period of time than was envisaged in October, and since the cease-fire in Cambodia depends to some extent on developments in Laos, we expect the same to be true there.

We said that certain linguistic ambiguities should be removed. The linguistic ambiguities were produced by the somewhat extraordinary negotiating procedure whereby a change in the English text did not always produce a correlative change in the Vietnamese text. All the linguistic ambiguities to which we referred in October have in fact been removed. At that time I mentioned only one, and therefore I am free to recall it.

I pointed out that the U.S. position had consistently been a rejection of the imposition of a coalition government on the people of South Viet-Nam. I said then that the National Council of Reconciliation was not a coalition government, nor was it conceived as a coalition government.

The Vietnamese language text, however, permitted an interpretation of the words "administrative structure" as applied to the National Council of Reconciliation which would have lent itself to the interpretation that it came close or was identical with a coalition government.

You will find that in the text of this agreement the words "administrative structure" no longer exist and therefore this particular—shall we say—ambiguity has been removed.

I pointed out in October that we had to find a procedure for signing which would be acceptable to all the parties for whom obligations were involved. This has been achieved.

I pointed out on October 26 that we would seek greater precision with respect to certain obligations particularly, without spelling them out, as they applied to the demilitarized zone and to the obligations with respect to Laos and Cambodia. That, too, has been achieved.

And I pointed out in December that we were looking for some means, some expression, which would make clear that the two parts of Viet-Nam would live in peace with each other and that neither side would impose its solution on the other by force.

This is now explicitly provided, and we have achieved formulations in which in a number of the paragraphs, such as article 14, 18(e), and 20, there are specific references to the sovereignty of South Viet-Nam.

There are specific references, moreover, to the same thing in article 6 and article II of the ICCS [International Commission of Control and Supervision] protocol. There are specific references to the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination.

And therefore we believe that we have achieved the substantial adaptations that we asked for on October 26. We did not increase our demands after October 26, and we substantially achieved the clarifications which we sought.

Now then, it is obvious that a war that has lasted for 10 years will have many elements that cannot be completely satisfactory to all the parties concerned. And in the two periods where the North Vietnamese were working with dedication and seriousness on a conclusion, the period in October and the period after we resumed talks on January 8, it was always clear that a lasting peace could come about only if neither side sought to achieve everything that it had wanted; indeed, that stability depended on the relative satisfaction and therefore on the relative dissatisfaction of all of the parties concerned. And therefore it is also clear that whether this agreement brings a lasting peace or not depends not only on its provisions but also on the spirit in which it is implemented.

It will be our challenge in the future to move the controversies that could not be stilled by any one document from the level of military conflict to the level of positive human aspirations, and to absorb the enormous talents and dedication of the people of Indochina in tasks of construction, rather than in tasks of destruction.

We will make a major effort to move to create a framework where we hope in a short time the animosities and the hatred and the suffering of this period will be seen as aspects of the past and where the debates concern differences of opinion as to how to achieve positive goals.

Of course the hatreds will not rapidly disappear, and of course people who have fought for 25 years will not easily give up their objectives, but also people who have suffered for 25 years may at last come to know that they can achieve their real satisfaction by other and less brutal means.

The President said yesterday that we have to remain vigilant, and so we shall, but we shall also dedicate ourselves to positive efforts. And as for us at home, it should be clear by now that no one in this war has had a monopoly of anguish and that no one in these debates has had a monopoly of moral insight. And now that at last we have achieved an agreement in which the United States did not prescribe the political future to its allies, an agreement which should preserve the dignity and the self-respect of all of the parties, together with healing the wounds in Indochina we can begin to heal the wounds in America.

I will be glad to answer any questions.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, what, if any, supervision do you envisage over the Ho Chi Minh Trail by an international agency?

Dr. KISSINGER. We expect that the International Control Commission that exists in Laos will be reinstituted. We have also provided for the establishment of border teams, as you can see from the maps, at all the terminal points of the Ho Chi Minh Trail into South Viet-Nam. And therefore, we believe that there will be international supervision of the provisions, both within Laos and within South Viet-Nam.

Marvin [Marvin Kalb, CBS News].

Question. Dr. Kissinger, one of the major problems has been the continued presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South. Could you tell us, first so far as you know, how many of these troops are there in the South now, and do you have any understanding or assurance that these troops will be withdrawn?

Dr. KISSINGER. Our estimate of the number of North Vietnamese troops in the South is approximately 145,000. Now, I want to say a number of things with respect to this.

First, nothing in the agreement establishes the right of North Vietnamese troops to be in the South.

Secondly, the North Vietnamese have never claimed that they have a right to have troops in the South, and while opinions may differ about the exact accuracy of that statement, from a legal point of view it is important because it maintains the distinction that we, too, maintain.

Thirdly, if this agreement is implemented, the North Vietnamese troops in the South should, over a period of time, be subject to considerable reduction. First, there is a flat prohibition against the introduction of any outside forces for any reason whatsoever, so that the normal attrition of personnel cannot be made up by the reinfiltration of outside forces. I am talking now about the provisions of the agreement. Secondly, there is a flat prohibition against the presence of foreign forces in Laos and Cambodia and therefore a flat prohibition against the use of the normal infiltration corridors. Thirdly, as the agreement makes clear, military movement of any kind across the demilitarized zone is prohibited, both in the clause requiring respect for the demilitarized zone, which by definition excludes military personnel, and second, in the clause that says only modalities of civilian movement can be discussed, not of any other movement between North and South Viet-Nam. Fourth, there is a provision requiring the reduction and demobilization of forces on both sides, the major part of which on the South Vietnamese (Communist) side is believed, by all knowledgeable observers, to have arrived from outside of South Viet-Nam.

Therefore it is our judgment that there is no way that North Viet-Nam can live up to that agreement without there being a reduction of the North Vietnamese forces in South Viet-Nam, without this being explicitly stated.

Of course, it is not inconceivable that the agreement will not in all respects be lived up to. In that case, adding another clause that will not be lived up to, specifically requiring it, would not change the situation.

It is our judgement and our expectation—it is our expectation that the agreement will be lived up to, and therefore we believe that the problem of these forces will be taken care of by the evolution of events in South Viet-Nam.

Peter [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News].

Question. Dr. Kissinger, can I try to get a clarification of just that point? Several times, I think, you have said it is understood that North Vietnamese troops in Laos and Cambodia are considered foreign troops.

Dr. KISSINGER. That is right.

Question. Are they so considered?

Dr. KISSINGER. I said it once, Peter.

Question. You said it in answer to Marvin's question, but is it so considered in South Viet-Nam? Is North Viet-Nam a foreign entity in South Viet-Nam according to this agreement?

Dr. KISSINGER. This is one of the points on which the bitterest feeling rages and with which it is best not to deal in a formal and legalistic manner.

As I have pointed out, in this agreement there are repeated references to the identity of South Viet-Nam, to the fact that the South Vietnamese people's right of self-determination is recognized both by the DRV and by the United States to the fact that North and South Viet-Nam shall settle their disputes peacefully and through negotiation, and other provisions of a similar kind.

Therefore it is clear there is no legal way by which North Viet-Nam can use military force against South Viet-Nam.

Now, whether that is due to the fact that there are two zones temporarily divided by a provisional demarcation line or because North Viet-Nam is a foreign country with relation to South Viet-Nam—that is an issue which we have avoided making explicit in the agreement and in which ambiguity has its merits. From the point of view of the international position and from the point of view of the obligations of the agreement, there is no legal way by which North Viet-Nam can use military force vis-a-vis South Viet-Nam to achieve its objectives.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, on that subject, by what means was the United States able to convince President Thieu to accept the presence of North Vietnamese troops in South Viet-Nam?

Dr. KISSINGER. First of all, it is not easy to achieve through negotiations what has not been achieved on the battlefield, and if you look at the settlements that have been made in the postwar period, the lines of demarcation have almost always followed the lines of actual control.

Secondly, we have taken the position throughout that the agreement cannot be analyzed in terms of any one of its provisions, but it has to be seen in its totality and in terms of the evolution that it starts.

Thirdly, we have not asked President Thieu, nor has he accepted, the presence of North Vietnamese troops in South Viet-Nam as a legal right, nor do we accept that as a legal right.

We have, since October 1970, proposed a cease-fire-in-place. A cease-fire-in-place always has to be between the forces that exist. The alternative of continued war also would have maintained the forces in the country.

Under these conditions, they are cut off from the possibility of renewed infiltration. They are prevented from under taking military action. Their resupply is severely restricted.

And President Thieu, after examining the totality of the agreement, came to the conclusion that it achieved the essential objectives of South Viet-Nam, of permitting his people to bring about self-determination and of not posing a security risk that he could not handle with the forces that we have equipped and trained.

Mr. Horner [Garnett D. Horner, Washington Star-News].

Question. Because of a news report from Paris this morning that actually there were some 15 or 20 protocols, of which only four are being made public, were there any secret protocols agreed to?

Dr. KISSINGER. The only protocols that exist are the protocols that have been made public.

Question. What about understandings?

Dr. KISSINGER. There are, with respect to certain phrases, read into the record certain statements as to what they mean, but these have been explained in these briefings and made clear.

There are no secret understandings.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, it has been widely speculated that the 12-day saturation bombing of the North was the key to achieving the agreement that you found acceptable. Was it, and if not, what was?

Dr. KISSINGER. I was asked in October whether the bombing or mining of May 8 brought about the breakthrough in October, and I said then that I did not want to speculate on North Vietnamese motives. I have too much trouble analyzing our own.

I will give the same answer to your question, but I will say that there was a deadlock which was described in the middle of December, and there was a rapid movement when negotiations resumed on the technical level on January 8 (January 2) and on the substantive level on January 8. These facts have to be analyzed by each person for himself.

I want to make one point with respect to the question about understandings. It is obvious that when I speak with some confidence about certain developments that happen with respect to Laos and other places, that this must be based on exchanges that have taken place, but for obvious reasons I cannot go further into them.

The formal obligations of the parties have all been revealed, and there are no secret formal obligations.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, the dollar amount put on the amount to which the United States is committed in rebuilding—this construction you referred to in North Viet-Nam or reparations or whatever it is to be—is there any dollar amount suggested?

Dr. KISSINGER. We will discuss the issue of economic reconstruction of all of Indochina, including North Viet-Nam, only after the signature of the agreements and after the implementation is well advanced. And the definition of any particular sum will have to await the discussions which will take place after the agreements are in force.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, is there any understanding with the Soviet Union or with Communist China that they will take part in an international conference or will help toward the preservation of this framework of the agreement?

Dr. KISSINGER. Formal invitations to the international conference have not yet been extended. But we expect both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China to participate in the international conference which will take place within 30 days of the signature of the agreement.

We have reason to believe that both of these countries will participate in this conference.

Now, with respect to their willingness to help this agreement become viable, it is, of course, clear that peace in Indochina requires the self-restraint of all of the major countries and especially of those countries which on all sides have supplied the wherewithal for this conflict.

We, on our part, are prepared to exercise such restraint; we believe that the other countries, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, can make a very major contribution to peace in Indochina by exercising similar restraint.

Question. If a peace treaty is violated and if the ICC proves ineffective, will the United States ever again send troops into Viet-Nam?

Dr. KISSINGER. I don't want to speculate on hypothetical situations that we don't expect to arise.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, what agreement or understanding is there on the role that will be played by the so-called neutralist or third-force groups in Viet-Nam in the National Council of Reconciliation?

Dr. KISSINGER. We have taken the position throughout that the future political evolution of South Viet-Nam should be left, to the greatest extent possible, to the South Vietnamese themselves and should not be predetermined by the United States.

Therefore, there is no understanding any detail on the role of any particular force in South Viet-Nam. The United States has always taken the view that it favored free elections, but on the whole, the essence of this agreement is to leave the political evolution of South Viet-Nam to negotiation among the various South Vietnamese parties or factions.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, about a year ago, President Nixon outlined a peace proposal which included a provision for President Thieu to resign prior to elections. Is there any similar provision in this agreement?

Dr. KISSINGER. That proposal was in a somewhat different context. In any event, there is no such provision in this agreement and this, again, is a matter that will have to be decided by the Vietnamese parties within the context of whatever negotiation they have, but there is no requirement of any kind like this in the agreement.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, when do you expect the first American planes to arrive in Hanoi to pick up the prisoners?

Dr. KISSINGER. Our expectation is that the withdrawals, as well as the release of prisoners, will take place in roughly equal increments of 15 days over the 60-day period, so within 15 days of January 27. That is the outside time. It could be faster.

Question. I wanted to know the earliest time.

Dr. KISSINGER. I can't give any earlier time than within 15 days.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, you have addressed yourself to this general area before, but the question keeps coming up. Would you just review for us briefly how you feel that the agreement that you have reached differs from one that could have been reached, say, four years ago?

Dr. KISSINGER. Four years ago the North Vietnamese totally refused to separate political and military issues. Four years ago the North Vietnamese insisted that as a condition to negotiations the existing governmental structure in South Viet-Nam would have to be disbanded, and only after this governmental structure had been disbanded and a different one had been installed would they even discuss, much less implement, any of the other provisions of the agreement.

Therefore, until October 8 of this year, all of the various schemes that were constantly being discussed foundered on the one root factor of the situation—that the North Vietnamese, until October 8 of this year, demanded that a political victory be handed to them as a precondition for a discussion of all military questions. But in that case, all military questions would have become totally irrelevant because there was no longer the political structure to which they could apply.

It was not until October 8 this year that the North Vietnamese ever agreed to separate these two aspects of the problem, and as soon as this was done, we moved rapidly.

Then, there was the second phase, which I have described, which included the changes that were made between October and January, which produced this.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, earlier you said that as of December 16 there were various disagreements which you then listed, and the first one was the question of the demilitarized zone and associated aspects over what identity South Viet-Nam should have under the agreement. Can you elaborate on this, and most par-

ticularly, can you elaborate on it from the standpoint of whether you are referring here to President Thieu's objections?

Dr. KISSINGER. I have made clear what exactly was involved. We have here several separate issues. One, is there such a thing as a South Viet-Nam, even temporarily, until unification? Secondly, who is the legitimate ruler of South Viet-Nam? This is what the civil war has been all about. Thirdly, what is the demarcation line that separates North Viet-Nam from South Viet-Nam?

Now, we believe that the agreement defines adequately the demarcation line. It defines adequately what the identity is to which we refer. It leaves open to negotiation among the parties the political evolution of South Viet-Nam and therefore the definition of what ultimately will be considered by all South Vietnamese the legitimate ruler.

The President made clear yesterday that as far as the United States is concerned, we recognize President Thieu. This is a situation that has existed in other countries. And these were the three principal issues involved, of which two have international significance and were settled within the agreement, and the third has significance in terms of the political evolution of South Viet-Nam, and that has been left to the self-determination of the South Vietnamese people.

As to the question of President Thieu's objections, comments, and so forth, we said on October 26 that obviously in a war fought in South Viet-Nam, in a war that has had hundreds of thousands of casualties of South Vietnamese, enormous devastation within South Viet-Nam, it stands to reason that the views of our allies will have to be considered. There is nothing wrong or immoral for them to have such views.

Secondly, their perception of the risks has to be different from our perception of the risks. We are 12,000 miles away. If we make a mistake in our assessment of the situation, it will be painful. If they make a mistake in the assessment of the situation, it can be fatal. And therefore, they have had a somewhat less flexible attitude. Where we in some respects have at some points been content with more ambiguous formulations, they were not.

Nevertheless, it is also obvious to any reader of the Saigon press and of their official communications that we did not accept all of their comments and that we carried out precisely what the President had said and what was said at the various press conferences in which I presented the U.S. Government view; namely, that we would make the final determination as to when the American participation in the war should end.

Those parts of their comments that we thought were reasonable we made our own; those that we did not, we did not. And once we had achieved an agreement with the North Vietnamese that we considered fair and just and honorable, we presented it with great energy and conviction in Saigon.

Question. This is what I am asking you, doctor. You say you made some of his points your points. What did he get in January that he didn't have in October?

Dr. KISSINGER. I do not want to discuss what he got. I pointed out the list of objectives we set ourselves in October and what was achieved. I pointed out the changes that were achieved between October and January. We believe them to be substantial, and I do not want to make a checklist of saying which originated in Saigon or which originated in Washington.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, did you personally feel strengthened in the negotiations as a result of the saturation bombing?

Dr. KISSINGER. The term "saturation bombing" has certain connotations. We carried out what was considered to be necessary at the time in order to make clear that the United States could not stand for an indefinite delay in the negotiations.

My role in the negotiations was to present the American point of view. I can only say that we resumed the negotiations on January 8 and the breakthrough occurred on January 9, and I will let those facts speak for themselves.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, what is now the extent and the nature of the American commitment to South Viet-Nam?

Dr. KISSINGER. The United States, as the President said, will continue economic aid to South Viet-Nam. It will continue that military aid which is permitted by the agreement. The United States is prepared to gear that military aid to the actions of other countries and not to treat it as an end in itself.

And the United States expects all countries to live up to the provisions of the agreement.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, you say, "The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to make periodic replacements of armaments, munitions and war materials which have been destroyed." Why do we have to put any more materials in there? Why should they be in there, and will these materials come from the United States or what countries?

Dr. KISSINGER. Let's separate two things: what is permitted by the agreement and what we shall do. What is permitted by the agreement is that military equipment that, as you read, is destroyed, worn out, used up, or damaged can be replaced.

The reason for that provision is that if for any reason the war should start at any level, it would be an unfair restriction on our South Vietnamese allies to prohibit them from replacing their weapons if their enemies are able to do so.

The degree, therefore, to which these weapons have to be replaced will depend on the degree to which there is military activity. If there is no military activity in South Viet-Nam, then the number of weapons that are destroyed, damaged, or worn out will of course be substantially less than in other circumstances.

Secondly, what will be the U.S. position? This depends on the overall situation. If there is no military activity, if other countries do not introduce massive military equipment into Viet-Nam, we do not consider it an end in itself to give military aid. But we believe that it would be unfair and wrong for one country to be armed by its allies while the other one has no right to do so. This is what will govern our actions.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, what is the plan for the rather sizable U.S. military force offshore in warships off South Viet-Nam and also B–52 bases in Thailand? Will these forces be reduced, and is there an understanding with the North Vietnamese that you have not mentioned to us here that would reduce those forces?

Dr. KISSINGER. There is no restriction on American military forces that is not mentioned in the agreement. One would expect, as time goes on, that the deployment of our naval forces will take account of the new situation.

As you know, we have kept many of our forces on station for longer than the normal period of time, and we have had more carriers in the area than before, but this is not required by the agreement and this is simply a projection of what might happen.

The same is true with respect to Thailand. There are no restrictions on our forces in Thailand. It has always been part of the Nixon doctrine that the deployment of our forces would be related to the degree of the danger and has not an abstract quality of its own.

So that as a general rule one can say that in the initial phases of the agreement, before one knows how it will be implemented, the deployment will be more geared to the war situation, and as the agreement is being implemented, the conditions of peace will have a major impact on it. But this is simply a projection of our normal policy and is not an outgrowth required by the agreement.

The press. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

THE VIETNAM AGREEMENT AND PROTOCOLS, SIGNED JANUARY 27, 1973[1]

AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM

The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam,

With a view to ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, and to contributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and the world,

Have agreed on the following provisions and undertake to respect and to implement them:

Chapter I

THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S FUNDAMENTAL NATIONAL RIGHTS

Article 1

The United States and all other countries respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.

---

[1] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Jan. 29, 1973, pp. 45–54.

Chapter II

Cessation of Hostilities—Withdrawal of Troops

Article 2

A cease-fire shall be observed throughout South Vietnam as of 2400 hours G.M.T., on January 27, 1973.

At the same hour, the United States will stop all its military activities against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by ground, air and naval forces, wherever they may be based, and end the mining of the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The United States will remove, permanently deactivate or destroy all the mines in the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of North Vietnam as soon as this Agreement goes into effect.

The complete cessation of hostilities mentioned in this Article shall be durable and without limit of time.

Article 3

The parties undertake to maintain the cease-fire and to ensure a lasting and stable peace.

As soon as the cease-fire goes into effect:

(a) The United States forces and those of the other foreign countries allied with the United States and the Republic of Vietnam shall remain in-place pending the implementation of the plan of troop withdrawal. The Four-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 16 shall determine the modalities.

(b) The armed forces of the two South Vietnamese parties shall remain in-place. The Two-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 17 shall determine the areas controlled by each party and the modalities of stationing.

(c) The regular forces of all services and arms and the irregular forces of the parties in South Vietnam shall stop all offensive activities against each other and shall strictly abide by the following stipulations:

All acts of force on the ground, in the air, and on the sea shall be prohibited;

All hostile acts, terrorism and reprisals by both sides will be banned.

Article 4

The United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam.

Article 5

Within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement, there will be a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of troops, military advisers, and military personnel, including technical military personnel and military personnel associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions, and war material of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a). Advisers from the above-mentioned countries to all paramilitary organizations and the police force will also be withdrawn within the same period of time.

Article 6

The dismantlement of all military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a) shall be completed within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement.

Article 7

From the enforcement of the cease-fire to the formation of the government provided for in Articles 9 (b) and 14 of this Agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military personnel including technical military personnel, armaments, munitions, and war material into South Vietnam.

The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to make periodic replacement of armaments, munitions and war material which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cease-fire, on the basis of piece-for-piece, of the same characteristics and properties, under the supervision of the Joint Military Commission of the two South Vietnamese parties and of the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

Chapter III

THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS, AND CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Article 8

(a) The return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with and completed not later than the same day as the troop withdrawal mentioned in Article 5. The parties shall exchange complete lists of the above-mentioned captured military personnel and foreign civilians on the day of the signing of this Agreement.

(b) The parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action.

(c) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam will be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties on the basis of the principles of Article 21 (b) of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam of July 20, 1954. The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, with a view to ending hatred and enmity, in order to ease suffering and to reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to resolve this question within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect.

Chapter IV

THE EXERCISE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

Article 9

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam undertake to respect the following principles for the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination:

(a) The South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination is sacred, inalienable, and shall be respected by all countries.

(b) The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Vietnam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision.

(c) Foreign countries shall not impose any political tendency or personality on the South Vietnamese people.

Article 10

The two South Vietnamese parties undertake to respect the cease-fire and maintain peace in South Vietnam, settle all matters of contention through negotiations, and avoid all armed conflict.

Article 11

Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties will:

Achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other;

Ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership, and right to free enterprise.

Article 12

(a) Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties shall hold consultations in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, mutual respect, and mutual non-elimination to set up a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord of three equal segments. The Council shall operate

on the principle of unanimity. After the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord has assumed its functions, the two South Vietnamese parties will consult about the formation of councils at lower levels. The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Vietnam as soon as possible and do their utmost to accomplish this within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect, in keeping with the South Vietnamese people's aspirations for peace, independence and democracy.

(b) The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord shall have the task of promoting the two South Vietnamese parties' implementation of this Agreement, achievement of national reconciliation and concord and ensurance of democratic liberties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will organize the free and democratic general elections provided for in Article 9 (b) and decide the procedures and modalities of these general elections. The institutions for which the general elections are to be held will be agreed upon through consultations between the two South Vietnamese parties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will also decide the procedures and modalities of such local elections as the two South Vietnamese parties agree upon.

Article 13

The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance with the postwar situation. Among the questions to be discussed by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their military effectives and to demobilize the troops being reduced. The two South Vietnamese parties will accomplish this as soon as possible.

Article 14

South Vietnam will pursue a foreign policy of peace and independence. It will be prepared to establish relations with all countries irrespective of their political and social systems on the basis of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty and accept economic and technical aid from any country with no political conditions attached. The acceptance of military aid by South Vietnam in the future shall come under the authority of the government set up after the general elections in South Vietnam provided for in Article 9(b).

Chapter V

The Reunification of Vietnam and the Relationship Between North and South Vietnam

Article 15

The reunification of Vietnam shall be carried out step by step through peaceful means on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Vietnam, without coercion or annexation by either party, and without foreign interference. The time for reunification will be agreed upon by North and South Vietnam.

Pending reunification:

(a) The military demarcation line between the two zones at the 17th parallel is only provisional and not a political or territorial boundary, as provided for in paragraph 6 of the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference.

(b) North and South Vietnam shall respect the Demilitarized Zone on either side of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line.

(c) North and South Vietnam shall promptly start negotiations with a view to reestablishing normal relations in various fields. Among the questions to be negotiated are the modalities of civilian movement across the Provisional Military Demarcation Line.

(d) North and South Vietnam shall not join any military alliance or military bloc and shall not allow foreign powers to maintain military bases, troops, military advisers, and military personnel on their respective territories, as stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.

32-891 O - 73 - 34

Chapter VI

THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

Article 16

(a) The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam shall immediately designate representatives to form a Four-Party Joint Military Commission with the task of ensuring joint action by the parties in implementing the following provisions of this Agreement:

The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam;

Article 3(a), regarding the cease-fire by U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries referred to in that Article;

Article 3(c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam;

Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from South Vietnam of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a);

Article 6, regarding the dismantlement of military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a);

Article 8(a), regarding the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties;

Article 8(b), regarding the mutual assistance of the parties in getting information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action.

(b) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall operate in accordance with the principle of consultations and unanimity. Disagreements shall be referred to the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

(c) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall begin operating immediately after the signing of this Agreement and end its activities in sixty days, after the completion of the withdrawal of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a) and the completion of the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties.

(d) The four parties shall agree immediately on the organization, the working procedure, means of activity, and expenditures of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission.

Article 17

(a) The two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately designate representatives to form a Two-Party Joint Military Commission with the task of ensuring joint action by the two South Vietnamese parties in implementing the following provisions of this Agreement:

The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;

Article 3(b), regarding the cease-fire between the two South Vietnamese parties;

Article 3(c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;

Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the introduction of troops into South Vietnam and all other provisions of this article;

Article 8(c), regarding the question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam;

Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobilization of the troops being reduced.

(b) Disagreements shall be referred to the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

(c) After the signing of this Agreement, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall agree immediately on the measures and organization aimed at enforcing the cease-fire and preserving peace in South Vietnam.

Article 18

(a) After the signing of this Agreement, an International Commission of Control and Supervision shall be established immediately.

(b) Until the International Conference provided for in Article 19 makes defini-

tive arrangements, the International Commission of Control and Supervision will report to the four parties of matters concerning the control and supervision of the implementation of the following provisions of this Agreement:

The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam;

Article 3(a), regarding the cease-fire by U.S. forces and those of other foreign countries referred to in that Article;

Article 3(c), regarding the cease-fire between all the parties in South Vietnam;

Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from Vietnam of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a);

Article 6, regarding the dismantlement of military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a);

Article 8(a), regarding the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties.

The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall form control teams for carrying out its task. The four parties shall agree immediately on the location and operation of these teams. The parties will facilitate their operation.

(c) Until the International Conference makes definitive arrangements, the International Commission of Control and Supervision will report to the two South Vietnamese parties on matters concerning the control and supervision of the implementation of the following provisions of this Agreement:

The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;

Article 3(b), regarding the cease-fire between the two South Vietnamese parties;

Article 3(c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;

Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the introduction of troops into South Vietnam and all other provisions of this Article;

Article 8(c), regarding the question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam;

Article 9(b), regarding the free and democratic general elections in South Vietnam;

Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobilization of the troops being reduced.

The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall form control teams for carrying out its tasks. The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree immediately on the location and operation of these teams. The two South Vietnamese parties will facilitate their operation.

(d) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall be composed of representatives of four countries: Canada, Hungary, Indonesia and Poland. The chairmanship of this Commission will rotate among the members for specific periods to be determined by the Commission.

(e) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall carry out its tasks in accordance with the principle of respect for the sovereignty of South Vietnam.

(f) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall operate in accordance with the principle of consultations and unanimity.

(g) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall begin operating when a cease-fire comes into force in Vietnam. As regards the provisions in Article 18(b) concerning the four parties, the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall end its activities when the Commission's tasks of control and supervision regarding these provisions have been fulfilled. As regards the provisions in Article 18(c) concerning the two South Vietnamese parties, the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall end its activities on the request of the government formed after the general elections in South Vietnam provided for in Article 9(b).

(h) The four parties shall agree immediately on the organization, means of activity, and expenditures of the International Commission of Control and Supervision. The relationship between the International Commission and the International Conference will be agreed upon by the International Commission and the International Conference.

Article 19

The parties agree on the convening of an International Conference within thirty days of the signing of this Agreement to acknowledge the signed agreements; to guarantee the ending of the war, the maintenance of peace in Vietnam, the respect of the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights, and the South Vietnamese people's rights to self-determination; and to contribute to and guarantee peace in Indochina.

The United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, on behalf of the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam, will propose to the following parties that they participate in this International Conference; the People's Republic of China, the Republic of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the four countries of the International Commission of Control and Supervision, and the Secretary General of the United Nations, together with the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam.

Chapter VII

REGARDING CAMBODIA AND LAOS

Article 20

(a) The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam shall strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Cambodia and the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos, which recognised the Cambodian and the Lao peoples' fundamental national rights, i.e., the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of these countries. The parties shall respect the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos.

The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam undertake to refrain from using the territory of Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach on the sovereignty and security of one another and of other countries.

(b) Foreign countries shall put an end to, all military activities in Cambodia and Laos, totally withdraw from and refrain from reintroducing into these two countries troops, military advisers and military personnel, armaments, munitions and war material.

(c) The internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos shall be settled by the people of each of these countries without foreign interference.

(d) The problems existing between the Indochinese countries shall be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

Chapter VIII

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Article 21

The United States anticipates that this Agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as with all the peoples of Indochina. In pursuance of its traditional policy, the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina.

Article 22

The ending of the war, the restoration of peace in Vietnam, and the strict implementation of this Agreement will create conditions for establishing a new, equal and mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the basis of respect for each other's independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. At the same time this will ensure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the preservation of lasting peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia.

Chapter IX

OTHER PROVISIONS

Article 23

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam. All

the parties concerned shall strictly implement this Agreement and its Protocols.

Done in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand-Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

[Separate Numbered Page]

For the Government of the United States of America:

WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
Secretary of State.

For the Government of the Republic of Vietnam:

TRAN VAN LAM,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[Separate Numbered Page]

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:

NGUYEN DUY TRINH,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

For the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam:

NGUYEN THI BINH,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM

The Government of the United States of America, with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam,

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam,

With a view to ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, and to contributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and the world,

Have agreed on the following provisions and undertake to respect and to implement them:

[Text of Agreement Chapters I–VIII Same As Above]

Chapter IX

OTHER PROVISIONS

Article 23

The Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam shall enter into force upon signature of this document by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and upon signature of a document in the same terms by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. The Agreement and the protocols to it shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

Done in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:

WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
Secretary of State.

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:

NGUYEN DUY TRINH,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Protocol on Prisoners and Detainees

[White House press release dated January 24]

PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS AND CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam.

In implementation of Article 8 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date providing for the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians, and captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel,

Have agreed as follows:

THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS

Article 1

The parties signatory to the Agreement shall return the captured military personnel of the parties mentioned in Article 8(a) of the Agreement as follows:

All captured military personnel of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a) of the Agreement shall be returned to United States authorities;

All captured Vietnamese military personnel, whether belonging to regular or irregular armed forces, shall be returned to the two South Vietnamese parties; they shall be returned to that South Vietnamese party under whose command they served.

Article 2

All captured civilians who are nationals of the United States or of any other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a) of the Agreement shall be returned to United States authorities. All other captured foreign civilians shall be returned to the authorities of their country of nationality by any one of the parties willing and able to do so.

Article 3

The parties shall today exchange complete lists of captured persons mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 of this Protocol.

Article 4

(a) The return of all captured persons mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 of this Protocol shall be completed within sixty days of the signing of the Agreement at a rate no slower than the rate of withdrawal from South Vietnam of United States forces and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 5 of the Agreement.

(b) Persons who are seriously ill, wounded or maimed, old persons and women shall be returned first. The remainder shall be returned either by returning all from one detention place after another or in order of their dates of capture, beginning with those who have been held the longest.

Article 5

The return and reception of the persons mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 of this Protocol shall be carried out at places convenient to the concerned parties. Places of return shall be agreed upon by the Four-Party Joint Military Commission. The parties shall ensure the safety of personnel engaged in the return and reception of those persons.

Article 6

Each party shall return all captured persons mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 of this Protocol without delay and shall facilitate their return and reception. The detaining parties shall not deny or delay their return for any reason, including the fact that captured persons may, on any grounds, have been prosecuted or sentenced.

THE RETURN OF CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Article 7

(a) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam will be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties on the basis of the principles of Article 21 (b) of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam of July 20, 1954, which reads as follows:

"The term 'civilian internees' is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason and have been kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities."

(b) The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord with a view to ending hatred and enmity in order to ease suffering and to reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to resolve this question within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect.

(c) Within fifteen days after the cease-fire comes into effect, the two South Vietnamese parties shall exchange lists of the Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained by each party and lists of the places at which they are held.

TREATMENT OF CAPTURED PERSONS DURING DETENTION

Article 8

(a) All captured military personnel of the parties and captured foreign civilians of the parties shall be treated humanely at all times, and in accordance with international practice.

They shall be protected against all violence to life and person, in particular against murder in any form, mutilation, torture and cruel treatment, and outrages upon personal dignity. These persons shall not be forced to join the armed forces of the detaining party.

They shall be given adequate food, clothing, shelter, and the medical attention required for their state of health. They shall be allowed to exchange post cards and letters with their families and receive parcels.

(b) All Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam shall be treated humanely at all times, and in accordance with international practice.

They shall be protected against all violence to life and person, in particular against murder in any form, mutilation, torture and cruel treatment, and outrages against personal dignity. The detaining parties shall not deny or delay their return for any reason, including the fact that captured persons may, on any grounds, have been prosecuted or sentenced. These persons shall not be forced to join the armed forces of the detaining party.

They shall be given adequate food, clothing, shelter, and the medical attention required for their state of health. They shall be allowed to exchange post cards and letters with their families and receive parcels.

Article 9

(a) To contribute to improving the living conditions of the captured military personnel of the parties and foreign civilians of the parties, the parties shall, within fifteen days after the cease-fire comes into effect, agree upon the designation of two or more national Red Cross societies to visit all places where captured military personnel and foreign civilians are held.

(b) To contribute to improving the living conditions of the captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel, the two South Vietnamese parties shall, within fifteen days after the cease-fire comes into effect, agree upon the designation of two or more national Red Cross societies to visit all places where the captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel are held.

WITH REGARD TO DEAD AND MISSING PERSONS

Article 10

(a) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall ensure joint action by the parties in implementing Article 8 (b) of the Agreement. When the Four-

Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities, a Four-Party Joint Military team shall be maintained to carry on this task.

(b) With regard to Vietnamese civilian personnel dead or missing in South Vietnam, the two South Vietnamese parties shall help each other to obtain information about missing persons, determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead, in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, in keeping with the people's aspirations.

Other Provisions

Article 11

(a) The Four-Party and Two-Party Joint Military Commissions will have the responsibility of determining immediately the modalities of implementing the provisions of this Protocol consistent with their respective responsibilities under Articles 16 (a) and 17 (a) of the Agreement. In case the Joint Military Commissions, when carrying out their tasks, cannot reach agreement on a matter pertaining to the return of captured personnel they shall refer to the International Commission for its assistance.

(b) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall form, in addition to the teams established by the Protocol concerning the cease-fire in South Vietnam and the Joint Military Commissions, a subcommission on captured persons and, as required, joint military teams on captured persons to assist the Commission in its tasks.

(c) From the time the cease-fire comes into force to the time when the Two-Party Joint Military Commission becomes operational, the two South Vietnamese parties' delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall form a provisional sub-commission and provisional joint military teams to carry out its tasks concerning captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel.

(d) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall send joint military teams to observe the return of the persons mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 of this Protocol at each place in Vietnam where such persons are being returned, and at the last detention places from which these persons will be taken to the places of return. The Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall send joint military teams to observe the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained at each place in South Vietnam where such persons are being returned, and at the last detention places from which these persons will be taken to the places of return.

Article 12

In implementation of Articles 18 (b) and 18 (c) of the Agreement, the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall have the responsibility to control and supervise the observance of Articles 1 through 7 of this Protocol through observation of the return of captured military personnel, foreign civilians and captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel at each place in Vietnam where these persons are being returned, and at the last detention places from which these persons will be taken to the places of return, the examination of lists, and the investigation of violations of the provisions of the above-mentioned Articles.

Article 13

Within five days after signature of this Protocol, each party shall publish the text of the Protocol and communicate it to all the captured persons covered by the Protocol and being detained by that party.

Article 14

This Protocol shall come into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of all the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam. It shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

Done in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

[Separate Numbered Page]

For the Government of the United States of America:

WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
Secretary of State.

For the Government of the Republic of Vietnam:

TRAN VAN LAM,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:

NGUYEN DUY TRINH,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

For the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam:

NGUYEN THI BINH,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS AND CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

The Government of the United States of America, with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam,

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam,

In implementation of Article 8 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date providing for the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians, and captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel,

Have agreed as follows:

[Text of Protocol Articles 1–13 same as above]

Article 14

The Protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam concerning the Return of Captured Military Personnel and Foreign Civilians and Captured and Detained Vietnamese Civilian Personnel shall enter into force upon signature of this document by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and upon signature of a document in the same terms by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. The Protocol shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

Done in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:

WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
Secretary of State.

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:

TRAN VAN LAM,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Protocol on the International Commission of Control and Supervision

[White House press release dated January 24]

PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION

The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam,

In implementation of Article 18 of the Agreement signed on this date providing for the formulation of the International Commission of Control and Supervision,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The implementation of the Agreement is the responsibility of the parties signatory to the Agreement.

The functions of the International Commission are to control and supervise the implementation of the provisions mentioned in Article 18 of the Agreement. In carrying out these functions, the International Commission shall:

(a) Follow the implementation of the above-mentioned provisions of the Agreement through communication with the parties and on-the-spot observation at the places where this is required;

(c) When necessary, cooperate with the Joint Military Commissions in deterring and detecting violations of the above-mentioned provisions.

Article 2

The International Commission shall investigate violations of the provisions described on Article 18 of the Agreement on the request of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, or of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, or of any party, or, with respect to Article 9(b) of the Agreement on general elections, of the National Council on National Reconciliation and Concord, or in any case where the International Commission has other adequate grounds for considering that there has been a violation of those provisions. It is understood that, in carrying out this task, the International Commission shall function with the concerned parties' assistance and cooperation as required.

Article 3

(a) When the International Commission finds that there is a serious violation in the implementation of the Agreement or a threat to peace against which the Commission can find no appropriate measure, the Commission shall report this to the four parties to the Agreement so that they can hold consultations to find a solution.

(b) In accordance with Article 18 (f) of the Agreement, the International Commission's reports shall be made with the unanimous agreement of the representatives of all the four members. In case no unanimity is reached, the Commission shall forward the different views to the four parties in accordance with Article 18 (b) of the Agreement, or to the two South Vietnamese parties in accordance with Article 18 (c) of the Agreement, but these shall not be considered as reports of the Commission.

Article 4

(a) The headquarters of the International Commission shall be at Saigon.

(b) There shall be seven regional teams located in the regions shown on the annexed map* and based at the following places:

Region I, Hue; Region II, Danang; Region III, Pleiku; Region IV, Phan Thiet; Region V, Bien Hoa; Region VI, My Tho; and Region VII, Can Tho.

The International Commission shall designate three teams for the region of Saigon-Gia Dinh.

*See map on p. 530.

(c) There shall be twenty-six teams operating in the areas shown on the annexed map and based at the following places in South Vietnam:

Region I. Quang Tri, Phu Bai.

Region II. Hoi An, Tam Ky, Chu Lai.

Region III. Kontum, Hau Bon, Phu Cat, Tuy An, Ninh Hoa, Ban Me Thuot.

Region IV. Da Lat, Bao Loc, Phan Rang.

Region V. An Loc, Xuan Loc, Ben Cat, Cu Chi, Tan An.

Region VI. Moc Hoa, Giong Trom.

Region VII. Tri Ton, Vinh Long, Vi Thanh, Khanh Hung, Quan Long.

(d) There shall be twelve teams located as shown on the annexed map and based at the following places: Gio Linh (to cover the area south of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line), Lao Bao, Ben Het, Duc Co, Chu Lai, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Vung Tau, Xa Mat, Bien Hoa Airfield, Hong Ngu, and Can Tho.

(e) There shall be seven teams, six of which shall be available for assignment to the points of entry which are not listed in paragraph (d) above and which the two South Vietnamese parties choose as points for legitimate entry to South Vietnam for replacement of armaments, munitions, and war material permitted by Article 7 of the Agreement. Any team or teams not needed for the above-mentioned assignment shall be available for other tasks, in keeping with the Commission's responsibility for control and supervision.

(f) There shall be seven teams to control and supervise the return of captured and detained personnel of the parties.

Article 5

(a) To carry out its tasks concerning the return of the captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties as stipulated by Article 8(a) of the Agreement, the International Commission shall, during the time of such return, send one control and supervision team to each place in Vietnam where the captured persons are being returned, and to the last detention places from which these persons will be taken to the places of return.


South China Sea
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
Gulf of Thailand
South China Sea

(b) To carry out its tasks concerning the return of the Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam mentioned in Article 8 (c) of the Agreement, the International Commission shall, during the time of such return, send one control and supervision team to each place in South Vietnam where the above-mentioned captured and detained persons are being returned, and to the last detention places from which these persons shall be taken to the places of return.

Article 6

To carry out its tasks regarding Article 9 (b) of the Agreement on the free and democratic general elections in South Vietnam, the International Commission shall organize additional teams, when necessary. The International Commission shall discuss this question in advance with the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord. If additional teams are necessary for this purpose, they shall be formed thirty days before the general elections.

Article 7

The International Commission shall continually keep under review its size, and shall reduce the number of its teams, its representatives or other personnel, or both, when those teams, representatives or personnel have accomplished the tasks assigned to them and are not required for other tasks. At the same time, the expenditures of the International Commission shall be reduced correspondingly.

Article 8

Each member of the International Commission shall make available at all times the following numbers of qualified personnel:

(a) One senior representative and twenty-six others for the headquarters staff.

(b) Five for each of the seven regional teams.

(c) Two for each of the other international control teams, except for the teams at Gio Linh and Vung Tau, each of which shall have three.

(d) One hundred sixteen for the purpose of providing support to the Commission Headquarters and its teams.

Article 9

(a) The International Commission, and each of its teams, shall act as a single body comprising representatives of all four members.

(b) Each member has the responsibility to ensure the presence of its representatives at all levels of the International Commission. In case a representative is absent, the member concerned shall immediately designate a replacement.

Article 10

(a) The parties shall afford full cooperation, assistance, and protection to the International Commission.

(b) The parties shall at all times maintain regular and continuous liaison with the International Commission. During the existence of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, the delegations of the parties to that Commission shall also perform liaison functions with the International Commission. After the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities, such liaison shall be maintained through the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, liaison missions, or other adequate means.

(c) The International Commission and the Joint Military Commissions shall closely cooperate with and assist each other in carrying out their respective functions.

(d) Wherever a team is stationed or operating, the concerned party shall designate a liaison officer to the team to cooperate with and assist it in carrying out without hindrance its task of control and supervision. When a team is carrying out an investigation, a liaison officer from each concerned party shall have the opportunity to accompany it, provided the investigation is not thereby delayed.

(e) Each party shall give the International Commission reasonable advance notice of all proposed actions concerning those provisions of the Agreement that are to be controlled and supervised by the International Commission.

(f) The International Commission, including its teams, is allowed such movement for observation as is reasonably required for the proper exercise of its functions as stipulated in the Agreement. In carrying out these functions, the International Commission, including its teams, shall enjoy all necessary assistance and cooperation from the parties concerned.

Article 11

In supervising the holding of the free and democratic general elections described in Articles 9 (b) and 12 (b) of the Agreement in accordance with modalities to be agreed upon between the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord and the International Commission, the latter shall receive full cooperation and assistance from the National Council.

Article 12

The International Commission and its personnel who have the nationality of a member state shall, while carrying out their tasks, enjoy privileges and immunities equivalent to those accorded diplomatic missions and diplomatic agents.

Article 13

The International Commission may use the means of communication and transport necessary to perform its functions. Each South Vietnamese party shall make available for rent to the International Commission appropriate office and accommodation facilities and shall assist it in obtaining such facilities. The International Commission may receive from the parties, on mutually agreeable terms, the necessary means of communication and transport and may purchase from any source necessary equipment and services not obtained from the parties. The International Commission shall possess these means.

Article 14

The expenses for the activities of the International Commission shall be borne by the parties and the members of the International Commission in accordance with the provisions of this Article:

(a) Each member country of the International Commission shall pay the salaries and allowances of its personnel.

(b) All other expenses incurred by the International Commission shall be met from a fund to which each of the four parties shall contribute twenty-three percent (23%) and to which each member of the International Commission shall contribute two percent (2%).

(c) Within thirty days of the date of entry into force of this Protocol, each of the four parties shall provide the International Commission with an initial sum equivalent to four million, five hundred thousand (4,500,000) French francs in convertible currency, which sum shall be credited against the amounts due from that party under the first budget.

(d) The International Commission shall prepare its own budgets. After the International Commission approves a budget, it shall transmit it to all parties signatory to the Agreement for their approval. Only after the budgets have been approved by the four parties to the Agreement shall they be obliged to make their contributions. However, in case the parties to the Agreement do not agree on a new budget, the International Commission shall temporarily base its expenditures on the previous budget, except for the extraordinary, one-time expenditures for installation or for the acquisition of equipment, and the parties shall continue to make their contributions on that basis until a new budget is approved.

Article 15

(a) The headquarters shall be operational and in place within twenty-four hours after the cease-fire.

(b) The regional teams shall be operational and in place, and three teams for supervision and control of the return of the captured and detained personnel shall be operational and ready for dispatch within forty-eight hours after the cease-fire.

(c) Other teams shall be operational and in place within fifteen to thirty days after the cease-fire.

Article 16

Meetings shall be convened at the call of the Chairman. The International Commission shall adopt other working procedures appropriate for the effective discharge of its functions and consistent with respect for the sovereignty of South Vietnam.

Article 17

The Members of the International Commission may accept the obligations of this Protocol by sending notes of acceptance to the four parties signatory to the Agreement. Should a member of the International Commission decide to withdraw from the International Commission, it may do so by giving three months notice by means of notes to the four parties to the Agreement, in which case those four parties shall consult among themselves for the purpose of agreeing upon a replacement member.

Article 18

This Protocol shall enter into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of all the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam. It shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

DONE in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

[Separate Numbered Page]

For the Government of the United States of America:

WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
Secretary of State.

For the Government of the Republic of Vietnam:

TRAN VAN LAM,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[Separate Numbered Page]

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:

NGUYEN DUY TRINH,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

For the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam:

NGUYEN THI BINH,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION

The Government of the United States of America, with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam,

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam,

In implementation of Article 18 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date providing for the formation of the International Commission of Control and Supervision,

Have agreed as follows:

[Text of Protocol Articles 1–17 same as above]

Article 18

The Protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam concerning the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall enter into force upon signature of this document by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and upon signature of a document in the same terms by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of

the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. The Protocol shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

DONE in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:

WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
Secretary of State.

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:

NGUYEN DUY TRINH,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Protocol on the Cease-Fire in South Viet-Nam and the Joint Military Commissions

[White House press release dated January 24]

PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS

The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam,

In implementation of the first paragraph of Article 2, Article 3, Article 5, Article 6, Article 16 and Article 17 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date which provide for the cease-fire in South Vietnam and the establishment of a Four-Party Joint Military Commission and a Two-Party Joint Military Commission,

Have agreed as follows:

CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Article 1

The High Commands of the parties in South Vietnam shall issue prompt and timely orders to all regular and irregular armed forces and the armed police under their command to completely end hostilities throughout South Vietnam, at the exact time stipulated in Article 2 of the Agreement and ensure that these armed forces and armed police comply with these orders and respect the cease-fire.

Article 2

(a) As soon as the cease-fire comes into force and until regulations are issued by the Joint Military Commissions, all ground, river, sea and air combat forces of the parties in South Vietnam shall remain in place; that is, in order to ensure a stable cease-fire, there shall be no major redeployments or movements that would extend each party's area of control or would result in contact between opposing armed forces and clashes which might take place.

(b) All regular and irregular armed forces and the armed police of the parties in South Vietnam shall observe the prohibition of the following acts:

(1) Armed patrols into areas controlled by opposing armed forces and flights by bomber and fighter aircraft of all types, except for unarmed flights for proficiency training and maintenance;

(2) Armed attacks against any person, either military or civilian, by any means whatsoever, including the use of small arms, mortars, artillery, bombing and strafing by airplanes and any other type of weapon or explosive device;

(3) All combat operations on the ground, on rivers, on the sea and in the air;

(4) All hostile acts, terrorism or reprisals; and

(5) All acts endangering lives or public or private property.

Article 3

(a) The above-mentioned prohibitions shall not hamper or restrict:

(1) Civilian supply, freedom of movement, freedom to work, and freedom of the people to engage in trade, and civilian communication and transportation between and among all areas in South Vietnam;

(2) The use by each party in areas under its control of military support elements, such as engineer and transportation units, in repair and construction of public facilities and the transportation and supplying of the population;

(3) Normal military proficiency training conducted by the parties in the areas under their respective control with due regard for public safety.

(b) The Joint Military Commissions shall immediately agree on corridors, routes, and other regulations governing the movement of military transport aircraft, military transport vehicles, and military transport vessels of all types of one party going through areas under the control of other parties.

Article 4

In order to avert conflict and ensure normal conditions for those armed forces which are in direct contact, and pending regulation by the Joint Military Commissions, the commanders of the opposing armed forces at those places of direct contact shall meet as soon as the cease-fire comes into force with a view to reaching an agreement on temporary measures to avert conflict and to ensure supply and medical care for these armed forces.

Article 5

(a) Within fifteen days after the cease-fire comes into effect, each party shall do its utmost to complete the removal or deactivation of all demolition objects, mine-fields, traps, obstacles or other dangerous objects placed previously, so as not to hamper the population's movement and work, in the first place on waterways, roads and railroads in South Vietnam. Those mines which cannot be removed or deactivated within that time shall be clearly marked and must be removed or deactivated as soon as possible.

(b) Emplacement of mines is prohibited, except as a defensive measure around the edges of military installations in places where they do not hamper the population's movement and work, and movement on waterways, roads and railroads. Mines and other obstacles already in place at the edges of military installations may remain in place if they are in places where they do not hamper the population's movement and work, and movement on waterways, roads and railroads.

Article 6

Civilian police and civilian security personnel of the parties in South Vietnam, who are responsible for the maintenance of law and order, shall strictly respect the prohibitions set forth in Article 2 of this Protocol. As required by their responsibilities, normally they shall be authorized to carry pistols, but when required by unusual circumstances, they shall be allowed to carry other small individual arms.

Article 7

(a) The entry into South Vietnam of replacement armaments, munitions, and war material permitted under Article 7 of the Agreement shall take place under the supervision and control of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission and of the International Commission of Control and Supervision and through such points of entry only as are designated by the two South Vietnamese parties. The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree on these points of entry within fifteen days after the entry into force of the cease-fire. The two South Vietnamese parties may select as many as six points of entry which are not included in the list of places where teams of the International Commission of Control and Supervision are to be based contained in Article 4(d) of the Protocol concerning the International Commission. At the same time, the two South Vietnamese parties may also select points of entry from the list of places set forth in Article 4(d) of that Protocol.

(b) Each of the designated points of entry shall be available only for that South Vietnamese party which is in control of that point. The two South Vietnamese parties shall have an equal number of points of entry.

Article 8

(a) In implementation of Article 5 of the Agreement, the United States and the other foreign countries referred to in Article 5 of the Agreement shall take with them all their armaments, munitions, and war material. Transfers of such

items which would leave them in South Vietnam shall not be made subsequent to the entry into force of the Agreement except for transfers of communications, transport, and other non-combat material to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission or the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

(b) Within five days after the entry into force of the cease-fire, the United States shall inform the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision of the general plans for timing of complete troop withdrawals which shall take place in four phases of fifteen days each. It is anticipated that the numbers of troops withdrawn in each phase are not likely to be widely different, although it is not feasible to ensure equal numbers. The approximate numbers to be withdrawn in each phase shall be given to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision sufficiently in advance of actual withdrawals so that they can properly carry out their tasks in relation thereto.

Article 9

(a) In implementation of Article 6 of the Agreement, the United States and the other foreign countries referred to in that Article shall dismantle and remove from South Vietnam or destroy all military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and of the other foreign countries referred to in that Article, including weapons, mines, and other military equipment at these bases, for the purpose of making them unusable for military purposes.

(b) The United States shall supply the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision with necessary information on plans for base dismantlement so that those Commissions can properly carry out their tasks in relation thereto.

THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS

Article 10

(a) The implementation of the Agreement is the responsibility of the parties signatory to the Agreement.

The Four-Party Joint Military Commission has the task of ensuring joint action by the parties in implementing the Agreement by serving as a channel of communication among the parties, by drawing up plans and fixing the modalities to carry out, coordinate, follow and inspect the implementation of the provisions mentioned in Article 16 of the Agreement, and by negotiating and settling all matters concerning the implementation of those provisions.

(b) The concrete tasks of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission are:

(1) To coordinate, follow and inspect the implementation of the above-mentioned provisions of the Agreement by the four parties;

(2) to deter and detect violations, to deal with cases of violation, and to settle conflicts and matters of contention between the parties relating to the above-mentioned provisions;

(3) To dispatch without delay one or more joint teams, as required by specific cases, to any part of South Vietnam, to investigate alleged violations of the Agreement and to assist the parties in finding measures to prevent recurrence of similar cases;

(4) To engage in observation at the places where this is necessary in the exercise of its functions;

(5) To perform such additional tasks as it may, by unanimous decision, determine.

Article 11

(a) There shall be a Central Joint Military Commission located in Saigon. Each party shall designate immediately a military delegation of fifty-nine persons to represent it on the Central Commission. The senior officer designated by each party shall be a general officer, or equivalent.

(b) There shall be seven Regional Joint Military Commissions located in the regions shown on the annexed map and based at the following places:

Regions:	*Places*	*Regions:*	*Places*
I	Hué	V	Bien Hoa
II	Danang	VI	My Tho
III	Pleiku	VII	Can Tho
IV	Phan Thiet		

Each party shall designate a military delegation of sixteen persons to represent it on each Regional Commission. The senior officer designated by each party shall be an officer from the rank of Lieutenant Colonel to Colonel or equivalent.

(c) There shall be a joint military team operating in each of the areas shown on the annexed map and based at each of the following places in South Vietnam:

Region I
Quang Tri
Phu Bai

Region II
Hoi An
Tam Ky
Chu Lai

Region III
Kontum
Hau Bon
Phu Cat
Tuy An
Ninh Hoa
Ban Me Thuot

Region IV
Da Lat
Bao Loc
Phan Rang

Region V
An Loc
Xuan Loc
Ben Cat
Cu Chi
Tan An

Region VI
Moc Hoa
Giong Trom

Region VII
Tri Ton
Vinh Long
Vi Thanh
Khanh Hung
Quan Long


Each party shall provide four qualified persons for each joint military team. The senior person designated by each party shall be an officer from the rank of Major to Lieutenant Colonel, or equivalent.

(d) The Regional Joint Military Commissions shall assist the Central Joint Military Commission in performing its tasks and shall supervise the operations of the joint military teams. The region of Saigon-Gia Dinh is placed under the responsibility of the Central Commission which shall designate joint military teams to operate in this region.

(e) Each party shall be authorized to provide support and guard personnel for its delegations to the Central Joint Military Commission and Regional Joint Military Commissions, and for its members of the joint military teams. The total number of support and guard personnel for each party shall not exceed five hundred and fifty.

(f) The Central Joint Military Commission may establish such joint sub-commissions, joint staffs and joint military teams as circumstances may require. The Central Commission shall determine the numbers of personnel required for any additional sub-commissions, staffs or teams it establishes, provided that each party shall designate one-fourth of the number of personnel required and that the total number of personnel for the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, to include its staffs, teams, and support personnel, shall not exceed three thousand three hundred.

(g) The delegations of the two South Vietnamese parties may, by agreement, establish provisional sub-commissions and joint military teams to carry out the tasks specifically assigned to them by Article 17 of the Agreement. With respect to Article 7 of the Agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties' delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall establish joint military teams at the points of entry into South Vietnam used for replacement of armaments, munitions and war material which are designated in accordance with Article 7 of this Protocol. From the time the cease-fire comes into force to the time when the Two-Party Joint Military Commission becomes operational, the two South Vietnamese parties' delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall form a provisional sub-commission and provisional joint military teams to carry out its tasks concerning captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel. Where necessary for the above purposes, the two South Vietnamese parties may agree to assign personnel additional to those assigned to the two South Vietnamese delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission.


South China Sea
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
Gulf of Thailand
Map to be attached to the Protocol Concerning the Cease-fire in South Vietnam and the Joint Military Commissions

Article 12

(a) In accordance with Article 17 of the Agreement which stipulates that the two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately designate their respective representatives to form the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, twenty-four hours after the cease-fire comes into force, the two designated South Vietnamese parties' delegations to the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall meet in Saigon so as to reach an agreement as soon as possible on organization and operation of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, as well as the measures and organization aimed at enforcing the cease-fire and preserving peace in South Vietnam.

(b) From the time the cease-fire comes into force to the time when the Two-Party Joint Military Commission becomes operational, the two South Vietnamese parties' delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels shall simultaneously assume the tasks of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels, in addition to their functions as delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission.

(c) If, at the time the Four-Party Joint Military Commission ceases its operation in accordance with Article 16 of the Agreement, agreement has not been reached on organization of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, the delegations of the two South Vietnamese parties serving with the Four-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels shall continue temporarily to work together as a provisional two-party joint military commission and to assume the tasks of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels until the Two-Party Joint Military Commission becomes operational.

Article 13

In application of the principle of unanimity, the Joint Military Commissions shall have no chairman, and meetings shall be convened at the request of any representative. The Joint Military Commissions shall adopt working procedures appropriate for the effective discharge of their functions and responsibilities.

Article 14

The Joint Military Commissions and the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall closely cooperate with and assist each other in carrying out their respective functions. Each Joint Military Commission shall inform the International Commission about the implementation of those provisions of the Agreement for which that Joint Military Commission has responsibility and which are within the competence of the International Commission. Each Joint Military Commission may request the International Commission to carry out specific observation activities.

Article 15

The Central Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall begin operating twenty-four hours after the cease-fire comes into force. The Regional Four-Party Joint Military Commissions shall begin operating forty-eight hours after the cease-fire comes into force. The joint military teams based at the places listed in Article 11 (c) of this Protocol shall begin operating no later than fifteen days after the cease-fire comes into force. The delegations of the two South Vietnamese parties shall simultaneously begin to assume the tasks of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission as provided in Article 12 of this Protocol.

Article 16

(a) The parties shall provide full protection and all necessary assistance and cooperation to the Joint Military Commissions at all levels, in the discharge of their tasks.

(b) The Joint Military Commissions and their personnel, while carrying out their tasks, shall enjoy privileges and immunities equivalent to those accorded diplomatic missions and diplomatic agents.

(c) The personnel of the Joint Military Commissions may carry pistols and wear special insignia decided upon by each Central Joint Military Commission. The personnel of each party while guarding Commission installations or equipment may be authorized to carry other individual small arms, as determined by each Central Joint Military Commission.

Article 17

(a) The delegation of each party to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall have its own offices, communications, logistics and transportation means, including aircraft when necessary.

(b) Each party, in its areas of control shall provide appropriate office and accommodation facilities to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the Two-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels.

(c) The parties shall endeavor to provide to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, by means of loan, lease, or gift, the common means of operation, including equipment for communication, supply, and transport, including aircraft when necessary. The Joint Military Commissions may purchase from any source necessary facilities, equipment, and services which are not supplied by the parties. The Joint Military Commissions shall possess and use these facilities and this equipment.

(d) The facilities and the equipment for common use mentioned above shall be returned to the parties when the Joint Military Commissions have ended their activities.

Article 18

The common expenses of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall be borne equally by the four parties, and the common expenses of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission in South Vietnam shall be borne equally by these two parties.

Article 19

This Protocol shall enter into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of all the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam. It shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

DONE in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

[Separate Numbered Page]

For the Government of the United States of America:

WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
Secretary of State.

For the Government of the Republic of Vietnam:

TRAN VAN LAM,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[Separate Numbered Page]

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:

NGUYEN DUY TRINH,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

For the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam:

NGUYEN THI BINH,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS

The Government of the United States of America, with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam,

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam,

In implementation of the first paragraph of Article 2, Article 3, Article 5, Article 6, Article 16 and Article 17 of the Agreement on Ending the War and

Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date which provide for the cease-fire in South Vietnam and the establishment of a Four-Party Joint Military Commission and a Two-Party Joint Military Commission,

Have agreed as follows:

[Text of Protocol Articles 1–18 same as above]

Article 19

The Protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam concerning the Cease-fire in South Vietnam and the Joint Military Commissions shall enter into force upon signature of this document by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and upon signature of a document in the same terms by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. The Protocol shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

DONE in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:

WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
Secretary of State.

For the Government of the Republic of Vietnam:

NGUYEN DUY TRINH,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Protocol on Mine Clearing in North Vietnam

[White House press release dated January 24]

PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE REMOVAL, PERMANENT DEACTIVATION, OR DESTRUCTION OF MINES IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS, PORTS, HARBORS, AND WATERWAYS OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

The Government of the United States of America,

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,

In implementation of the second paragraph of Article 2 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The United States shall clear all the mines it has placed in the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This mine clearing operation shall be accomplished by rendering the mines harmless through removal, permanent deactivation, or destruction.

Article 2

With a view to ensuring lasting safety for the movement of people and watercraft and the protection of important installations, mines shall, on the request of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, be removed or destroyed in the indicated areas; and whenever their removal or destruction is impossible, mines shall be permanently deactivated and their emplacement clearly marked.

Article 3

The mine clearing operation shall begin at twenty-four hundred (2400) hours GMT on January 27, 1973. The representatives of the two parties shall consult immediately on relevant factors and agree upon the earliest possible target date for the completion of the work.

Article 4

The mine clearing operation shall be conducted in accordance with priorities and timing agreed upon by the two parties. For this purpose, representatives of the two parties shall meet at an early date to reach agreement on a program and a plan of implementation. To this end:

(a) The United States shall provide its plan for mine clearing operations, including maps of the minefields and information concerning the types, numbers and properties of the mines;

(b) The Democratic Republic of Vietnam shall provide all available maps and hydrographic charts and indicate the mined places and all other potential hazards to the mine clearing operations that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is aware of;

(c) The two parties shall agree on the timing of implementation of each segment of the plan and provide timely notice to the public at least forty-eight hours in advance of the beginning of mine clearing operations for that segment.

Article 5

The United States shall be responsible for the mine clearance on inland waterways of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam shall, to the full extent of its capabilities, actively participate in the mine clearance with the means of surveying, removal and destruction and technical advice supplied by the United States.

Article 6

With a view to ensuring the safe movement of people and watercraft on waterways and at sea, the United States shall in the mine clearing process supply timely information about the progress of mine clearing in each area, and about the remaining mines to be destroyed. The United States shall issue a communique when the operations have been concluded.

Article 7

In conducting mine clearing operations, the U.S. personnel engaged in these operations shall respect the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and shall engage in no activities inconsistent with the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and this Protocol. The U.S. personnel engaged in the mine clearing operations shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for the duration of the mine clearing operations.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam shall ensure the safety of the U.S. personnel for the duration of their mine clearing activities on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and shall provide this personnel with all possible assistance and the means needed in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that have been agreed upon by the two parties.

Article 8

This Protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam shall enter into force upon signature by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It shall be strictly implemented by the two parties.

DONE in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:

WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
Secretary of State.

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:

NGUYEN DUY TRINH,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

UNITED STATES–NORTH VIETNAM COMMUNIQUE, FEBRUARY 14, 1973[1]

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President of the United States, arrived in Hanoi on February 10, 1973, and left Hanoi on February 13, 1973. He was accompanied by Mr. Herbert G. Klein, Director of Communications for the Executive Branch, Ambassador William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and other American officials.

During his stay in Hanoi, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger was received by Premier Pham Van Dong, Special Advisor Le Duc Tho, and Vice Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh. The DRVN side and the U.S. side had frank, serious, and constructive exchanges of views on the implementation of the agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam which was signed in Paris on January 27, 1973, as well as post-war relations between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States, and other subjects of mutual concern. Special Advisor Le Duc Tho and Dr. Kissinger also held discussions in a continuation of their meetings which took place in Paris during the past four years. In addition to these working sessions, Dr. Kissinger and his party visited a number of points of interest in Hanoi.

The two sides carefully reviewed the implementation of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam in the recent period. They discussed various imperative measures which should be taken to improve and expedite the implementation of the agreement, and also agreed that they would continue to have periodic exchanges of views in order to ensure that the agreement and its protocols are strictly and scrupulously implemented, as the signatories have undertaken.

The two sides welcomed the discussions between the two South Vietnamese parties for the purpose of carrying out the provisions concerning self-determination in South Vietnam, in accordance with the stipulations of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States declared that the full and scrupulous implementation of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam would positively contribute to the cause of peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia on the basis of strict respect for the independence and neutrality of the countries in this region.

The two sides reaffirmed that the problems existing between the Indochinese countries should be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. They welcomed the negotiations between the parties in Laos, which are intended to produce a peaceful settlement in that country.

The two sides exchanged views on the manner in which the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to post-war economic reconstruction in North Vietnam. They agreed to establish a DRVN–U.S. Joint Economic Commission. This Commission, which will be composed of an equal number of representatives from each side, will be charged with the task of developing the economic relations between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States.

The two sides also exchanged views on the convening of International Conference on Vietnam, as provided for in Article 18 of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam. They will continue their consultations with the other participants in the conference so as to prepare the ground for a successful meeting.

The two sides considered the post-war relationship between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States, and examined concrete steps which can be taken to normalize the relations between the two countries. They agreed on certain general principles which should govern their mutual relations.

—All provisions of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam and its protocols should be fully and scrupulously implemented.

—The Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States should strive for a new relationship based on respect for each other's independence and sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit.

—The normalization of the relations between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States will help to ensure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the cause of peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia.

Dr. Kissinger and his party expressed warm appreciation for the hospitality extended by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Both sides hope that this visit will mark the beginning of new bilateral relations.

---

[1] Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 5, 1973, pp. 262–263.

97. Declaration of the International Conference on Viet-Nam[1]

The Government of the United States of America;
The Government of the French Republic;
The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam;
The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic;
The Government of the Republic of Indonesia;
The Government of the Polish People's Republic;
The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam;
The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;
The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam;
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
The Government of Canada; and
The Government of the People's Republic of China;
In the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations;

With a view to acknowledging the signed Agreements; guaranteeing the ending of the war, the maintenance of peace in Viet-Nam, the respect of the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights, and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination; and contributing to and guaranteeing peace in Indochina;

Have agreed on the following provisions, and undertake to respect and implement them;

Article 1

The Parties to this Act solemnly acknowledge, express their approval of, and support the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam signed in Paris on January 27, 1973, and the four Protocols to the Agreement signed on the same date (hereinafter referred to respectively as the Agreement and the Protocols).

Article 2

The Agreement responds to the aspirations and fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people, *i.e.*, the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam, to the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination, and to the earnest desire for peace shared by all countries in the world. The Agreement constitutes a major contribution to peace, self-determination, national independence, and the improvement of relations among countries. The Agreement and the Protocols should be strictly respected and scrupulously implemented.

Article 3

The Parties to this Act solemnly acknowledge the commitments by the parties to the Agreement and the Protocols to strictly respect and scrupulously implemen the Agreement and the Protocols.

Article 4

The Parties to this Act solemnly recognize and strictly respect the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people, *i.e.*, the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam, as well as the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination. The Parties to this Act shall strictly respect the Agreement and the Protocols by refraining from any action at variance with their provisions.

Article 5

For the sake of a durable peace in Viet-Nam, the Parties to this Act call on all countries to strictly respect the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people, *i.e.*, the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam and the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination and to strictly respect the Agreement and the Protocols by refraining from any action at variance with their provisions.

Article 6

(a) The four parties to the Agreement or the two South Vietnamese parties may, either individually or through joint action, inform the other Parties to

[1] Department of State Press Release, Mar. 6, 1973.

this Act about the implementation of the Agreement and the Protocols. Since the reports and views submitted by the International Commission of Control and Supervision concerning the control and supervision of the implementation of those provisions of the Agreement and the Protocols which are within the tasks of the Commission will be sent to either the four parties signatory to the Agreement or to the two South Vietnamese parties, those parties shall be responsible, either individually or through joint action, for forwarding them promptly to the other Parties to this Act.

(b) The four parties to the Agreement or the two South Vietnamese parties shall also, either individually or through joint action, forward this information and these reports and views to the other participant in the International Conference on Viet-Nam for his information.

Article 7

(a) In the event of a violation of the Agreement or the Protocols which threatens the peace, the independence, sovereignty, unity, or territorial integrity of Viet-Nam, or the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination, the parties signatory to the Agreement and the Protocols shall, either individually or jointly, consult with the other Parties to this Act with a view to determining necessary remedial measures.

(b) The International Conference on Viet-Nam shall be reconvened upon a joint request by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam on behalf of the parties signatory to the Agreement or upon a request by six or more of the Parties to this Act.

Article 8

With a view to contributing to and guaranteeing peace in Indochina, the Parties to this Act acknowledge the commitment of the parties to the Agreement to respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and neutrality of Cambodia and Laos as stipulated in the Agreement, agree also to respect them and to refrain from any action at variance with them, and call on other countries to do the same.

Article 9

This Act shall enter into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of all twelve Parties and shall be strictly implemented by all the Parties. Signature of this Act does not constitute recognition of any Party in any case in which it has not previously been recorded.

Done in twelve copies in Paris this second day of March, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in English, French, Russian, Vietnamese, and Chinese. All texts are equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:

WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
The Secretary of State.

For the Government of the French Republic:

MAURICE SCHUMANN,
The Minister for Foreign Affairs.

For the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam:

NGUYEN THI BINH,
The Minister for Foreign Affairs.

For the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic:

JANOS PETER,
The Minister for Foreign Affairs.

For the Government of the Republic of Indonesia:

ADAM MALIK,
The Minister for Foreign Affairs.

For the Government of the Polish People's Republic:

STEFAN OLSZOWSKI,
The Minister for Foreign Affairs.

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam:
NGUYEN DUY TRINH,
The Minister for Foreign Affairs.

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME,
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

For the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam:
TRAN VAN LAM,
The Minister for Foreign Affairs.

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
ANDREI A. GROMYKO,
The Minister for Foreign Affairs.

For the Government of Canada:
MITCHELL SHARP,
The Secretary of State for External Affairs.

For the Government of the People's Republic of China:
CHI PENG-FEI,
The Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[New York Times, April 25, 1973]

TEXTS OF NOTES BY NORTH VIETNAM AND U.S. SENT TO PEACE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

(By North Vietnam)

[1]

The Paris agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam has been signed on the basis of respect for the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination. It meets the eager aspiration for peace of all countries in the world, and constitutes a major contribution to the cause of peace, self-determination, and national independence of the peoples.

Pursuant to their commitment under the Paris agreement and the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam have strictly respected and scrupulously implemented the agreement and the protocols. On the other hand, the U.S. Government and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam have seriously violated many essential provisions thereof.

Since the cease-fire came into force, the South Vietnam People's Liberation Armed Forces have scrupulously observed it in all theaters of operations, have remained in place, and stopped all offensive operations and hostile acts. But the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, with the backing of the United States, has failed to observe the cease-fire, thereby seriously violating Articles 2 and 3 of the agreement. It has launched tens of thousands of operations involving regiment or division-size infantry units with air and artillery support to encroach on the areas under the control of the Provisional Revolutionary Government.

As a result in the past two months and more, the cease-fire has not yet been effective in South Vietnam; the bloodshed has continued; the people have not yet enjoyed peace, and have continued to suffer so much suffering and mourning. This is an extremely serious situation which jeopardizes the implementation of the agreement as a whole, and poses a direct threat to peace in South Vietnam.

[2]

The U.S. Government has had to end the war in both South and North Vietnam, and to withdraw its troops and those of its allies from South Vietnam. But at variance with Articles 5 and 6 of the agreement, the withdrawing U.S. troops

have not taken away their armaments and have not dismantled their bases. Moreover, the United States has left behind over 10,000 military personnel disguised as civilian advisers, and it has illegally brought big quantities of armaments, munitions and war material into South Vietnam in flagrant violation of articles 5 and 7 of the agreement.

[3]

With regard to the removal and destruction of mines in the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of North Vietnam, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has afforded all favorable conditions for the U.S. side to carry it out rapidly and effectively.

But the U.S. Government has deliberately delayed the mine-clearing operations, thus prolonging in fact the blockade of the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. So far, it has exploded only three out of the tens of thousands of mines it is duty-bound to clear.

[4]

Pursuant to Article 8 of the agreement, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam have returned within the prescribed time-limit all American military personnel and foreign civilians captured and held in North and South Vietnam. In the same period of time, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam has also returned to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam the captured and detained military personnel of the latter.

In contrast, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam has failed to return to the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam all military personnel captured and held by it. Moreover, in the past two months and more, it has not returned any civilian personnel arrested and detained by it to the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. As a result, hundreds of thousands of political prisoners have not so far been allowed to return to their families, and are still being detained, and subjected to the worst tortures and treatments in the prisons of South Vietnam.

This constitutes an extremely serious situation which is in flagrant violation of Article 8C of the agreement, and at variance with the pledge of the U.S. Government. Public opinion in Vietnam and in the world is raising indignant condemnations, and demanding the Government of the Republic of Vietnam immediately return to the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam the civilian personnel still being detained.

[5]

In the areas under its control, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam has frenziedly intensified its measures of constraint and coercion against the people, carried out repressions and persecutions against patriots and peace-loving people, and those who do not belong to the ruling clique. It has launched tens of thousands of police and "pacification" operations which are in no way different in terms of scale and atrocity from wartime operations, it maintains in force wartime laws and regulations and has enacted many new Fascist laws. The freedoms of movement, of residence, of work, of the press, of gathering, etc., continue to be denied to the people.

[6]

At variance with Article 8 of the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam, the United States has undertaken with its aircraft including B-52's the bombing of the Lao territory right after the signing of the Agreement on Restoring Peace and Achieving National Concord in Laos; and it is intensifying carpet-bombings in Cambodia, thus seriously violating the independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and neutrality of Laos and Cambodia.

[7]

Obviously, over the past two months and more, the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam have brazenly and systematically violated many essential provisions of the Paris agreement on Vietnam. The U.S. Government has not yet brought strictly to an end its military involvement and its interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam, where it is still

trying to carry out neocolonialism. If the violations of the Paris agreement on Vietnam should continue, peace cannot be maintained for a long period in South Vietnam. This would be completely at variance with the South Vietnamese people's eager aspirations for peace, independence, democracy, national reconciliation and concord, and with the desire for peace of the world's peoples.

To consolidate and maintain a lasting peace in Vietnam and Indochina, the U.S. Government and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam must scrupulously and strictly implement the Paris agreement on Vietnam and the annexed protocols. The Government of the Republic of Vietnam must stop all encroaching operations against the liberated zone, all police and "pacification" operations in the areas under its control, carry into effect democratic liberties for the people of these areas, and return to the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam all military and civilian personnel it is holding. The U.S. Government must strictly bring to an end its military involvement and its interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam, scrupulously carry out its obligation concerning the removal of mines in North Vietnam, and cease all acts encroaching on the sovereignty and security of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam as well affirm once again their unswerving position of strictly respecting and scrupulously implementing all provisions of the Paris agreement and the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam.

In its last part, the note sent to the U.S. and the Saigon administration pointed out that in face of this situation, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, pursuant to Article 6 of the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam, demands that the U.S. Government and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam stop at once these violations, strictly respect and scrupulously implement all provisions of the Paris agreement and the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam.

The D.R.V. Foreign Ministry proposes that the governments of the Soviet Union, China, Poland, Hungary, Canada, Indonesia, Britain and France "firmly condemn the serious violations of the agreement and the act by the U.S. Government and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and urge these two governments to stop at once these violations, to strictly respect and scrupulously implement all provisions of the Paris agreement and the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam."

BY THE UNITED STATES

[1]

The Department of State of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Ministry of External Affairs of ——— and has the honor to refer to a note dated April 16, 1973, transmitted by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the Government of the United States and, it is assumed, also to the other signatories of the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam.

[2]

In its note, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, on its own behalf and occasionally also in the name of the "Provisional Revolutionary Government," purports to describe the situation in South Vietnam and lodges charges against the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

[3]

The United States rejects as utterly groundless the accusations of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and views this note as an ill-disguised attempt by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to divert attention away from its own numerous and extremely serious violations of the cease-fire.

[4]

Contrary to the contentions listed in the note, it is abundantly clear that the main obstruction to peace consists of the military activities carried out by the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam and forces under its control in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in direct and unexcusable contravention of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and the Agreement on the Restoration of Peace and Reconciliation in Laos.

[5]

Of extreme concern is the vast quantity of military equipment shipped clandestinely since Jan. 28 from North Vietnam into South Vietnam without the least effort to observe Articles 7 and 20 of the peace agreement of Jan. 27. Evidence is overwhelming of continued illegal movement of equipment and supplies out of North Vietnam for the use of the military forces opposing the legitimate governments of those countries. Included in the supplies reaching South Vietnam are over 400 tanks and armored vehicles, 300 artillery pieces of various types and vast quantities of ammunition, vehicles, etc.

For example, from the time of the Vietnam cease-fire through April 18, 1973, over 27,000 short tons of military supplies have been moved through the demilitarized zone into South Vietnam. In the same period, over 26,000 short tons were moved from North Vietnam into Laos. Also during this period, we have detected over 17,000 military truck movements from North Vietnam into Laos and over 7,000 crossing the demilitarized zone into South Vietnam. None of the peacekeeping organs established by the peace agreement has been given the opportunity to monitor these shipments.

[6]

Evidence of an intention to persist in violations of Article 20 of the agreement is the substantial effort being made to upgrade the road system within Laos and adjoining parts of South Vietnam. Bridge and drainage ditch construction have been observed on Route 7, the primary route into the Plain of Jars from North Vietnam and on Routes 4 and 4/7 which transit the northern plain in an east-west direction. Furthermore, there is evidence of continuing North Vietnamese efforts to construct a road from southern Laos into Quang Tri and Quang Ngai Provinces. This crossborder route is not close to any of the designated entry points and its only logical use could be as a clandestine supply highway into the central coastal regions of South Vietnam.

[7]

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam also has moved military personnel and military equipment in and through the demilitarized zone in direct violation of Articles 7 and 15 (B) of the peace agreement and of Article 7 of the cease-fire protocol.

[8]

In most serious violation of the agreement, more than 30,000 North Vietnamese army personnel are known to have continued moving through Laos and Cambodia into South Vietnam after the cease-fire on Jan. 28. These combat replacements have greatly increased the capability of North Vietnamese army units in the South. In addition there is evidence that the new North Vietnamese army organizations, such as antiaircraft artillery units, entered South Vietnam after Jan. 28. For example, the Khe Sanh airfield complex has recently been ringed with SA-2 missiles, which clearly were not present prior to the cease-fire.

[9]

Not content with illegally building up its military potential, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has since the cease-fire actually employed these and other forces under its command to launch attacks on hamlets, villages and Republic of Vietnam military positions throughout the country in unequivocal violation of the fundamental purpose of the peace agreement as embodied in Articles 2 and 3. The assaults have generally consisted of mortarings and shellings, frequently followed by ground attacks in an obvious effort to expand the area controlled by forces under North Vietnamese command. In some cases the assaults were of such intensity as to require withdrawal of Government defending forces, for example, from positions at Hoang Hau near Hue, on the Cambodian border in Chau Duc Province and in Bac Lieu Province. Other beleaguered outposts long occupied by the Republic of Vietnam armed forces continue to hold out

despite persistent harassment, such as at Tonle Cham in Tay Ninh, at Rach Bap in Binh Duong and in the Hong Ngu and Cai Cai districts of Kien Phong Province.

[10]

North Vietnamese forces, moreover, continue larger military offensives aimed at opening up new supply routes and expanding their control, such as in the Sa Huynh area of southern Qung Ngai Province.

[11]

Troops under the control of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam also have placed many mines in violation of Article 5 of the cease-fire protocol and have tried to interfere with resumed train service. Earlier this month, in Phu Yen Province, a mine was set under a train and a ground attack was launched on a track repair crew.

[12]

These forces, moreover, have fired mortars and artillery indiscriminately into many cities, refugee camps and other centers of population, for example in Tan Chan and Phan Thiet, causing heavy civilian casualties. They have even mortared the team locations of the International Commission of Control and Supervision at Tri Ton and Hong Ngu.

[13]

In addition to widespread attacks on Republic of Vietnam territorial security forces, agents of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have continued their acts of terrorism including assassinations, tossing grenades in public places, mining of public thoroughfares and widespread abductions.

[14]

Another serious impediment to peace is the record of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the "Provisional Revolutionary Government" of clear and calculated obstructionism in the Four-Party Joint Military Commission. Both consistently refused to participate meaningfully in any Four-Party Military Commission investigation which would not benefit their cause. Accordingly, they blocked or prevented investigation of the downing of a CH-47 helicopter of the Sa Huynh attack and the Khe Sanh missile installation, to cite only three representative examples.

[15]

The tactic to stall and obstruct was also clearly evident in the refusal to deploy fully to the field. The North Vietnamese deployed to only five of the seven regional headquarters, and their associates of the "Provisional Revolutionary Government" to only one. Deployment to subregional teams was minimal. The "Provisional Revolutionary Government" had less than one-quarter of its authorized contingent functional at any one time.

[16]

Thus the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the "Provisional Revolutionary Government" must bear the responsibility for failure of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission to fulfill its assigned functions.

[17]

Of particular concern to the United States is the failure to date of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to provide information about Americans missing in action in Indochina or about those known to have died there, as required by Article 8(B) of the Paris agreement.

[18]

The charges levied against the United States by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in its note, include the allegation that the United States gave "backing" to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam in failing to observe the cease-fire

and thereby seriously violated Articles 2 and 3 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. The entire charge is without foundation. The United States concentrated instead after Jan. 28 on observing the terms of the agreement scrupulously by withdrawing its own military forces from Vietnam and refraining from participating in any hostilities in Vietnam. Any arms and military equipment provided to the Republic of Vietnam have been strictly in accordance with Article 7 of the Paris agreement and Article 7 of the cease-fire protocol.

[19]

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam also alleges that the withdrawal of United States forces has been concluded in a manner at variance with Articles 5 and 6 of the Paris agreement and accuses the United States of failing to withdraw its armaments and dismantle its bases as required by those articles. Article 5, however, required withdrawal only of those armaments, munitions, and war material which the United States (or allies of the United States and the Republic of Vietnam) may have owned in South Vietnam at the date of or subsequent to the date of entry into force of the agreement. It did not require the withdrawal from South Vietnam of any armaments which the United States, prior to the entry into force of the agreement, no longer owned because of prior transfer. This was the meaning of the phrase "of the United States" in Article 5. The same phrase with the same meaning was used in Article 6 with respect to military bases to be dismantled. The United States has fully complied with these provisions. All military equipment and military base facilities formerly owned by the United States forces in South Vietnam which remained there after March 28, had been transferred to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam prior to Jan. 27.

[20]

The referenced note makes the further charge that the United States has supplied arms, munitions, and war materials to the Republic of Vietnam in violation of the agreement and its cease-fire protocol. This charge is simply without merit. Article 7 of the agreement permits the South Vietnamese parties to replace, on a piece-for-piece basis, destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up armaments, munitions and war material. The United States and the Republic of Vietnam have established procedures for monitoring arms shipments, to insure compliance with these restrictions, and records are being maintained which verify this compliance. Introduction of these replacements, as well as these records and procedures, are always open to inspection and observation of the International Commission of Control and Supervision and the Two-Party Joint Military Commission. Introduction of these replacements has been restricted to those three points of entry that have been designated by the Republic of Vietnam under the terms of the agreement.

[21]

The contention in the note of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that the United States has left behind over 10,000 military personnel disguised as civilian advisers has no basis in fact and is undoubtedly an attempt to draw attention from the large numbers of North Vietnamese armed forces in the South. The United States, in accordance with Article 5 of the peace agreement, has withdrawn its troops and its military and police advisers. There remain in South Vietnam only about 200 American military personnel, belonging to the defense attaché office, the embassy marine security guard and the team attempting to resolve the status of the missing in action. There are no military persons disguised as civilians. As publicly stated, the total number of official American personnel in South Vietnam is less than 9,000, the large majority of whom are filling logistics and maintenance functions which are soon to be taken over by the South Vietnamese.

[22]

Other Americans are performing the kinds of functions conducted by diplomatic, consular and aid missions throughout the world. The purposes and functions of the personnel of the United States remaining in South Vietnam are fully known to the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and are completely in keeping with the Jan. 27 agreement.

52-983 O - 75 - 36

[23]

The United States also is accused of violating Article 8 of the Act of Paris by virtue of its military activities in Laos immediately after the conclusion of the cease-fire agreement between the Lao parties. United States military activities since the cease-fire have been very limited. They were conducted at the request of Premier Souvanna Phouma. They were made necessary by, and were in direct response to major and flagrant violations of that agreement by the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces, specifically the post-cease-fire attacks at Pak Song on Feb. 23 and Tha Vieng on April 18.

[24]

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam further alleges United States violation of the "independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and neutrality" of Cambodia by continuing to conduct military activities in that country. In fact, these activities are limited to air-support operations in response to the continued military operations in Cambodia by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and were requested by the Khmer Republic itself. In late January, the Government of the Khmer Republic suspended all offensive operations and the United States likewise halted offensive air operations. However, the reaction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Cambodian forces under its control was a total military offensive, despite obligations assumed by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Article 20 of the agreement and Article 8 of the Act of Paris. In order to induce compliance with those essential provisions, without which the entire Vietnam agreement would be endangered, the United States is giving air support to the Khmer forces.

[25]

With respect to allegations by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam concerning the continued detention of South Vietnamese civilians, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam will doubtless wish to rebut them, but the Government of the United States wishes to point out that "the Provisional Revolutionary Government" has offered to release only several hundred civilian prisoners despite the fact that it has captured many thousands. This is an issue where reciprocity is clearly essential.

[26]

The allegation that the United States Government was deliberately delaying mine-clearing operations is patently false.

The United States mine-clearing operation has progressed as rapidly as safety, available forces, weather and restrictions imposed by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would allow. We have been able to adhere to our agreed schedule despite the loss of two helicopters. Every available United States mine-countermeasures unit has been marshaled for this operation. In fact, a force significantly greater than that originally proposed by the United States and accepted by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has been employed.

[27]

The fact that only a few mines have been observed to explode is completely understandable and not at all surprising. As has been carefully explained to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam representatives on numerous occasions, the mines have a variable neutralization capability that can be programed and which has resulted in the neutralization of most of them by now. Nevertheless, adequate safety cannot be guaranteed unless all affected areas are methodically swept with proper equipment by highly trained personnel.

[28]

However, in view of the many serious violations of other provisions of the agreement by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which have been discussed above, the United States has decided to suspend its mine-clearance operations. This suspension is justified as a response to the numerous material breaches of the agreement by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in accordance with the

rule of international law as set forth in Article 60 of the 1969 Convention on the Law of Treaties. The United States is, of course, prepared to resume mine-clearance operations as soon as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam begins to act in compliance with its obligations under the agreement.

[29]

The Government of the United States thus categorically rejects the general and the specific charges that it has violated the terms of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. For its part, except as noted above, the Government of the United States again affirms its intention to adhere to the terms of the agreement of Jan. 27 and will exert its best efforts to help bring about a lasting peace in Indochina. It calls on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and all other parties to the final act of the International Convention on Vietnam to lend their support to this endeavor.

U.S.-North Vietnam Joint Communiqué, June 13, 1973

The parties signatory to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, signed on January 27, 1973,

Considering that strict respect and scrupulous implementation of all provisions of the Agreement and its Protocols by all the parties signatory to them are necessary to ensure the peace in Vietnam and contribute to the cause of peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia,

Have agreed on the following points (in the sequence of the relevant articles in the Agreement):

1. In the conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement, the United States shall cease immediately, completely, and indefinitely aerial reconnaissance over the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

2. In conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement and with the Protocol on Mine Clearance:

(a) The United States shall resume mine clearance operations within five days from the date of signature of this Joint Communiqué and shall successfully complete those operations within thirty days thereafter.

(b) The United States shall supply the Democratic Republic of Vietnam means which are agreed to be adequate and sufficient for sweeping mines in rivers.

(c) The United States shall announce when the mine clearance in each main channel is completed and issue a final announcement when all the operations are completed.

3. In implementation of Article 2 of the Agreement, at 1200 hours, G.M.T., June 14, 1973, the High Commands of the two South Vietnamese parties shall issue identical orders to all regular and irregular armed forces and the armed police under their command, to strictly observe the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam beginning at 0400 hours, G.M.T., June 15, 1973, and scrupulously implement the Agreement and its Protocols.

4. The two South Vietnamese parties shall strictly implement Articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol on the Cease-fire in South Vietnam which read as follows:

Article 2

(a) As soon as the cease-fire comes into force and until regulations are issued by the Joint Military Commissions, all ground, river, sea and air combat forces of the parties in South Vietnam shall remain in place; that is, in order to ensure a stable cease-fire, there shall be no major redeployments or movements that would extend each party's area of control or would result in contact between opposing armed forces and clashes which might take place.

(b) All regular and irregular armed forces and the armed police of the parties in South Vietnam shall observe the prohibition of the following acts:

(1) Armed patrols into areas controlled by opposing armed forces and flights by bomber and fighter aircraft of all types, except for unarmed flights for proficiency training and maintenance;

(2) Armed attacks against any person, either military or civilian, by any means whatsoever, including the use of small arms, mortars, artillery, bombing and strafing by airplanes and any other type of weapon or explosive device;

(3) All combat operations on the ground, on rivers, on the sea and in the air;

(4) All hostile acts, terrorism or reprisals; and

(5) All acts endangering lives or public or private property.

ARTICLE 3

(a) The above-mentioned prohibitions shall not hamper or restrict:

(1) Civilian supply, freedom of movement, freedom to work, and freedom of the people to engage in trade, and civilian communication and transportation between and among all areas in South Vietnam;

(2) The use by each party in areas under its control of military support elements, such as engineer and transportation units, in repair and construction of public facilities and the transportation and supplying of the population;

(3) Normal military proficiency training conducted by the parties in the areas under their respective control with due regard for public safety.

(b) The Joint Military Commissions shall immediately agree on corridors, routes, and other regulations governing the movement of military transport aircraft, military transport vehicles, and military transport vessels of all types of one party going through areas under the control of other parties."

5. The Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall immediately carry out its task pursuant to Article 3(b) of the Agreement to determine the areas controlled by each of the two South Vietnamese parties and the modalities of stationing. This task shall be completed as soon as possible. The Commission shall also immediately discuss the movements necessary to accomplish a return of the armed forces of the two South Vietnamese parties to the positions they occupied at the time the cease-fire entered into force on January 28, 1973.

6. Twenty-four hours after the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3 enters into force, the commanders of the opposing armed forces at those places of direct contact shall meet to carry out the provisions of Article 4 of the Protocol on the Cease-fire in South Vietnam with a view to reaching an agreement on temporary measures to avert conflict and to ensure supply and medical care for these armed forces.

7. In conformity with Article 7 of the Agreement:

(a) The two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military personnel, including technical military personnel, into South Vietnam.

(b) The two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of armaments, munitions, and war material into South Vietnam. However, the two South Vietnamese parties are permitted to make periodic replacement of armaments, munitions, and war material, as authorized by Article 7 of the Agreement, through designated points of entry and subject to supervision by the Two-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

In conformity with Article 15(b) of the Agreement regarding the respect of the Demilitarized Zone, military equipment may transit the Demilitarized Zone only if introduced into South Vietnam as replacements pursuant to Article 7 of the Agreement and through a designated point of entry.

(c) Twenty-four hours after the entry into force of the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall discuss the modalities for the supervision of the replacements of armaments, munitions, and war material permitted by Article 7 of the Agreement at the three points of entry already agreed upon for each party. Within fifteen days of the entry into force of the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3, the two South Vietnamese parties shall also designate by agreement three additional points of entry for each party in the area controlled by that party.

8. In conformity with Article 8 of the Agreement:

(a) Any captured personnel covered by Article 8(a) of the Agreement who have not yet been returned shall be returned without delay, and any event within no more than thirty days from the date of signature of this Joint Communiqué.

(b) All the provisions of the Agreement and the Protocol on the Return of Captured Personnel shall be scrupulously implemented. All Vietnamese civilian personnel covered by Article 8(c) of the Agreement and Article 7 of the Protocol

on the Return of Captured Personnel shall be returned as soon as possible. The two South Vietnamese parties shall do their utmost to accomplish this within forty-five days from the date of signature of this Joint Communique.

(c) In conformity with Article 8 of the Protocol on the Return of Captured Personnel, all captured and detained personnel covered by that Protocol shall be treated humanely at all times. The two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately implement Article 9 of that Protocol and, within fifteen days from the date of signature of this Joint Communique, allow National Red Cross Societies they have agreed upon to visit all places where these personnel are held.

(d) The two South Vietnamese parties shall cooperate in obtaining information about missing persons and in determining the location of and in taking care of the graves of the dead.

(e) In conformity with Article 8(b) of the Agreement, the parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action. For this purpose, frequent and regular liaison flights shall be made between Saigon and Hanoi.

9. The two South Vietnamese parties shall implement Article 11 of the Agreement, which reads as follows:

> Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties will:
>
> Achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organisations that have collaborated with one side or the other;
>
> Ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership and right to free enterprise.

10. Consistent with the principles for the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination stated in Chapter IV of the Agreement:

(a) The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Vietnam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision.

(b) The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord consisting of three equal segments shall be formed as soon as possible, in conformity with Article 12 of the Agreement.

The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Vietnam as soon as possible, and shall do their upmost to accomplish this within forty-five days from the date of signature of this Joint Communiqué.

(c) The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree through consultations of the institutions for which the free and democratic general elections provided for in Article 9(b) of the Agreement will be held.

(d) The two South Vietnamese parties shall implement Article 13 of the Agreement which reads as follows:

> The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance with the postwar situation. Among the questions to be discussed by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their military effectives and to demobilize the troops being reduced. The two South Vietnamese parties will accomplish this as soon as possible.

11. In Implementation of Article 17 of the Agreement:

(a) All the provisions of Articles 16 and 17 of the Protocol on the Cease-fire in South Vietnam shall immediately be implemented with respect to the Two-Party Joint Military Commission. That Commission shall also immediately be accorded the eleven points of privileges and immunities agreed upon by the Four-Party Joint Military Commission. Frequent and regular liaison flights shall be made between Saigon and the headquarters of the regional Two-Party Joint Military Commissions and other places in South Vietnam as required for the operations of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission. Frequent and regular liaison flights shall also be made between Saigon and Loc Ninh.

(b) The headquarters of the Central Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall be located in Saigon proper or at a place agreed upon by the two South Vietnamese parties where an area controlled by one of them adjoins an area controlled by the other. The locations of the headquarters of the regional Two-Party Joint Military Commissions and of the teams of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall be determined by that Commission within fifteen days after the entry into force of the cease-fire referred to in paragraph 3. These locations may be changed at any time as determined by the Commission. The locations, except for teams at the points of entry, shall be selected from among those towns specified in Article 11(b) and (c) of the Protocol on the Cease-fire in South Vietnam and those places were an area controlled by one South Vietnamese party adjoins an area controlled by the other, or at any other place agreed upon by the Commission.

(c) Once the privileges and immunities mentioned in paragraph 11(a) are accorded by both South Vietnamese parties, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall be fully staffed and its regional commissions and teams fully deployed within fifteen days after their locations have been determined.

(d) The Two-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall closely cooperate with and assist each other in carrying out their respective functions.

12. In conformity with Article 18 of the Agreement and Article 10 of the Protocol on the International Commission of Control and Supervision, the International Commission, including its teams, is allowed such movement for observation as is reasonably required for the proper exercise of its functions as stipulated in the Agreement. In carrying out these functions, the International Commission, including its teams, shall enjoy all necessary assistance and cooperation from the parties concerned. The two South Vietnamese parties shall issue the necessary instructions to their personnel and take all other necessary measures to ensure the safety of such movement.

13. Article 20 of the Agreement, regarding Cambodia and Laos, shall be scrupulously implemented.

14. In conformity with Article 21 of the Agreement, the United States-Democratic Republic of Vietnam Joint Economic Commission shall resume its meetings four days from the date of signature of this Joint Communique and shall complete the first phase of its work within fifteen days thereafter.

Affirming that the parties concerned shall strictly respect and scrupulously implement all the provisions of the Paris Agreement, its Protocols, and this Joint Communiqué, the undersigned representatives of the parties signatory to the Paris Agreement have decided to issue this Joint Communique to record and publish the points on which they have agreed.

Signed in Paris, June 13, 1973.

For the Government of the United States of America:	For the Government of the Republic of Vietnam:
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President of the United States of America	Nguyen Luu Vien, Representative of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam
For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:	For the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam:
Le Duc Tho, Representative of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam	Nguyen Van Hieu, Minister of State of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam

* * * * * * *

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

From May 17 to May 28, from June 6 to June 9, and from June 12 and June 13, 1973 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, and Mr. Le Duc Tho, on behalf of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, reviewed the implementation of the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and its Protocols and discussed

urgent measures to ensure the correct and strict implementation of the Agreement and its Protocols.

The Government of the United States of America, with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam,

Considering that strict respect and scrupulous implementation of all provisions of the Paris Agreement and its Protocols by all the parties signatory to them are necessary to ensure the peace in Vietnam and contribute to the cause of peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia,

Have agreed on the following points (in the sequence of the relevant articles in the Agreement):

(Text of Joint Communique Articles 1–14 same as above)

Affirming that the parties concerned shall strictly respect and scrupulously implement all the provisions of the Paris Agreement, its Protocols, this Joint Communique, and a Joint Communique in the same terms signed by representatives of the Government of the United States of America, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, the representative of the United States of America, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, and the representative of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Mr. Le Duc Tho, have decided to issue this Joint Communique to record and publish the points on which they have agreed.

Signed in Paris, June 13, 1973.

For the Government of the United States of America:	For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President of the United States of America	Le Duc Tho, Representative of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

---

[From the New York Times, June 14, 1973]

TRANSCRIPT OF KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE ON THE RESULTS OF THE TALKS IN PARIS

PARIS, June 13.—Following is a transcript of a news conference today by Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser on national security affairs, as recorded by The New York Times:

Ladies and gentlemen.

First of all I want to thank those of you who have been following me around for these many sessions, in November, December and January and now, for your patience, sometimes at the risk of your neck. I regret that I haven't been able to be more communicative at the end of each session. These negotiations are somewhat complex and involve many parties.

I understand that there has already been a previous briefing which went through the details. Let me say very briefly what we consider to be the significance of this communiqué; then I will answer your questions.

As you know, during most of March and April the United States became quite concerned by the manner in which the cease-fire agreement was being implemented. We were specifically concerned by the following points:

One, the inadequate implementation of the cease-fire.

Secondly, continued infiltration into South Vietnam and continued utilization of Laos and Cambodia as corridors for that infiltration.

Three, we were concerned about the inadequate accounting for the missing in action.

Fourthly, we were concerned about the violation of the demilitarized zone.

Fifth, we were concerned about the inadequate cooperation of the International Control Commission and the slower staffing of the Two-Party Military Commission.

Six, we were concerned about the violations of Article 20 according to the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodia and Laos.

COMPLAINTS ON OTHER SIDE

Needless to say, the other side has its list of complaints. In these circumstances we proposed that Mr. Le Duc Tho and I meet again to review the implementation of the agreement that had been so painfully negotiated last fall. There was a preliminary meeting between Ambassador Sullivan and Prime Minister Thach, and then on May 17 Le Duc Tho and I met again and reached some preliminary conclusions.

We were in daily contact with the Government of South Vietnam through its delegation here, through our embassy in Saigon and sent Ambassador Sullivan to Saigon for further consultation. I returned here, negotiations continued. There was a slight interruption last Saturday, and we reached a final conclusion today.

By the content of the joint communiqué concerned, we believe that we have achieved a satisfactory conclusion of the points that were of principal concern to the United States. There is, as you know a new—there is to be issued a new order on a cease-fire which is to go into effect probably 36 hours from now and which we hope and expect will be implemented.

Secondly, it is a clear repetition of the prohibition against the infiltration of personnel and material into South Vietnam except as replacements of Article 7 of the original agreement and according to procedures agreed to by the two parties. There is an explicit reference to this effect for the demilitarized zone and to the prohibition of transiting the demilitarized zone except in accordance with the replacement provisions of the treaty.

Under the provisions for missing in action, all sides have pledged that they would make major efforts to help each other to account for the missing in action throughout Indochina, and this is a matter which is of great concern to the United States.

LAOS AND CAMBODIA

A Two-Party Military Commission is to be fully set up, and special assurances have been given in Paragraph 12 about cooperation with the International Control Commission by all the parties to grant them reasonable freedom. In respect to Laos and Cambodia the communiqué says that the provisions of Article 20 are to be scrupulously observed.

There have been long discussions on the whole complex of issues raised by Laos and Cambodia. However, the final determinations depend on the solemn decisions of other parties. We will not discuss this subject here, and we will leave it to the results and new events to testify to progress.

The other subject that has been discussed and which I have left separately is that of political evolution in South Vietnam. As you know the United States has always taken the view that the political evolution of South Vietnam is to be decided by the South Vietnamese. And therefore the United States has always believed, and that is reflected in the communiqué, that the political future of South Vietnam should be determined by a process of free and democratic general elections. The other provisions regarding the political evolution reaffirmed what was said in Chapter 4 of the cease-fire communiqué.

Now we have today signed a communiqué.

And the history of Indochina is replete with agreements and joint declarations. I'm not naive enough to pretend to you that the mere fact of again having agreed to certain words in itself guarantees peace. But I will also say that since all parties have worked so seriously for the past three weeks, we have every hope that they will match this effort with performance.

And therefore there is great hope and, we hope, a new spirit in the implementation of the agreement which in itself is maintained, what was signed today is an amplification and a consolidation of the original agreement—it is not a new agreement.

Now the people of Indochina, and especially the people of Vietnam, have suffered conflict for a generation. Our greatest effort has been to end their suffering and to restore peace, and it is our hope that by what has been done today a significant step has been taken in the consolidation of peace in Vietnam and Indochina.

And now I'll be glad to answer your questions.

NO "SCORECARD" PROVIDED

For my own education, would you identify yourself?

Q. What were the changes in the communiqué that made it acceptable to the South Vietnamese Government?

A. I don't think it is useful to go through all the details of the negotiations and to provide a scorecard. In any negotiation there are impasses reached that afterward are rather complex to explain. I would be glad to explain one difficulty that existed, which was perhaps not of monumental substance or significance but which was perhaps extremely time-consuming, and which concerned the form of signing of the communiqué.

The United States began by proposing that it should be a two-party communiqué between Hanoi and the United States and a recommendation to the South Vietnamese parties. The North Vietnamese proposed that it should be a two-party communiqué signed with the concurrence of the South Vietnamese parties. The South Vietnamese proposed that it should be a four-party communiqué. We accepted a four-party communiqué, at which point Saigon proposed that it should be a two-party communiqué with recommendations to the two South Vietnamese parties, which induced Hanoi to accept the four-party communiqué. We then as a compromise accepted Hanoi's proposal of a two-party communiqué with the concurrence of the South Vietnamese parties.

There was one fleeting moment where Saigon had our position, we had Hanoi's position and Hanoi had Saigon's position. So one must not believe that every time that a great deal of time is spent it always concerns vital issues of war and peace. This was one of the issues that took some time, but I will never discuss every issue that arose.

POLITICAL SOLUTIONS

Q. Dr. Kissinger, besides the fact that the other parties did negotiate seriously, what else makes you think that they are now willing to work together seriously for a political solution in Indochina and not a military one?

A. I think that the whole evolution of the Indochina tragedy, that the Vietnamese war, has been a slow realization by all parties that they could not impose a military solution on each other. This has been a very painful process for all concerned because, I think it is safe to say, that the art of compromise is not the most highly developed quality in Vietnam.

I believe that the realities of the situation both before the cease-fire agreement, and I think it is safe to say since the cease-fire agreement, may have proved to the parties concerned the necessity of first peace before coexistence and eventually some political solution.

But I repeat, I did not say that this was guaranteed. It is undoubtedly a process which will have its ups and downs, but sent with the intention of contributing what we can to easing the situation and promoting the peace.

Q. Point 5 of the communique today deals with the two-side military leaders getting together to agree on what areas are controlled. Since the January agreement of the 27th, they have not been able to agree on an agenda for political discussions. Why is there reason to believe that they will be able to agree on what areas they militarily control?

A. Events will show very quickly whether they will be able to agree. One of the reasons why the two-party military has not worked sufficiently as had been hoped was because of the difficulty of agreeing on location and immunity. And that problem has been or should have been substantially solved by this agreement. With respect to area controls and modalities of station, it is of course our view that this is determined by the military presence and on that basis both sides after it feels its part in the treaty should be able empirically to determine where the forces are located and on that basis delimit the zones of the military control.

One reason it has not worked previously is because the cease-fire—was not fully observed. The extent that this new cease-fire order goes into effect, at 4 o'clock Greenwich mean time on the 15th, to the extent that that is observed, the delimitation of areas of control should be substantially eased.

MAJOR ISSUES REMAIN

Q. Do you believe now that with the signing of this document you have more or less ended your work or that you will have a lot of difficulties?

A. The main issues in Indochina will still require a significant diplomatic effort, and we expect to continue them. Of course we remain committed to the strict implementation of the agreement and we will maintain our interests in it. I hope to be able to reduce my own participation in this process in order to be able to preserve my emotional stability.

Q. I believe that the question that was just asked has to do with American aerial work and the operation in Cambodia. If it was not, what I would like to ask is, is there anything agreed in this communique which substantially commits the United States to cease such operations?

A. There is nothing in this communique that commits the United States to cease such operations. It is our hope, and we shall make major efforts in that direction, and we are making major efforts in that direction, to continue the—that it will produce a cease-fire in Cambodia.

Q. Can I ask you what there is in the communiqué released today besides the goodwill and seriousness of the people who negotiated it, that will make it work better than the agreement that was negotiated on Jan. 27?

A. There is nothing in any communiqué that makes a communiqué work. The communiqué works because the parties concerned intend to implement it. Therefore, all a communiqué or an agreement can do is to prescribe what the obligations of the various parties are. To the extent that this communiqué lays out the specific obligations and reaffirms them it can contribute to the consolidation of peace. But it is never words alone that produces peace. It is the combination of words, intentions and the consequences of performance.

SCHEDULE IS DEFINED

Q. I find in the communiqué one new point, and that is that your Government has agreed to conclude the first phase of the talks on the Joint Economic Commission with the North Vietnamese within 15 days after the signing of the accord. If I understand the American process of negotiation, I was under the impression that in the fact the negotiations on the joint economic aid were to some extent meant to be a guarantee that North Vietnam does apply the accords. Have you managed to obtain some guarantees from the North Vietnamese apart from what we have found in the communiqué, that they will apply the accords because I am rather surprised by the concession, if we can call it that.

A. The Joint Economic Commission had substantially completed its work at the point when we suspended negotiations, so that the schedule that is indicated in the communiqué is inherent in the resumption of negotiations.

The United States has always made clear that the final implementation of the economic clauses of the agreement have to be seen as part of the total implementation of the agreement, and of course many of you know that even after the Joint Economic Commission has completed its work, its results first have to be submitted to the conference, and secondly will have to be approved by the conference, which is not an automatic process. So there will be sufficient time in which to assess the implementation of the agreement. This Administration has left no doubt its program in the various forms is related to the overall implementation of the agreement.

Q. May I ask you a question off the subject of the Vietnam agreement?

A. Preferably not.

Q. Preferably not, but I may?

A. Well, you can ask it, then I will tell you whether I will answer it.

Q. I wonder if you would be prepared to say why you went to see Chi Peng-fei today, on whose initiative, and what you talked about.

A. The Foreign Minister of China is an old friend whom I have seen repeatedly in Peking, and since we are both in the same town, a courtesy visit was arranged. It lasted 50 minutes. But you'll have to allow time for translation.

EFFECT OF CLOSE CONTACT

Q. I would like to ask, Dr. Kissinger, what kind of measurement you have over the last few months in connection with the cease-fire violations? To the extent to which they are intentional or accidental, controlled or out of control, on the other side, naturally?

A. In a situation as in Vietnam where many of the forces are mingled together in very close contact, an implementation of cease-fire is of course extremely dif-

ficult. The first thing to remember is that the level of violence since Jan. 27 has dropped very widely, and it is at the lowest level that it has been in a decade.

I would say that there are daily reports of major and minor violations. I think it is safe to say that of the minor violations a significant percentage is produced by the proximity of the forces and not necessarily by deliberate design. In the case of the major violations, which have averaged around 15 a day, I think it is safe to say that a significant majority is produced by the deliberate decisions, often of local commanders, but in any case by deliberate decision.

Q. Both the Saigon Government and, I believe, the American Government, have said they were very eager to tie down a date for free and democratic elections in South Vietnam. On the surface of the communiqué there doesn't seem to be any such tying down or linking. Are you satisfied that significant progress is being made in that particular direction?

A. We have two separate processes. One is the desirability of the day for general elections and the stability of the four-party document as far as such a day goes. For that cause, when we negotiated this agreement the Saigon Government very properly took the view that it would be inappropriate for the United States or for an international document to prescribe the specific day for elections. And we spent many days on that issue, because it was at that time that the North Vietnamese wanted to find out a day, and it was we who followed the recommendations of the Saigon Government and did not do so.

Under these circumstances it is impossible for the United States to insist now on what it refused in December. Nevertheless, we have always taken the view that the political future of South Vietnam should be left to the South Vietnamese and that free and democratic general elections should be a central element in determining that future.

Individually, we support the South Vietnamese proposal that a time should be fixed for that election. We think it is a reasonable proposal. But in the line of negotiating history, it was inappropriate to introduce into a communiqué which was supposed to bring about the implementation of the agreement a clause which was not part of the original agreement, and which was not part of the original agreement at the request of the South Vietnamese Government. But nevertheless, as far as the internal negotiations are concerned, we think the South Vietnamese demand is real, and we hope it could be accepted.

Q. If this agreement does not work out, do you think there is an interest of necessity in negotiating a third agreement?

A. It is a prospect I cannot face today. When we sign an agreement, we hope that it will be implemented, and whatever difficulties there are should be principally discussed between the Vietnamese parties. I don't want to go into the question of what happens in the case of violations before we have even concluded the two-party signature. We have negotiated this in good faith after a long war, a great deal of suffering, with the hope that at last the parties concerned will draw the conclusions from the overwhelming reality in Vietnam that nobody can have his way by force.

Thank you very much.

SECRETARY KISSINGER RESPONDS TO SENATOR FULBRIGHT ON RELATION BETWEEN WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND LEGISLATION PROHIBITING HOSTILITIES BY U.S. FORCES IN INDOCHINA

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., December 6, 1973.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: You asked on November 30 whether the Department believes that the War Powers Resolution supersedes the legislative restrictions such as the Case-Church amendment on engagement by United States military forces in hostilities in Indochina (P.L. 93-50, P.L. 93-52 as extended by P.L. 93-118 and 93-124, P.L. 93-126, and P.L. 93-165).

It is our opinion that the War Powers Resolution does not supersede or otherwise modify those legislative restrictions. I understand that this is consistent with the weight of Congressional interpretation of this Resolution.

Warm regards,

HENRY A. KISSINGER.

Secretary Kissinger Responds to Senator Kennedy on Indochina Policy Issues

Following is the text of a letter dated March 25 from Secretary Kissinger to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Refugees of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

Text of Letter

March 25, 1974.

Dear Mr. Chairman: In response to your letter of March 12 on various aspects of United States policy toward Indochina, I am enclosing our comment on the nine specific items you have outlined. I hope this information will be useful to you. As to the recommendations of the Subcommittee's Study Mission to Indochina last year, which were enclosed with your letter, I have asked Governor Holton [Linwood Holton, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations] to review these and to prepare our comments for submission to you as soon as possible.

Your letter also expresses concern over a March 6 cable by Ambassador [Graham] Martin commenting on a recent press article on the United States role in Viet-Nam. I do not believe the Ambassador is suggesting a cause-and-effect relationship between decisions in Hanoi and the views of any individual Members of Congress or their staffs. What he is describing is a very real and sophisticated propaganda effort by North Viet-Nam to bring to bear on a wide spectrum of Americans its own special view of the situation in Indochina. The Ambassador believes, and in this he has our full confidence and support, that we must counter these distortions emanating from Hanoi and continue to provide the best answers to the concerned questions many Americans have about our Indochina policy.

Warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger.

Enclosure:
Comment on Indochina Policy Issues.

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.

Text of Enclosure

(1) *"The general character and objectives of American policy towards Indochina as a whole and towards each government or political authority in the area."*

There are two basic themes in our policy toward Indochina. The first is our belief that a secure peace in Indochina is an important element in our efforts to achieve a worldwide structure of peace. Conversely, we believe that an evolution toward peace in other troubled areas helps bring about the stability for which we strive in Indochina. Consequently, our Indochina policy has been geared to bring about the conditions which will enable the contending parties to find a peaceful resolution of their differences.

A resolution of differences can, of course, be achieved by other than peaceful means. For example, North Viet-Nam might seek to conquer South Viet-Nam by force of arms. Such a resolution, however, would almost certainly be a temporary one and would not produce the long-term and stable peace which is essential. Therefore, a corollary to our search for peace, and the second theme of our policy, is to discourage the takeover of the various parts of Indochina by force. Forcible conquest is not only repugnant to American traditions but also has serious destabilizing effects which are not limited to the area under immediate threat.

We would stress the point that the United States has no desire to see any particular form of government or social system in the Indochina countries. What we do hope to see is a free choice by the people of Indochina as to the governments and systems under which they will live. To that end we have devoted immense human and material resources to assist them in protecting this right of choice.

Our objective with regard to the Government of Viet-Nam, the Government of the Khmer Republic and the Royal Lao Government is to provide them with the material assistance and political encouragement which they need in determining their own futures and in helping to create conditions which will permit

free decisions. In Laos, happily, real progress has been made, partly because of our assistance. The Vientiane Agreement and Protocols give clear evidence of the possibility for the peaceful settlement our policies are designed to foster. We have supported the Royal Lao Government and, when it is formed, we will look with great sympathy on the Government of National Union. We welcome a peaceful and neutral Laos and, where appropriate, we will continue to encourage the parties to work out their remaining problems.

In Cambodia we are convinced that long-term prospects for stability would be enhanced by a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement among the Khmer elements to the conflict. Because such stability is in our interests we are providing diplomatic and material support to the legitimate government of the Khmer Republic, both in its self-defense efforts and in its search for a political solution to the war.

Our objective in Viet-Nam continues to be to help strengthen the conditions which made possible the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam. With this in mind we have supported the Republic of Viet-Nam with both military and economic assistance. We believe that by providing the Vietnamese Government the necessary means to defend itself and to develop a viable economy, the government in Hanoi will conclude that political solutions are much preferable to renewed use of major military force. The presence of large numbers of North Vietnamese troops in the South demonstrates that the military threat from Hanoi is still very much in evidence. Because of that threat we must still ensure that the Republic of Viet-Nam has the means to protect its independence. We note, however, that the level of violence is markedly less than it was prior to the cease-fire and believe that our policy of support for South Viet-Nam has been instrumental in deterring major North Vietnamese offensives.

Our objective with regard to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and its southern arm, the Provisional Revolutionary Government, is to encourage full compliance with the Paris Agreement. We have been disappointed by North Viet-Nam's serious violations of important provisions of the Agreement. However, we still believe that the Agreement provides a workable framework for a peaceful and lasting settlement, and we will continue to use all means available to us to support the cease-fire and to encourage closer observance of it. Our future relations with Hanoi obviously depend in large part on how faithfully North Viet-Nam complies with the Agreement.

(2) *"The general content and nature of existing obligations and commitments to the governments in Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane."*

The U.S. has no bilateral written commitment to the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam. However, as a signator of the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam, the United States committed itself to strengthening the conditions which made the cease-fire possible and to the goal of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination. With these commitments in mind, we continue to provide to the Republic of Viet-Nam the means necessary for its self-defense and for its economic viability.

We also recognize that we have derived a certain obligation from our long and deep involvement in Viet-Nam. Perceiving our own interest in a stable Viet-Nam free to make its own political choices, we have encouraged the Vietnamese people in their struggle for independence. We have invested great human and material resources to support them in protecting their own as well as broader interests. We have thus committed ourselves very substantially, both politically and morally. While the South Vietnamese Government and people are demonstrating increasing self-reliance, we believe it is important that we continue our support as long as it is needed.

Our relations with the Government of the Khmer Republic also do not stem from a formal commitment but are based on our own national interests. Recognizing that events in Cambodia relate directly to the bitter hostilities in other parts of Indochina, we have sought to help create stability in that country as a part of our effort to encourage the development of peace in the entire region. We, therefore, support the legitimate government of Cambodia, in the hope that its increasing strength will encourage the Khmer Communists toward a political settlement rather than continued conflict.

We have also undertaken our assistance to Laos and support for the Royal Lao Government because of our own broad national interests, not because of any formal commitment to that country. The most important and visible of our interests is our desire for a just settlement of the tragic war in Indochina. Laos plays a key role in this effort to achieve the peace. Indeed, Laos is the bright spot in Indochina where the fruits of our efforts to assist and support the Royal Lao Government are most clearly seen. A ceasefire based on an agreement worked out by the two Lao parties has endured for more than a year. The two parties

have together organized joint security forces in the two capital cities of Vientiane and Luang Prabang and a coalition government may not be far away. We feel that these large steps toward a lasting peace in Los would probably not have succeeded but for our steadfast support for the efforts of the Royal Lao Government.

(3) *"The kinds, categories and levels of support and assistance given or projected to the governments in Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane for fiscal year 1973 through 1975—including (a) a breakdown of the number, distribution, activities and agency/departmental association of official American personnel, as well as those associated with private business and other organizations under contract to the United States government; and (b) a breakdown from all sources of humanitarian assistance, police and public safety oriented assistance, general supporting and economic development assistance, and military assistance."*

(a) U.S. Economic Assistance

Our annual Congressional Presentation books provide the data requested here in considerable detail. These Congressional Presentation books for FY 1975 will shortly be delivered to the Congress. We provide these first, as a matter of course, to the authorizing and appropriations Committees of the Senate and the House and then routinely make them available to all Members as well as the interested public. We will be happy to provide your Subcommittee on Refugees with copies as soon as available.

The Congressional Presentation books focus, of course, on our proposals for the coming year, FY 1975, but also contain data on both the current fiscal year, FY 1974, and the preceding, FY 1973. This year, at last, we are preparing a separate book providing the details of our economic assistance programs for the Indochina countries.

These Congressional Presentation books form a partial basis, of course, for extensive Hearings held each year by the authorizing committees in the Senate and House, and then by the appropriations committees. We would expect the question you pose, as well as many others, to be further explored in considerable depth during the course of these hearings.

(b) U.S. Military Assistance

Our military assistance to South Viet-Nam and Laos is provided under MASF [military assistance service funded]. The breakdown of this assistance for the period you requested is as follows:

Fiscal year	Ceiling	New obligational authority
1973	$2,735,000,000	$2,563,000,000
1974	1,126,000,000	907,500,000
1975	1,000,000,000	[1] 1,450,000,000

[1] Vietnam only; Laos will be included under MAP for fiscal year 1975.

The level of official U.S. military/civilian personnel in South Viet-Nam during the same period is as follows:

Year	Military	Civilian
January 1973	[1] 23,516	730
January 1974	[2] 221	1,200
June 1974	[2] 221	935

[1] Assigned.
[2] Authorized.

The number of U.S. civilian contractors has declined from 5,787 in January, 1973, to 2,736 in January, 1974. This number is expected to decrease further to 2,130 by June, 1974. We do not yet have a projected level of U.S. civilian contractors for FY 1975.

Our military assistance to Cambodia is furnished under MAP [military assistance program]. This assistance totalled $148.6 million in FY 1973 and $325 million in FY 1974. The level of our military assistance for FY 1975 is now under review. The amount to be proposed will be included in the Congressional presentation documents on military assistance which we expect to submit to Congress shortly.

U.S. military and civilian personnel in Cambodia during the period you requested is as follows:

Year	Military	Civilian
December 1972	112	53
December 1973	113	55
December 1974	113	(1)

[1] Data not available.

U.S. military and civilian personnel in Laos during the period you requested is as follows:

Year	Military	Civilian
December 1972	185	457
December 1973	190	424
December 1974	[1] 30	(2)

[1] Based on the assumption that a coalition government will be formed in Laos before the end of this year.
[2] Data not available.

(4) *"The current status and problems of reported efforts to establish an international consortium for general reconstruction assistance to the area."*

In April 1973, President Thieu asked the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to help form an aid group for the Republic of Viet-Nam. The IBRD agreed to make the effort, provided that this would be acceptable to the Bank membership and that the group could be organized in association with both the IBRD and the Asian Development Bank. In May the World Bank sent a study mission to Viet-Nam to review the situation. In August, Japan suggested that the Bank arrange a preliminary meeting to exchange views on aid to the countries of Indochina. The Japanese also proposed that the member countries discuss the formation of a loose Indochina consultative group for the areawide coordination, with sub-groups for any of the four countries concerned which might request such a group and where conditions were satisfactory.

An initial meeting was held at the Bank's Paris office in October. The United States supported the Bank's efforts as well as the Japanese proposal. The Bank sent a second mission to Viet-Nam in November and subsequently proposed that a follow-on meeting be held in February of this year to discuss the formation of the Indochina consultative group. However, the reactions of participating countries to the energy crisis and to the Congressional decision on IDA [International Development Association] replenishment led the Bank to postpone the meeting, tentatively until late Spring. In February, at the request of the Lao Government, a World Bank team also visited Laos to assess the situation and to discuss a possible consultative group for that country.

The United States continues to support efforts to form an Indochina consultative group. We also favor the proposal that there be sub-groups for each recipient country to which donors may contribute as they wish. The sub-groups would be formed when considered appropriate by donors and at the request of the recipient We remain in close consultation with the World Bank and other interested parties on this matter. We are hopeful that a second meeting of participants might be held in the near future and that such a meeting might lead to the establishment of the groups in question. A reversal of the negative Congressional action on IDA replenishment would clearly enhance the possibility of success in this regard.

(5) *"The current status and problems of the Administration's stated intention to encourage internationalizing humanitarian assistance to the area."*

In addition to U.S. bilateral humanitarian assistance to the Indochina countries which totals $111.4 million for FY 1974, the Department and the Agency for International Development (AID) continue to encourage other donors, including international organizations, to provide such assistance. AID made a grant of $2 million on November 1, 1973, to the Indochina Operations Group of the International Committee of the Red Cross and discussions are continuing about an additional grant to that organization. UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund] has recently completed its study of the problems in the Indochina coun-

tries and has just submitted its proposed program to possible donor countries. We have encouraged UNICEF in its study and are pleased that it is now prepared to expand its activities in all three countries.

The World Health Organization has had meaningful programs in Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam which supplement and do not overlap with activities supported by the United States. We have encouraged that organization to play an even more important role, particularly in the malaria control program, and we at the same time would phase out of our activities in that field.

Our discussions with Indochina countries have stressed the desirability of establishing plans and priorities for programs and projects which require assistance so that other donor countries and organizations can fit their assistance efforts into the host country requirements.

(6) *"The current status of negotiations between Washington and Hanoi on American reconstruction assistance to North Viet-Nam."*

Following the conclusion of the Peace Agreement last year, preliminary discussions of post-war reconstruction were held in Paris between U.S. and North Vietnamese members of the Joint Economic Commission. These talks have been suspended since last July. The Administration's position, which we believe is shared by the great majority of members of Congress, is that the U.S. cannot at this time move forward with an assistance program for North Viet-Nam. To date, North Viet-Nam has failed substantially to live up to a number of the essential terms of the Agreement, including those relating to the introduction of troops and war materiel into South Viet-Nam, the cessation of military activities in Cambodia and Laos, and the accounting for our missing-in-action. Should Hanoi turn away from a military solution and demonstrate a serious compliance with the Agreement, then we would be prepared, with the approval of Congress, to proceed with our undertaking regarding reconstruction assistance to North Viet-Nam.

(7) *"The Department's assessment on the implementation of the ceasefire agreements for both Viet-Nam and Laos."*

The cease-fire in Viet-Nam has resulted in a substantial decrease in the level of hostilities; for example, military casualties since the cease-fire have been about one-third the level of casualties suffered in the years preceding the Paris Agreement. Nonetheless, it is unfortunately evident that significant violence continues to occur and that the cease-fire is far from scrupulously observed. The fundamental problem is that the North Vietnamese are still determined to seize political power in the South, using military means if necessary. To this end they have maintained unrelenting military pressure against the South Vietnamese Government and have continued widespread terrorism against the population. In particularly flagrant violation of the Agreement North Viet-Nam has persisted in its infiltration of men and materiel into the South, bringing in more than one hundred thousand troops and large quantities of heavy equipment since the cease-fire began. South Vietnamese forces have reacted against these attacks by North Vietnamese forces and several sizable engagements have taken place.

Despite these serious violations, we continue to believe that the Paris Agreement has already brought substantial benefits and continues to provide a workable framework for peace. After more than a quarter century of fighting it would have been unrealistic to expect that the Agreement would bring an instant and complete end to the conflict. What it has done, however, is to reduce the level of violence significantly and provide mechanisms for discussion. The two Vietnamese parties are talking to each other and are achieving some results, even if these results are much less than we would like to see. The final exchange of prisoners which was completed on March 7 is illustrative.

We assess the cease-fire agreement in Laos as being so far largely successful. The level of combat was reduced substantially immediately following the cease-fire and has since fallen to a handful of incidents per week. There is hope that if developments continue as they have, the Laos cease-fire will work and the Lao, through their own efforts, will be able to establish a coalition government and a stable peace in their country.

(8) *"The Department's assessment of the overall situation in Cambodia and the possibility for a ceasefire agreement."*

Despite continued pressure by the Khmer insurgents, now generally under the control of the Khmer Communist Party, the Khmer armed forces have successfully repulsed two major insurgent operations, one against Kompong Cham and,

more recently, against Phnom Penh, with no U.S. combat support. Serious military problems remain, and continued hard fighting during the next few months is expected, both in the provinces and around the capital.

A broadened political base, a new Prime Minister and a more effective cabinet offer signs of improvements in the civil administration. The enormous dislocation of war, destroying production, producing over a million refugees and encouraging spiralling inflation, face the leaders of the Khmer Republic with serious problems.

Nonetheless, we are convinced that with U.S. material and diplomatic support the Khmer Republic's demonstration of military and economic viability will persuade their now intransigent opponents to move to a political solution of the Cambodian conflict. The Khmer Republic's Foreign Minister on March 21 reiterated his government's position that a solution for Cambodia should be peaceful and not forced by arms or capitulation. Instead, his government will continue to seek talks with the other side. His government hopes their efforts for peace will achieve some results after the current insurgent offensive.

(9) "*Recent diplomatic initiatives, involving the United States, aimed at a reduction of violence in Indochina and a greater measure of normalization in the area.*"

Since the signing of the Viet-Nam ceasefire agreement, the United States has been in constant liaison with the interested parties, including those outside of the Indochina area. While it would not be useful to provide details of all of these contacts, we can assure the Congress that we have used every means at our disposal to encourage a reduction in the level of violence and an orderly resolution of the conflict. We believe these measures have had some success. The level of fighting is down substantially from 1972 and the Vietnamese parties have taken at least beginning steps toward a satisfactory accommodation. Further, the interested outside parties remain basically committed to building on the framework of the ceasefire agreement.

When Hanoi established a pattern of serious violations of the Agreement shortly after its conclusion, Dr. Kissinger met with Special Adviser Le Duc Tho and negotiated the Paris communique of June 13, 1973, with a view to stabilizing the situation. Secretary Kissinger returned to Paris in December, 1973, to again discuss with Special Adviser Tho the status of the implementation of the Agreement. We will continue to maintain such contacts with Vietnamese and other parties in the hope that Hanoi will eventually be persuaded that its interests lie in peaceful development rather than in conflict.

In Laos, we have offered every encouragement to an evolution toward peace. At this time the Laotian parties are making great progress in the formation of a government of national union. We can help in this regard with our sympathy and encouragement while properly leaving the issue in the hands of those most interested, the Lao people.

The Government of the Khmer Republic, with our complete endorsement, has made notable efforts to terminate the hostilities in that country. Following the cease-fire in Viet Nam, the Cambodian Government unilaterally ceased hostile activity by its forces in the hope that the other side would respond. Unfortunately that striking gesture was rebuffed. On frequent occasions thereafter the Khmer Republic made proposals designed to move the conflict from the battlefield to political fora, with our strong support in each instance. Although all of those proposals have been ignored by the Khmer Communists, we continue to hope that the current relative military balance will make apparent to the other side what the Khmer Republic has already perceived, that peace is a far more hopeful prospect for Cambodia than incessant conflict.

93-991 O - 73 - 37

C. CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS CONCERNING UNITED STATES-VIETNAM RELATIONS

SOUTHEAST ASIA RESOLUTION,* APPROVED AUGUST 10, 1964[1]

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of Southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

SEC. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

---

[1] Text of Public Law 88-408 [H.J. Res. 1145], 78 Stat. 384, approved Aug. 10, 1964.

* Terminated by Section 12 of P.L. 91-672, approved Jan. 12, 1971.

COMPARISON OF RESOLUTIONS RELATING TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN VARIOUS AREAS

Southeast Asia	Cuba	Formosa	Middle East
Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Viet-Nam, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked U.S. naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of Southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area but desires only that they should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it	Whereas President James Monroe, announcing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, declared that the United States would consider any attempt on the part of European powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety"; and Whereas in the Rio Treaty of 1947 the parties agreed that "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States, and, consequently, each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations"; and Whereas the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States at Punta del Este in January 1962 declared "The present Government of Cuba has identified itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has established a political, economic, and social system based on that doctrine, and accepts military assistance from continental Communist powers, including even the threat of military intervention in America on the part of the Soviet Union;" and Whereas the international Communist movement has increasingly extended into Cuba its political, economic, and military sphere of influence: Now, therefore, be it	Whereas the primary purpose of the United States in its relations with all other nations, is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all; and Whereas certain territories in the West Pacific under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China are now under armed attack, and threats and declarations have been and are being made by the Chinese Communists that such armed attack is in aid of and in preparation for armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores; Whereas such armed attack if continued would gravely endanger the peace and security of the West Pacific area and particularly of Formosa and the Pescadores; and Whereas the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in or bordering upon the Pacific Ocean; and Whereas the President of the United States on Jan. 6, 1955, submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification a Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China, which recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific area directed against territories, therein described, in the region of Formosa and the Pescadores, would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the parties to the treaty: Therefore be it	
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of	*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That the United States is determined—	*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That the President of the United States be and he hereby is au-	*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That the President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with

COMPARISON OF RESOLUTIONS RELATING TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN VARIOUS AREAS—Continued

Southeast Asia	Cuba	Formosa	Middle East
the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.	(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere; (b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States; and (c) to work with the Organization of American States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination.	thorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in ensuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.	and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East desiring such assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.
SEC. 1. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any protocol or member state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.			SEC. 2. The President is authorized to undertake in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance. Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this and, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism: *Provided*, That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United States.
This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress, except that it may be terminated earlier by a concurrent resolution of the two Houses		This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress.	This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise except that it may be terminated earlier by a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress.

PUBLIC LAW 90–5, 90TH CONGRESS, S. 665, MARCH 16, 1967
(Excerpts)

AN ACT To authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1967 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, and tracked combat vehicles, and research, development, test, evaluation, and military construction for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

* * * * * * *

TITLE IV—STATEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL POLICY

SEC. 401. The Congress hereby declares—

(1) its firm intentions to provide all necessary support for members of the Armed Forces of the United States fighting in Vietnam;

(2) its support of efforts being made by the President of the United States and other men of good will throughout the world to prevent an expansion of the war in Vietnam and to bring that conflict to an and through a negotiated settlement which will preserve the honor of the United States, protect the vital interests of this country, and allow the people of South Vietnam to determine the affairs of that nation in their own way; and

(3) its support for the convening of the nations that participated in the Geneva Conferences or any other meeting of nations similarly involved and interested as soon as possible for the purpose of pursuing the general principles of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 and for formulating plans for bringing the conflict to an honorable conclusion.

Approved March 15, 1967.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

House reports: No. 29 accompanying H.R. 4515 (Committee on Armed Services) and No. 73 (committee of conference).
Senate Report No. 58 (Committee on Armed Services).
Congressional Record, volume 113 (1967):
February 23, 24, 27, 28, considered in Senate.
March 1, considered and passed Senate.
March 2, considered and passed House, amended, in lieu of H.R. 4515.
March 8, House and Senate agreed to conference report.

RESOLUTION SEEKING U.S. INITIATIVE TO ASSURE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF VIETNAM CONFLICT, NOVEMBER 30, 1967

Whereas the question of the Vietnamese conflict is a matter of which the Security Council of the United Nations is seized by action previously taken by the Council in connection with a letter of the Permanent Representative of the United States dated January 31, 1966, submitting a resolution seeking a settlement of the hostilities, and

Whereas more than one hundred members of the United Nations through their Chiefs of State or Foreign Ministers or Permanent Representatives have expressed their deep concern with the continued hostilities and their desire for a peaceful and honorable settlement of the Vietnamese conflict, therefore be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President of the United States consider taking the appropriate initiative through his representative at the United Nations to assure that the United States resolution of January 31, 1966, or any other resolution of equivalent purpose be brought before the Security Council for consideration.

S. RES. 85, 91ST CONGRESS, NATIONAL COMMITMENTS RESOLUTION, JUNE 25, 1969

Whereas accurate definition of the term "national commitment" in recent years has become obscured: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That (1) a national commitment for the purpose of this resolution means the use of the Armed Forces of the United States on foreign territory, or a promise to assist a foreign country, government, or people by the use of the Armed Forces or financial resources of the United States, either immediately or upon the happening of certain events, and (2) it is the sense of the Senate that a national commitment by the United States results only from affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches of the United States Government by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress specifically providing for such commitment.

COOPER-CHURCH AMENDMENT TO THE DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, FY 1970, DECEMBER 15, 1969

"SEC. 643. In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand."

FULBRIGHT AMENDMENT, (IN ITALICS), SECTION 502, ARMED FORCES APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION, 1971–P.L. 91–441, OCTOBER 7, 1970, (EXCERPT)

Not to exceed $2,800,000,000 of the funds authorized for appropriation for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act are authorized to be made available for their stated purposes to support: (A) Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces, (B) local forces in Laos and Thailand; and for related costs, during the fiscal year 1971 on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine. None of the funds appropriated to or for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States may be used for the purpose of paying any overseas allowance, per diem allowance, or any other addition to the regular base pay of any person serving with the free world forces in South Vietnam if the amount of such payment would be greater than the amount of special pay authorized to be paid, for an equivalent period of service, to members of the Armed Forces of the United States (under section 310 of title 37, United States Code) serving in Vietnam or in any other hostile fire area, except for continuation of payments of such additions to regular base pay provided in agreements executed prior to July 1, 1970. *Nothing in clause (A) of the first sentence of this paragraph shall be construed as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos.*

COOPER-CHURCH AMENDMENT TO THE SPECIAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1971, AS AMENDED, H.R. 19911, P.L. 91–652

SEC. 7. (a) In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds authorized or appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act may be used to finance the introduction of United States ground combat troops into Cambodia, or to provide United States advisers to or for military, paramilitary, police, or other security or intelligence forces in Cambodia.

(b) Military and economic assistance provided by the United States to Cambodia and authorized or appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act shall not be construed as a commitment by the United States to Cambodia for its defense.

Mansfield Amendment to Draft Extension Act, H.R. 6531, Public Law 92–129

TITLE IV—TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES IN INDOCHINA

Sec. 401. It is hereby declared to be the sense of Congress that the United States terminate at the earliest practicable date all military operations of the United States in Indochina, and provide for the prompt and orderly withdrawal of all United States military forces at a date certain subject to the release of all American prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam and forces allied with such Government, and an accounting for all Americans missing in action who have been held by or known to such Government or such forces. The Congress hereby urges and requests the President to implement the above expressed policy by initiating immediately the following actions:

(1) Negotiate with the Government of North Vietnam for an immediate cease-fire by all parties to the hostilities in Indochina.

(2) Negotiate with the Government of North Vietnam for the establishing of a final date for the withdrawal from Indochina of all military forces of the United States contingent upon the release at a date certain of all American prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam and forces allied with such Government.

(3) Negotiate with the Government of North Vietnam for an agreement which would provide for a series of phased and rapid withdrawals of United States military forces from Indochina subject to a corresponding series of phased releases of American prisoners of war, and for the release of any remaining American prisoners of war concurrently with the withdrawal of all remaining military forces of the United States by not later than the date established pursuant to paragraph (2) hereof.

SYMINGTON AMENDMENT, SECTION 505, ARMED FORCES APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION, 1972—H.R. 8687, P.L. 92-156, NOVEMBER 17, 1971 ,EXCERPT.

,a. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other Act may be expended in any amount in excess of $350,000,000 for the purpose of carrying out directly or indirectly any economic or military assistance, or any operation, project, or program of any kind, or for providing any goods, supplies, materials, equipment, services, personnel, or advisers in, to, for, or on behalf of Laos during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972.*

MANSFIELD AMENDMENT TO MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION BILL, H.R. 8687, P.L. 92-156, November 17, 1971

TITLE VI—TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES IN INDOCHINA

SEC. 601. (a) It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to terminate at the earliest practicable date all military operations of the United States in Indochina, and to provide for the prompt and orderly withdrawal of all United States military forces at a date certain, subject to the release of all American prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam and forces allied with such Government and an accounting for all Americans missing in action who have been held by or known to such Government or such forces. The Congress hereby urges and requests the President to implement the above-expressed policy by initiating immediately the following actions:

(1) Establishing a final date for the withdrawal from Indochina of all military forces of the United States ,contingent upon the release of all American prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam and forces allied with such Government and an accounting for all Americans missing in action who have been held by or known to such Government or such forces.

(2) Negotiate with the Government of North Vietnam for an immediate cease-fire by all parties to the hostilities in Indochina.

(3) Negotiate with the Government of North Vietnam for an agreement which would provide for a series of phased and rapid withdrawals of United States military forces from Indochina in exchange for a corresponding series of phased releases of American prisoners of war, and for the release of any remaining American prisoners of war concurrently with the withdrawal of all remaining military forces of the United States by not later than the date established by the President pursuant to paragraph (1) hereof or by such earlier date as may be agreed upon by the negotiating parties.

Approved November 17, 1971.

* Symington Amendment continues through Section 505,b. through ,f..

Fulbright-Aiken Amendment—Public Law 93-52, Section 108, July 1, 1973[1]

SOUTHEAST ASIA, COMBAT ACTIVITIES, FUNDS, PROHIBITION

SEC. 108. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by United States military forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.

Approved July 1, 1973.

Department of State Appropriation Authorization Act of 1973—P.L. 93-126, Section 13, October 18, 1973

SEC. 13. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after August 15, 1973, no funds heretofore or hereafter appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance the involvement of United States military forces in hostilities in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, unless specifically authorized hereafter by the Congress. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, upon enactment of this Act, no funds heretofore or hereafter appropriated may be obligated or expended for the purpose of providing assistance of any kind, directly or indirectly, to or on behalf of North Vietnam, unless specifically authorized hereafter by the Congress.

Military Procurement Authorization Act of 1973—P.L. 93-155, Section 806, November 16, 1973

SEC. 806. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, upon enactment of this Act, no funds heretofore or hereafter appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance the involvement of United States military forces in hostilities in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, unless specifically authorized hereafter by the Congress.

McGovern Amendment to Foreign Assistance Act of 1973—P.L. 93-189, Section 30, December 17, 1973

TERMINATION OF INDOCHINA WAR

SEC. 30. No funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other law may be expended to finance military or paramilitary operations by the United States in or over Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.

---

[1] H.J. Res. 630, approved July 1, 1973.

D. DOCUMENTS AND STATEMENTS BY VIETNAMESE AND CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES

PREMIER PHAM VAN DONG ON POSITION OF NORTH VIETNAM, APRIL 8, 1965

Pham Van Dong, premier of the DRV, elucidated the unswerving stand of the Government of the DRV on the Vietnam question in his report on Government work made at the second session of the Third National Assembly. The VNA issued the text of the report today. Premier Pham Van Dong said that it is the unswerving policy of the Government of the DRV to strictly respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to correctly implement their basic provisions as embodied in the following points:

1. Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people—peace, independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must withdraw from South Vietnam U.S. troops, military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, and cancel its "military alliance" with South Vietnam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must stop its acts of war against North Vietnam, completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the DRV.

2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still temporarily divided into two zones, the military provisions of

the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam must be strictly respected —the two zones must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries, there must be no foreign military bases, or military personnel in their respective territory.

3. The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of the NFLSV without any foreign interference.

4. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.

Pham Van Dong said that the above-mentioned stand of the DRV Government unquestionably enjoys the approval and support of all peace- and justice-loving governments and peoples in the world. The Government of the DRV is of the view that the stand expounded above is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem. If this basis is recognized, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Vietnam.

The Government of the DRV declares that any approach contrary to the above-mentioned stand is inappropriate, any approach tending to secure a United Nations intervention in the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate, because such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam.

EXTRACT OF SPEECH BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER TRAN VAN DO ON THE OCCASION OF THE "DAY FOR INTERNATIONAL AID," JUNE 22, 1965[1]

For many years, South Vietnam has been plunged into a war imposed on it by the Communists. It has been able to preserve the integrity of its territory and freedom only because of the courage of its sons and the friendly countries of the free world, which have not spared either their friendship or their generous assistance.

To the representatives of those countries present at this ceremony, I express, in the name of the Republic and people of South Vietnam, our profound gratitude, which I ask them to convey to their Government.

It is also my duty to tell them what we are doing with their assistance. Some is used to relieve the misery and suffering of our people as a result of the war, to rebuild on our ruins, and to reconstruct our nation; some to help us defend ourselves against the Communist aggression. I say "defend ourselves" advisedly, for our primary objective continues to be the search for peace and not the spread or prolongation of the war. We do, certainly, want peace, but not peace at any price. If it is to be a just and enduring peace, the following conditions must be met:

1. Since the war now in progress in Vietnam was provoked by Communist aggression and subversion, it is essential, first of all, that

[1] Source: Department of State.

these subversive and military activities undertaken, directed, and supported from abroad against the independence and freedom of the people of South Vietnam cease, and that the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of the two zones, a principle that was laid down in the 1954 Geneva agreement and in international law, be respected. Consequently, the Communist regime of Hanoi must dissolve all these front organizations and agencies it has created in South Vietnam under the title the "Front for the Liberation of the South," "Liberation Radio Station," and "People's Revolutionary Party," and, it must remove from South Vietnam the troops and the political and military leaders it has sent there illegally.

2. The internal affairs of the South Vietnamese people must be left to the discretion of those people in conformity with democratic principles and without any foreign interference from whatever source. That will be feasible, obviously, only when the aggression by the Communist regime of Hanoi and its campaign of intimidation to which the people of South Vietnam have been subjected have been terminated.

3. As soon as aggression has ceased, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and the nations that come to its aid will be able to suspend the military measures in the territory of South Vietnam and beyond its boundaries that are now necessary to defend that territory against Communist aggression. Moreover, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam is prepared to ask friendly nations then to remove their military forces from South Vietnam. It reserves the right, however, to take whatever measures are necessary to see that law and order are respected throughout the territory of South Vietnam and to insure the safety of the South Vietnamese people, as well as the right to appeal again for foreign assistance in the case of further aggression or threat of aggression.

4. Lastly, the independence and freedom of the people of South Vietnam must be effectively guaranteed.

If the Communist regime in Hanoi sincerely wants peace, if it puts the interests of the nation above those of an ideology or a party, if it wants the Vietnamese people and the other peoples of Southeast Asia to live in peace instead of war, prosperity instead of poverty, freedom instead of slavery, it has only to put an end to aggression.

This is the only path that we believe can lead to peace if the South Vietnamese people are to be able to enjoy the full benefits of the aid that the friendly nations have so generously lavished upon it.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM[1]

EFFECTIVE APRIL 1, 1967

PREAMBLE

Confident that the patriotism, indomitable will, and unyielding traditions of the people will assure a radiant future for our country;

[1] Department of State release, Apr. 1, 1967.

Conscious that after many years of foreign domination, followed by the division of our territory, dictatorship and war, the people of Viet-Nam must take responsibility before history to perpetuate those hardy traditions and at the same time to welcome progressive ideas in order to establish a republican form of government of the people, by the people and for the people whose purpose is to unite the people, unite the territory and assure independence, freedom, and democracy with justice and altruism for the present and future generations;

We, 117 Deputies of the National Constituent Assembly representing the people of Viet-Nam, after debate, approve this Constitution.

Chapter I

BASIC PROVISIONS

Article 1. (1) Viet-Nam is a territorially indivisible, unified and independent Republic.

(2) National sovereignty resides in the whole people.

Article 2. (1) The State recognizes and guarantees the fundamental rights of all citizens.

(2) The State advocates equality of all citizens without discrimination as of sex, religion, ethnic origin or political party. Minority compatriots shall receive special support so that they can achieve the same rate of progress as the population as a whole.

(3) It is the duty of every citizen to serve the interests of the nation and the people.

Article 3. The functions and powers of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government must be clearly delineated. Activities of these three branches must be coordinated and harmonized in order to realize public order and prosperity on the basis of freedom, democracy and social justice.

Article 4. (1) The Republic of Viet-Nam opposes Communism in all forms.

(2) Every activity designed to propagate or implement Communism is prohibited.

Article 5. (1) The Republic of Viet-Nam shall approve those principles of international law which are not contrary to its national sovereignty and equality between nations.

(2) The Republic of Viet-Nam is determined to oppose all forms of aggression and strives to contribute to the building of international peace and security.

Chapter II

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CITIZENS

Article 6. (1) The State respects human dignity.

(2) The law protects the freedom, lives, property and honor of every citizen.

Article 7. (1) The State respects and protects the security of each individual and the right of every citizen to plead his case before a Court of Law.

(2) No one can be arrested or detained without a legal order issued by an agency with legal jurisdiction conferred upon it by law, except in case of flagrante delicto.

(3) The accused and his next of kin must be informed of the accusation against him within the time limit prescribed by law. Detentions must be controlled by an agency of the Judiciary.

(4) No citizen can be tortured, threatened or forced to confess. A confession obtained by torture, threat or coercion will not be considered as valid evidence.

(5) A defendant is entitled to a speedy and public trial.

(6) The defendant has the right to a defense lawyer for counsel in every phase of the interrogation, including the preliminary investigation.

(7) Any person accused of minor offenses who does not have a record of more than three months imprisonment for an intentional infraction may be released from pre-trial custody provided that he or she is employed and has a fixed residence. Women pregnant more than three months who are accused of minor offenses and who are employed and have a fixed residence may be released from pre-trial custody.

(8) The accused is presumed innocent until sentence recognizing his guilt is handed down.

In event of doubt, the court shall rule in favor of the accused.

(9) If unjustly detained, a person has the right to demand compensation for damages from the State after he has been pronounced innocent, in accordance with conditions determined by law.

(10) No one can be detained for indebtedness.

Article 8. (1) The private life, home and correspondence of every citizen must be respected.

(2) No one has the right to enter the residence, search the premises, or confiscate the property of a person unless in possession of orders from a court or when necessary to the defense of security and public order within limits prescribed by law.

(3) Privacy of correspondence is protected by law. Any restriction imposed on this right must be determined by law.

Article 9. (1) The State respects and guarantees freedom of religious belief and freedom to preach and practice religion of every citizen provided it does not violate the national interest, and is not harmful to public safety and order or contrary to good morals.

(2) No religion is recognized as the State religion. The State is impartial in the development of religions.

Article 10. (1) The State recognizes freedom of education.

(2) Basic education is compulsory and free of charge.

(3) University education is autonomous.

(4) Talented persons who do not have means shall be given aid and support to continue their studies.

(5) The State encourages and supports research and creative work by citizens in the fields of science, letters and the arts.

Article 11. (1) Culture and education must be considered matters of national policy, on a national, scientific and humanistic basis.

(2) An appropriate budge must be reserved for the development of culture and education.

Article 12. (1) The State recognizes freedom of thought, speech, press and publishing provided the exercise does not harm personal honor, national security or good morals.

92-991 O - 75 - 38

(2) Censorship is abolished except for motion pictures and plays.
(3) Press regulations will be prescribed by law.

Article 13. (1) Every citizen has the right to meet and form associations within the framework prescribed by law.

(2) Every citizen has the right to vote, run for office and participate in public affairs on an equal basis and in accordance with conditions and procedures prescribed by law.

(3) The State respects the political rights of all citizens, including the right to petition freely and engage in overt, non-violent and legal opposition.

Article 14. Every citizen enjoys freedom to choose his place of residence and freedom of movement including the right to go and return from abroad. These freedoms can be restricted by law only for reasons of public health, security or national defense.

Article 15. (1) Every citizen has the right and the duty to work and shall receive fair remuneration enabling him and his family to live in dignity.

(2) The State shall endeavor to create employment for all citizens.

Article 16. Freedom to join labor unions and to strike is respected within the framework and regulations prescribed by law.

Article 17. (1) The State recognizes the family as the foundation of society. The State encourages and supports the formation of families, and assists expectant mothers and infants.

(2) Marriage must be based on mutual consent, equality and cooperation.

Article 18. (1) The State endeavors to establish a system of social security.

(2) It is the duty of the State to establish a system of social welfare and public health.

(3) It is the duty of the State to afford spiritual and material assistance to the nation's warriors, as well as to support and raise the nation's orphans.

Article 19. (1) The State recognizes and guarantees the right of private property.

(2) The State advocates a policy of making the people property owners.

(3) Expropriation or requisition by the State for the common good must be accompanied by speedy and just compensation at price levels existing at time of expropriation or requisition.

Article 20. (1) Freedom of trade and competition is recognized, but it cannot be exercised to secure monopoly or manipulation of the Market.

(2) The State facilitates economic cooperation which has the nature of mutual economic assistance.

(3) The State gives special support to those elements of society which have a low standard of living.

Article 21. The State advocates raising the standard of living of rural citizens, and especially helping farmers to have farmland.

Article 22. On the basis of equality between duties and rights, workers have the right to choose representatives to participate in the management of business enterprises, especially in matters concerning

wages and conditions of work in accordance with framework and procedures prescribed by law.

Article 23. (1) Military personnel elected to public offices or serving in positions in the central government must be demobilized or take leave of absence without salary, according to their choice.

(2) Military personnel on active duty are not permitted to engage in political party activity.

Article 24. (1) The State recognizes the presence of ethnic minorities in the Vietnamese community.

(2) The State respects the habits and customs of the minority compatriots. Customary courts shall be established to pronounce judgments in certain cases involving habits and customs of minority compatriots.

(3) A law shall prescribe special rights in order to assist minority compatriots.

Article 25. Every citizen has the duty to defend the country and the Republic.

Article 26. Every citizen has the duty to defend the Constitution and respect the Law.

Article 27. Every citizen has the duty to fulfill his military obligations as prescribed by law.

Article 28. Every citizen has the duty to pay taxes in accordance with the provisions of law.

Article 29. Any restriction upon the fundamental rights of the citizens must be prescribed by law and the time and place within which such a restriction is in force must be clearly specified. In any event the essence of all basic freedoms shall not be violated.

Chapter III

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Article 30. (1) Legislative power is vested by the people in the National Assembly.

(2) The National Assembly includes two houses, the House of Representatives and the Senate.

The House of Representatives

Article 31. The House of Representatives includes from 100 to 200 Representatives.

(1) Representatives shall be elected by universal and direct suffrage, and secret ballot. Candidates run as individuals from separate constituencies no larger than provinces.

(2) The term of office of Representatives shall be four years. Representatives may be re-elected.

(3) The election for a new House of Representatives shall be completed at least one month prior to the completion of the term of the old House of Representatives.

Article 32. Citizens meeting the following qualifications may run for the House of Representatives:

(1) Must have Vietnamese citizenship since birth or having obtained Vietnamese citizenship at least seven years prior to the day of election, or having recovered Vietnamese citizenship at least five years prior to the day of election;

(2) Must be at least 25 years of age on the day of election;
(3) Enjoy full rights of citizenship;
(4) Have legal draft status in order;
(5) Meet other conditions specified in the electoral law of the House of Representatives.

The Senate.

Article 33. The Senate includes from 30 to 60 members.

(1) Senators are elected at large by universal and direct suffrage, and secret ballot. Election is by list voting and on a basis of plurality. Each list includes from one-third to one-sixth of the total membership of the Senate.

(2) The term of office for Senators shall be six years. One half of the Senate shall be re-elected every three years. Senators may be re-elected.

(3) Members of the first Senate shall be divided into two groups by drawing lots. The first group will serve six years, the second group three years.

(4) The election of one half of the Senate shall take place at least one month before the term of that half of the Senate ends.

Article 34. Candidates for the Senate must be citizens at least thirty years of age on the day of election. They must meet all the conditions prescribed in the electoral law of the Senate and those prescribed in Article 32.

Article 35. (1) If for any reason a vacancy occurs in the House of Representatives more than two years prior to the end of the term, the election of a replacement will be held within three months.

(2) If for any reason a vacancy occurs in the Senate, the election of the replacement shall be held concurrently with the next regular election of one-half of the Senate.

Article 36. Procedures and conditions for the candidacies and election of Representatives and Senators, including ethnic minority Representatives, will be prescribed by law.

Guarantees for Representatives and Senators

Article 37. (1) Representatives or Senators cannot be prosecuted, pursued, incarcerated or judged for any statement or vote in the National Assembly.

(2) During their entire term of office, Representatives and Senators cannot be prosecuted, pursued, incarcerated or judged without the approval of three-fourths of the total number of Representatives or Senators, except in cases of flagrante delicto.

(3) In cases of flagrante delicto prosecution or detention of Representatives and Senators must be suspended if the House concerned so decides.

(4) Representatives and Senators have the right to keep secret the origin of documents presented to the National Assembly.

(5) The responsibilities of Representatives and Senators are incompatible with any other public or elected position.

(6) Representatives and Senators may serve as instructors at universities and advanced technical schools.

(7) Under no circumstances may a Representative or Senator or his spouse participate in a bid or sign a contract with a government agency.

Article 38. (1) In cases of treason or other major crimes, Representatives or Senators may be removed from office by the House concerned.

(2) Removal from office must be proposed by two-thirds of the total number of Representatives or Senators.

(3) The resolution to remove a member from office must be approved by three-quarters of the total number of Representatives or Senators.

(4) The Representative or Senator concerned has the right to a defense counsel during all phases of the removal procedure.

Authority of the National Assembly

Article 39. The National Assembly has the power to:

(1) Vote legislation.

(2) Ratify treaties and international agreements.

(3) Determine declarations of war and holding of peace talks.

(4) Determine declarations of a state of war.

(5) Control the government in the execution of national policy.

(6) Within the framework of each House, pass on the validation of the election of Representatives or Senators.

Article 40. (1) Each House, with the agreement of one-third of its membership, has the right to request the Prime Minister or government officials to appear before it to answer questions regarding the execution of national policy.

(2) Committee chairmen in each House have the right to request government officials to appear before sessions of their committee to report on problems relating to the ministries concerned.

Article 41. The Senate has the right to open investigations regarding the execution of national policy and to request public agencies to produce documents necessary in its investigations.

Article 42. (1) The National Assembly has the right to recommend the replacement of part or all of the government by a two-thirds majority vote of the total number of Representatives and Senators.

(2) The recommendation is binding unless the President has special reasons for rejecting it.

(3) In the event of rejection by the President, the National Assembly has the right to vote final approval of the recommendation by a three-quarters majority vote of the total number of Representatives and Senators. This recommendation by the National Assembly is binding from the day it is voted.

Legislative procedures

Article 43. (1) Representatives and Senators have the right to introduce bills.

(2) The President has the right to introduce bills.

(3) Bills must be submitted to the office of the House of Representatives.

(4) If the House of Representatives approves or rejects a bill, it shall transmit the bill to the office of the Senate within three full days.

(5) If the Senate agrees with the viewpoint of the House of Representatives the bill shall be transmitted to the President for promulgation or will be abolished.

(6) If the Senate does not agree with the viewpoint of the House of Representatives, it shall return the bill to the House of Representatives within three full days with an explanatory resolution.

(7) In the latter case, the House of Representatives has the right to vote final approval of the bill with a two-thirds majority of its total membership.

(8) If the House of Representatives is unable to reach the above two-thirds majority, the viewpoint of the Senate shall be considered as final approval.

(9) The time limit for debating and voting on a bill in the Senate may not exceed half the time required to debate and vote on the bill in the House of Representatives. The time limit for debating and voting on a bill in the House of Representatives may not exceed twice the time required to debate and vote on the bill in the Senate.

Article 44. (1) Bills approved by the National Assembly will be transmitted to the President within three full days.

(2) The President shall promulgate the law within 15 full days from the date of receipt.

(3) If the National Assembly appraises the matter as urgent, the bill must be promulgated within seven full days.

(4) If the President does not promulgate the bill within the specified period of time, the bill shall automatically become law and shall be promulgated by the Chairman of the Senate.

Article 45. (1) Within the period allowed for promulgation, the President has the right to send an explanatory message requesting the National Assembly to reconsider one or several provisions of the bill.

(2) In this case, the National Assembly shall meet in joint plenary session to vote final approval of the bill with an absolute majority of the total number of Representatives and Senators. If the National Assembly votes to reject the request of reconsideration of the President, the bill shall automatically become law and will be returned to the President for promulgation.

Article 46. (1) The draft budget shall be submitted to the office of the House of Representatives prior to September 30.

(2) Representatives and Senators have the right to propose additional expenditures but shall at the same time purpose equivalent new receipts.

(3) The House of Representatives shall vote on the draft budget prior to November 30 and transmit the approved version to the Senate by December 1 at the latest.

(4) The Senate shall vote on the draft budget before December 31.

(5) During the above-mentioned period, if the Senate requests the House of Representatives to reconsider one or several provisions of the draft budget, then the procedures outlined in Article 43 shall be applied. In the event that the draft budget has not been finally voted by December 31, the President has the right to sign Decree-laws authorizing expenditure of the equivalent to one-twelfth of the previous budget until the House of Representatives has voted final approval of the draft budget.

Article 47. (1) Each house shall meet in regular and extraordinary sessions.

(2) Every year each House shall meet in two regular sessions: one session beginning on the first Monday of April; the other beginning on the first Monday of October. A session shall not last for more than ninety days. However, the House of Representatives may prolong its session in order to vote final approval of the draft budget.

(3) Either House may meet in extraordinary sessions when so requested by the President or one-third of the Representatives or Senators. When extraordinary sessions are convened by the President, the President will fix the agenda.

Article 48. (1) Each House shall meet in open session except when more than half the members present in the House request a closed session.

(2) In open sessions verbatim reports of the debate and documents presented shall be published in the official journal.

Article 49. (1) Each House shall elect its Chairman and permanent officers.

(2) Each House may establish standing and special committees.

(3) Each House has full power to establish its own internal rules.

(4) The offices of the two Houses will meet together to determine procedures for maintaining liaison and activities between the two Houses.

Article 50. (1) The Chairman of the Senate shall convene and preside over joint plenary sessions of both Houses.

(2) If the Chairman of the Senate is unable to perform this function, it will be performed by the Chairman of the House of Representatives.

Chapter IV

The Executive

Article 51. Executive authority is vested by the people in the President.

Article 52. (1) The President and Vice President run together on one list and are elected by the entire nation by direct suffrage and secret ballot.

(2) The term of office of the President and Vice President shall be four years. The President and Vice President may be re-elected once.

(3) The term of office of the President and Vice President ends precisely at 12:00 noon on the last day of the forty-eighth month from the day they took office, and the term of the new President and Vice President begins at that time.

(4) The election of the new President and new Vice President will be held on a Sunday, four weeks before the term of the incumbent President ends.

Article 53. Citizens meeting the following qualifications may run for President or Vice President:

(1) Must have Vietnamese citizenship and must have resided continuously in Viet-Nam for at least ten years prior to the day of election. Time spend abroad on official assignment or in political exile is considered as residence in Viet-Nam;

(2) Must be at least 35 years of age on the day of election;

(3) Must have legal draft status in order;
(4) Enjoy full rights of citizenship;
(5) Meet all other conditions specified in the Presidential and Vice Presidential election law.

Article 54. (1) The Supreme Court shall establish lists of candidates, control the fairness, and announce the results of the election.

(2) Candidates shall receive equal means in the electoral campaign.

(3) Procedures and conditions governing candidacies and election of the President and Vice President shall be prescribed by law.

Article 55. When assuming office, the President, witnessed by the Supreme Court and National Assembly, shall take the following oath before the people: "I solemnly swear before the people of the nation to protect the Fatherland, respect our Constitution, serve the interests of the Nation and the People, and to the best of my ability fulfill my duties as President of the Republic of Viet-Nam."

Article 56. (1) The duties of the President and Vice President may terminate prior to the end of their terms of office in the following circumstances:

(a) Death;
(b) Resignation;
(c) Impeachment;
(d) Serious and prolonged illness such that the incumbent can no longer accomplish his duties. This disability shall be recognized by three-fourths of the total membership of the two houses of the National Assembly after complete medical expertise.

(2) In the event that the duties of the President are terminated more than one year prior to the end of his term of office, the Vice President will temporarily assume the Presidency for a period not to exceed three months in order to organize the election of a new President and new Vice President for a new term of office.

(3) In the event that the duties of the President are terminated within one year prior to the end of his term of office, the Vice President shall assume the Presidency for the remainder of the term, except in cases of impeachment of the President.

(4) If for any reason the Vice President is unable to assume the Presidency, the Chairman of the Senate shall assume the office for a period not to exceed three months in order to organize the election of a new President and new Vice President for a new term of office.

Article 57. The President promulgates laws within the period determined in Article 44.

Article 58. (1) The President appoints the Prime Minister. Upon the proposal of the Prime Minister, the President appoints members of the government.

(2) The President has the right to reorganize all or part of the government on his own initiative, or upon the recommendation of the National Assembly.

Article 59. (1) The President appoints, with the approval of the Senate, Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions and Rectors of Universities.

(2) The President represents the Nation in international relations and receives the letters of accreditation of diplomatic envoys.

(3) The President signs and, after ratification by the National Assembly, promulgates treaties and international agreements.

Article 60. The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Article 61. (1) The President grants all types of decorations.

(2) The President has the right to grant amnesty and pardon for criminals.

Article 62. (1) The President determines national policy.

(2) The President presides over the Council of Ministers.

Article 63. (1) The President communicates with the National Assembly by message. In each regular session, and whenever the President considers it necessary, he shall advise the National Assembly of the situation in the country and of domestic and foreign policies of the government.

(2) The Prime Minister and other government officials may participate in sessions of the National Assembly or its committees in order to present and explain matters relating to national policy and its execution.

Article 64. (1) In special situations, the President may sign Decree-Laws declaring states of alert, siege or emergency over part or all of the territory of the country.

(2) The National Assembly shall meet no later than twelve days after the date of promulgation of the Decree-Law in order to ratify, amend or reject it.

(3) If the National Assembly rejects or amends the President's Decree-Law, the special situations which were decreed shall end or be modified accordingly.

Article 65. In a state of war, and when it is impossible to organize elections, the President, with the approval of two-thirds of the total membership of the National Assembly, has the right to prolong the terms of some of the elected bodies of the country and to appoint some province chiefs.

Article 66. (1) The Vice President is Chairman of the Culture and Education Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Ethnic Minority Council.

(2) The Vice President shall not hold any other position in the government.

Article 67. (1) The Prime Minister directs the government and the administrative agencies of the nation.

(2) The Prime Minister is responsible before the President for the execution of national policy.

Article 68. (1) The President, Vice President, Prime Minister and members of the government shall not hold any position in the private sector whether it is remunerated or not.

(2) In no event may spouses of persons holding the above positions participate in government bids or contracts.

Article 69. (1) It is the duty of the National Security Council to: examine all matters relating to national security and defense; propose appropriate measures for the maintenance of national security; propose the declaration of states of alert, siege, emergency or war; propose declarations of war or the holding of peace talks.

(2) The President is Chairman of the National Security Council.

(3) A law shall prescribe the organization and functioning of the National Security Council.

Article 70. (1) The principle of administrative decentralization is recognized for local communities with legal status: Villages, Provinces, Cities, and the Capital.

(2) A law shall prescribe the organization and functioning of local administration.

Article 71. (1) Deliberative bodies and the heads of executive bodies of local communities shall be elected by universal and direct suffrage and secret ballot.

(2) At the village level, Village Chiefs may be elected by Village Councils from among Village Council members.

Article 72. The head of executive bodies of local communities units are:

Villages—Village Chief;
Provinces—Province Chief;
Cities—Mayor;
Capital—Mayor.

Article 73. The deliberative bodies of local communities are:

Villages—Village Council;
Provinces—Province Council;
Cities—Municipal Council;
Capital—Municipal Council.

Article 74. The government will appoint two civil servants who have the responsibility to assist Mayors, Province Chiefs and Village Chiefs in administrative and security matters, as well as other administrative personnel.

Article 75. Members of deliberative bodies and heads of executive bodies of local communities may be dismissed by the President if they violate the Constitution, laws of the nation, or national policy.

Chapter V

THE JUDICIARY

Article 76. (1) Independent judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court of Justice and is exercised by presiding judges.

(2) A law shall establish the organization and administration of the Judiciary.

Article 77. Every Court shall be established by law with an element of professional Presiding and Prosecuting Judges and in accordance with a procedure which respects the right of defense.

Article 78. (1) The functions of Presiding Judges and Prosecuting Judges are clearly delineated, and the two shall be governed by separate statutes.

(2) Presiding Judges make decisions according to their consciences and the law, under the control of the Supreme Court of Justice.

(3) Prosecuting Judges supervise the application of the law in order to protect public order, under the control of the Ministry of Justice.

Article 79. Presiding Judges can be relieved of their functions

only in cases of conviction, or violation of discipline, or mental or physical incapacity.

Article 80. (1) The Supreme Court of Justice includes from nine to fifteen judges selected by the National Assembly and appointed by the President from a list of 30 persons elected by the Association of Presiding Judges, Association of Prosecuting Judges and Association of Lawyers.

(2) Judges of the Supreme Court of Justice must be judges or lawyers who have served at least ten years in the Judiciary.

(3) The term of office of Judges of the Supreme Court of Justice shall be six years.

(4) The numbers of electors of the Association of Presiding Judges, Association of Prosecuting Judges and Association of Lawyers shall be equal.

(5) A law shall prescribe the organization and regulation of the Supreme Court of Justice.

Article 81. (1) The Supreme Court of Justice is empowered to construe the Constitution, to decide on the constitutionality of all laws and decree-laws, and to decide on the constitutionality and legality of decrees and administrative decisions.

(2) The Supreme Court of Justice is empowered to decide on the dissolution of a political party whose policy and activities oppose the republican form of government.

(3) In these cases, the Supreme Court of Justice shall meet in plenary session. Representatives of the legislative and executive branches may participate in order to present their viewpoints.

(4) Decisions declaring the unconstitutionality of a law or the dissolution of a political party require a three-fourths vote of the total number of Supreme Court judges.

Article 82. The Supreme Court of Justice is empowered to review judgments appealed from courts of last resort.

Article 83. The Supreme Court of Justice shall have an autonomous budget and shall be empowered to establish regulations governing the judiciary.

Article 84. (1) The Council of Judges has the following responsibilities:

To propose the appointment, promotion, transfer and disciplining of presiding Judges;

To advise the Supreme Court in matters relating to the Judiciary.

(2) The Council of Judges shall be composed of presiding Judges elected by the Association of Presiding Judges.

(3) A law shall prescribe the organization and functioning of the Council of Judges.

Chapter VI

Special Institutions

The Special Court of Justice

Article 85. The Special Court of Justice is empowered to remove from office the President, Vice President, Prime Minister, Ministers, Supreme Court Judges and members of the Inspectorate in cases of treason or other major crimes.

Article 86. (1) The Special Court is chaired by the Chairman of the Supreme Court and includes five Representatives and five Senators.

(2) When the Chairman of the Supreme Court is accused, the Chairman of the Senate shall preside over the Special Court of Justice.

Article 87. (1) The proposal to bring charges and citing reasons therefor shall be signed by more than one half of the total number of Representatives and Senators. The motion of impeachment shall be approved by a two-thirds majority vote of the total number of Representatives and Senators and it must be approved by a majority vote of ¾ of the total number of Representatives and Senators.

(2) The functions of the accused shall be suspended from the date of approval of the motion by the National Assembly until the decision of the Special Court of Justice is rendered.

(3) The Special Court of Justice decides removal from office by a three-fourths vote of its membership. In the particular case of the President and Vice President, the decision shall be by a four-fifths vote of the total membership.

(4) The accused shall enjoy the right of defense during the entire proceedings.

(5) After having been removed from office, the accused may be tried by an ordinary Court.

(6) A law shall prescribe the organization, functioning and procedures of the Special Court of Justice.

The Inspectorate

Article 88. The Inspectorate is empowered to:

(1) Inspect, control and investigate personnel of all public and private agencies engaged as accessory or accomplice in corruption, speculation, influence-peddling or acts harmful to the national interest;

(2) Audit accounts of public agencies and limited partnership firms with national capital.

(3) Audit the property of personnel of public agencies including the President, Vice President, Prime Minister, Representatives, Senators and the Chairman of the Supreme Court of Justice.

(4) In the cases of the Chairman and members of the Inspectorate, the audit of personal property shall be conducted by the Supreme Court of Justice.

Article 89. The Inspectorate is empowered to propose disciplinary measures against guilty persons or to request prosecution by competent Courts.

(2) The Inspectorate has the right to announce publicly the results of its investigations.

Article 90. (1) The Inspectorate includes from nine to eighteen Inspectors, one-third designated by the National Assembly, one-third by the President and one-third by the Supreme Court Justice.

(2) Inspectors shall enjoy those powers and guarantees necessary for them to accomplish their duties.

Article 91. (1) The Inspectorate shall have an autonomous budget and shall be empowered to establish regulations organizing and governing the Inspectorate branch.

(2) A law shall prescribe the organization and the functioning of the Inspectorate.

The Armed Forces Council

Article 92. (1) The Armed Forces Council advises the President in matters relating to the Armed Forces, especially promotion, transfer and disciplining of soldiers of all ranks.

(2) A law shall prescribe the organization and functioning of the Armed Forces Council.

The Culture and Education Council

Article 93. (1) The Culture and Education Council advises the government in the drafting and execution of cultural and educational policy. A National Academy shall be established.

(2) With the approval of the National Assembly, the Culture and Education Council may select representatives to report to the National Assembly on related matters.

(3) The Culture and Education Council may contribute ideas before the National Assembly debates bills relating to culture and education.

Article 94. (1) The membership of the Culture and Education Council includes:

One-third designated by the President;

Two-thirds elected by public and private cultural and educational organizations and by parent-teacher associations.

(2) The term of office of the Culture and Education Council shall be four years.

(3) A law shall prescribe the organization and functioning of the Culture and Education Council.

The Economic and Social Council

Article 95. (1) The Economic and Social Council advises the government in economic and social matters.

(2) With the approval of the National Assembly, the Economic and Social Council may select representatives to report to the National Assembly on related matters.

(3) The Economic and Social Council may contribute ideas before the National Assembly debates bills relating to economic and social matters.

Article 96. (1) The membership of the Economic and Social Council includes:

One-third designated by the President;

Two-thirds elected by industrial and commercial organizations, and by labor unions and associations having an economic and social character.

(2) The term of office of the Economic and Social Council shall be four years.

(3) A law shall prescribe the organization and functioning of the Economic and Social Council.

The Ethnic Council

Article 97. (1) The Ethnic Council advises the government in matters affecting ethnic minorities.

(2) With the approval of the National Assembly, the Ethnic Council may select representatives to report to the National Assembly on related matters.

(3) The Ethnic Council may contribute ideas before the National Assembly debates bills relating to ethnic minorities.

Article 98. (1) The membership of the Ethnic Council includes:

One-third designated by the President;

Two-thirds elected by the ethnic minorities.

(2) The term of office of the Ethnic Council shall be four years.

(3) A law shall prescribe the organization and functioning of the Ethnic Council.

Chapter VII

POLITICAL PARTIES AND OPPOSITION

Article 99. (1) The State recognizes that political parties have an essential role in a democratic system.

(2) Political parties may be established and operated freely, according to the procedures and conditions prescribed by law.

Article 100. The State encourages progress toward a two-party system.

Article 101. The State recognizes the institutionalizing of political opposition.

Article 102. A law shall prescribe regulations of Political Parties and political opposition.

Chapter VIII

AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION

Article 103. (1) The President or an absolute majority of the total number of Representatives or an absolute majority of the total number of Senators has the right to propose amendments to the Constitution.

(2) The proposal shall cite reasons, and therefore shall be submitted to the Office of the Senate.

Article 104. A joint Committee shall be established to research the proposed amendment and report to joint plenary session of the Assembly.

Article 105. The resolution to amend the Constitution must be approved by two-thirds of the total number of Representatives and Senators.

Article 106. The President shall promulgate the Amendment to the Constitution according to the procedures prescribed in Article 44.

Article 107. Article 1 of the Constitution and this article may not be amended or deleted.

Chapter IX

TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

Article 108. The Constitution takes effect from the date it is promulgated, and the Provisional Charter of June 19, 1965, is automatically invalidated.

Article 109. During the transitional period, the National Assembly popularly elected on September 11, 1966, representing the people of the nation in the legislative sphere, will:

1. Draft and approve: Election laws for the elections of the President and Vice President, Senate and House of Representatives; laws organizing the Supreme Court of Justice and the Inspectorate; political party and press regulations.
2. Ratify treaties.

Article 110. From the time first President and Vice President take office, the Assembly popularly elected on September 11, 1966, shall assume legislative powers until the first National Legislative Assembly is convened.

Article 111. During the transitional period, the National Leadership Committee and the Central Executive Committee shall continue in power until the first President and Vice President take office.

Article 112. During the transitional period existing Courts shall continue to exercise judicial authority until the judicial institutions prescribed in this Constitution are established.

Article 113. The National Assembly popularly elected on September 11, 1966 will establish a list of candidates, control the fairness and announce the result of the election of the first President and Vice President.

Article 114. During the first Presidential term, the President may appoint province chiefs.

Article 115. The election of the President and Vice President shall be organized no later than six months from the date of promulgation of this Constitution.

Article 116. The election of the National Legislative Assembly and the organization of the Supreme Court of Justice and Inspectorate shall be accomplished no later than twelve months from the date the first President takes office.

Article 117. The other structures prescribed by the Constitution shall be established no later than two years from the date the first National Assembly is convened.

TEXT OF POLITICAL PROGRAM ADOPTED BY SOUTH VIETNAM NATIONAL FRONT FOR LIBERATION, AUGUST 1967

[Text] Hanoi—Following is the full text of the political program of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation adopted by an extraordinary congress of the Front convened by its Central Committee in mid-August 1967. The program was distributed to Vietnamese and foreign pressmen at a news conference here today by Nguyen Van Tien, head of the NFLSV permanent representation in North Vietnam:

Political Program of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation

In 1960, the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation came into being with its 10-point program aimed at uniting the entire people against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys. Since then,

the Front has achieved a broad union of the various sections of the people, the political parties, organizations, nationalities, religious communities, and patriotic personalities with a view to jointly fighting against U.S. aggression, for national salvation. It has successfully consolidated its base among the broad masses of the people; at the same time, it has achieved joint action with many political and religious forces and won over many industrialists and traders, many officials and functionaries of the puppet administration, and many officers and men of the puppet army.

The Front has constantly enjoyed wholehearted encouragement and assistance from our compatriots in the north and abroad. It has also enjoyed ever stronger approval and support from the peoples of neighboring Cambodia and Laos, from the peoples of the socialist, nationalist, and other countries in the world, including progressive people in the United States.

Under the leadership of the NFLSV, our people in the south have gone from victory to victory. The prestige of the Front has been unceasingly enhanced at home and abroad. The South Vietnam National Front for Liberation has become the sole genuine representative of the heroic South Vietnamese people.

These great achievements have proved that the line and policy of the front are correct, and that the strength of our people's unity and struggle is invincible.

At present, despite heavy defeats, the U.S. imperialists are still unwilling to give up their aggressive designs against Vietnam. They are stepping up the war, trampling upon the south, and intensifying the bombing of the north of our country. The monstrous crimes of the U.S. imperialists, however, have only served to deepen our people's hatred and increase their indomitable will. The people of South Vietnam, regardless of social standing, and even a number of persons in the puppet army and administration, have seen through the true features of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, hate them, and want to contribute to the struggle against U.S. aggression, for national salvation.

Never before in our nation's history has the mettle of our entire people united for the fight to wipe out the enemy and save the country been so strong as now. Our people are in a victorious, initiative, and offensive position. The U.S. imperialists and the lackeys have been increasingly driven into passivity and embarrassment; they are in an impasse and are sustaining defeats.

At this juncture, in a spirit of developing the former program, the NFLSV has worked out this political program with a view to further broadening the bloc of great national union, encouraging and stimulating the entire people to rush forward, resolved to fight and defeat the U.S. aggressors, and to build an independent, democratic, peaceful, neutral, and prosperous South Vietnam.

I. UNITE THE ENTIRE PEOPLE, FIGHT THE U.S. AGGRESSORS, SAVE THE COUNTRY

1. During 4,000 years of their history, the Vietnamese people have united and fought against foreign invasion to preserve their inde-

pendence and freedom. Ever since our country was conquered by the French colonialists, our people have fought unremittingly for their liberation. In 1945, our people from north to south rose up, successfully carried out the August revolution, seized political power from the Japanese militarists and their lackeys, and founded the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

When the French colonialists came back to invade our country once again, our entire people heroically fought for nearly nine years, brought our sacred resistance to the great victory of Dien Bien Phu, smashing the aggressive schemes of the French colonialists and the interventionist policy of the U.S. imperialists.

The independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam were formally recognized by the 1954 Geneva conference. Since then, our compatriots in South Vietnam together with the people all over the country, should have been living in peace and building a free and happy life. However, the U.S. imperialists have sabotaged the Geneva agreements, ousted the French colonialists, set up in South Vietnam an extremely cruel puppet regime, and tried to turn the southern part of Vietnam into a neocolony and a military base in an attempt to prolong the partition of our country, conquer the whole of Vietnam, and impose their domination throughout Indochina and Southeast Asia.

The U.S. imperialists have shrunk from no cruel method to carry out their dark design. Defeated in their special war, they have switched to a local war, using over a half a million U.S. and satellite troops, along with more than half a million puppet soldiers, for aggression against South Vietnam. At the same time, they have undertaken a war of destruction against the northern part of our country. They have also stepped up their special war in Laos and carried out continual provocations aimed at wrecking the independence and neutrality of Cambodia.

The U.S. imperialists are daily causing untold sufferings and mourning to our compatriots throughout the country! They have resorted to all kinds of modern war means and weapons, including strategic aircraft, napalm bombs, toxic chemicals, and poison gas to massacre our fellow countrymen. They have launched repeated operations, again and again sweeping many areas, carrying out the kill all, burn all, destroy all policy to raze villages and hamlets to the ground. They have herded the population, grabbed land, and set up a no man's land and fascist-type concentration camps dubbed strategic hamlets, prosperity zones, resettlement areas, and so on. In the north, they have wantonly bombed and strafed streets, villages, industrial centers, and heavily populated areas. They have even struck at dikes, dams, schools, hospitals, churches, and pagodas.

Obviously the U.S. imperialists are the most ruthless aggressors in history, the saboteurs of the 1954 Geneva agreements, the saboteurs of the peace and security of the peoples in Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the world—the enemy number one of our people and of mankind.

Over the past few years, the U.S. imperialists have continually escalated the war, yet they have unceasingly clamored about peace negotiations in an attempt to fool the American and world people.

92-991 O - 73 - 39

The Saigon puppet administration has sold out South Vietnam to the U.S. imperialists. It has oppressed and exploited our southern compatriots in an extremely ruthless way. It has forced South Vietnam youth into the army to serve the United States in massacring our fellow countrymen. In a demagogic bid, it has also staged the farce of working out a constitution and holding elections. It is only a clique of traitors, an instrument for the U.S. imperialists to enslave the South Vietnamese people, prolong the partition of our country and further the U.S. war of aggression.

2. The U.S. aggressors and their lackeys think they can intimidate our people by the use of force and deceive them by means of tricks. But they are grossly mistaken. Our people definitely will never submit to force, never let themselves be deceived! Bringing into play our nation's tradition of undauntedness, our 31 million compatriots from the south to the north have resolutely stood up and united as one man to fight against the U.S. aggressors and save the country.

On the frontline of the fatherland, our southern fellow countrymen have over the past 13 years shown marvelous heroism. Irrespective of age, sex, political tendencies, religious beliefs, and no matter whether they live in the plains or in mountain areas, our people of all strata and all nationalities have resolutely fought shoulder to shoulder to liberate the south, defend the north, and proceed toward the reunification of the fatherland.

Since 1959–1960, our compatriots in the South Vietnamese countryside have carried out successive, simultaneous uprisings, destroyed a series of concentration camps and prosperity zones of the U.S. imperialists and the puppet administration and liberated vast rural areas. Our armed forces and people then rushed forward, destroyed thousands of strategic hamlets, liberated millions of people, and defeated the U.S. special war.

Since 1965, although the U.S. aggressors have brought in hundreds of thousands of U.S. expeditionary troops for direct aggression against South Vietnam, our armed forces and people have repeatedly won big victories, smashed two successive U.S. dry-season strategic counteroffensives, defeated over 1 million enemy troops—U.S., puppet, and satellite.

The liberated areas have continuously expanded and now make up four-fifths of the South Vietnam territory with two-thirds of its population. In these liberated areas, a national and democratic power is taking shape and a new life is blossoming. In addition to big military victories, we have also recorded important successes in in the political, economic, cultural, and diplomatic fields.

In the beloved northern part of the fatherland, our 17 million compatriots are heroically defeating the U.S. imperialist's war of destruction, maintaining and boosting production, and wholeheartedly encouraging and helping the cause of liberating the south, thus fulfilling the obligations of the great rear toward the great front.

In the world, the peoples of the socialist, nationalist, and other countries, including the progressive people in the United States, are sternly condemning the U.S. imperialist's war of aggression, and are giving their approval, support, and assistance to our people's struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation.

Facts have clearly shown that the more the U.S. imperialists obdurately intensify and expand their war of aggression against our country, the more they sustain bitter defeats and are driven into isolation; on the other hand, our people win greater victories and get more friends.

3. The most dangerous enemies of our people at present are the U.S. imperialist aggressors and their lackeys—the traitorous puppet administration.

The tasks and objectives of the South Vietnamese people in the struggle for national salvation are now as follows: To unite the entire people, resolutely defeat the U.S. imperialist's war of aggression, overthrow their lackey puppet administration, establish a broad national union and democratic administration and build an independant, peaceful, neutral, and prosperous South Vietnam, and proceed toward the peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

The force that guarantees the fulfillment of the above task of fighting against U.S. aggression and saving the country is our great national union. The NFLSV constantly stands for uniting all social strata and classes, all nationalities, all political parties, all organizations, all religious communities, all patriotic personalities, all individuals, and all patriotic and progressive forces, irrespective of political tendencies, in order to struggle together against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, wrest back our sacred national rights, and build up the country.

The NFLSV is prepared to invite and welcome all patriotic forces and individuals who oppose the U.S. aggressors to join its ranks, and to shoulder together the common duties. It proposes that any force which, for one reason or another, does not adhere to its ranks, take joint action against the common enemy—the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys.

The NFLSV pledges itself to strive, shoulder to shoulder with the Vietnam fatherland front, to fulfill gloriously the common task of fighting against U.S. aggression to liberate the south, defend the north, and proceed toward the peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

While fighting for their sacred national rights, the people of South Vietnam actively accomplish their internationalist duty. Their resistance war against U.S. aggression is an integral part of the revolutionary struggle of the people all over the world.

The NFLSV undertakes to stand within the united bloc of the Indochinese peoples to fight against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, to defend the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

The NFLSV pledges to take an active part in the common struggle of the world's people against the bellicose and aggressive imperialists headed by U.S. imperialism, for peace, national independence, democracy, and social progress.

4. The cruel U.S. aggressors are trampling upon our homeland. We, the people of South Vietnam, must stand up to make revolution and wage a people's war with a view to annihilating them, driving them out of our borders, and wresting back national independence and sovereignty.

Having experienced over 20 years of war, our southern compatriots eagerly want to live in peace and rebuild our war-devastated country. But the U.S. imperialists have trampled underfoot this legitimate aspiration. That is why our people have to fight against them to win peace in independence. Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom. Only when real independence is secured can we have genuine peace.

The enemy of our nation is ruthless and obdurate. But our entire people are determined to fight and to defeat the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys. So long as the U.S. imperialists do not end their war of aggression, withdraw all U.S. and satellite troops from our country, and let the South Vietnamese people settle themselves the internal affairs of South Vietnam without foreign intervention, our people will resolutely fight on until total victory. The South Vietnamese people's liberation war is a long and hard one, but it is sure to end in victory.

Our people rely mainly on their own forces; at the same time they strive to win the sympathy, support, and assistance of the world's peoples.

To defeat the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys, our people do not spare any sacrifice. They enthusiastically contribute manpower, material resources, and talent to the national liberation war in the spirit of doing everything for victory.

The NFLSV undertakes to develop the Liberation Armed Forces comprising the main force units, the regional troops, and the militia and guerrilla units, with the aim of promoting people's war, combining guerrilla with regular warfare, wiping out as many live enemy forces as possible, crushing the enemy's will for aggression, and winning the final victory.

The front undertakes to build and develop the political forces of the masses, promote the movement of political struggle, and combine armed struggle with political struggle and agitation among enemy troops, thus forming three converging prongs to defeat the enemy.

The NFLSV undertakes to encourage all strata of the population in the towns and rural areas still under enemy control to unite and struggle in every possible form to break the grip of the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys, destroy the Phuong (corporations) and strategic hamlets, demand democratic freedoms, national sovereignty, and a better life, oppose the pressganging of troops and forcible labor draft, struggle against enslaving and depraved culture, and march forward, together with the entire people, to overthrow the enemy's rule and seize political power.

At the same time, the Front undertakes to encourage all stata of people in the liberated areas to unite closely, to build the people's self-management system, to achieve step by step a local national democratic administration, to build base areas, to strive to produce and fight against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, to proceed with a good settlement of the agrarian question, to build the new economy and culture of the liberated areas, to foster the people's forces with a view to insuring supplies for the frontline and carrying the resistance war through to complete victory.

II. BUILD AN INDEPENDENT, DEMOCRATIC, PEACEFUL, NEUTRAL, AND PROSPEROUS SOUTH VIETNAM

The people of South Vietnam are determined to defeat the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys, and to devote their might and main to build a political system that guarantees the independence and sovereignty of the nation and the freedom and happiness of the people, to heal the wounds of war, to liquidate the social evils left over by the U.S. puppet regime, to restore moral life and build an independent, democratic, peaceful, neutral, and prosperous South Vietnam.

To achieve these objectives, the NFLSV lays down the following concrete policies:

1. *To achieve a broad and progressive democratic regime.*—To abolish the disguised colonial regime established by the U.S. imperialists in South Vietnam, to overthrow the puppet administration, hireling of the United States, not to recognize the puppet national assembly rigged up by the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, to abolish the constitution and all antinational and anti-democratic laws enacted by the U.S. imperialists and the puppet administration.

To hold free general elections, to elect the national assembly in a really democratic way in accordance with the principle of universal, equal, direct suffrage and secret ballot. This national assembly will be the state body with the highest authority in South Vietnam. It will work out a democratic constitution which fully embodies the most fundamental and most eager aspirations of all social strata in South Vietnam and guarantee the establishment of a broad, progressive, democratic state structure. To guarantee the immunity of the deputies to the national assembly.

To set up a national union democratic government including the most representative persons among the various social strata, nationalities, religious communities, patriotic and democratic parties, patriotic personalities, and forces which have contributed to the cause of national liberation.

To proclaim and enforce broad democratic freedoms—freedom of speech, freedom of the press and publication, freedom of assembly, trade union freedom, freedom of association, freedom to form political parties, freedom of creed, freedom to demonstrate.

To guarantee to all citizens inviolability of the human person, freedom of residence and lodging, secrecy of correspondence, freedom of movement, freedom to work and rest, and the right to study.

To enforce equality between man and woman and equality among the various nationalities.

To set free all persons detained by the U.S. imperialists and the puppet administration on account of their patriotic activities.

To dissolve the concentration camps set up in all forms by the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys.

All those people who have had to seek asylum abroad because of the U.S. and puppet regime have the right to return to the country to serve the fatherland.

To severely punish the diehard cruel agents of the U.S. imperialists.

2. *To build an independent and self-supporting economy, to improve the people's living conditions.*—To abolish the policy of economic enslavement and monopoly of the U.S. imperialists. To confiscate the property of the U.S. imperialists and their diehard cruel agents and turn it into state property. To build an independent and self-supporting economy. To rapidly heal the wounds of war, to restore and develop the economy so as to make the people rich and the country powerful. To protect the right to ownership of the means of production and other property of the citizens under the laws of the state.

To restore and develop agricultural production. To improve farming, animal husbandry, fish rearing, and forestry.

The state will encourage the peasants to unite and help one another in boosting production, grant them loans at low interest for the purchase of buffaloes, oxen, farming implements, agricultural machines, seeds, fertilizers, etc., help them develop irrigation works, and apply advanced techniques in agriculture. To guarantee outlets for agricultural products.

To restore and develop industry, small industries and handicrafts. To guarantee to the workers and employees the right to take part in the management of enterprises.

The state will encourage the capitalists in industry and trade to help develop industry, small industries and handicrafts. To enforce freedom of enterprise to the benefit of nation-building and the people's welfare; to apply a customs policy designed to encourage and protect home-production. To restore and develop communications and transport. To encourage and step up economic exchanges between towns and country, between the plains and the mountain areas. To give due consideration to the interests of the small traders and petty shopkeepers. To set up a state bank. To build an independent currency. To apply a fair and rational tax policy. The state will adopt a policy of granting loans at low interest to encourage production, and will prohibit usury. To develop economic relations with the north, the two zones will help each other so that Vietnam's economy may prosper rapidly.

In accordance with the front's policy of neutrality and on the principle of equality, mutual benefit and respect for the independence and sovereignty of the Vietnamese nation, trade with all countries will be expanded, and economic and technical assistance from foreign countries will be accepted, regardless of political and social systems.

3. *To enact the land policy, to carry out the slogan "Land to the Tiller."*—To confiscate the lands of the U.S. imperialists and the diehard cruel landlords—their lackeys. To allot those lands to landless or land-poor peasants. To confirm and protect the ownership of the lands allotted to peasants by the revolution.

The state will negotiate the purchase of land from landlords who possess land upward of a certain amount, varying with the situation in each locality. It will allot these lands to landless or land-poor peasants. The recipients will receive the lands free of charge and will not be bound by any condition whatsoever. In areas where the

required conditions for land reform do not yet obtain, land-rent reduction will be carried out.

To entrust the lands belonging to absentee landlords to peasants for cultivation and enjoyment of the produce. Adequate steps will be taken on this subject at a later stage in consideration of the political attitude of each landlord. To allow landlords to offer land to the Liberation Peasants Association; the state will allot these lands to landless or land-poor peasants. To encourage the owners of industrial crops or fruit-tree plantations to keep their farms going. To respect the legitimate right to ownership of land by the churches, pagodas, and holy sees of religious sects. To carry out a fair and rational redistribution of communal lands. To guarantee the legitimate right to ownership of reclaimed lands to those who reclaim them.

Those compatriots who have been forced into strategic hamlets, or concentration camps in any other form, will be free to return to their former villages.

Those who have been compelled to evacuate or to change abodes and who wish to go on living there, will enjoy recognition of their ownership of the lands and other property which have resulted from their labor, and will be helped to continue earning their living in the same place; those who wish to return to their native places will also receive help.

4. *To build a national democratic culture and education, to develop science and technology, to promote public health.*—To fight against the American-type enslaving and depraved culture and education now adversely affecting our people's fine, long-standing cultural traditions. To build a national democratic culture and education, to develop science and technology in service of national construction and defense. To educate the people in the Vietnamese nation's tradition of struggle against foreign invasion and its heroic history. To preserve and develop the fine culture and good customs and habits of our nation.

To raise the people's cultural standards: to liquidate illiteracy, to promote complementary education, to open new general education schools, higher learning establishments, and vocational schools. To make an all-out effort to train and foster a contingent of scientific workers, technicians, and skilled workers. To use the Vietnamese language as the teaching medium in higher learning establishments. To reduce school fees for pupils and students. To exempt poor pupils and students from school fees, or grant them scholarships. To reform the system of examinations.

The state will give every possible help to those youth and children who have rendered services to the fight against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, to the children born into the families who have rendered services to the revolution, and to other outstanding youths so as to enable them to study and develop their capabilities.

Every citizen is free to carry out scientific and technological research, to indulge in literary and artistic creation, and to participate in other cultural activities. To encourage the intellectuals writers, artists, and scientists and to afford them the required conditions

for research work, creation, and invention in the service of the fatherland and the people. To afford opportunities to those cultural workers, writers and artists who have been persecuted by the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys for their patriotic activities. To develop health service and the movement for hygiene and prophylaxis. To attend to the people's health. To control epidemics. To do away with dangerous diseases left over by the U.S. and puppet regime. To develop the movement for physical training and sports. To develop cultural relations with the north; the two zones will help each other to raise the people's educational level and the (development) of qualified people. To promote cultural relations with foreign countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

5. *To guarantee the rights and cater to the livelihood of workers, laborers, and civil servants.*—To promulgate labor legislation. To put into practice the eight-hour working day. To provide for a regime of rest and recreation. To set up a rational system of wages and bonuses for increased productivity. To improve the living and working conditions of the workers, laborers, and civil servants. To apply a policy of adequate remuneration for apprentices. To provide jobs to the workers and the poor people in the towns. To make every effort to do away with unemployment. To put into practice a policy on social security to care for and assist workers, laborers, and civil servants in case of disease, incapacitation, old age, or retirement. To improve living conditions in working people's residential quarters.

To settle disputes between employers and employees through negotiations between the two sides and mediation by the national democratic administration. To strictly prohibit the beating of workers and laborers, to strictly prohibit fines deducted from wages and unjustified sacking of workers.

6. *To build up strong South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces with a view to liberating the people and defending the fatherland.*—The South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces—comprising the main force units, the regional troops, and the militia and guerrillas—are the children of the people, and are boundlessly loyal to the interests of the fatherland and the people, and are duty-bound to fight shoulder to shoulder with the entire people to liberate the south, defend the fatherland, and make an active contribution to the defense of peace in Asia and in the world. To pay due attention to the building of the Liberation Armed Forces. To strive to raise their quality and increase their fighting capacity with a view to stepping up peoples war, defeating the U.S. satellite, and puppet troops, and bringing the fight against U.S. aggression, for national salvation to total victory. To strengthen the political work with a view to enhancing the patriotism and determination to fight and to win of the Liberation Armed Forces, enhancing the sense of discipline, and continuously tightening the "fish and water" relations between the army and the population.

7. *To show gratitude to the martyrs, to cater for disabled armymen, to reward the fighters and compatriots who have an outstanding record in the fight against U.S. aggression and for national salvation.*—The entire people are grateful to, and constantly bear in

mind the memory of the martyrs who belonged to the Liberation Armed Forces or to various services and revolutionary organizations, and those who laid down their lives in political struggles. Their families are catered for and assisted by the state and the people. Armymen and compatriots disabled in the course of the armed and political struggle are cared for and helped. To reward in a worthy manner all fighters and compatriots who have an outstanding record in the struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation. The entire people are grateful to and help the families who have rendered services to the revolution.

8. *To organize social relief.*—To give relief to the compatriots—victims of the war of aggression unleased by the U.S. imperialists and the puppet regime. To attend to orphans, old folks, and invalid people. To organize relief for the areas affected by natural calamities or bad crops. Consideration is also given to disabled puppet armymen and to the families of puppet armymen killed in action, who are poor and forlorn. To help those people driven to desperation by the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, to rebuild their lives and serve the fatherland and the people.

9. *To put into practice equality between man and woman, to protect Mothers and children.*—To pay utmost attention to raising the political, cultural, and vocational standards of women in a manner fitting with their merits in the struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation. To develop the Vietnamese women's traditions of heroism, undauntedness, loyalty, and aptitude to shoulder every responsibility. Women are equal to men politically, economically, culturally, and socially. Women who do the same job receive the same salary and allowances, and enjoy all other rights as men. Women workers and civil servants enjoy two months maternity leave with full pay before and after childbirth.

To put into practice a policy of actively helping perfecting and training women cadres. To promulgate progressive marriage and family regulations. To protect the rights of mothers and children. To develop a network of maternity homes, creches, and infant classes.

To do away with all social evils brought about by the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, which are harmful to women's health and dignity.

10. *To strengthen unity, to practice equality and mutual assistance among nationalities.*—To abolish all systems and policies applied by the imperialists and their lackeys with a view to dividing, oppressing, and exploiting the various nationalities. To oppose discrimination among and forcible assimilation of the nationalities. To develop the long-standing tradition of unity and mutual assistance among the various fraternal nationalities with a view to defending and building the country. All nationalities are equal in rights and obligations.

To implement the agrarian policy with regard to minority peasants. To encourage and help them settle down in fixed residences, to improve their lands, to develop economy and culture, to raise their living standards so as to keep abreast of the general level. The

national minorities have the right to use their own spoken and written languages to develop their own culture and art and to maintain or to change their customs and habits.

To strive to train minority cadres so as to quickly bring about conditions for good management of the local affairs by the concerned minority itself. In the areas inhabited by big communities of a specific minority and where the required conditions exist, autonomous zones will be established within independent and free Vietnam.

11. *To respect freedom of creed, to achieve unity and equality among the different religious communities.*—To fight against all maneuvers and tricks of the imperialists and their lackeys who use a number of persons under the cloak of religion to oppose our people's struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, to sow dissension between believers and nonbelievers and among different religious communities, and to harm the country, the people, and the religion. To respect freedom of creed and worship. To preserve pagodas, churches, holy sees, temples. All religions are equal and none is to be discriminated against. To achieve unity among believers of various religions and between believers and the entire nation for the sake of the struggle against U.S. aggression and their lackeys to defend and build the country.

12. *Welcome puppet officers and men and puppet officials back to the just cause, show leniency, and give a humane treatment to rallied armymen and prisoners-of-war.*—To oppose the U.S. imperialists and the puppet administration's attempts to pressgang mercenaries to serve the U.S. aggressors against the fatherland and massacre the people. To severely punish the diehard thugs acting as efficient agents of the U.S. imperialists. To afford conditions for puppet officers and puppet officials to come back to the just cause and join the people's fight against U.S. aggression to save and build the country.

Those individuals, groups, or units of the puppet army and administration who render services to the cause of fighting against U.S. aggression for national salvation will be rewarded and entrusted with responsible jobs. Those who sympathize with and support the struggle against U.S. aggression for national salvation or those who refuse to carry out orders of the United States and puppets to harm the people will have their merits recorded.

Those individuals, groups, or units who have broken away from the puppet army and voluntarily apply to join the Liberation Armed Forces for fighting against the United States to save the country are welcomed and enjoy equal treatment. Regarding those individuals or units who have broken away from the puppet army and administration and risen against the U.S. aggressors to save the country, the front standards ready to join actions with them in the fight against the U.S. aggressors on a basis of equality, mutual respect, and assistance so as together to protect the people and liberate the fatherland.

Those functionaries of the puppet administration who volunteer to serve the country and the people in the state machine after the liberation of South Vietnam will enjoy equal treatment. Those in the puppet army and the puppet administration at any level who have

committed crimes against the people but are now sincerely repentant will be pardoned. Those who redeem their crimes by meritorious deeds will be rewarded accordingly. Captured officers and men of the puppet army will enjoy humanitarian treatment and clemency.

Those in the U.S. Army and its satellite armies who cross over to the people's side will be given kind treatment and helped to return to their families when conditions permit. Captured U.S. and satellite troops will be treated as captured puppet troops.

13. *To protect the rights and interests of overseas Vietnamese.*—To welcome the patriotism of overseas Vietnamese and highly value all their contributions to the resistance to U.S. aggression for national salvation of the people. To protect the rights and interests of overseas Vietnamese. To help those overseas Vietnamese who wish to return to take part in the building of the country.

14. *To protect the legitimate rights and interests of foreign residents in South Vietnam.*—To welcome those foreign residents who have contributed to the Vietnamese people's resistance to U.S. aggression for national salvation. All foreign residents living in South Vietnam must respect the independence and sovereignty of Vietnam and obey the law of the national democratic administration. To protect the legitimate rights and interests of all foreign residents who do not cooperate with the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in opposing the Vietnam people and who do not harm the independence and sovereignty of Vietnam. To give adequate consideration to the rights and interests of those foreign residents who have directly or indirectly supported the Vietnamese people's resistance to U.S. aggression for national salvation.

To resolutely oppose and abolish all policies of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen aimed at sowing discord between the Vietnamese people and Chinese residents in South Vietnam and exploiting, repressing, and forcing Chinese residents to adopt Vietnamese citizenship. To punish the diehard agents and secret agents of the imperialists and the South Vietnam puppet administration.

III. TO RESTORE NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM, PROCEED TOWARD PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE FATHERLAND

Vietnam is one. The Vietnamese people are one. No force can divide our fatherland. Reunification of the country is the sacred aspiration of our entire people. Vietnam must be reunified.

The policy of the NFLSV consists of the following:

1. The reunification of Vietnam will be realized step by step and through peaceful means on the principle of negotiation between the two zones without either side using pressure against the other and without foreign interference.

2. Pending the reunification of the country, the people in both zones will make joint efforts to oppose foreign invasion and defend the fatherland and at the same time endeavor to expand economic and cultural exchanges. The people in both zones are free to exchange letters, to go from one zone to another, and to choose their place of residence.

IV. TO APPLY A FOREIGN POLICY OF PEACE AND NEUTRALITY

The NFLSV applies a foreign policy of peace and neutrality, a foreign policy which guarantees the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of the country and helps safeguard world peace. In more concrete terms this policy consists of the following points:

1. To establish diplomatic relations with all countries regardless of their social and political system on the principle of mutual respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity without infringement upon each other, without interference into each other's internal affairs, territory, equality, mutual benefits, and peaceful coexistence. To abolish all unequal treaties which the puppet administration has signed with the United States or any country. To respect the economic and cultural interests of those countries which sympathize with, support, or assist the struggle against U.S. aggression for national salvation of the Vietnamese people. To accept technical and economic assistance from any country without political conditions attached. To join no military alliance, to accept no military personnel or military bases of foreign countries on South Vietnam territory.

2. To strengthen friendly relations with all countries which sympathize with, support, or assist the struggle against U.S. aggression for national salvation of the Vietnamese people. To strengthen relations of good neighborhood with Cambodia and Laos. To unceasingly consolidate solidarity and mutual assistance between the peoples of the Indochinese countries with a view to defending their respective independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity against the aggressive and war-provocation policy of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen.

3. Actively support the national liberation movement of the peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America against imperialism and old and new colonialism. Actively support the struggle of the American people against the U.S. imperialists' war of aggression in Vietnam. Actively support the struggle for peace, democracy, and social progress in all countries in the world.

4. Actively struggle to contribute to the safeguarding of world peace oppose the bellicose and aggressive imperialists headed by U.S. imperialism. Demand the dissolution of the aggressive military blocs and foreign military bases of imperialism. Unceasingly consolidate and develop relations with international democratic organizations and the peoples of all countries including the American people. Actively contribute to the consolidation and development of the world people's front in support of Vietnam against the U.S. imperialist aggressors, for national independence and peace.

The struggle against U.S. aggression, for national salvation of our people is an extremely hard but glorious cause. It concerns not only the destiny of our people at present and all our future generations but also the interests of the peoples in the world who are struggling for peace, national independence, democracy, and social progress. In

order to accomplish that glorious cause, our people already united, must unite still more close and broadly.

The NFLSV warmly welcomes all political parties, mass organizations, and patriotic and progressive personalities who broadly rally within and outside the front in order to defeat together the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen.

The struggle against U.S. aggression, for national salvation of our people is a just cause. Our people throughout the country are of one mind to fight and defeat the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen. The sympathy, support, and assistance of the people of the socialist countries, the Asian, African, and Latin American countries, and peace-loving, justice-loving people all over the world, including the progressive people in the United States, are becoming deeper and stronger day by day. We are willing and will surely win complete victory.

No matter how frenzied, brutal, obdurate, and perfidious the U.S. imperialists may be, they will inevitably meet with bitter failure in their criminal schemes.

In the supreme interests of the fatherland, let our entire people in South Vietnam strengthen their solidarity, millions as one, and rush forward shoulder to shoulder in the impetus of our victories to completely defeat the U.S. aggressors and their stooge administration, and together with our northern compatriots to fulfill the great and glorious cause of liberating the south, defending the north, and proceeding toward the peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

The NFLSV pledges to be always worthy of the confidence of our compatriots and our friends on the five continents. The Vietnamese people will surely be victorious. The U.S. aggressors and their henchmen will certainly be defeated. The NFLSV program for liberation is sure to materialize. Fighters and compatriots throughout South Vietnam, under the glorious banner of the NFLSV, march forward heroically.

STATEMENT OF THE NFLSV CENTRAL COMMITTEE NOVEMBER 3, 1968

Over the past 14 years, in the hope of materializing their scheme of turning South Vietnam into a U.S. neocolony and military base, the U.S. imperialists have carried out the most cruel policy of aggression in history against the Vietnamese people, grossly trampling upon Vietnam's independence, sovereignty, unification, and territorial integrity, recognized by the 1954 Geneva agreements. They set up an extremely cruel lackey administration in South Vietnam and have used weapons and fire in the hope of forcing the South Vietnamese people to endure their yoke of domination.

But the South Vietnamese people, united millions as one, have courageously arisen and have struggled resolutely and perseveringly against the country-grabbers and country-sellers. Under the NFLSV's glorious banner and enjoying the wholehearted and strongest support of the northern compatriots and the resolute and vigorous sympathy and assistance of the friendly governments and

of the people throughout the world, the South Vietnamese people's sacred resistance has continued to win increasingly great victories.

In the hope of averting their complete collapse, the U.S. imperialists massively sent U.S. expeditionary troops to wage direct aggression against South Vietnam and, at the same time, unleased a destructive war against the DRV, piling up their savage crimes throughout both parts of Vietnam. But no cruel strength can save the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys from disastrous defeats. The northern armed forces and people, fighting in an extremely courageous manner, have downed more than 3,200 U.S. aircraft, defeating the U.S. war of destruction, and fulfilling the vast rear base's duty toward the vast frontline.

The Southern armed forces and people have frustrated all of the Americans' plans to intensify their war of aggression and, since early spring, have continuously launched offensives and staged concerted uprisings, directing thunderous blows to the Americans and their lackeys right in their dens, winning presedented victories in all fields, altering the war situation, and driving the Americans and their lackeys more and more deeply into an irreversibly passive and declining situation.

Faced with the courageous and stalwart struggle and the victories of great significance in all fields won by the armed forces and people throughout our country and faced with the vigorous demand of the world's peoples, including progressive American people, the U.S. Government was compelled to agree to and carry out an unconditional cessation of the bombings and strafings over the entire DRV territory. This constituted an extremely great victory for all the Vietnamese people and for peace-loving peoples throughout the world.

However, it is not true that the U.S. imperialists have renounced their evil aggressive designs against Vietnam. They stubbornly continue to step up the war in South Vietnam and to foster the puppet lackey administration in the hope of maintaining their neocolonialist yoke domination in South Vietnam and perpetuating the partition of our country.

The U.S. imperialists stubbornly continue to conduct actions which violate the DRV's sovereignty and security. They continue to demand that our people pay a premium for an end to their war of destruction against the North.

The South Vietnamese people and the NFLSV resolutely demand that the Americans permanently renounce all violations of the DRV's sovereignty and security, put an end to their war of aggression in South Vietnam, honor all the commitments they made at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Vietnam, and respect the inviolable national rights of the South Vietnamese people. The South Vietnamese people deeply cherish peace, but it must be peace in independence and freedom. Manifesting these aspirations and this determination and basing itself upon its political platform, the NFLSV solemnly declares its stand on the political solution to the South Vietnam problem as follows:

1. South Vietnam is determined to strive to realize its sacred rights to independence, democracy, peace, neutrality, and prosperity and to proceed toward the peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

2. The U.S. imperialists must put an end to their war of aggression against Vietnam, withdraw all U.S. and satellite troops and their war equipment from South Vietnam and dismantle U.S. military bases in South Vietnam.

3. The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people in conformity with the NFLSV political platform, without foreign intervention. The NFLSV advocates the formation of a broad national and democratic coalition government and the holding of free general elections in South Vietnam.

4. The reunification of Vietnam will be settled by the Vietnamese people in both parts of the country step by step, by peaceful means, on the basis of discussions and agreement between the two parts of the country, and without foreign intervention.

5. South Vietnam will adopt a foreign policy of peace and neutrality, will not enter into military alliances with foreign countries in any form, will establish friendly relations with all countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and will establish good neighborly relations with the Cambodian Kingdom on the basis of respect for Cambodia's independence, sovereignty, neutrality, and territorial integrity within its existing borders and with Laos on the basis of respect for the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos.

The U.S. imperialists are the aggressors in South Vietnam. The NFLSV is the organizer and leader of the South Vietnamese people's resistance against the U.S. aggressors. It has led the South Vietnamese people from one victory to another. The front is building and developing the revolutionary administration of the South Vietnamese people. The governments of many countries and the world's peoples have recognized the NFLSV and have accorded it great support and assistance. The NFLSV truly represents the legitimate aspirations of the South Vietnamese people and is fully competent to solve all problems related to South Vietnam.

The NFLSV asserts its complete unanimity with the support for the four-point stand of the DRV Government. This stand, which represents the aspirations and will of the people throughout our country, constitutes the correct basis for the settlement of the Vietnam problem. In the situation in which the United States has unconditionally ended its bombing of and attacks against North Vietnam, the NFLSV resolutely supports the stand of the DRV Government which was set forth in the 2 November 1968 statement and is aimed at seeking a political solution for the Vietnam problem.

After discussing and unanimously agreeing with the Vietnam alliance of national, democratic, and peace forces, the NFLSV approves the four-party conference, which comprises the DRV, the NFLSV, the United States, and the Saigon administration. At this conference, the NFLSV representative will express the southern people's voice, that of the just cause.

The present Saigon administration is merely a clique of country-sellers serving as lackeys for the U.S. aggressors and running counter to the legitimate aspirations of all the South Vietnamese people. They have been energetically opposed by our people and cursed by progressive people in the world. They represent no one. The pres-

ence of the Saigon administration's representative at the above-mentioned conference does not mean that the NFLSV recognizes this administration.

The United States has been obviously defeated, but it has not yet renounced its evil aggressive design against Vietnam. The closer to victory the Vietnamese people's anti-U.S. resistance is, the more difficulties there are.

Enthusiastically responding to President Ho's 3 November 1968 sacred appeal, let all the compatriots and combatants of the people's liberation armed forces in South Vietnam heighten their presevering determination to fight until final victory. As long as there is an aggressor on our country, we must continue to fight and wipe him out.

Let us hold high the banner of victory, bravely rush forward to develop the impetus of continuous offensive and uprisings, defeat the aggressive U.S. war, topple the country-selling Vietnamese traitors, gain the entire administration for the people, and gloriously fulfill the sacred task of liberating the South, protecting the North, and advancing toward peacefully reunifying the fatherland, thus contributing to preserving peace in Asia and the world!

Let the combatants of the puppet armed forces and personnel of the puppet administration machinery clearly realize the situation in time, return to the fatherland and the people, struggle to save the country, their families, and themselves, and oppose the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys. The NFLSV is ready to welcome you all.

The NFLSV calls on all democratic governments, organizations, and notables and progressive people throughout the world, including progressive U.S. people, to vigorously support the correct NFLSV stand and aid more positively the South Vietnamese people's anti-U.S., national resistance until final victory.

South Vietnam will certainly be liberated! The Vietnamese people's anti-U.S. national salvation struggle will certainly be victorious!

South Vietnam, November 3, 1968.

Source: Department of State.

STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, NOVEMBER 26, 1968[1]

In its constant search for peace, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam has been discussing with the U.S. Government during the past weeks the ground rules and arrangements for the new meetings in Paris which would enable the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to send its delegation to Paris to engage in direct and serious talks with the Hanoi delegation, toward the ending of Communist aggression and the establishment of a just, secure, and guaranteed peace in Vietnam.

As a result of these discussions the U.S. Government has submitted to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam a statement. By

[1] Released through Department of State, Nov. 26, 1968.

mutual agreement, that statement is being made public in both Saigon and Washington at this time.

In that statement, we find that the major points in the message of the President of the Republic before the joint session of the National Assembly on November 2, and the two-side formula proposed by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam on November 8, have been given satisfaction in their essential aspects.

The sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam has been respected.

The governments of the other allied nations have been consulted and wholeheartedly support the agreements achieved through the close cooperation between the U.S. Government and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

Once again, the solidarity between the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and allied governments has been eloquently demonstrated in the face of the intransigent attitude of North Vietnam and its auxiliary forces.

Therefore, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam decides that it is prepared to participate in the new talks in Paris with the Hanoi delegation to show the good will of the Republic of Vietnam and to test the good faith of Hanoi.

MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU TO THE JOINT SESSION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF SOUTH VIETNAM, APRIL 7, 1969[1]

Mr. President of the Senate, Mr. Speaker of the House, Distinguished Senators and Representatives, Ladies and Gentlemen. A few days ago we met to celebrate the second anniversary of the promulgation of the Constitution, a day the whole nation still remembers for it had happily participated in the election of the constituent assembly, in a completely free and democratic election without precedent, to prepare the basic texts for the foundation of the current nation building process.

Again a few days ago, the government had presented to the nation the results of the Pacification and Development Campaign, the election in the villages and hamlets, and the improvement of the rural administration obtained during the last few months.

Again a few days ago, I had made one more initiative for peace which once again showed the maximum goodwill for peace of the Republic of Viet-Nam, in dealing with a most important matter which is the restoration of peace in this land.

Furthermore, today's joint session of the National Assembly coincides with a phase of the war in South Viet-Nam when the gains of our side and the defeats of the enemy enable me to present to the National Assembly and to the nation the relationship between the current situation and the future of the country in the forthcoming months.

Ladies and Gentlemen, my dear fellow countrymen,

Exactly six months ago, on October 7, 1968, in my message delivered at the opening session of the Second Joint Session of the

[1] Vietnam Bulletin.

82-941 O - 75 - 40

National Assembly, I had asserted that our 1969 objectives were consolidation and self-development. I had said: "1969 must be the year for consolidation and self-development." The situation of the country at that time allowed me to say so, for I had the belief of a leader, and my belief is always based on a certain number of basic problems, on what we already possessed, on what we are about to do in accordance with the trend of our continual progress and the enemy's increasing weakness.

That was the very time when on the purely military field, the enemy was completely defeated and weakened following the Mau Than general offensive and second and third waves of attacks in May and August. That was the very time when the South Vietnamese people clearly saw their true faces as cruel, inhuman, and unrighteous aggressors, which they had cleverly covered up for many years. That was the very time when the South Vietnamese people hated the Communists the most, and when the South Vietnamese people realized that with respect to the Communists, there is one single solution: to talk with them from a position of strength.

That was also the time when I realized that world public opinion can no longer say that the South Vietnamese armed forces and people do not want to fight, that the South Vietnamese people are ready to accept Communism, or that the South Vietnamese people agree to surrender to the Communists. That was also the very time when the Communist troops and cadres in the South, including those coming from the North, clearly realized that their leaders' beautiful words, "liberating the South" or "three-fourths of the territory and four-fifths of the population are under their control," are nothing but lies.

Also at that time, I put forth a number of main goals for 1969, not only for coping with the situation, but also for taking the initiative in further exploiting it in order to firmly hold to victory and create a strong position for ourselves. I remember that I also said: If the position is strong the stand will be firm; and if the position is strong, the stand can be defended by us.

The main goals I set forth for 1969 are aimed at launching military counteroffensives to annihilate the greatest part of the enemy's fighting potential, strengthening our armed forces, intensively arming our people, accelerating pacification and construction, improving territorial security, improving the village and hamlet administration and infrastructures, and vigorously accelerating the implementation of the social reform program in which top priority must be given to agrarian reforms and agricultural development.

In my early 1969 message, in which I presented our glorious achievements in 1968, I also reiterated these goals. Since then, especially over the past three months, we have enthusiastically conducted a special campaign to launch military counteroffensives and accelerate the implementation of the pacification and construction program throughout the territory, establishing new hamlets and extending our control over some 90 per cent of the population.

Faced with a situation in which they have sustained increasingly serious losses on the battlefield and their infrastructures have been increasingly destroyed, the Communists have become more confused

than ever. Driven out of the rural areas, which were their first footholds, the Communists reacted by adopting a resolution and drawing up a plan to create a second Mau Than Tet early in the Ky Dau Tet, in the hope of using it as a springboard for winning new victories. The Communists' plan called for the coordination among attacks by major units against large cities, reckless shellings directed at the civilian population, incitement of the masses to arise to seize power. The results were:

—Tet Ky Dau never became a second Tet Mau Than.

—The plan to have large scale attacks on major cities by large units failed.

—The only thing left that the Communists could carry out was the indiscriminate shellings to kill innocent people. In brief, the so-called fourth general offensive beginning on the 5th day of the last Tet Ky Dau has only caused some noise for the Communists, but at an extremely high cost: 27,000 enemies were killed and 1,977 others were captured, making a total of 29,197. 10,441 weapons of all kinds were seized. At the same time our forces and the allies suffered only 4,342 casualties, approximately one-seventh of the Communist casualties. During that period of less than one and a half months, an additional 5,363 returnees left the Communist ranks and rallied to the government bringing the actual total number of returnees to 163,442. During that same short period we have killed an additional 4,961 enemy infrastructure cadres. A number of important enemy covert organizations in the capital were also annihilated.

The only important achievements of the Communists during this escalation of the war are: 574 innocent civilians killed, and 1,784 wounded in addition to more than 20,000 other people with houses destroyed as a result of the wanton shellings and criminal attacks of the Communists against the civilian population. This includes one Buddhist orphanage in Quang Ngai, one Protestant church in Can Giuoc, one maternity ward in Gia Dinh and even the mining of a school bus terminal in Phuoc-Tuy.

During all this period, the very period during which they hoped to lure us into and pin our armed forces down in the urban centers by threatening to attack the towns in order to be free to destroy our Pacification and Development Campaign in the countryside, the Communists had not succeeded in taking any single important military outpost or hamlet.

Not only had the results of the late 1969 accelerated pacification campaign been preserved and consolidated every day, but the Pacification and Development Campaign that we have prepared for the first months of 1969 is being carried out steadily. Right now, the armed forces are supporting the building of 933 hamlets out of 1,809 which are planned for the first five months of 1969, and 1,023 teams of cadres are in action in those hamlets.

I am convinced that our 1969 Pacification and Development Program will not have any unsurmountable obstacle to overcome and will be carried out as planned, that is towards controlling 100 per cent of the population.

With regard to the village and hamlet elections, the objectives fixed before the Communists' 4th general offensive are being reached smoothly. The results are achieved at the right level and on schedule: Election in an additional 589 villages and 3,031 hamlets in order to raise the ratio of villages with elections completed to 76.8% and 77% for the hamlets. The percentage of the electorate which went to the polls is 89 per cent. Along with the elections, we have improved the organization, added more personnel and cadres, retrained all the officials during this year.

The figures that I have just quoted are not just cold mathematical numbers. They are figures obtained with the blood of our soldiers, with the sacrifices and efforts of the personnel and cadres of all ranks and all branches, with the sweat and tears and the huge though silent contribution of the population. These figures must be considered as a glorious but painful achievement, arduous but lively symbols of our fighting. These figures should make all of us feel proud, but should make us judge our own contribution to them. The figures which I have just mentioned still have many other meanings, namely:

—The Communists cannot accomplish anything better and they are weaker and weaker every day.

—Their cadres and soldiers defect in increasing big number, even though they were inspired by the so-called general offensive.

—Their infrastructure is destroyed one after another.

—Even at the peak of the Communist general offensive our installations and pacification and development programs were not affected at all; on the contrary, they still proceed smoothly and on schedule.

—Even by intimidation and sometimes by real acts of terrorism the population in the rural areas had run for offices in the elections in a record turnout rate. This shows that the people prefer the free and democratic regime to create for themselves a better life, and this also shows, in an eloquent manner, that the contructive results of the Communist propaganda in Paris, a month ago, were all lies designed to mislead world opinion.

—The most significant fact is that the enemy casualties in this 4th general offensive are higher than ever, and have caused the Communists great embarrassment when they want to create, at any cost, some sort of achievement to support their position at the conference; but they have failed.

I have shown those figures to analyze and to help us assess the situation in order to clearly see between ourselves and the Communists where victory lies and where defeat lies, who is strong and who is weak and where the solid and real gains in the objectives our side has obtained are:

I have often told you and our fellow countrymen that:

—The basis of strength of weakness lies here in Viet-Nam and not at the negotiations table in Paris.

—Our position of strength or weakness depends on our performance in the battlefields and within the population right

here in Viet-Nam, and not on the stubborn declarations of the Communists or of some irresponsible people who think that they can change it.

—Our just position can be defended or not, depending on what we already have, on what we can do more to support that position. It is not the stubbornness of the Communists at the negotiations table in Paris that can make us weaker or ready to make more concessions.

I have often repeated to this assembly and to the nation:

—This war is our own war, first and foremost. The allies are here only to help us, not to decide for us.

—Our allies are helping us to achieve a position of strength. We ourselves are trying to consolidate and develop this position of strength in order that we can take the initiative both in the war against aggression and the search for peace.

We have now solidly established a position of strength which I just mentioned, and from there we are growing stronger. This very position of strength which we have now has allowed us to face the enemy at the negotiations table with more self-confidence than at any time before.

It is because our position is growing stronger every day and the enemy is weaker that in these last few months in Paris, they have been compelled to adopt a stubborn attitude to make the world believe that they are strong when in reality they are too weak to be able to negotiate seriously and take the initiative.

—Only a truly strong position like the one we actually have enables us to be self-confident.

—Only a truly strong position can solidly protect our stand.

—Only with a solid stand and self-confidence can we take many initiatives without fear of weakening our position.

For those reasons, we now know more clearly than ever before that the enemy can never shake our just position. On the contrary, because of the need to save Vietnamese lives and bring back peace to this part of the world, we feel we can actively show many initiatives in bringing about peace.

—We feel we can have active participations without affecting in any way our basic stand.

—We also want the Communists to clearly see their real situation, even though outwardly they have had to resort to the usual Communist tactics to mislead public opinion and deceive their own cadres. We also want the Communists to understand that we will never surrender nor accept their irrational and absurd conditions while we are and will be in an increasingly stronger position and while our stand is a most moderate and reasonable one. Therefore, we want the Communists to understand that our initiative for peace which I just proposed a few days ago is not a sign of weakness and readiness to accept defeat. That peace initiative must be understood as the maximum goodwill displayed by the Republic of Viet-Nam, a fact which, I am sure, the whole world, except the Communists, know.

Today, in this forum, I wish to solemnly confirm once more to the world, to our allies, to our fellow countrymen, and to our enemy

that in our constant search for a constructive solution to this conflict, we consider that the following six points constitute a reasonable and solid basis for the restoration of peace in Viet-Nam:

(1) Communist aggression should stop.

Communist North Viet-Nam should give up its attempts to conquer the RVN by force. It should stop violating the DMZ and the frontiers of the RVN, and stop its wanton attacks against the innocent population of the RVN.

(2) Communist North Vietnamese and auxiliary troops and cadres should be completely withdrawn from the Republic of Viet-Nam.

As the military and subversive forces of Communist North Viet-Nam are withdrawn, infiltration ceases, and the level of violence thus subsides, the RVN will ask its allies to remove their forces, in accordance with the Manila joint-communique of seven nations in October, 1966.

(3) The territories of the neighboring countries of the RVN should not be violated and used by Communist North Viet-Nam as bases and staging areas for aggression against the RVN.

Communist North Vietnamese troops and cadres illegally introduced and stationed in Laos and Cambodia should be withdrawn from these countries. Communist North Viet-Nam military installations in these countries should be dismantled.

(4) The RVN adopts the policy of National Reconciliation.

Those now fighting against us, who renounce violence, respect the laws, and faithfully abide by the democratic processes, will be welcomed as full members of the National Community. As such, they will enjoy full political rights and assume the same obligations as other lawful citizens under the National Constitution.

(5) The reunification of the two Viet-Nams is to be decided by the free choice of the entire population of Viet-Nam through democratic processes.

To establish the atmosphere conducive to national reunification, after peace has been reestablished, modalities of economic and cultural exchanges between North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam, as well as between the two Viet-Nams and other countries of this area, can be actively explored, together with other intermediary measures of peaceful coexistence so that, pending reunification, the two Viet-Nams can participate more fully and more constructively in the various undertakings of the international community.

(6) There must be an effective system of international control and reliable international guarantees against the resumption of Communist aggression.

The control mechanisms should be freed from the paralyzing effects of the Veto system. It should have sufficient personnel and adequate means to detect any violation of peace agreement. When violations are committed, and aggression is renewed, there should be prompt and effective response from a reliable system of international guarantees, otherwise any peace agreement will be only a sham device used by the Communists to weaken our system of defense, and not a basis for long lasting peace and stability for this part of the world.

From the basic moderate and logical stand, always with the maximum of goodwill, I want to confirm once again that the RVN is

still ready to continue to explore every means to move towards serious and truly progressive talks.

In this forum today I seriously address myself to the other side: If they continue to escalate the war, attempt to launch offensive after offensive, carry on their wanton shellings causing innocent people to die, if they still ask for a coalition government and a peace cabinet, repeat over and over again the NVN 4-point, the NLF 5-point and their so-called fundamental principle, if they still demand that the RVN ask its allies to withdraw their troops unconditionally, then I believe we cannot have serious and fruitful talks with them.

I call upon them to be a little more realistic, to look more clearly into their real situation in the South, to listen to their cadres, to measure the spirit and attitude of the South Vietnamese people and to take the figures we have shown and think about them.

Therefore, I call upon them to have good faith and to discuss with us with a realistic approach, then a logical and honorable solution surely can be achieved. What they should bear in mind is that if they are not strong this year then next year they will not be strong either. Time will not help them, instead they should be clear-sighted and cease their stubborn belligerent attitude and understand once and for all that along with our goodwill for peace there is also the strong determination of the South Vietnamese people to fight patiently until the day peace in freedom and democracy should naturally by itself be restored.

After my presentation of the situation and policy to solve the war, you and our countrymen must have realized that we are actually facing a serious and difficult reality. No war ends easily whether by blood sacrifices or by negotiations. Everybody knows that the Viet-Nam problem is a difficult and subtle one. Peace talks do not have results just by having one formula at one place, but by many formulas, at many places, on many levels in order to cope, to solve all the subtle aspects of the problem.

The difficulty in solving the war problem lies not only in our desire to annihilate all the enemies, but also in our desire to shorten the war and save the nation's blood and bones and capability without prejudice to our genuine basic stand.

Still we have not yet asked the question on how we will accept into our national community, into our national political and social community those elements who fought against us but now want to renounce the political doctrine, the form of organization as well as the methods of action of the Communists.

First, the truth is that, after having been brainwashed, indoctrinated and oppressed throughout the years, those elements will not be able to easily forget the doctrines they have been taught, though they may apparently renounce Communism in the near future, they will not be able to easily discard the methods they were familiar with nor can they easily dismantle the cells and networks they had set up, in one day, one month or one year. It will take us many years to win their hearts and minds, to reeducate them and reform them. We have not yet taken into consideration the fact that the Communists will not sit still but will attempt to resume their aggression under their permanent strategy of subversion.

At that time, the struggle will occur in many aspects and though bloodless, will be arduous, complex, long lasting and decisive in comparison with the current armed conflict.

In the face of a future in which we take the initiative to shorten the war to minimize the sacrifices of our fellow countrymen's lives and the use of our national resources, I would like to ask the following questions:

—What have we got ready?

—How far are we ready to cope with the situation in order to guarantee our success?

—What will the future of the country be?

Anybody among us, anybody who is concerned about politics and anxious about the future of the nation can see the answer and at the same time the ensuring needs. Those needs, I think, are:

—The problem of ideology,

—The problem of leadership,

—And lastly, the problem of organization, or, in more correct and clearer terms, those needs are national parties with ideology, with leadership and with organization.

Our actual shortcoming resides in the fact that, having clearly realized the importance of those needs, we have not, up to this date had any practical solution, nor obtained any appropriate results.

On this issue, many times in the past, I, as the leader of the nation have always posed this problem, have always reminded, have always urged, have always waited for the active participation of those involved in politics, of the people, and especially of you, representatives of the people and of the various political trends in the two houses of the National Assembly. In this same forum, one year ago I had termed this problem as the moral and political mobilization. As of this moment, we are at the last stage. I have been concerned with this important problem and its even more important consequences of late. I was very cautious at first, but today, I have finally arrived at a conclusion, a decision which I need all the political courage to take. That decision is that right now I, myself, must solve this problem and solve it directly.

As I have said earlier, our needs in the field of political parties are: ideology, leadership, and organization.

In so far as ideals are concerned, I am sure that we do not lack any to serve, to believe in, and to make sacrifices for. To this date, through countless challenges, and countless difficulties, we are still standing, we are still strong and we have succeeded in opening the road to development and progress. All of this is due to the spirit and the guidance of those ideals. Thus within the present world structure, of all the new, progressive trends and doctrines, that have survived various challenges, to serve the nation has always been the truest and noblest ideal, the one we should follow.

In opposition to the noble spirit of the national ideal, the Communist and Marxist doctrine which has been regarded as the most up to date and closely organized, has shown itself a total failure.

This assertion is neither only an opinion nor an argumentation. This is a historical reality. What happened in Poznan, Budapest more than ten years ago, what happened in Czechoslovakia in the

preceding months, what happened recently and what is happening at the Russia-Red China borders? From where did all these events originate and receive their motive force, if not from the national doctrine, if not from the need for conservation and the national pride, despite the fact that they are nations whose people in power considered themselves as the most faithful disciples of Communism.

More recently and more concretely, right in Viet-Nam, such events as the opposition activities right after the Communist usurpation of power in 1945, the exodus of nearly one million refugees since the Communist take-over of the North in 1945, the hopeless uprising at Quynh Luu in 1956, the opposing literary and artist fronts in the North, and lately the resistance of South Viet-Nam, all these facts manifest no other thing than the determination of the National Doctrine in fighting against Communism.

In the face of those realities, one must wonder what remains of the so-called international ideology. What meaning can it have other than that it is a camouflaged new Imperialist doctrine?

I do not intend to do here what is commonly labelled as denouncing the Communists. But I want to dissipate those complexes, to root out those cowardly obsessions which have infected some people when faced with the "victory" boasted by Communist propaganda.

I realize that the national ideology is the most justifiable ideology we can choose and attain. However, I am also aware that to speak only of the word nation might sound ambiguous and might lead to confusion. To explain the nature of the national ideology, we should have in view its primary objective which is the people, our fellow countrymen. The word nation would be meaningless if it consists only of a piece of land, an empty territory. The word nation would be also meaningless if hunger, ignorance, diseases, injustice and oppression are still hanging over the people.

Consequently, my opinion is that the very substance of the national doctrine should commensurate with the trend of progress. It should aim at reorganizing and establishing an ever equitable and progressive social order.

In this spirit, I have assigned as one of the three national objectives, social reorganization. And when speaking of reorganization, reconstruction and development for progress, I think immediately of the biggest, the most concrete concern which are the farmers, the poor tillers in the rural areas, a social class which has been mistreated for many centuries and which has suffered most of the sacrifices and disasters caused by the present Communist war of subversion.

With such a conception, I have, within the limits of my capacity and power, striven to materialise that conception by concrete actions, as stated in my message at the end of 1968. My determination during this year is to carry out the policy to help the farmers acquire property through a truly vigorous and revolutionary land reform program.

I want every farmer to become a small landowner, to have a medium-level living standard. Thus, our society will progress, our culture and economy will have favorable conditions under which to develop.

I reiterate those wishes to confirm clearly to you and to my fellow countrymen that the reason I am determined to make efforts to reform is due to my conception of the national doctrine, to my belief in the fact that my conceptions are totally just, totally sound, totally in accordance with the just cause and the requirement of the situation. I do not do it for demagogy or for any other personal reason.

In summary, as far as ideology is concerned, we are not in need of any ideology. On the contrary, we do have a very strong and just one. The problem remains to propagate this ideology, to have this ideology widely diffused and adopted by the majority of the population. I think that the best way to carry out this task is to materialize the ideology's criteria into policy, into achievements, into useful accomplishments for our fellow countrymen, mainly for the massive low-income farmers who constitute the primary concern. I am striving to achieve this task. Many of you and many others are certainly doing the same task. If the majority, if all of us will work together, our problem on ideology can be considered as solved in a satisfactory manner.

But there still remains the problem of organization and leadership. All of us should be honest and should have the courage to recognize that this is our biggest deficiency and the main reason we have always been in the defensive position and on the losing side in the struggle against Communism for the twenty years. And when we speak of the Communists, we should think of organization. When we want to compete with Communism, we must compete in the field of organization.

"On organization" no one among us is satisfied with the situation we have at the present. Though there are many personalities and denominations which have tried to realize their intentions on improvement and unity, we have not witnessed any big results to date.

With the same basic ideology and only minute differences in policy, why have the efforts for unity not succeeded? I believe that the reply is in the "problem of leadership," or more precisely, the men in leadership. And now, as time is pressing and cannot tolerate any further delay, I have decided to volunteer to accomplish the said task actively and directly.

From one point of view, "on the stand point of the ruling side," I believe that it is the best and shortest way to solve the problem of leadership, the reality being that I am ruling. The reality is that we need a political organization which represents the ruling tendancy. I personally will assume this task.

I know that as I announce my decision, there undoubtedly are people who will question, who will wonder about my intentions and my personal ambitions. I want to make it clear that I only do it because of the nation's needs, needs which are furthermore encouraged by the constitution, and I do it because political parties play an essential role in a democratic regime. My sole ambition is "to put our nation across the current and future difficult period of challenges in such a way that the Republic of Viet-Nam will not fall into the hands of the Communists."

I also feel the duty to contribute into building for the country a strong political system of activities through an organized political

party system. And when I start, I sincerely want to see the coming of honest and qualified leaders. I want to assume the "role of a scout." I never have the ambition to "close the door after me."

With regard to organization, in the forthcoming days, I will actively promote the creation of a capable political union which befits the role and the meaning of the words, political party. I will outline to you a broad political union which may be called a group or a front. Its name may not be important, but its essence is composed of all those personalities, all those groups and denominations which agree with my policy to solve the nation's problems and with my objectives to build democracy, solve the war and reform society. All those personalities and denominations will assemble with me in some kind of organization frame, which may be broad or narrow, which may be one unique entity or which may comprise of many organizational units acting together, but the prime objective is to assemble.

The important problem is to assemble, to be thoroughly informed about concept and policy, while the form and modality of organization should be decided by common consent of all the concerned personalities and denominations. One of my basic objectives is democracy, and I want it to be implemented and respected at the start, from myself on down.

In this forum, and in this broad and flexible context I want to appeal to you, ladies and gentlemen and my dear fellow countrymen, "all those who agree with me should join me, should cooperate with me and should carry the burden with me."

I believe that all those who agree with me on the nation's ideology, on the objectives we should attain for the nation, on the dangers we should spare for our people, and who have followed a common line should cooperate. I am hopeful and determined to carry this task to a successful end, for this will not be my personal success but the success of all those who have cooperated with me. This will also be a success for the nation. I am also encouraged to note that to date, a great number of personalities, a great number of my fellow countrymen have encouraged me and many others are ready to respond to and to cooperate with me.

As for the personalities and citizens who do not agree with me, I want to make clear that "they do not agree with me about the modalities or methods but not about the ideology, for the Communists are the only people who do not agree with us about the National Ideology." True, for those who do not agree with me, I wish, more than that, I urge them to unite, to reorganize because it will constitute also a contribution to solving the problems of organization and leadership, in respect to the other side, called the opposition group.

Our system is a democratic one, our aspirations and objectives are democratic ones, therefore, right from the beginning, we should solve our problems in a democratic way, that is not to solve them in one direction. And also for the sake of democratic objectives, those who do not agree with me and with us should unite and reorganize. We have repeatedly cited the word opposition. Indeed, "the only force which can actually play the role of opposition is a strong political party with a clear-sighted leadership, a well-estab-

lished organization, a sense of responsibility and responsible activities." Without such a force, there would not be any real, efficient and orderly opposition. Any individual, any separate faction, not withstanding their willingness or their exceptional value, would not be in a position to assume the role of an opposition without unity and leadership. The act of making public statements on minor activities to be taken against the ruling group is not sufficient to attribute to oneself the valuable role of opposition. Without unity, without leadership, without organization one can only arrive at chaos and never establish oneself as an opposition force.

Distinguished Senators and Representatives, while addressing you on the solution to the problems of political union, leadership and organization, I wish to ask for permission to call your attention to the "political parties and press statutes" which are the urgently-needed legislative documents long-awaited by everybody and every circle. Indeed, the political parties and press are the sine-qua-non elements in our mission to build a democratic regime. And, if the statutes governing the said activities are not yet promulgated, both the government and the involved parties, more precisely those engaged in politics and press, would have no criterion by which to direct the said activities in a legitimate and harmonious manner.

Frankly speaking, from the stand point of the executive, as long as those statutes are not promulgated, the executive has a freer hand in its scope of action. However, I do not want such a situation. I want our task of establishing democracy to be accomplished seriously and promptly. This is not my personal desire but is a necessary national requirement. In my message of October 7, 1968, I reiterated the above request. And today, I strongly hope that the National Assembly will approve and promptly promulgate those two statutes.

Mr. President of the Senate, Mr. Speaker of the House, distinguished Senators and Representatives:

Under the present circumstances, we are at the same time fighting and building, resisting and struggling for peace, and although we find ourselves in a strong position, the situation still has many difficulties and temptations.

We have attained the present strong position, certainly thanks to various factors and other subjective as well as objective conditions, but it appears to me that the most important factor depends on our choice of the right way, the democratic and republican way, the legitimate and constitutional way wherein all the national rights are clearly defined, fully established and harmoniously worked out.

In this respect, we have obtained very encouraging results, but when compared with the needs, I am certain that they cannot be considered as sufficient. I neither dare nor want to solicit one-way opinions, unconditional support of all policies or activities initiated by the executive without any exception.

However, I strongly expect the activities of the three constitutional powers to be coordinated and harmonized in a better manner, for it is only through such a situation that we can bring our nation a strong position and consolidate it every day in order to win over the Communist aggressors. I hope that the said harmony will be

realized at the maximum on the standpoint of National Ideology and interest. I hope that only the notion of national utility will serve as propelling forces and motives for all the activities we are to carry out. I hope that we will assume greater responsibility for our attitude as well as for our activities, especially for our attitude in regards to the existing regime, a regime which has been established by the will of the whole people. Each individual, each institution of our society attains its value only through this legislative and constitutional factor. Our force lies therein: The strong position of South Viet-Nam on the international scene lies therein; what has caused the Communist aggressors and the tools they have fabricated in South Viet-Nam to fail lies therein.

As a result, the coordination of the constitutional powers and the fine harmonization of these powers constitute a life and death need in order to assemble a sufficient force against Communism and to build the nation in order and prosperity.

Mr. President of the Senate, Mr. Speaker of the House, Ladies and Gentlemen, my dear fellow countrymen.

—I have just presented to you and to our fellow countrymen our view on the situation and our problems.

—I have just asserted to the world, to our allies, to our fellow countrymen, and to the Communists the basic six-point program in order to solve the Viet-Nam war and to restore peace to this part of the world.

—I have just presented to you and to our fellow countrymen my decision to assume the leadership of a national political union in order to secure a South Viet-Nam free from Communist interference and despotism.

—I have just appealed for a closer cooperation and harmony between the various national agencies in order that the social order and national prosperity can be achieved from a position of strength based on freedom, democracy and social justice.

—Our objective is not to drag on the war but to search for a prompt peace.

—We are not a belligerent nation but a peace-loving nation.

—I am not a hawk as interpreted in its most excessive and belligerent meaning, but neither am I a dove, a term usually understood as willingly inclined to surrender to Communist aggressors.

—I only want to prevent this South Viet-Nam from falling into Communist hands, while at the same time try to shorten the war by a just and reasonable peaceful settlement, by a road which can minimize the sacrifices of the people of South Viet-Nam. I only want to forge for the nation a strong position in every field: military, political, social, as to enable us to attain the desired peaceful settlement, and I want all our fellow countrymen to cooperate with me in building up our existing position of strength and thus make it more solid every day, to do it the faster the better, because although the Communists and the development of events do not ask it of us, we ourselves must take the first step from a position of strength.

—I am determined to solve the war and to bring about a just peace to the nation.

—Our position is our bible, the supreme interests of our nation and our people—i.e. not to let the people of the RVN fall into the hands of the Communists either indirectly or in the long run—should be the guiding light for the leaders. What remains is a wise, appropriate, timely, clear-sighted modality of response to solve the war and bring back a just, genuine peace.

—With the heavy responsibility toward the nation in the coming difficult period, once again I call upon the true and active cooperation of the National Assembly and of all the people from all walks of life. I also call for the sacrificies and efforts of all the soldiers, cadres and administrative personnel.

On behalf of the people and the government of the RVN, I would like to express again our deep gratitude and our appreciate for the great sacrifices and efforts made by the people and governments of our allies who have helped us to defend freedom in this land. We are determined and will continuously try to gradually bear the full responsibility in this conflict and we will only ask for efficient material aid from those friendly countries.

—I warmly wish the two houses of the National Assembly great success in this session.

—Let us pray for the prompt restoration of peace to the fatherland.

Thank you.

TEXT OF PROPOSAL SUBMITTED AT PARIS CONFERENCE BY TRAN BUU KIEM, CHIEF DELEGATE OF THE NFLSV, MAY 8, 1969[1]

PRINCIPLES AND MAIN CONTENT OF AN OVER-ALL SOLUTION TO THE SOUTH VIET-NAM PROBLEM TO HELP RESTORE PEACE IN VIET-NAM

Proceeding from a desire to reach a political solution with a view to ending the United States imperialists' war of aggression in South Vietnam and helping restore peace in Vietnam.

On the basis of the guarantee of the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people.

Proceeding from the fundamental principles of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and the actual situation in Vietnam.

On the basis of the political program and the five-point position of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, which keeps with the four-point stand of the government of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam.

The South Vietnam National Liberation Front sets forth the principles and main content of an over-all solution to the South Vietnam problem to help restore peace in Vietnam as follows:

1. To respect the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights, i.e. independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, as recognized by the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam.

[1] Unofficial translation from the New York Times, May 9, 1969.

2. The United States Government must withdraw from South Vietnam all United States troops, military personnel, arms and war material of the other foreign countries of the United States camp without posing any condition whatsoever; liquidate all United States military bases in South Vietnam; renounce all encroachments on the sovereignty, territory and security of South Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

3. The Vietnamese people's right to fight for the defense of their fatherland is the sacred, inalienable right to self-defense of all peoples. The question of the Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be resolved by the Vietnamese parties among themselves.

4. The people of South Vietnam shall settle themselves their own affairs without foreign interference. They shall decide themselves the political regime of South Vietnam through free and democratic general elections; a constituent assembly will be set up, a constitution worked out and a coalition government of South Vietnam installed reflecting national concord and the broad union of all social strata.

5. During the period intervening between the restoration of peace and the holding of general elections, neither party shall impose its political regime on the people of South Vietnam.

The political forces representing the various social strata and political tendencies in South Vietnam that stand for peace, independence and neutrality—including those persons who, for political reasons, have to live abroad—will enter into talks to set up a provisional coalition government based on the principle of equality, democracy and mutual respect with a view to achieving a peaceful, independent, democratic and neutral South Vietnam.

The provisional coalition government is to have the following tasks:

A. To implement the agreement to be concluded on the withdrawal of the troops of the United States and the other foreign countries of the American camp.

B. To achieve national concord, and a broad union of all social strata, political forces, nationalities, religious communities and all persons, no matter what their political beliefs and their past may be, provided they stand for peace, independence and neutrality.

C. To achieve broad democratic freedoms—freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of belief, freedom to form political parties and organizations, freedom to form political parties and organizations, freedom to demonstrate etc.; to set free those persons jailed on political grounds; to prohibit all acts of terror, reprisal and discrimination against people having collaborated with either side and who are now in the country or abroad, as provided for the 1954 Geneva agreement on Vietnam.

D. To heal the war wounds, restore and develop the economy, to restore the normal life of the people and to improve the living conditions of the laboring people.

E. To hold free and democratic general elections in the whole of South Vietnam with a view to achieving the South Vietnam people's right to self-determination, in accordance with the content of point 4 mentioned above.

6. South Vietnam will carry out a foreign policy of peace and neutrality.

To carry out a policy of good neighborly relations with the Kingdom of Cambodia on the basis of respect for her independence, sovereignty, neutrality and territorial integrity within her present borders; to carry out a policy of good neighborly relations with the Kingdom of Laos on the basis of respect for the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos.

To establish diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with all countries, irrespective of political and social regime, including the United States, in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence: mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, noninterference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, peaceful coexistence, to accept economic and technical aid with no political conditions attached from any country.

7. The reunification of Vietnam will be achieved step by step, by peaceful means, through discussions and agreement between the two zones, without foreign interference.

Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, the two zones shall re-establish normal relations in all fields on the basis of mutual respect.

The military demarcation line between the two zones at the 17th parallel, as provided for by the 1954 Geneva agreements, is only of a provisional character and does not constitute in any way a political or territorial boundary. The two zones shall reach agreement on the status of the demilitarized zone, and work out modalities for movements across the provisional military demarcation line.

8. As provided for in the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, the two zones. North and South Vietnam, shall undertake to refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries, not allow any foreign country to maintain military bases, troops and military personnel on their respective soil, and not recognize the protection of any country or military alliance or bloc.

9. To resolve the aftermath of the war:

A. The parties will negotiate the release of soldiers captured in war.

B. The United States government must bear full responsibility for the losses and devastations it has caused to the Vietnamese people in both zones.

10. The parties shall reach agreement on an international supervision about the withdrawal from South Vietnam of the troops, military personnel, arms and war materiel of the United States and the other foreign countries of the American camp.

The principles and content of the over-all solution expounded above form an integrated whole. On the basis of these principles and content, the parties shall reach understanding to the effect of concluding agreements on the above-mentioned questions with a view to ending the war in South Vietnam, and contributing to restore peace in Vietnam.

BASIC RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS OF NATIONAL DELEGATES OF SOUTH VIETNAM, ESTABLISHING THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM HELD FROM JUNE 6 TO 8, 1969 [1]

Independence, sovereignty, unification, and territorial integrity are the sacred, inviolable basic national rights of all people of every country. The U.S. imperialists have trampled upon human rights, self-determination and the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam by sending half-a-million troops to invade South Vietnam and to wage the most atrocious war of aggression in mankind's history. The U.S. imperialists want to turn South Vietnam into a neocolony and a military base, plotting to partition and occupy our entire country forever, thereby seriously threatening the security of Indochina and peace in Southeast Asia and the world.

With the indomitable, historic tradition and the uprising spirit of a people who have for 4,000 years constructed and protected their country and continued the anticolonialist struggle from one generation to another over a century, we have sacrificed everything, determined not to live as slaves. Our sacred, strong, just resistance against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys has been riding a continuous high tide, scoring repeated successes. The more the U.S. imperialists escalate the war, the more heavily they are defeated. The more our armed forces and people fight, the stronger they become and the greater their victories.

In the 1968 Mau Than spring, the strong and continuous general offensive and uprisings of our armed forces and people throughout the south have scored great, comprehensive achievements, thus leading our anti-U.S. national salvation undertaking to an extremely glorious era of new development. The U.S. aggressors are obviously defeated, but they remain very stubborn, continuing to oppose the legitimate demands of our people, Americans, and the peace-loving people worldwide. These demands are: end the aggressive war and withdraw all U.S. troops.

During these very important hours of our country's history, the congress of South Vietnamese people's delegates, representing the entire people's desire, solemnly asserts that the South Vietnamese people's basic objectives are independence, democracy, peace, neutrality, and the peaceful reunification of the country, for which our 14 million compatriots' are determined to sacrifice and struggle to the end.

The present important tasks for all our troops and people in South Vietnam are to strengthen their militant solidarity and concentrate all their spirit and energy to defeat the aggressive policy of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, to overthrow the reactionary U.S. puppet administration, to liberate the south, to protect the north, to achieve an independent, democratic, peaceful, and neutral South Vietnam, and to proceed toward national reunification. To manifest the unsubmissive desire for independence and freedom of a

[1] Department of State.

92-991 O - 75 - 41

nation which is winning; to gather, consolidate, and develop the brilliant achievements and great victories of the anti-U.S. national salvation resistance; to comply with the democratic requirements of the local situation, and to strongly advance the inevitably victorious resistance toward complete victory—for these goals the congress of South Vietnamese delegates solemnly establishes a regime of the Republic of South Vietnam and outlines its great organizational structure as follows:

PART 1. THE REGIME OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM

Article 1. The political system of South Vietnam is a republican system in South Vietnam.

(*A*) *National flag:* The congress of South Vietnamese delegates decide to take a NFLSV flag, representing the all-people solidarity bloc and the South Vietnamese people's stalwart, unsubmissive fighting spirit, as the national flag of the Republic of South Vietnam;

(*B*) *National anthem:* The congress of South Vietnamese people's delegates decided to take the hymn "Liberate the south," representing the South Vietnamese people's determination to fight and win, as the national anthem of the Republic of South Vietnam;

(*C*) *Motto:* The motto of the Republic of South Vietnam is independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality.

Article 2. The Republic of South Vietnam's domestic policy is aimed at uniting all people, irrespective of social strata, religion, nationality, political tendencies, or their past provided that they approve peace, independence, and neutrality. The Republic of South Vietnam is resolved to protect the national sovereignty, to insure democratic freedoms, to respect the freedom of faith, to achieve equality among nationalities, to implement agrarian policies to develop production and industrial and commercial activities, to accelerate the educational, medical, cultural, and social tasks in order to constantly improve the material and spiritual life of the people, especially laborers, and to mobilize human and material resources in accordance with the slogan "all for the frontline, all for victory."

Article 3. The Republic of South Vietnam will implement a peaceful and neutral foreign policy, establish diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with all countries, regardless of political and social regimes, in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and implement a good neighbor policy with the Cambodian Kingdom on the basis of respect for the independence, sovereignty, neutrality, and territorial integrity of Cambodia in conformity with the present borders. The Republic of South Vietnam will implement a good neighbor policy with the Laotian Kingdom on the basis of respect for the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos and will continue to support the movement of struggle for national independence, against imperialism, old colonialism, and neocolonialism, and for the protection of peace in Southeast Asia and the world.

Article 4. Vietnam is one, the Vietnamese people are one. The Vietnamese people's right to fight for the protection of their fatherland is the sacred, inviolable self-defense right. After the liberation

of South Vietnam, the unification of Vietnam will be achieved step by step peacefully on the basis of agreement between the two zones, without foreign interference.

PART 2. THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES AT ALL LEVELS.

Article 5. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam is an organization possessing the most concentrated power and representing the will and aspirations of all the South Vietnamese people to: vigorously lead the resistance toward victory and create conditions for the formation of a provisional coalition government in order to organize free general elections, elect the national assembly, promulgate the constitution, and designate the South Vietnam official government.

Article 6. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam has the duty to mobilize and lead all people and armed forces, to lead the people's revolutionary committees of all echelons and ministries, to strive to develop the victories obtained, to step up the general offensive and uprising movements in coordination with diplomatic struggle, and to continuously develop the resistance forces in all aspects to defeat the U.S. imperialists' aggressive policy, topple the reactionary puppet administration, force the Americans to end the agressive war and withdraw all U.S. and satellite troops from South Vietnam, and to achieve the objectives: independence, democracy, peace, neutrality proceeding toward national reunification.

Article 7. In the present critical situation, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam has been entrusted by the delegates' congress with full power to direct and solve all domestic and foreign problems of the country.

The provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam will rely on the resolution of the people delegates' congress, the NFLSV's political program, and the political program of the Vietnam Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces to promulgate decree-laws, orders, instructions, and circulars aimed at accelerating the anti-U.S. national salvation struggle, building the country, and unifying the leadership of people's revolutionary committees of all echelons. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam is an organ endowed with the right to deal with foreign relations problems, to establish diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with foreign countries, and to solve the South Vietnam issue in accordance with the principles and main content of the 10-point overall solution set forth by the NFLSV representative at the Paris conference.

Article 8. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam comprises a chairman, a vice chairman, and the following ministries: defense, foreign affairs, interior, economic and financial, education and youth, public health, social action and wounded soldiers, and justice. The secretariat of the chairman's office has a minister and a deputy minister.

In the future, to meet the increasing demands of the situation the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam may create new and necessary ministries and appoint more personnel.

Article 9. The revolutionary administration in South Vietnam will be organized according to the principle of democratic centralism from central level to basic units.

Article 10. The administrative system of the Republic of South Vietnam will be divided into: central, city, province or equivalent, district or equivalent, village, quarter, and hamlet.

Article 11. The establishment of administrations at city, provincial, district, and village levels or equivalent will be carried out according to the people-elected principle: through universal suffrage by the people, people's revolutionary councils will be elected which will designate people's revolutionary committees. Under the war of resistance conditions, in areas where conditions have not yet allowed universal suffrage, congresses of people's representatives will be held to designate people's revolutionary committees. The congress of national delegates entrusts the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam with the task of basing itself on its resolution and on the real situation in localities to determine the duties and powers of and organize people's revolutionary councils and people's revolutionary committees at all levels.

Part 3. Advisory Council

Article 12. To help the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam reflect the entire people's aspirations in its works, the congress of national delegates unanimously decided to set up, in addition, the Advisory Council composed of representatives of the NFLSV, the Vietnam Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces, political parties, people's organizations, religious communities, nationalities, political forces, and notables and intellectuals struggling for peace, independence, and neutrality in South Vietnam. It consists of a chairman, vice chairman, and members.

Article 13. The Advisory Council will base itself on the resolution of the congress of national delegates, the NFLSV's political program, the Vietnam Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces' political program, and the aspirations of various strata of people to join ideas with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam in setting forth stands and domestic and foreign policies, and in promulgating, completing, and revising decree-laws, arrests, instructions, and circulars of the government.

Article 14. In case it is necessary to take great decisions on important problems of the country, joint conferences between the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the Advisory Council will be held.

South Vietnam 8 June 1969, the congress of the South Vietnamese people's delegates.

CABINET NAMED

Liberation Radio (Clandestine) in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 2330 GMT 10 Jun 69 S

[Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam]

[Text] Chairman:	Architect Huynh Tan Phat
Vice chairman and minister of interior:	Dr Phung Van Cung
Vice chairman and minister of education and youth:	Prof Nguyen Van Kiet
Vice Chairman:	Nguyen Doan
Minister to the chairman's office:	Tran Buu Kiem
Minister of defense:	Tran Nam Trung
Minister of foreign affairs:	Mrs Nguyen Thi Binh
Minister of the interior:	Dr Phung Van Cung
Minister of economy and finance:	Engineer Cao Van Bon
Minister of information and culture:	Composer Luu Huu Phuoc
Minister of education and youth:	Prof Nguyen Van Kiet
Minister of health, social action, and disabled soldiers:	Dr Duong Quynh Hoa
Minister of justice:	Truong Nhu Tang
Vice minister to the chairman's office:	Ung Ngoc Ky
Vice minister of defense:	Dong Van Cong and Nguyen Chanh
Vice ministers of foreign affairs:	Le Quang Chanh and Hoang Bich Son
Vice minister of interior:	Prof Nguyen Ngoc Thuong
Vice minister of economy and finance:	Nguyen Van Trieu
Vice ministers of information and culture:	Writer Hoang Trong Qui—pen name Thanh Nghi—and writer Lu Phuong
Vice ministers of education and youth:	Prof Le Van Tri and Ho Huu Nhut
Vice ministers of health, social action, and disabled soldiers:	Dr Ho Van Hue and Prof Bui Thi Nga
Vice minister of justice:	Prof Le Van Tha

TEXT OF PRESIDENT THIEU'S SPEECH ON RESTORATION OF PEACE IN VIETNAM, JULY 11, 1969 (EXCERPT)[1]

. . . this war cannot be permitted to last indefinitely. It should be ended one way or another. We, the peace-loving people, would like to solve this war by way of reconciliation.

[1] Washington Post, July 11, 1969.

To move the negotiations forward, I feel that a major initiative is needed. To that effect, we are willing to make, as another act of goodwill, a comprehensive offer for the political settlement of this conflict.

Both sides in this struggle have said that the internal affairs of South Vietnam should be decided by the South Vietnamese themselves, in a free and democratic fashion.

The only way for the people of South Vietnam to exercise their right of self-determination, to participate in public affairs, and to determine the future of the country, is through elections in which they can genuinely express their choice, free from fear and coercion.

In this spirit, free elections can be based on the following principles:

(1) All political parties and groups, including the NLF which is now bearing arms against us, can participate in the elections if they renounce violence and pledge themselves to accept the results of the elections.

(2) To make sure that the elections would be conducted in all fairness, an electoral commission could be set up, in which all political parties and groups, including the NLF now fighting against us, could be represented.

The electoral commission will assure equal opportunities in the campaigning to all candidates.

It will also enable all political parties and groups to participate in watching the polls to see that people vote absolutely freely, and in watching the counting of the ballots to see that they are honestly counted.

(3) An international body is to be established to supervise the elections, and to make sure that the elections are held under conditions fair to all.

(4) We are prepared to discuss with the other side the timetable and the modalities under which the elections will be held.

(5) There will be no reprisals or discrimination after the elections.

(6) The Government of Vietnam declares that it will abide by the results of the elections, whatever these results may be. We challenge the other side to declare the same.

The other side claims that it controls 80 per cent of the population of South Vietnam. We say that they dominate by force only a small portion of the population. Let these claims be put to the test of elections. If the other side really believes its own claims, and really stands for the right of self-determination of the Vietnamese people, there can be no reason for it not to accept our offer of genuinely free elections, in which they can participate without discrimination, not only in the voting but also in the control of the counting of the votes, with international supervision.

To be meaningful elections should be conducted under conditions under which the South Vietnamese people can exercise their choice, free from fear and coercion.

Thus, there is an obvious connection between free elections, supervised withdrawal of non-South Vietnamese forces, and an end to violence and terrorism.

Today I renew the offer of private talks with the NLF, without preconditions, to discuss the above and any other questions of peace and national reconciliation.

The other side should not misconstrue our desire for peace as a sign of weakness. It should not be induced by our repeated acts of goodwill into believing that it has only to remain adamantly negative for us to accept eventual surrender.

We are fighting for a just cause and in self-defense, and we are becoming every day stronger. We shall not grow tired in this struggle. In fact there is a point beyond which we shall get tired of making unilateral acts of goodwill. Hanoi will then have to bear all the consequences of the protracted war, and it has to assume full responsibility for the sufferings that it imposes on the people in both parts of Vietnam.

TEXT OF 8-POINT PROPOSAL SUBMITTED AT PARIS CONFERENCE BY MME. NGUYEN THI BINH OF THE NFLSV PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, SEPTEMBER 17, 1970 (EXCERPTS)[1]

The United States Is Held Responsible for the Stalemate of the Paris Conference.

The delegation of the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation previously and that of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam at present have taken part in the Paris conference on Viet Nam with a very clear aim: The search for a peaceful settlement of the Viet Nam problem on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights and the South Vietnam people's right to genuine self-determination.

Right at the first plenary session of this conference, we expounded our five-point position and presented it as a basis for a correct solution to the South Vietnam problem.

On May 8, 1969, with a view to making this conference move forward, our delegation again set forth the 10-point overall solution, proposing the way to settle the South Vietnam problem comprehensively, also dealing with both military and political aspects, principles and main contents, as well as immediate imperative issues, so as to put an end to the war and preserve a lasting peace too. That solution not only ensures the Vietnamese people's sacred national and democratic rights but also meets the American people's legitimate interests together with the world people's aspirations for peace. . . .

To respond to the deep desire for peace of broad sectors of the people in South Viet Nam, in the United States and in the world, on the instructions of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam, I would like to further elaborate on a number of points in the 10-point overall solution as follows:

1—The U.S. Government must put an end to its war of aggression in Viet Nam, stop the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war, totally withdraw from South Viet Nam troops, military personnel, weapons, and war materials of the United States as well as troops, military personnel, weapons, and war materials of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, without posing any condition whatsoever, and dismantle all U.S. military bases in South Viet Nam.

In case the U.S. Government declares it will withdraw from South Viet Nam all its troops and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp by June 30, 1971, the People's Liberation Armed Forces will refrain from attacking the withdrawing troops of the United States and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, and the parties will engage at once in discussions on:

—The question of ensuring safety for the total withdrawal from South Viet Nam of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp.

—The question of releasing captured militarymen.

2—The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be resolved by the Vietnamese parties among themselves.

3—The warlike and fascist Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration, an instrument of the U.S. policy of aggression, are frantically opposing peace, striving to call for the intensification and expansion of the war, and for the prolongation of the U.S. military occupation of South Viet Nam, and are enriching themselves with the blood of the people. They are serving the U.S. imperialist aggressors who massacre their compatriots and devastate their country. They have stepped up the "pacification" campaigns to terrorize the people and hold them in the vise of their regime, set up a barbarous system of jails of the type of "tiger cages" in Can Dao and establish a police regime of the utmost cruelty in South Viet Nam. They carry out ferocious repression against those who stand for peace, independence, neutrality and democracy, regardless of their social stock, political tendencies and religions. They repress even those who are not of their clan. They increase forcible pressganging and endeavor to plunder the property of the South Viet Nam people so as to serve the U.S. policy of "Vietnamization" of the war. The restoration of genuine peace in South Viet Nam necessitates the formation in Saigon of an administration without Thieu, Ky, and Khiem, an administration which stands for peace, independence, neutrality, which improves the people's living conditions, which ensures democratic liberties such as freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, freedom of belief, etc., and releases those who have been jailed for political reasons, and dissolves concentra-

[1] Hanoi Radio, Sept. 18, 1970.

tion camps so that the inmates there may return to and live in their native places. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam is prepared to enter into talks with such an administration on a political settlement of the South Viet Nam problem so as to put an end to the war and restore peace in Viet Nam.

4—The South Viet Nam people will decide themselves the political regime of South Viet Nam through really free and democratic general elections, elect a national assembly, work out a constitution of a national and democratic character and set up a government reflecting the entire people's aspirations and will for peace, independence, neutrality, democracy, and national concord.

The general elections must be held in a really free and democratic way. The modalities of the elections must guarantee genuine freedom and equality during the electoral campaigns and vote proceedings to all citizens, irrespective of their political tendencies, including those who are living abroad. No party shall usurp for itself the right to organize general elections and lay down their modalities. The general elections organized by the U.S. puppet administration in Saigon at the bayonets of the U.S. occupying troops cannot be free and democratic.

A provisional government of broad coalition is indispensable for the organization of really free and democratic general elections and also for ensuring the right to self-determination of the South Viet Nam people during the transitory period between the restoration of peace and the holding of general elections.

5—The provisional coalition government will include three components:

—Persons of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam.

—Persons of the Saigon administration, really standing for peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy.

—Persons of various political and religious forces and tendencies standing for peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy including those who, for political reasons, have to live abroad.

The provisional coalition government will implement the agreements reached by the parties.

The provisional coalition government will carry out a policy of national concord, ensure the democratic freedoms of the people, prohibit all acts of terror, reprisal, and discrimination against those who have collaborated with either side, stabilize and improve the living conditions of the people and organize general elections to form an official coalition government.

The provisional coalition government will pursue a foreign policy of peace and neutrality, practice a policy of good neighborhood with the Kingdom of Laos and the Kingdom of Cambodia, respect the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, and territorial integrity of these two countries. It will establish diplomatic relations with all countries regardless of their political regime, including the United States, in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

6—Viet Nam is one, the Vietnamese people is one. The reunification of Viet Nam will be achieved step by step, by peaceful means, on the basis of discussions and agreements is between the two zones, without coercion or annexation from either side, without foreign interference. The time of reunification as well as all questions relating to the reunification will be discussed and agreed upon by both zones. Pending the peaceful reunification of the country, the two zones will reestablish normal relations in all fields on the basis of equality and mutual respect, and will respect each other's political regime, internal and external policies.

7—The parties will decide together measures aimed at ensuring the respect and the correct implementation of the provisions agreed upon.

8—After the agreement on and signing of accords aimed at putting an end to the war and restoring peace in Viet Nam, the parties will implement the modalities that will have been laid down for a cease-fire in South Viet Nam.

To attain a peaceful settlement of the Viet Nam problem, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam declares its readiness to get henceforth in touch with the forces or persons of various political tendencies and religions in the country and abroad, including members of the present Saigon administration, except Thieu, Ky and Khiem.

My statement at this 84th session of the Paris conference on Viet Nam today makes clearer some of the 10-point overall solution. It faithfully reflects the Vietnamese people's legitimate demands and conforms with the aspirations for peace of the peoples in the United States and the world.

Our delegation is firmly convinced that the governments and peoples of the socialist countries, the peace- and justice-loving countries, the international peace and democratic organizations, the peoples in the United States and the world, understanding our correct position and goodwill better, will support more strongly the Vietnamese people's just struggle.

If the U.S. Government is really concerned about peace and the United States' reputation, this is a very good opportunity for it to put an end to its unpopular war costly in human lives and property. Once the U.S. Government is willing to act according to reason, and respond seriously to the aforesaid legitimate demands it is sure [as received] that peace will be promptly restored in Viet Nam. But in case it obstinately carries on its war of aggression in South Viet Nam, the people there, together with their compatriots all over the country, are determined to fight on undauntedly for independence and freedom till complete victory.

The Vietnamese people are resolved to unite more strongly with the brother Lao and Khmer peoples in their common fight to defeat the U.S. policy of expanding the war to the whole of Indochina.

Once again, I make it clear that the progress of this conference depends upon whether the U.S. Government is ready or not to respond seriously to the 10-point overall solution and the points I have clarified today.

Text of 7-Point Peace Plan Submitted at Paris by Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh of the NFLSV, July 1, 1971[1]

The statement deals with the deadline for the total withdrawal of U.S. forces, the question of power in South Viet Nam, the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Viet Nam, the peaceful re-unification of Viet Nam and the relations between the north and south zones, the foreign policy of peace and neutrality of South Viet Nam, the damage caused by the U.S. to the Vietnamese people in the two zones, and the respect for the international guarantee of the accords that will be concluded.

Follow the seven points:

1—Regarding the deadline for the total withdrawal of U.S. forces.

The U.S. Government must put an end to its war of aggression in Viet Nam, stop its policy of "Vietnamization" of the war, withdraw from South Viet Nam all troops, military personnel, weapons, and war materials of the United States and of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, and dismantle all U.S. bases in South Viet Nam, without posing any condition whatsoever.

The U.S. Government must set a terminal date for the withdrawal from South Viet Nam of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp.

If the U.S. Government sets a terminal date for the withdrawal from South Viet Nam in 1971 of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, the parties will at the same time agree on the modalities:

A—Of the withdrawal in safety from South Viet Nam of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp.

B—Of the release of the totality of militarymen of all parties and of the civilians captured in the war (including American pilots captured in North Viet Nam) so that they may all rapidly return to their homes.

These two operations will begin on the same date and will end on the same date.

A cease-fire will be observed between the South Viet Nam People's Liberation Armed Forces and the armed forces of the United States and of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp as soon as the parties reach agreement on the withdrawal from South Viet Nam of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp.

2—Regarding the question of power in South Viet Nam.

The U.S. Government must really respect the South Viet Nam people's right to self-determination, put an end to its interference in the internal affairs of South Viet Nam, cease backing the bellicose group headed by Nguyen Van Thieu at present in office in Saigon, and stop all maneuvers, including tricks on elections, aimed at maintaining the puppet Nguyen Van Thieu.

---

[1] Liberation Press Agency, July 1, 1971.

The political, social and religious forces in South Viet Nam aspiring to peace and national concord will use various means to form in Saigon a new administration favouring peace, independence, neutrality and democracy. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam will immediately enter into talks with that administration in order to settle the following questions:

A—To form a broad three-segment government of national concord that will assume its functions during the period between the restoration of peace and the holding of general elections and organize general elections in South Viet Nam.

A ceasefire will be observed between the South Viet Nam People's Liberation Armed Forces and the armed forces of the Saigon administration as soon as a government of national concord is formed.

B—To take concrete measures with the required guarantees so as to prohibit all acts of terror, reprisal, and discrimination against persons having collaborated with one or the other party, to ensure every democratic liberty to the South Viet Nam people, to release all persons jailed for political reasons, to dissolve all concentration camps and to liquidate all forms of constraint and coercion so as to permit the people to return to their native places in complete freedom and to freely engage in their occupations.

C—To see that the people's living conditions are stabilized and gradually improve, to create conditions allowing everyone to contribute his talents and efforts to heal the war wounds and rebuild the country.

D—To agree on measures to be taken to ensure the holding of genuinely free, democratic and fair general elections in South Viet Nam.

3—Regarding the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Viet Nam.

The Vietnamese parties will together settle the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Viet Nam in a spirit of national concord, equality and mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance with the post-war situation and with a view to lightening the people's contribution.

4—Regarding the peaceful reunification of Viet Nam and the relations between the north and south zones.

A—The reunification of Viet Nam will be achieved step by step, by peaceful means, on the basis of discussions and agreements between the two zones, without constraint and annexation from either party, without foreign interference.

Pending the reunification of the country, the north and the south zones will reestablish normal relations, guarantee free movement, free correspondence, free choice of residence and maintain economic and cultural relations on the principle of mutual interests and mutual assistance.

All questions concerning the two zones will be settled by qualified representatives of the Vietnamese people in the two zones on the basis of negotiations, without foreign interference.

B—In keeping with the provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Viet Nam, in the present temporary partition of the country into two zones, the north and the south zones of Viet Nam will refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries, from allowing any foreign country to have military bases, troops and military personnel on their soil, and from recognising the protection of any country, of any military alliance or bloc.

5—Regarding the foreign policy of peace and neutrality of South Viet Nam.

South Viet Nam will pursue a foreign policy of peace and neutrality, establish relations with all countries regardless of their political and social regime, in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence, maintain economic and cultural relations with all countries, accept the cooperation of foreign countries in the exploitation of the resources of South Viet Nam, accept from any country economic and technical aid without any political conditions attached, and participate in regional plans of economic cooperation.

On the basis of these principles, after the end of the war, South Viet Nam and the United States will establish relations in the political, economic and cultural fields.

6—Regarding the damage caused by the United States to the Vietnamese people in the two zones.

The U.S. Government must bear full responsibility for the losses and destruction it has caused to the Vietnamese people in the two zones.

7—Regarding the respect for and international guarantee of the accords that will be concluded.

The parties will find agreement on the forms of respect for and international guarantee of the accords that will be concluded.

After reading out the seven-point statement, Minister Nguyen Thi Binh said:

"With this seven-point statement, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam has once again clearly shown its goodwill for peace. These correct proposals and this serious attitude will no doubt win the approval and vigorous support of freedom and justice-loving governments and peoples the world over.

"We are firmly convinced that the South Viet Nam people, in the cities as well as in the countryside will, together with the Provisional Revolutionary Government, struggle with all their strength to end the U.S. war of aggression, to bring about peace and independence to the fatherland, and to achieve the broad concord of the whole nation. We are confident that the North Viet Nam people will always promote their union with the South Viet Nam people and will unreservedly support the correct proposals of the National Front for Liberation and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam. We firmly believe that the forces of freedom and peace in the United States, together with the Vietnamese people, will struggle for the end of the war in Viet Nam, in the interest of the Vietnamese people, the American people and world peace.

"We call on the U.S. Government to give a serious response to the new initiative that we have put forward at this session so as to allow the Paris conference on Viet Nam to progress."

New York Times Letter to Premier Pham Van Dong and Hanoi's Response, January 1972[1]

[1] Hanoi Radio, Jan. 16, 1972

Message from A.M. Rosenthal, New York Times

Honorable Pham Van Dong, Foreign Ministry, Hanoi

In view of the conflicting accounts we have had recently [on the] negotiating position of your government and PRG on ways to end the Indochina war, we invite your answers to the following questions because we believe they can clarify the situation.

1—If the United States sets a firm troop withdrawal date would you agree to the release of American prisoners in your control?

2—Would you negotiate on military withdrawal and the release of prisoners completely separate from questions pertaining to the political future of Vietnam?

3—Which of the following must be wholly withdrawn or halted to obtain the release of all American prisoners in your control?

1/ American ground troops in South Vietnam.
2/ American transport and logistic air support to South Vietnamese forces.
3/ American bombing in North Vietnam.
4/ American air reconnaissance in North Vietnam.
5/ American bombing in South Vietnam.
6/ American bombing in Laos and Cambodia.
7/ American airbases in Southeast Asia outside Indochina.
8/ American military advisory activities in South Vietnam.
9/ American military aid shipments to South Vietnam.
10/ American economic aid to South Vietnam.

4—Are there any additional conditions for the release of all American prisoners?

5—Assuming an agreement is possible under the terms of Question 3, how soon could all prisoners be released and how much time would be available to arrange the American disengagements?

6—Would the elements of such an agreement be separate? Could some prisoners be released before others in exchange for some acts of disengagement?

7—What in concrete terms is the meaning of your demand that the United States withdraw all political support from the present Saigon government? How could such a withdrawal be acted upon?

8—Quite apart from negotiations for withdrawal and prisoner release, under what conditions would you agree to a larger International peace conference on all Indochina? Who should attend? At what stage could such negotiations prove profitable?

A.M. Rosenthal, Managing editor, the New York TIMES.

Reply by Ngo Dien, head of DRV Foreign Ministry's Information and Press Department to A.M. Rosenthal's message to Pham Van Dong

Mr. A.M. Rosenthal, managing editor of the New York TIMES.

Dear sir: Concerning your questions addressed to Premier Pham Van Dong, I am authorized to draw your attention to the following points:

—The fundamental problem is the cessation of the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam and the restoration of peace in Vietnam with respect for the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people. Therefrom, the aspiration of the Vietnamese people for a peace in independence and freedom will be satisfied, as well as the wish of the American people who are demanding the extrication of their country from the current quagmire in Vietnam and the repatriation of all their sons engaged in the ranks of the U.S. expeditionary corps in Vietnam, including the U.S. militarymen captured in Vietnam.

—At present, forced to carry out a gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops, President Nixon has not, however, resigned himself in putting an end to his war of aggression. Implementing his Vietnamization policy, he intends to pursue it through the Nguyen Van Thieu clique and the Saigon puppet army, which the United States has provided with colossal aid and massive participation of the U.S. Air Force and Navy in combat.

—By simultaneously raising the issue of prisoners of war and that of U.S. troop withdrawal, without renouncing all commitment to and support for the Nguyen Van Thieu puppet administration, President Nixon does not aim at bringing a solution to the abovementioned fundamental problem, but simply at placating the legitimate demands of the American people. In fact, he aims at evading the pressure of U.S. and world public opinion with a view to prolonging and extending the war in Indochina.

—Concerning the solution to the Vietnamese problem, the DRV Government approves of and fully supports the seven points put forward on 1 July 1971 by the PRGRSV. You can find in this the answer to the questions which you raised in your telegram.

In refusing to comply with these seven points, the Nixon administration has turned away from the path leading to a correct solution of the Vietnam problem, rejecting at the same time the opportunity to bring home last Christmas all U.S. militarymen, including those who have been captured in Vietnam.

I am, sir, yours very truly, Ngo Dien, head of the Information and Press Department of the DRV Foreign Ministry.

North Vietnamese Broadcast of January 31, 1972 Containing U.S. 8-Point Proposal of October 11, 1971 and the Nine Points of the DRV of June 26, 1971

["The eight points of the United States presented to the DRV on 11 October 1971"]

[Text] 1—The United States agrees to a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of all U.S. forces and other foreign forces allied with the Government of South Vietnam. The withdrawal will be carried out in the following manner:

—The U.S. and allied forces, except for a small number of personnel necessary for technical advice, logistics and observation of the cease-fire mentioned in Point 6, will be withdrawn by 1 July 1972 at the latest, on the condition that this declaration of principle is signed between now and 1 December 1971. In no case will the final date for these withdrawals exceed a period of 7 months after the signing of this declaration of principle. (x)

—The remaining personnel will be progressively withdrawn, beginning 1 month before the presidential election mentioned in Point 3 and simultaneously with the resignation of the present president and vice president of South Vietnam also provided for in Point 3. These withdrawals will be completed before the date of the presidential election. (x)

2—The release of all militarymen and innocent civilians captured throughout Indochina will be carried out in parallel with the troop withdrawals mentioned in Point 1. Both sides will present a complete list of militarymen and innocent civilians held throughout Indochina on the day this declaration of principle is signed. This release will begin on the same day the troop withdrawal begins

and will be completed on 1 July 1972, on the condition that this declaration is signed by 1 December 1971 at the latest. The completion of this release will not be later than 7 months after the signing of this declaration. (x)

3—The following principles will govern the political future of South Vietnam:

The political future of South Vietnam will be left for the South Vietnamese people to decide for themselves, free from outside interference.

There will be free and democratic presidential elections in South Vietnam within 6 months after the signing of the final agreement based on the principles of this declaration. (x)

These elections will be organized and run by an independent body representing all political forces in South Vietnam which will assume its responsibilities on the date of the final agreement. This body will, among other responsibilities, determine the qualifications of candidates. All political forces in South Vietnam can participate in the elections and present candidates. There will be international supervision of these elections.

One month before the presidential election takes place, the present president and vice president of South Vietnam will resign. A caretaker government, headed by the chairman of the senate, will assume administrative responsibilities except for those pertaining to the election, which will remain with the independent election body.

The United States, for its part, declares that:

—It will support no candidate and will remain completely neutral in the election.

—It will abide by the outcome of this election and any other political processes shaped by the South Vietnamese people themselves.

—It is prepared to define its military and economic assistance relationships with any government that exists in South Vietnam.

Both sides agree that:

—South Vietnam, together with the other Indochinese countries, should adopt a foreign policy of neutrality. (x)

—The reunification of Vietnam should be decided on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Vietnam without constraint or annexation from either party and without foreign interference.

4—Both sides will respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina and those of 1962 on Laos. There will be no foreign intervention in the Indochinese countries and the Indochinese people will be able to settle their own affairs by themselves.

5—The problems existing among the Indochinese countries will be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of mutual respect for their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and noninterference in each other's affairs. Among the problems that will be settled is the implementation of the principle that all armed forces of the Indochinese countries must remain within their national frontiers.

6—There will be a general cease-fire throughout Indochina, to begin when the final agreement is signed. (x) Apart from the cease-fire, there will be no further infiltration of outside forces into any of the Indochinese countries.

7—There will be international supervision of the military aspects of this agreement, including the cease-fire and its provisions, the release of prisoners of war and innocent civilians and the withdrawal of outside forces from Indochina. (x)

8—There will be an international guarantee for the fundamental national rights of the Indochinese people, for the neutrality of all Indochinese countries (x) and for a lasting peace in this region.

Both sides express their willingness to participate in an international conference for this and other appropriate purposes.

(x) Passages indicate a different content than in the eight-point proposal published by the White House on 25 January 1972 and presented to the Paris conference on Vietnam on 27 January 1972.

The nine points of the DRV of 26 June 1971:

1—The withdrawal of all the forces of the United States and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp from South Vietnam and the other Indochinese countries must be achieved in 1971.

2—The release of all the militarymen and civilians captured in the war will be carried out at the same time and will be completed at the same moment as the withdrawal of troops mentioned in Point 1.

3—In South Vietnam, the United States ceases supporting Thieu-Ky-Khiem to allow the formation in Saigon of a new administration standing for peace,

independence, neutrality and democracy. The PRGRSV will engage in talks with the said administration with a view to settling the internal affairs of South Vietnam and achieving national concord.

4—The U.S. Government must assume the entire responsibility for the damage caused by the United States to the entire Vietnamese people. The DRV Government and the PRGRSV request from the U.S. Government reparations for damage caused by the United States in the two zones of Vietnam.

5—The United States must respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and Indochina and those of 1962 on Laos. It must cease its aggression against and intervention in the Indochinese countries to let the Indochinese people settle their own affairs.

6—The problems existing between the Indochinese countries will be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and for noninterference in internal affairs. For its part, the DRV is prepared to participate in the settlement of these problems.

7—All the parties will observe a cease-fire after the conclusion of agreements on the aforementioned problems.

8—An international supervision will be set up.

9—An international guarantee will be indispensable for the realization of the basic national rights of the Indochinese people, for the neutrality of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and for the establishment of a lasting peace in this region.

These nine points make up a whole.

PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT TWO-POINT CLARIFICATION GIVEN ON FEBRUARY 2, 1972 [EXCERPT]

. . . While resolutely fighting against U.S. aggression, the Vietnamese people have always shown their good will and desire to settle peacefully the Vietnam problem. Their negotiating position, the most reasonable and logical one, designed to bring about genuine peace and independence, has been given a full expression in the seven-point solution put forward on July 1, 1971, by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, and in the nine-point proposal made on June 26, 1971, by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Proceeding from the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam wishes to elaborate on the two key problems in the seven-point solution to stop the U.S. war of aggression, and to put a complete end to the "Vietnamization" policy as follows:

1—Regarding the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the cessation of the U.S. air war and all U.S. military activities in Vietnam.

The U.S. Government must stop its air war and all military activities in Vietnam, rapidly and completely withdraw all U.S. troops, advisers, military personnel, weapons and war materials and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp from South Vietnam and dismantle the U.S. military bases in South Vietnam.

The U.S. Government must set a specific terminal date for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. troops, advisers, military personnel, weapons and war materials and those of the other foreign countries in [the] U.S. camp from South Vietnam without posing any condition whatsoever. This specific terminal date will also be the date for the release of all military men of the parties and of the civilians captured in the war (including the U.S. pilots captured in North Vietnam).

2—Regarding the political problem in South Vietnam.

The U.S. Government must really respect the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, put an end to all interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam.

Nguyen Van Thieu and his machine of oppression and constraint, instruments of the U.S. "Vietnamization" policy, constitute the main obstacle to the settlement of the political problem in South Vietnam. Therefore, Nguyen Van Thieu must resign immediately, the Saigon administration must end its warlike policy,

disband at once its machine of oppression and constraint against the people, stop its "pacification" policy, disband the concentration camps, set free those persons arrested on political grounds and guarantee to the people the democratic liberties as provided for by the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam.

After the above has been achieved, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam will immediately discuss with the Saigon administration the formation of a three-segment government national concord with a view to organizing general elections in South Vietnam, to elect a constituent assembly, work out a constitution, and set up the definitive government of South Vietnam. The general elections will be held according to procedures agreed upon among the political forces in South Vietnam so as to ensure effectively free, democratic and fair character.

Agreement on the above two key problems will make it easy to resolve the other problems with a view to ending the war, and restoring peace in Vietnam. For its part, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam is prepared to negotiate an overall solution for the purpose of signing a comprehensive agreement.

If the U.S. Government really wants a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem, it must respond to the seven-point solution whose two key problems have been elaborated above, and it must engage in serious negotiations at the Paris conference on Vietnam. . . .

LETTER FROM MME. NGUYEN THI BINH TO U.S. CONGRESS, APRIL 20, 1972[1]

The honourable members of the U.S. Congress.

In the capacity of one of the leaders of the National Front for Liberation and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, I wish to write to you, on the present, extremely serious situation in Vietnam, a situation that concerns both our peoples and our countries.

For more than 3 years now, President Nixon has been making repeated promises to the American people about "U.S. disengagement" in Vietnam, but he has actually prolonged and expanded the war throughout Indochina and is dangerously intensifying the hostilities.

After pouring over 6 million tons of bombs and shells on our land since he took office, President Nixon is sending B–52 bombers, tactical aircraft and warships to release everyday thousands of tons of bombs and shells on North and South Vietnam, indiscriminately killing Vietnamese women and children. Going even farther than Mr. Johnson, President Nixon has ordered B–52's to bomb Hanoi, Haiphong and other populous areas of North Vietnam. Mr. Nixon said that such actions were necessary to "protect the lives of the American troops" and "to defend the self-determination" of the South Vietnamese people. In fact, he has thrown in the material strength and the honour of the United States in an attempt to maintain Nguyen Van Thieu, a hated U.S. agent whose immediate resignation is firmly demanded by the South Vietnamese people, and to preserve a regime which is symbolized by "tiger-cage" jail-cells built with the American people's money. This is what Mr. Nixon calls his policy of "Vietnamization" of the war.

For many years the American people have been deceived by the successive administrations in Washington about what was happening in Vietnam. The resolution on the so-called "Tonkin Gulf incident" allowed the Johnson administration to introduce over half a million U.S. troops to South Vietnam and to bomb North Vietnam. What did all this lead to? At present, by repeating about the so-called "invasion by North Vietnam", Mr. Nixon wants the United States to live again the same old tragedy, to embark on the path of new military adventures, to cause savage destructions and killings to a country whose people have done no harm whatsoever to the United States and its people.

I can assure you that, no matter to what level Mr. Nixon escalates the war, he cannot retrieve his "Vietnamization" policy from bankruptcy, nor can he prevent the South Vietnamese people from achieving their genuine independence, freedom and self-determination. The only thing Mr. Nixon can do is to pile up crimes that are unbearable to any person of conscience throughout the world and that further smear the honour of the United States.

---

[1] North Vietnamese broadcast, Apr. 26, 1972.

According to the U.S. Constitution, the Congress has the power to decide on the question of war and peace. Therefore, I urge you to stop President Nixon in taking an adventurous path fraught with unpredictable consequences.

What do we want? In July 1971, I presented to the Paris conference on Vietnam a peace plan, of which the two crucial questions have been further clarified in February 1972. The plan is more than explicit: The American Government should withdraw all its forces within a determined period. We are prepared to ensure full safety for such a withdrawal. We do not compel the U.S. to accept the Provisional Revolutionary Government, but on the other hand, we will not allow the U.S. Government to impose upon us the U.S.-created Thieu administration. We stand for the formation in South Vietnam of a completely new government, truly and widely representative of the South Vietnam people regardless of their political tendencies and religious beliefs. That government will organize general elections with all necessary measures to ensure their democratic and free character, so that the South Vietnam people may decide themselves their own political system. We advocate an independent, peaceful and neutral South Vietnam. We hold that the peaceful reunification of Vietnam should be carried out step by step, on [words indistinct] of agreement between the two zones north and south. If an agreement is reached on these questions at the Paris conference on Vietnam the [words indistinct] be rapidly [words indistinct] captured servicemen of both sides will return soon to their homes. After the end of the war, we want to establish friendly relations with the United States on the basis of equality and mutual interest.

Is that a demand of "capitulation" from the United States, or a desire to "turn South Vietnam communist", or a demand that the U.S. "abandon its ally", as Mr. Nixon pretends to the American public to justify his escalation of the war? Our people are acting just as all self-respecting people would do when a foreign country drops millions of tons of bombs over them to impose upon them a regime of its creation.

There is no other solution to the South Vietnam problem than that the Nixon administration should stop its intensification of the war in South Vietnam, end its escalation of the air war against North Vietnam, and resume the work of the Paris conference with a real desire to negotiate.

I am firmly confident that justice will overcome cruelty, and truth will overcome fallacy. Please accept, ladies and gentlemen, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[signed] Nguyen Thi Binh, member of Central Committee of the NFL, foreign minister of the PRG of the Republic of South Vietnam.

Mme. Binh Receives Bella Abzug, Patsy Mink on 21 April

Liberation Radio [Clandestine] in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 1400 GMT 24 Apr 72 B

[Text] Minister Nguyen Thi Binh, head of the PRGRSV delegation to the Paris conference, on 21 April 1972, received Mrs. Bella Abzug, representative, Democrat, of New York, and Mrs. Patsy Mink, representative, Democrat of Hawaii.

The two representatives expressed indignation at the new bombings by the U.S. Government of both zones of Vietnam, particularly of Hanoi and Haiphong, and promised that they would step up their activities in the U.S. Congress to demand that the Nixon administration bring all U.S. troops home, end the bombing of North and South Vietnam, and resume the Paris conference on Vietnam.

Minister Nguyen Thi Binh clearly expounded the PRGRSV's stand at the Paris conference on Vietnam and stressed the South Vietnamese people's determination to defeat the U.S. Vietnamization of the war policy and make available the Vietnamese people's basic rights. Minister Nguyen Thi Binh cordially invited the two American women to dinner. The meeting took place in a friendly and understanding atmosphere.

Provisional Revolutionary Government Statement on Ending the War, September 11, 1972 [Excerpt] [1]

A correct political solution to the Vietnam problem must affirm the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights and the South Vietnamese people's right to

[1] Hanoi Radio, Sept. 11, 1972.

effective self-determination, and proceed from the present realities in South Vietnam. This reality is the existence of the people's power and armed forces which are developing in a victorious fight against the U.S. imperialist aggressors and their lackeys, whereas the Saigon stooge administration is a mere instrument of the U.S. imperialist aggressors, and is in a losing position, a position in which it is going down the slope.

Having at heart peace, independence and national concord, and responding to the peace aspirations of the world's peoples, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam has put forward the 7-point solution, the two key issues of which have been elaborated. Its negotiating position is: The United States, being the aggressor, must end its aggression, scrupulously respect the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights, and the South Vietnamese people's right to settle themselves their own affairs without any foreign interference, in keeping with the actual situation now obtaining in South Vietnam.

The Provisional Revolutionary Government has proposed the formation of a provisional three-segment government of national concord which is to comprise people from the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, people from the Saigon administration, and representatives of other political forces in South Vietnam, including those who, for political reasons, have to live abroad. The three segments in that government will be in equal strength and on an equal footing. The Provisional Revolutionary Government and the Saigon administration without Nguyen Van Thieu will each appoint its people to participate in the government of national concord. The appointment of people belonging to the third segment will be made through consultations.

The broad segments of public opinion support the seven points of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, the two key questions of which have been elaborated. They regard them as a fair solution guaranteeing lasting peace in Vietnam, and making it possible for the United States to get out of the Vietnam war in honour. President Nixon's claims that the U.S. negotiating terms are "very generous" and that the negotiating position of the Provisional Revolutionary Government is tantamount to "imposing a communist regime" on South Vietnam are nothing but shameless tricks to fool public opinion and conceal the dark designs of the present U.S. administration to maintain in office the stooge administration and to pursue the war in South Vietnam.

Should the U.S. Government really respect the South Vietnamese people's right of self-determination and seriously negotiate to peacefully settle the South Vietnam problem, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam is prepared to reach agreements to the effect that neither a communist regime nor a U.S.-stooge regime shall be imposed on South Vietnam. It is prepared to accept a provisional government of national concord that shall be dominated by neither side.

The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam solemnly declares as follows:

If a correct solution is to be found to the Vietnam problem, and a lasting peace ensured in Vietnam, the U.S. Government must meet the two following requirements:

1—To respect the Vietnamese people's right to true independence and the South Vietnamese people's right to effective self-determination; stop the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam, the bombing, mining and blockade of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; completely cease the "Vietnamization" policy; and all U.S. military activities in South Vietnam; rapidly and completely withdraw all U.S. troops, advisors, military personnel, technical personnel, weapons and war materials and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp from South Vietnam; liquidate the U.S. military bases in South Vietnam; end all U.S. military involvement in Vietnam; and stop supporting the Nguyen Van Thieu stooge administration.

2—A solution to the internal problem of South Vietnam must proceed from the actual situation that there exist in South Vietnam two administrations, two armies, and other political forces. It is necessary to achieve national concord. The sides in South Vietnam must unite on the basis of equality, mutual respect and mutual nonelimination. Democratic freedoms must be guaranteed to the people. To this end, it is necessary to form in South Vietnam a provisional government of national concord with three equal segments to take charge of the affairs in the period of transition and to organise truly free and democratic general elections.

So long as the U.S. imperialist aggressors continue the war and maintain

the Saigon stooge administration, the South Vietnamese people along with their beloved northern countrymen, acting upon the testament of the venerated President Ho Chi Minh, will resolutely fight on, until the yankees quit and the puppets topple. The Vietnamese people are resolved to fight on shoulder to shoulder with the fraternal peoples of Cambodia and Laos, and completely defeat the U.S. imperialist aggressors, and cause the "Nixon doctrine" to go bankrupt in Indochina. The bombs and shells, the insolent threats, the perfidious political and diplomatic manoeuvres of the U.S. imperialists cannot possibly conquer the Vietnamese people; instead, they will only serve to deepen their hatred and increase their resolve to fight and to win.

Bringing into play the national traditions of heroism, the armed forces and people of South Vietnam are determined to march forward in the flush of victory, and emulate one another in wiping out the enemy and achieving exploits, so as to defeat the "Vietnamization" policy, to smash all hysterical military adventures of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, score still greater successes, and proceed to win total victory. With indefectible loyalty, the south is determined to keep its vow that for each U.S. encroachment on the north, the South Vietnam armed forces and people will punish them with five, ten times stronger blows.

Over the past 10 years and more, under the pretense of defending "the interests of the United States," "the people's right to self-determination," "world peace," the U.S. administrations have deliberately concealed the root cause and true nature of the Vietnam war. But through the Pentagon's "secret papers" and the so-called "Tonkin Gulf incident," it has been clear that these are but deceptive contentions. The Vietnamese people believe that the American people will not allow the Nixon administration to carry on the "Vietnamization" policy under cover of hypocritical claims about bringing home all U.S. "prisoners," defending the honour of the United States, etc. It is not to protect the lives of the captured U.S. servicemen, but rather to save the corrupt stooge clique in South Vietnam that the United States has lost tens of thousands more killed and hundreds of thousands more disabled in Vietnam over the past 4 years or so. If the Vietnamese people have fought a protracted fight and accepted countless sacrifices and destructions, this is to gain independence, freedom, peace, and not to humiliate anybody. If the present U.S. administration ends the war of aggression, withdraws all U.S. troops, ceases all military involvement in Vietnam, stops supporting the Saigon stooge administration, and lets the South Vietnamese people form a three-segment government of national concord, this will bring about an early release of all captured U.S. servicemen and an early restoration of peace in Vietnam.

The Vietnamese people believe that for the sake of national independence, peace and justice, the world's peoples will not allow the U.S. imperialists to continue their war of aggression, carry out the "Nixon doctrine" in Vietnam, and then extend it to the whole world. The people's movement in support of the Vietnamese people's just struggle is gaining in strength and scope in various countries. This shows that progressive mankind is resolutely opposing the U.S. imperialists' attempts to use their great armed forces and modern weapons to do away with the right of a nation to live in independence, freedom and peace.

The National Front for Liberation and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam express their sincere and deep gratitude to the governments and peoples of peace and justice-loving countries, the American people, the international democratic organizations, the forces of peace and progress in the world, and call on all brothers and friends to urge the Nixon administration to end its war of aggression in Vietnam, as well as in Laos and Cambodia, withdraw all U.S. troops from South Vietnam, cease all U.S. air and naval attacks in the two zones of Vietnam and the mining and blockade of North Vietnam, put an end to all U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, stop supporting the Saigon stooge administration, and let the South Vietnamese people form a three-segment government of national concord.

The South Vietnamese people's struggle against U.S. aggression, for national salvation is bound to end in glorious victory.

Speech to Parliament by Premier Lon Nol, January 28, 1973

[Text] My homage to the two samdech supreme patriarchs, mister chairman of the Senate, mister chairman of the National Assembly, ladies and gentlemen:

The hostilities in various battlefields of the Indochina peninsula will be stopped by the cease-fire agreement just signed by the United States and other warring

parties. The Khmer Republic, a peace-aspiring country, gleefully welcomes this event and demands that the settlement principle upon which this agreement is based be further strengthened in the future by good will for its implementation. The Khmer Republic emphasizes that the groundless war which has caused havoc and suffering of all kinds to the Cambodian people ever since they founded the republic was provoked by the aggression of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Since 29 March 1970, the North Vietnamese-Viet Cong forces, illegally based on Cambodian territory, began attacks against the Cambodian people and the less numerous, poorly equipped and badly trained Cambodian armed forces. In this case, North Vietnam enfringed upon the sovereignty, neutrality and territorial integrity of the Cambodian nation and encroached upon the 1954 Geneva agreement which guaranteed these assets, despite the fact that this country was one of the agreement signatories. North Vietnam must bear total responsibility for the deaths and destruction inflicted by its multi-division armed forces on the Cambodian people.

The above-mentioned cease-fire agreement must put an end to all these acts of aggression and must order these forces to immediately withdraw from Cambodian soil. As a contribution to and support for the restoration of peace in the Indochinese Peninsula, the government and people of the Khmer Republic express heartfelt welcome to the achievement of this agreement. However, they solemnly declare that in parallel with this agreement the Cambodian Government and people demand that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam cease its aggression and respect the 1954 Geneva convention on Cambodia. *Therefore, we Cambodian people request that the North Vietnamese aggressors and their Viet Cong lackeys lay down their weapons and immediately pull out of Cambodian territory.* We forbid all arms caches and sanctuaries and all military bases or other strategic installations on our land. We demand that these persons immediately stop their sabotage and any destructive activities against the lives and property of our people as well as immediately cease their subversion and all kinds of interference in our internal affairs. We declare that the Khmer Republic will remain under the control of the 1954 Geneva agreement which guaranteed our country's independence, sovereignty, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity. We demand that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam—which is now calling for the application of the Geneva agreement, too, so that its rights over Vietnam are respected—scrupulously respect this agreement itself regarding the rights of other peoples in countries other than Vietnam. The Cambodians are sovereign, independent and neutral people. They desire to live in their chosen ways and institutions. They absolutely do not tolerate foreign interference in their own business. They can never accept any disregard for their territorial integrity and insist on strict fulfillment of promises contained in international agreements. The Cambodians always desire to coexist peacefully with all countries, without ideological or social discrimination. The cease-fire in Vietnam compels the North Vietnamese-Viet Cong aggressors to cease their illegal activities in the Khmer Republic which they have used as a shelter and base for their attacks against neighboring countries.

We declare that the following acts will be regarded as an encroachment upon the spirit and principle of the newly made cease-fire agreement:

1—All military offensive operations that may be launched by the North Vietnamese-Viet Cong forces on the Cambodian territory after the cease-fire;

2—Refusal to withdraw the Vietnamese-Viet Cong troops from Cambodian territory or disintegration of and disguising these forces as civilians living among our people;

3—Clandestine use of certain regions of our territory as passageways;

4—Caches of arms as well as preservation of military bases or other strategic installations on our territory;

5—All kinds of sabotage, destruction of lives and property of the Cambodian people, as well as all sorts of subversion and interference in our internal affairs.

By virtue of the 1954 Geneva agreement, we are legitimately and entirely entitled to reoccupy our territory which has been illegally controlled by the North Vietnamese-Viet Cong. Therefore, in order to permit the North Vietnamese-Viet Cong troops to withdraw from our territory within the shortest delay, we affirm that as of Monday, 29 January 1973, at 0700 Phnom Penh time all units of the National Cambodian Armed Forces will suspend all offensives and transform these war activities into a drive to contact the people and to assure their

security. Any impediment against this move of our armed forces which affects the positions of our armed forces can occur only from infringement upon these rules. Whosoever so does must bear complete responsibility for all consequences. We will always maintain the rights of legal self-defense by continuing our self-defense operations across our country. We appeal to the International Control and Supervisory Commission, all signatory parties of the present cease-fire agreement, the United Nations and all justice- and peace-loving countries to help us defend the territorial integrity of our fatherland and help us defend our legal rights in our capacity as an independent and sovereign nation by demanding that the application of this agreement be correctly and thoroughly made. We hope that the present cease-fire agreement will bring about peace in the entire Indochinese peninsula and in the whole region of Southeast Asia. Based on our own experiences, we believe that the good will of the signatory parties of the cease-fire agreement alone is insufficient to preserve a lasting peace. In this case, all friendly countries should help supervise the implementation of this agreement by forcing the parties concerned to strictly respect it, and especially, should keep enough troops in this region to prevent any aggressor from nurturing an attempt to fight the others.

In conclusion, we solemnly declare that the Khmer Republic is always ready to establish friendly relations with every country without discrimination on condition that countries respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Khmer Republic.

STATEMENT BY PRINCE SIHANOUK, JANUARY 29, 1973

[Text] Peking, 29 Jan.—by Pierre Comparet—Prince Norodom Sihanouk Monday evening announced that during the next few days the National United Front of Cambodia [NUFC] and Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia [RGNUC] will analyze the situation resulting from the Paris-reached U.S.-Vietnamese agreement and reexamine the attitudes adopted by the NUFC and RGNUC.

In an exclusive interview granted to the AFP correspondent, Sihanouk declared that the Cambodian resistance did not intend to modify its basic goals, which still consist of getting rid of Lon Nol and putting an end to American neocolonialism, but to express their attitude so as to meet with the world's understanding and approval. "We do not want to be considered as warmongers or to be accused of endeavoring to worsen the conflict in Indochina," Sihanouk declared.

He said that his government would never hesitate to hold talks with the United States—without promises or preconditions—on the peace to prevail in Cambodia. He proposed that unofficial U.S.-RGNUC talks be held, followed by a bilateral conference if the preliminary talks were successful. Sihanouk declared that there now exists an international movement directed at "including us to participate in a tripartite RGNUC-U.S.-Lon Nol government conference." He said that two countries originated this movement, namely the United States and France but that he rejected such a formula. Sihanouk said it would be erroneous to draw any comparisons between South Vietnam and Cambodia. "In South Vietnam there traditionally exists a government in Saigon and there is also a second government born in the jungle: the Provisional Revolutionary Government. Insofar as Cambodia is concerned, I represent the legality while Lon Nol is but a traitor. We cannot accept a solution identical to that which was reached for South Vietnam," the Prince said.

Sihanouk said he met Saturday with Premier Chou En-lai. "If China continues to give us its full support," Sihanouk declared, " and if the United States violates the Paris agreement by continuing its arms supplies to Lon Nol, China will reserve the right not only to help us but also to send arms by air to the Cambodian liberation forces."

Sihanouk declared that it was necessary to reexamine the attitudes adopted by RGNUC and NUFC "because our friends told us that our adversaries are accusing us of bellicosity at a time when peace is being built and—should our motives be misinterpreted—we could find ourselves isolated while Lon Nol launched its peace campaign." And the Prince added: "Lon Nol has no other al-

ternative but to display pacifist intentions because he could do nothing without the air cover the United States had difficulties in granting him. But Lon Nol demonstrated his bellicosity by appealing to the U.S. armed forces."

Sihanouk said that it was without great hopes that he proposed bilateral contacts with the United States because the U.S. Government was no more inclined to abandon Lon Nol than Thieu. "But we make the proposal to demonstrate our good will," the Prince said. He added that the attitude adopted by the Cambodian resistance, which is operating in the interior, will prevail over the intended reexamining of the situation. Finally, he pointed out that should this reexamination not be concluded before the end of his forthcoming visit in Hanoi, no joint declaration would be issued following his visit to the DRV.

STATEMENT BY SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT IN EXILE, JANUARY 29, 1973

On 26 January 1973 the traitors' clique of Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, and Son Ngoc Thanh boasted about a supposed suspension of offensive operations by their mercenaries as of 29 January 1973.

Everyone knows that since the debacle of its military operation Chenla 11 at the end of 1971, the traitors' clique of Lon Nol, Sirik Matak and Son Ngoc Thanh has been irremediably driven on the defensive and that, despite U.S. air cover, the Cambodian people and CPNLAF since that date have launched crushing, sustained general offensives in all fields against the regime of the fascist clique, casting it into defeat and total collapse in all domains.

The CPNLAF has liberated more than 85 percent of the territory with over 5 million people of the total of 7 million people in Cambodia. The traitors are hiding in a few enclaves which are being relentlessly harassed by the CPNLAF. The capital, Phnom Penh, where NUFC organizations are particularly active and constantly assert their presence with resounding actions, is totally isolated. It is experiencing a shortage of rice and food, and the people are struggling more fiercely against the fascist and rotten regime of the traitors, who are becoming more isolated with each passing day and who survive only thanks to massive U.S. aid. Support for the traitors in the international arena is decreasing, whereas the prestige of the NUFC and RGNUC is continuously increasing. No force can ever extricate the traitors' clique of Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, and Son Ngoc Thanh from this deep impasse. Therefore, the boastings on 26 January 1973 about a supposed suspension of offensive operations by this clique are nothing more than a gross attempt to cover up its total incapacity to launch an offensive to try to remedy its situation of defeat. They are also a perfidious maneuver to deceive world opinion with regard to its so-called desire for peace.

The fascist, militarist regime of the traitorous Phnom Penh clique is merely the product of the antinational, antipeople 18 March 1970 coup d'etat and a sordid, bloody tool of the U.S. neocolonialist policy of aggression in Cambodia. The Cambodian people have drawn once and for all a sharp delineation between the patriotic forces joined with the NUFC and the handful of criminal traitors who have massacred tens of thousands of Cambodians and destroyed all the achievements of 16 years of peace. Therefore, no compromise is possible between the NUFC and the traitorous clique.

Since independence 16 years ago, the peace-loving Cambodian people have actively fought against all U.S. maneuvers and plots in order to preserve their country's policy of independence, peace, and neutrality. More than anyone, they appreciate the benefits of this policy. However, peace is lasting and just only if it is linked to liberty, honor, and national unity.

Such a peace will be restored in Cambodia only when all the objectives of the Cambodian people's struggle are realized, that is, after the total, definitive, unconditional cessation of bombing and strafing by U.S. aircraft and all other acts of aggression, the withdrawal from Cambodia of all military and civilian personnel of the U.S. and its satellite, the cessation of all U.S. support and aid to the fascist Phnom Penh regime, and the total elimination of the entire traitors' clique of Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, and Son Ngoc Thanh, thus permitting NUFC and RGNUC, once installed in Phnom Penh, to build an independent, sovereign, peaceful, neutral, democratic and prosperous Cambodia on the basis of territorial integrity, in conformity with the solemn 27 March 1970 statement of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, head of state and NUFC chairman, and with the NUFC political program.

The Cambodian people's just struggle for national salvation under NUFC and RGNUC leadership is making an important contribution to the common struggle of the peace, justice and freedom-loving people throughout the world against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. From the Vietnamese, Lao, Chinese, Korean and all other peoples of the world, including the American people, it enjoys firm and active support and multifarious aid for which NUFC and RGNUC express once again their profound gratitude. The Cambodian people are confident that, thanks to their unity, their unshakable determination, and this international aid, their just and noble struggle will certainly triumph.

NORTH VIETNAMESE STATEMENT ON CAMBODIA, JANUARY 30, 1973

[Text] At a time when all progressive mankind is displaying the highest elation and enthusiastically hailing our people's great victory won through the signing of the agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam, in Phnom Penh, a helpless and isolated island in the middle of the impenetrable siege of the Cambodian revolution, the U.S. puppet reactionaries have not stopped uttering strange discordant allegations and vile slanders against our people. On 27 and again on 28 January, puppet president Lon Nol in messages over Phnom Penh radio distorted the spirit and letter of the 27 January 1973 Paris agreement, brazenly slandered the DRV and the PRGRSV by claiming that they have committed aggression against Cambodia, and demanded that our people put an end to this so-called aggression.

This is indeed a brazen act of changing white to black, and an evil trick designed to cover up the U.S. imperialists' aggression in that country. The American lackeys in Phnom Penh, however, have acted in vain. The actual situation in Cambodia has completely refuted their distorting allegations and vile slanders.

For a long time now the whole world has clearly known that it is the U.S. imperialists who have intervened in and invaded Cambodia and the other countries in Indochina. It was the U.S. imperialists who instigated the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak lackeys to stage the reactionary coup d'etat on 18 March 1970 against the Cambodian people in an attempt to eliminate Cambodia's independence and turn this country into a new-type U.S. colony and a springboard against the resistance of the Vietnamese and Lao peoples. The whole world knows very well that it was precisely the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh clique which let the wolf enter the house by bringing U.S.-Saigon puppet troops into Cambodia to ravage its land, causing untold misery and death to its people.

This challenge by the country-stealers and country-sellers promptly met with the Cambodian people's strong answer. Under the leadership of the National United Front of Cambodia, headed by Samdech Head of State Norodom Sihanouk as chairman, and of the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (RGNUC), headed by Samdech Penn Nouth as prime minister and Mr. Khieu Samphan as deputy prime minister, the Cambodian people have waged an extremely valiant struggle against the U.S. imperialist aggressors and their lackeys to liberate their fatherland and have registered one brilliant victory after another in all fields—military, political and diplomatic.

The Cambodian armed forces and people have been continuously strengthening their position of initiative and offensive, stepping up their people's war, pushing the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh clique back toward their den in Cambodia, and inflicting upon the enemy troops heavy and disastrous defeats, particularly in the case of the failure of the Chen La II military operation, which represented the utmost effort of the U.S.-Phnom Penh puppets in their Khmerization of the war plan.

The prestige of the Cambodian revolution has been steadily enhanced. Many personalities, intellectuals, monks and patriotic militarymen have left the zone temporarily under the control of the enemy to join the liberated zone and to directly participate in the war of resistance. Many groups of peasants and farmers have bravely crossed enemy lines or left concentration camps and returned to their liberated native lands.

On the international stage, the prestige of the Cambodian revolution has also steadily risen. Over 30 countries have established diplomatic relations with the RGNUC. The fact that the conference of the foreign ministers of nonalined nations held in Georgetown in August 1972 recognized the RGNUC delegation

as an official member of the conference constituted convincing proof of the considerable prestige of the just and victorious struggle of the Cambodian people. On the contrary, the fact that the delegation of the Phnom Penh puppet regime was not allowed to participate in the same international conference also showed very clearly the highly isolated position of the U.S.-puppets on the international stage.

Resorting to vile accusations against our people, the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh clique has striven to cover up the above-mentioned irrefutable facts involving Cambodia and the U.S. war of aggression against that country. At the same time, they have also tried to hide their country-selling crimes. However, the more they accuse others and distort the truth, the more they will expose their true features to public opinion at home and abroad. Despite the fact that it has been dolled up by every possible means by its American masters and nurtured with dollars and weapons, the corpse of the so-called Khmer Republic has come to its last gasps.

Our people are resolutely determined to reject the above-mentioned slanderous and vile arguments of the Lon Nol clique, and they demand that the Americans end all of their involvement in Cambodia and respect the fundamental national rights of the Cambodian people as the 27 January 1973 Paris agreement has stipulated. The people and Government of the DRV have always respected the fundamental national rights of the Cambodian people, that is, the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Cambodia. Our stand is unchanged.

All of the slanderous arguments and vile tricks of the Phnom Penh puppets against the Vietnamese people will end in pitiful bankruptcy, as will their acts in serving as U.S. lackeys.

North Vietnamese Statement on Cambodia on the Cambodian Problem, February 1, 1973

On 26 January 1973, Samdech Head of State Norodom Sihanouk, chairman of the National United Front of Cambodia (NUFC), and Samdech Premier Penn Nouth and Vice Premier Khieu Samphan, on behalf of the NUFC and the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (RGNUC), issued a statement clearly defining their correct position on Cambodia on the occasion of their hailing the agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam. On 28 January 1973, Messrs Khieu Samphan, Hon Youn and Hu Nim—three ministers representing the interior part of the RGNUC—also issued a statement reasserting this position on Cambodia.

The statements clearly pointed out that the Cambodian people have always desired to live in peace and to adhere to their peaceful and neutral line, which has enjoyed extremely great sympathy and support from people the world over. However, the U.S. imperialists and the reactionary Lon Nol-Sirik Natak-Son Ngoc Thanh clique carried out a coup dietation 18 March 1970, eliminating Cambodia's indepedence, peace and neutrality.

The Cambodian people have had to stand up to struggle (?to wrest back) peace with independence, sovereignty and true freedom for Cambodia. But the U.S. imperialists have refused to give up their dark design of aggression against Cambodia and, furthermore, have entertained the scheme of destroying the liberated area and massacring the Cambodian people.

The statements issued on 26 January 1973 and on 28 January 1973 by the RGNUC exposed the just nature of the Cambodian people's anti-U.S. national salvation struggle and their correct stand, that is, that the Cambodian problem should be solved in keeping with the 23 March 1970 five-point declaration of Samdech Head of State Norodom Sihanouk with a view to building Cambodia as an independent, peaceful, neutral, democratic and prosperous country with unity and territorial integrity.

To proceed toward restoring peace throughout Indochina, the Vietnamese people and the DRV Government are resolved to support this just struggle and correct stand of the Cambodian people. The United States should respect the Cambodian people's basic national rights. Cambodia's internal affairs should be settled by the Cambodian people themselves without foreign interference. Samdech Head of State Norodom Sihanouk is the representative of the legitimacy, genuineness and continuity of the Cambodian state. The RGNUC with Samdech Penn Nouth as premier and Mr. Khieu Samphan as vice premier, is the sole legitimate and genuine government of the Cambodian people.

The Vietnamese people firmly believe that the just struggle of the valiant Cambodian people, under the leadership of the NUFC and the RGNUC, as well as the just struggle of the valiant Lao people, under the leadership of the NLHS, will certainly achieve glorious victories.

The fate of the three Indochinese peoples will always be closely linked. The love between Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos has been built up with blood in the course of the long struggle against the common enemy for the sake of the independence and freedom of each country.

Loyal to the joint declaration of the Indochinese peoples' summit conference, the Vietnamese people and the DRV Government are unswervingly determined to intensify solidarity with the fraternal Cambodian and Lao peoples to defeat all schemes of aggression of the U.S. imperialists, defend the basic national rights of the people of each country, and make the land of the three Indochinese countries really an independent and peaceful area.

ROYAL DECREE LISTS MEMBERS OF COALITION GOVERNMENT

Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao 1303 GMT 5 Apr 74

[Text] His Majesty the king has issued Royal Decree 90 dated 5 April appointing the Provisional National Union Government as follows:

1.	Prime Minister	Prince Souvanna Phouma
2.	Deputy prime minister and minister of education, fine arts, sports and youth	Phagna Leuan Insisiengmai
3.	Deputy prime minister and foreign affairs minister	Phagna Phoumi Vongvichit
4.	National defense minister	Tiao Sisouk na Champassak
5.	Finance Minister	Phagna Ngon Sananikon
6.	Interior and social welfare minister	Phagna Pheng Phongsavan
7.	Economy and planning minister	Sot Phetrasi
8.	Information, propaganda and tourism minister	Tiao Sonk Vongsak
9.	Justice minister	Phagna Khamking Souvanlasi
10.	Religious affairs minister	Maha Kou Saouvannamethi
11.	Public health minister	Phagna Khamphai Abhay
12.	Public works and transport minister	Gen Singkapo Chounlamany
13.	Posts and telecommunications minister	Phagna Kampheng Boupha
14.	Secretary of state for education, sports, youth and fine arts	Oun Neua Phimmason
15.	Secretary of state for foreign affairs	Chanthon Chantarasi
16.	Secretary of state for national defense	Gen Khamouan Boupha
17.	Secretary of state for finance	Boutsabong Souvannavong
18.	Secretary of state for interior	Col Deuan Sunnalat
19.	Secretary of state for economy and planning	Dr Somphou Oudomvilay
20.	Secretary of state for information, propaganda and tourism	Phagna Oudai Sonvannavong
21.	Secretary of state for justice	Somvang Sengsathit
22.	Secretary of state for religious affairs	Phagna Soukan Vilaysan
23.	Secretary of state for public health	Dr Khamlien Phonsena
24.	Secretary of state for public works and transport	Phagna Houmphan Saignasit
25.	Secretary of state for posts and telecommunications	Phagna Touby Ly Fung

In addition, his majesty the king has signed a royal decree appointing the National Coalition Political Council.

The important details of his majesty the king's speech delivered before the National Coalition Political Council [time not given] are as follows: [read by announcer]

Your Highnesses, members of the National Coalition Political Council: In proper implementation of the agreement signed by the two sides in Vientiane on 21 February 1973, the National Coalition Political Council is established today. I have the duty to appoint the council [words indistinct]. May the council's advice honorably respond to the unanimous desire and aim of creating the means to conduct activities in the Kingdom of Laos in accordance with the rules and

regulations of the constitution and within the spirit of reconciliation. [apparent end of speech]

The National Coalition Political Council comprises 42 personages with His Highness Prince Souphanouvong as chairman, Tiao Sisoumang Sisaleumsak as vice chairman and Phagna Khamsouk Keola as vice chairman and secretary general. There are 39 other members. The names of the council members will be announced later.

KING'S SPEECH ON PNUG

Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao 1201 GMT 5 Apr 74 D

[Text] This afternoon at the grand palace in Luang Prabang His Majesty King Sisavang Vatthana granted an audience to members of the new Provisional National Union Government in order to officially appoint the new government. On this occasion, His Majesty the King delivered the following speech [read by announcer]:

The Provisional National Union Government has been appointed in accordance with the royal decree dated 5 April. The members of this government are under the leadership of His Highness Prince Souvanna Phouma, who has patience, perseverance and ability. The restoration of peace and tranquility in the country will enable all people to properly conduct their lives in accordance with their own wishes, and will provide democratic freedoms within the limit of the constitution, independence and neutrality.

I express confidence in you all. I extend to you my best and sincere congratulations. May you all carry out your important tasks.

PNUG, NCPC MEMBERS TO GO TO VIENTIANE 6 APR

Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao 1215 GMT 5 Apr 74 D

[5 April announcement by the mayor of Vientiane—read by announcer]

[Text] It is announced to officials, soldiers, policemen, students, pupils and citizens that the members of the Provisional National Union Government, headed by His Highness Prince Souvanna Phouma, and the National Coalition Political Council, headed by His Highness Prince Souphanouvong, will return to Vientiane on 6 April at 0900. They have been graciously appointed to their posts by his majesty the king in a royal decree. An official reception will be held at Wattay Airport.

Vientiane, 5 April 1974

Phagna Songsavat Vongsavanthong, mayor of Vientiane.

LON NOL PROPOSES UNCONDITIONAL PEACE TALKS, JULY 9, 1974

Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0225 GMT 9 Jul 74 D

[Message to Cambodian nation by President Lon Nol, at 9 July Executive Council special work session at Chamcar Mon palace—recorded]

[Text] My homage to the samdech supreme patriarchs of the two Buddhist orders, dear compatriots:

A year ago, on 6 July 1973 to be precise, the minister of foreign affairs issued a six-point peace proposal of the Government of the Khmer Republic. This proposal clearly indicated our sincere desire to contribute to the settlement of the Cambodian problem through negotiations. A full year has elapsed since then. During this period, the enemy has made clear its categorical opposition to all peace initiatives, both on the military front and in various public statements. The enemy has persisted in causing suffering and misery for the innocent Cambodian people. The enemy's intention, as it has pointed out several times, is to achieve military victory. This is because the enemy is unable to win politically, since the Cambodian people living in the zone it controls have lost confidence and trust in it. The only possibility left for the enemy is to try to impose its will by force of arms and by denying our compatriots the right to choose freely a system of government and the right to practice freely their beloved and sacred religion.

Faced with this deplorable attitude, we are firmly convinced that there is only one way to make our enemy think about the search for peace: This is to prevent him from achieving a military victory. This we have done. Our forces have taken the initiative on various battlefields and achieved important results. At the same time, the Mekong and Tonle Sap rivers remain open to all traffic. Every provin-

cial capital that sustained attacks during the past dry season has successfully withstood all enemy offensives and inflicted considerable losses on the enemy. This development in the military situation must make the enemy understand that the path it is following can only lead to greater casualties among the Cambodian people and will certainly not lead to military victory, as the enemy believes.

For us, our main goal, both in the political and military fields, is to attain the final objective desired by our people and monks: peace. It is in continuation of our efforts toward our final goal that today, on behalf of the Government of the Khmer Republic, before the venerable samdech supreme patriarchs and before the eminent representatives of the Senate and National Assembly and high-ranking authorities of our Cambodian National Armed Forces, I make the following solemn statement: The Khmer Republic solemnly appeals to the Cambodians of the other side to prepare immediately for negotiations, without preconditions, at a place and on a date to be agreed by both sides, in order to seek a Cambodian solution to the current conflict. We hope, and we are confident that these negotiations will lead us to a solution that will bring about a cease-fire, withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodian territory, unity and national concord. All problems dividing Cambodians can be brought up for discussion. The Khmer Republic makes no preconditions to its desire to hold negotiations. The Khmer Republic solemnly appeals to all peace- and justice-loving countries to support Cambodians of all sides in order to help make possible negotiations between Cambodians. This new proposal is put forth in the hope of ending the suffering of the Cambodian people and with the aim of achieving a just and lasting peace guaranteeing the independence, neutrality and territorial integrity of our nation.

Text of Sihanouk Statement Rejecting Talks Offer

Cambodian Information Agency [Clandestine] in French to East Asia 1140 GMT 12 Jul 74

[Text] Cambodia, 12 Jul, AKI—On 10 July Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, chief of state and chairman of the NUFC, issued a statement in Peking, vigorously rejecting the fallacious proposal for holding negotiations and forming a government of national coalition put forth by the clique of traitor Lon Nol at the instigation of the U.S. imperialists. The statement also expressed the firm determination of the Cambodian people to fight to the end for the liberation of their fatherland. The text of the statement is as follows:

The U.S. Government headed by Richard Nixon has just ordered the so-called government of the so-called Khmer Republic in Phnom Penh to proclaim an offer of negotiation, reconciliation, peace and establishment of a Lao-type government of national coalition.

In this connection, in my capacity as the legal chief of state of Cambodia, recognized as such by the entire Cambodian resistance movement (including the Khmer Rouge, the most famous of whom is Khieu Samphan), and also officially recognized by 60 sovereign states in the world, I would like to give the following exact information to international opinion so that it will not be misled by the hypocritical, deceptive, shameless and cynical propaganda of U.S. imperialism of which the so-called Khmer Republic is a foul tool.

First, the NUFC, RGNUC and CPNLAF are not making war for the sake of war, but embody the Cambodian people's genuine, profound and unshakable desire for freedom, independence and nonalinement. They are forced to wage an extremely difficult armed struggle against the super powerful and super rich United States which, unprovoked by the people and Kingdom of Cambodia, has committed aggression and invaded and colonised them after organising the so-called republican coup d'etat of 18 March 1970.

Consequently, the armed struggle that the NUFC, RGNUC and CPNLAF have waged for more than 4 years is a sacred struggle of national salvation and national liberation. It is a national duty and not just an act of belligerency.

Second, international opinion should keep this crucial point of history in view: the sole abettor of war in Cambodia is U.S. imperialism. It and it alone has put an end since 1970 to the 16 years of peace in the Kingdom of Cambodia which, to that date, was called by all of the world people an oasis of peace in wartorn Indochina.

The aggression against the Kingdom of Cambodia by the United States has started since 18 March 1969.

In fact, exactly a year before the 18 March 1970 coup d'etat, U.S. President Richard Nixon ordered the U.S. Air Force based in South Vietnam to begin the bombing and strafing raids over the neutral Kingdom of Cambodia with the glaring double aim, on the one hand, of ruining the economy and finances of the anti-imperialist royal government, which made the mistake of daring to reject all U.S. aid since 1963 and, on the other hand, of causing the people of the bombed and strafed areas and the members of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces to lose confidence in Norodom Sihanouk's ability to defend the neutrality, sovereignty, peace and prosperity of the country.

On 16 March 1970 the (U.S.) CIA organized and . . . succeeded in the coup d'etat against Sihanouk and the independent and neutral Kingdom of Cambodia that U.S. imperialism has since changed into a "republic"—a satellite of "Washington"—and integrated it in the pro-imperialist and capitalist system of the so-called free world.

The Royal Cambodian Army, after being transformed into a "republican army" has been immediately used by the Americans to fight against the forces of the NFLSV operating against U.S. imperialism in the zones of South Vietnam adjoining the Cambodian border.

President Richard Nixon denied that his government was "behind" the 18 March 1970 coup d'etat. However, on 30 April 1970 he ordered 50,000 U.S. soldiers and 60,000 Saigon troops to invade Cambodia to save the Phnom Penh regime of the quisling (Lon Nol) from being defeated by the patriotic Cambodian people.

Between 1970 and 1973 the government of Washington used several groups of mercenaries and many foreign individuals (Thai, South Vietnamese, Lao, Taiwanese, Philippine and so on) to help the clique of traitor Lon Nol wage the war against the patriotic Cambodian people. These foreigners served either in the ground forces, the Marine Corps or the Air Force.

From 18 March 1970 to 15 August 1973 the U.S. Air Force stepped up the number and intensified the deadly, destructive firepower and violence of its raids in Cambodia. The acknowledged goal of these raids was to annihilate the resistance movement of the Cambodian people while completely destroying Cambodia for making the mistake of not following the Lon Nol clique on the path of national treason and treason to the idea of nonalinement of the Third World.

From 16 August 1973 up to now, the United States has pretended that it has no role in the Cambodian war because, as they say, this war has "become a pure civil war" pitting nobody else but the Cambodians against each other.

As far as the NUFC, RGNUC and CPNLAF are concerned, the affirmation by the Americans and their press saying that "the Khmer Rouge are fighting alone without the assistance of any Viet Cong or North Vietnamese combat unit" corresponds to the reality.

But so far as the "Lon Nol side" is concerned, such an affirmation about a "civil war" is absolutely incorrect. The truth is that the Americans continue to command and take a direct part in the Cambodian war. Therefore this war is not a "civil war," but a war of aggression and colonization against Cambodia by the United States.

According to an official confession of (U.S.) Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, the U.S. Air Force based in Thailand carried out nearly 700 flights every month to help, in various ways, the Lon Nol army to "contain" the assaults and offensives of the CPNLAF.

The U.S. Marines and the Saigon Marines help the "Lon Nol marine" to fight the CPNLAF and NUFC all along the Cambodian seacoast (blockade of the coast, occupation of coastal islands, transport of logistics, transport of Cambodian officers and American weapons, transport of war material and military personnel for coastal cities such as Kampot, Sihanoukville, and Kean that are besieged on land by the CPNLAF and so forth).

In the field of operations, several hundred U.S. officers are openly commanding "Lon Nol" units. As a matter of fact, according to the U.S. press itself, U.S. Ambassador John Gunther Dean is the supreme chief of general staff of the so-called Khmer Republic army.

On top of this we should point out the presence everywhere of CIA officers who, according to the U.S. press itself, are active in "Lon Nolite" provincial cities handling the (forcible) recruitment of young "cannonfodder" and their training, in the "secret war" against the patriots (war of the Hitlerite SS or Gestapo kind) and so on.

Finally, we should also mention the very important fact that the U.S. Congress itself is an accomplice of Richard Nixon by according to him massive credits (nearly $700 million per annum) to render viable the "Khmer Republic"—meaning U.S. neocolonialism set up in Phnom Penh and in one-tenth of Cambodia.

Thus, the key to war and peace in Cambodia is in the hands of the United States, aggressor against my country.

It would thus be insane to accuse the NUFC, RGNUC and GPNLAF or Sihanouk of refusing peace.

Peace? We demand no other than this, and immediately; but we would not accept a peace without returning 100 percent to Cambodia her freedom, sovereignty, national independence, territorial integrity, national unity and state unity.

We shall always categorically refuse an "American peace" which imposes partition of our country or a "government coalition" with the traitors (the quislings and the Pierre Laval's whom one would send to a firing squad but with whom one would never sit at a table of government or even a table of * * * negotiations).

The return of peace to Cambodia need not go through "negotiations" or an "international conference". This peace can be realized immediately: if the United States ceases to interfere in Cambodia's affairs and ceases to give military aid to the Lon Nol clique, this will suffice for the Cambodian problem to be solved ipso facto.

Third, the NUFC, RGNUC, GPNLAF and Norodom Sihanouk together embody the State of Cambodia, the state of independent and nonaligned Cambodia.

Indeed the U.S. press in particular and the press of the so-called "free" world in general call us "rebels".

We are not "rebels" for the double reason that, on the one hand, we embody the legal Government of Cambodia, the legal regime of the Kingdom of Cambodia illegally "deposed" from Phnom Penh by the (U.S.) CIA-paid lackeys, and, on the other hand, we are fighting not against a national government, for we are the national government, but against U.S. imperialism, which is a foreign power and which commits aggression against us and carries out an atrocious war of genocide without declaration of war and without any acceptable justification.

As for the "Khmer Republic" and the "Lon Nol-Long Boret government," what are they really?

The most recent, serious and thorough inquiries by the big U.S. press affirm that they have no popular basis and that they only exist and survive thanks to the United States.

These inquiries led us to establish the following most singular and astounding, but very precise fact: U.S. Ambassador John Gunther Dean, given "full powers" by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, is the absolute master of the so-called Khmer Republic. It is Dean who chose Long Boret as chief of the Phnom Penh "government". The "ministers" of this government are chosen by * * * Dean. It is also Dean who names various posts, praises or blames, moves or recalls, or retires the principal civilian and military figures of the "Khmer Republic". It was Dean who fired Cheng Heng (the No. 3 man of the regime at the beginning) from the High Political Council of this republic. It was Dean who replaced the High Political Council with a High Executive Council led by another favorite lackey of the Americans: ex-Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak. And finally, it was again Dean who, from the confession of some big Western press agencies themselves, fancied and decided to launch the new seemingly charming offensive in the form of the offer of a general reconciliation among Cambodians and peace in Cambodia accompanied by formation of a government of national coalition. [words indistinct] satellites of the United States. Nevertheless, the respective governments of these countries have some kind of personality, enjoy a certain degree of support of the people and know how to create a certain state sovereignty. But the so-called Khmer Republic is absolutely naked in the sense that it has no serious legal basis, enjoys no popular support (except for the support of rapacious persons and hooligans who make personal profit from it), is spat at by its own rightist youths and has no means to survive by itself.

This so-called republic claims to have under control a large territory of great economic significance and the majority of the Cambodian people. If it is so, why can it survive (and even so, very painstakingly) only thanks to the continued aid of the United States, Thailand, South Vietnam, South Korea, Taiwan, New Zealand, Japan and so on, not only in kind but also in rice, maize, meat, vegeta-

bles, fruit, tobacco, vegetable oil, cotton and so on—all agricultural products that the Kingdom of Cambodia produced and exported in large quantities and that the present Cambodia of the NUFC and RGNUC (representing nine-tenths of national territory) is producing in more than sufficient quantities for its own consumption and even for export to our neighbors and brothers of liberated South Vietnam and Laos?

The Khmer Republic thus has no legal or economic basis, nor any living territory; that is, a territory where the people can live normally while working and producing.

Therefore, it is a puppet, without soul and without life—a puppet of the United States. When one peace proposal or another seems to come from its mouth, in reality it only comes from the mouth of the U.S. Government, which shamelessly manipulates it.

I invite the latter to stop its hypocritical and cynical game and not to cowardly try to mislead international opinion by attempting to present white as black and black as white, i.e., that the NUFC, RGNUC, CPNLAF and Norodom Sihanouk are warmongers whereas Washington and Phnom Penh are pacifists and replete with good will.

On behalf of the NUFC, RGNUC and CPNLAF, I demand that the U.S. Government led by Richard Nixon unconditionally and immediately cease interfering in Cambodia's internal affairs and unconditionally and immediately dismantle the U.S. neocolonialist system established in Phnom Penh and several other Cambodian cities.

Failing this, the NUFC, RGNUC, CPNLAF and Norodom Sihanouk will fight the enemy to death. We shall never accept any compromise with the traitors, his [as received] despicable lackeys.

The patriotic Cambodian people entrust us with the sacred, historic task of carrying the struggle of (total) national liberation to the end. We will not fail in our solemn commitment. Whatever difficulties we meet in the future (for we do not forget that we have as an adversary the super-rich power in the world and the best "equipped," the most cruel, the most cynical, the most immoral and the most obstinate imperialism of all times) and even if we have to fight and suffer for 10 or 20 more years we will never go down on our knees. We will never accept an "American peace". We swear before history, we will certainly achieve the "Cambodian peace".

○